B 75 P 235.

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THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

EDITED BY

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GEORGE E. DAY, AND ARCHIBALD DUFF, JR.,
WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF
DR. J. P. THOMPSON, DR. D. W. SIMON.

VOL. XXXIV.

ANDOVER:
PUBLISHED BY WARREN F. DRAPER.
LONDON: TRÜBNER AND COMPANY.
1877.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1877, by
WARREN F. DRAPER,
In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.

ANDOVER:
PRINTED BY WARREN F. DRAPER.

PRESS, RAND, AVERY, & CO.

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ARTICLE I.

THE ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF GOD.

BY REV. GEORGE T. LADD, MILWAUKIE, WIS.

THE knowledge which the adult mind has, or thinks it has, of God is given in the form of a concept. The truth of this statement will doubtless be admitted by all — by those who accept the theory of an innate idea, as well as by those who refer all the elements of the concept, and also the act of combining these elements, to man's powers of observation and reasoning. Whether the concept contain some germ of knowledge or belief which, given with the original gift of the mind itself, unfolds as the mind unfolds, and gathers to itself, as it were, by accretion the other "marks" of the concept, may be, indeed, open to inquiry. We may also fairly question whether there be not some instinctive and constitutional cravings, which drive the mind to its act of conception. But a cognition so complex and shifting as that which answers to the word "God" in the ordinary experiences of the adult mind can never be looked upon otherwise than as the result of foregoing observation and reasoning. It is, therefore, a concept. A concept, however, is ordinarily considered as the sole product of the logical faculty. It is a product composed of more or fewer factors, gathered from several objects by abstraction, comparison, and reflection, and impressed by the intellect with the stamp of mental

unity. Logic is the science that deals with conception; the logicians own by native right all the concepts. But we cannot bring ourselves to believe that with the formation and criticism of this particular and somewhat peculiar concept the logical faculty alone is concerned.

Indeed, it is clear that none of the so-called concepts are formed or reproduced without contributions from many other parts of man's total nature than that which we in dialectics have exalted to the supremacy. In the process of knowledge as it takes place in real life, the centres of sensual impressions, the feelings, the moral faculties, and particularly the will, are no less active than the intellect. The product corresponds to the process. When the word which stands for and calls up the product of this process is pronounced, and by the soul attended to, the nerve-ganglia of vision and of the other senses, the instinctive or acquired emotions, volitions put forth to summon or to repress certain elements of the desired total, take part in the response which is given by the soul. Nor do we represent the true state of the soul fairly when we speak as though these activities of sense, feeling, and will must be transformed into terms of the intellect, and so submit to be *understood*, in order that the concept may do its proper work. The fact is, that much of the whole product is spoiled by the very effort to render it a purely intelligible and logical product. In the real life of the living man, those activities which are not intellectual and cannot be presented to the soul in terms of the intellect are as real and as potent elements as any. For instance, how little can analysis and verbiage do to set forth what goes on within some men's souls when they hear spoken the word "mother."

Let a man of symmetrical culture be asked to pronounce the Divine name, and, summoning all his powers, to observe as fully as possible what state of mind and heart is induced in response to the name. The effort to observe will mar the product which he wishes to make the object of his observation. The subsequent effort to describe his state of consciousness will be quite unsatisfactory, — indeed, will be

without power to represent adequately any of his experiences, — unless the descriptive words stir up in him to whom they are directed a corresponding condition not only of intellect, but of feeling and volition as well. But what will be the result of his observation of this his own highest concept? He will be likely to detect a certain instinctive use of the physical organs, such as accompanies, usually, if not universally, the effort to become clearly conscious of the indefinitely grand and sublime. There will be observed that full inspiration which is so vastly expressive, and which seems to give token that the brain, called upon for an unusual effort, demands an unusual supply of well aerated blood. There will, perhaps, be also observed that effort at an indefinite widening of the circle of vision which comes, customarily, when the mind strives after a sensuous representation of indefinite space; with a bowing of the head in the reverence of awe, or an uplifting of it in the reverence of confidence. Nor must it be thought that these physical concomitants are impotent factors in the whole to be realized, or unworthy of notice by one who wishes to understand his own conceptions. How natural and expressive these gestures and other physical phenomena are, how almost indispensable in attaining the highest possible result in consciousness, is made clearly apparent by the conduct of men in those semi-conscious states when the senses are partially dormant and the will has withdrawn its accustomed control. Of the hypnotized subject Dr. Garth Wilkinson says: "Raise his head while in prayer, and his lips pour forth exulting glorifications, as he sees heaven opened and the majesty of God raising him to his place. Then, in a moment, depress the head, and he is dust and ashes, an unworthy sinner, with the pit of hell yawning at his feet."

There will also be observed certain constituent elements of the concept which are furnished by the intellect, — the "marks," in logical parlance, of the concept, — some of which are themselves concepts, and others intuitions. Among such marks may be named those of power, unity, purity,

justice, love, causation, final purpose. The effort to bring some of these into consciousness with their fullest vigor of presentation will, it is likely, be made not without certain physical concomitants. Just as the notion of power is apt to be accompanied with the *nisus;* this *nisus* indicating that the force which originates with the will, and which gives us our point of starting in our proof for the reality of all force, is about to discharge itself in the movement of the bodily organs. There will be observed, also, arising into the conscious soul, certain emotions of awe, trust, fear, or answering love. And the whole will be moulded, in a measure, by the ever active volition of the observer, who, while he controls thought and feeling in order that he may observe them, also decides to a considerable extent what ones of the whole throng of impressions crowding their way into the sphere of consciousness shall submit to examination at all, what ones shall fall back into the darkness whence they came.

This view of the concept of God as a complex whole, to which the emotional as well as the intellectual makes its contributions, corresponds, I believe, to the truth of experience. The significance and potency of those elements of the whole which in order to be represented to the intellect must necessarily be totally changed are no less than of those elements which are primarily intellectual. As to this greatest of all concepts, the heart is in it, as well as the head. In it the heart is as trustworthy as the head. The heart has as good right to be heard as the head, and as good right to demand that the deliverances of the head shall be made to the heart in terms of emotion as the head has to claim that the deliverances of the heart shall be made to the head in terms of logic. Any perversion of feeling, conscience, or will is sure to detract important elements from the total product. This view of the nature of the concept corresponds, also, I believe, to the true view of its origin.

But our method of investigation must be more clearly defined. There are, we will say, three different methods of inquiring into the origin of our present knowledge of God.

One of these may be called the historic. It is the method of antiquarian research into man's early religious condition, and the method, as well, of him who studies in history the changes that the centuries bring to men's theological views. The second of these is the experimental or inductive. This method may engage itself with that more narrow observation of the phenomena of religious life which is open to every man; or it may go out into the world at large, and compare the present views of nations differing in situation, education, and inherited characteristics. Both of these two methods are pursued by the student of comparative theology. The third method we will call analytic, not because the other methods do not demand power of keen analysis, but because the third method demands little else. This method, with much distrust as to ability to cope with a theme so vast, but with confidence that our suggestions of truth will be found in the main true, we will follow. The investigation according to this method requires some analysis of the concept of God and of the complex faculties of man, with a view to show how the different elements of the former necessarily take their rise from, and correspond to, the latter. In this way man's whole nature is made responsible for, and is discovered to be consonant with, the revelation of God which is made within man. And when it is seen that the symmetrically cultured man is the proper organ for the reception of the truth concerning God, then it is also seen that any refusal to accept deliverances of this truth, or any marring of its fulness, testifies to weakness or disease in some part of the whole manhood, that is, in some part of the organ through which the truth is delivered.

Nothing is, however, more necessary, in the endeavor to understand how the concept under consideration originates, than to hold correct views of the entire relation of man to truth. The view which, if not held as a theory, is quite too frequently carried out in the practical search after knowledge seems to be this one — that truth is a product of mind wrought out by the skilful use of the ratiocinative faculties.

It follows, then, that the correct working of these faculties is almost the only important or necessary guarantee of truth. But it is not any lone faculty or set of faculties which is concerned in man's reception of truth. The truth becomes ours only as a gift from without. All truth is of the nature of a revelation, and demands that the organ through which the revelation is made should be properly adjusted. *The organ for the reception of truth is symmetrically cultured manhood, rightly correlated action, and balanced capabilities of man's different powers.* The attitude of him who would attain to truth is one of docility, of receptiveness, of control exercised upon all the powers of the soul, so that none of them by abnormal development or activity interfere with the action of all the rest. The great causes of error in thought, and so of falsehood in the concept, are sin and weakness. These impair the organon of truth by destroying the symmetrical development and action of the soul's different powers. Truth cannot be beaten out of things around us by the hammer of logic, or spun out of a machine for making syllogisms. Intellect may be the gun by which the huntsman secures his game; but he needs willing feet, clear eye, steady hand, benevolent heart, or he will not use his gun to its best purpose.

How intimately and inseparably connected with each other are all the various faculties of man in his apprehension of truth is a familiar thought to every student of psychology. In every state of consciousness the whole soul is found involved. Each state in each man bears the impress of all the man's previous history, and, indeed, to a large extent, also, of the history of the race. The feelings, in the coolest investigation of the most practised observer of nature, are always coloring the intellect; the voice of conscience is never quite hushed; the will is always putting forth its volitions and directing the attention according to motives which arise from every part of our complex being.

Just now physiology is directing more than ever our thoughts to phenomena which, instead of being feared, ought

to be cordially accepted, and made the basis of certain modifications in psychology and theology alike. We are asked to believe that the intellect and its organ are capable of automatic action, the value of the results of which depends largely upon the previous culture of all the powers. We are also asked to believe that the power to direct the attention to this or that part of these automatic activities is almost the only power that is, strictly speaking, ours. That all else is done not by us so much as for us, is the claim. But it is really no new thing when we are told that the centre of the circumference — "the heart of the heart," as says Müller — is the will. And the value of its due action is by no means diminished when we know that it, and through it all the moral and other emotions, play such an important part in the moulding of the intellectual machinery, whose healthy automatic action transmits the truth from without, but whose disturbed automatic action is the source of falsehood.

It is, in substance, recognized by some of the scientists, that, within their sphere of research, a more thoroughly cultured manhood is indispensable even for the apprehension and correct appreciation of those truths which some others suppose to be entirely independent of aesthetic, moral, and religious conditions in the investigator. The time is coming when not only a vivid imagination, but a clean conscience and a devout spirit, will be considered requisite to the best prosecution of scientific truth.

In connection with this line of thought, it is also significant to notice how quickly and surely they who stunt or maltreat any part of our complex manhood make themselves incapable to deal with truths for whose treatment the very parts injured are most clearly indispensable. A fit of intellectual insanity, bred of preceding moral insanity, seems to seize upon them when they turn their minds upon certain subjects. The positivist denies the validity, or even the existence, of those parts of the human soul out of which metaphysics grows, and which need special culture in order to a successful pursuit of metaphysics. Who is a more untrustworthy meta-

physician than the thorough positivist? Who more incapable than he of arriving at a correct opinion upon any metaphysical problem? Who is more palpably and foolishly false than the man who attempts to adjust the balance between science and religion, while himself without any cultured thought and feeling with respect to either one of the two? The open soul, given with the symmetrical culture and action of all its powers to the docile reception of truth, is the organ of truth. "Fixed points in knowledge," according to the profound philosophic teaching of Trendelenburg, "are won only by the mutual interpenetration of thought and being."

If the statements just made are true with regard to human knowledge in general, they are pre-eminently true with regard to such knowledge as is presented to the soul in the form of the concept of God. The pure in heart shall see God; they that obey shall know of the doctrine; the things of the spirit are spiritually judged of. These statements are as profound in their philosophic import as they are quickening in their practical tendencies. *This concept comes as God's revelation of himself within all the complex activities of the human soul.* It is adapted to man as man in the totality of his being and energies. And the whole being of man must be co-operative in the reception of this self-revelation of God, as well as met and filled by the form which the revelation takes, in order that the highest truth concerning God may become known. If the loftiest energy of the intellect demands the Absolute, no less truly do the deepest cravings of the heart demand the good and loving Father. The scientific and the so-called popular demand must alike be found satisfied in the true concept of God. The true knowledge of God is attained through the receptive activity, each in its place, of all the powers of the complete man. The concept of God which most nearly corresponds to the reality arises from this symmetrical use of all that is within us as an organon for the deliverance of a heavenly message. As the student of nature places himself before nature, and, being cultured in the powers that especially pertain to his research,

expects to receive from her hand the truth, so ought the student of theology, with the culture of all his powers, to place himself before God.

In proof and elucidation of our thought, we call attention to the following realities of history and of daily experience. The difficulty of presenting any one irrefragable proof for the existence or for any of the attributes of God is experienced by both the philosopher and the teacher of practical Christianity. At the end of any of the various lines of proof there is found always a choice. The voice which issues from the profoundest of our speculations is still the call of the servant of Jehovah: "Choose ye this day whom ye will serve." Is there a First Cause, or an unending series of secondary causes? Is the First Cause a person, or the unknown ground of all known phenomena? Is the person who is First Cause perfectly good, infinite in justice and love, or a sort of demiurge, working under restrictions that he cannot control — a compound in himself of the same contradictory elements which are seething together in his works? These and similar questions different intellects, which otherwise seem equally trustworthy, will answer differently. Is the truth, therefore, in doubt? and do we stand, with regard to this question of questions, in jeopardy every hour? Is it not, rather, clear that no other disproof of God's existence could be at all comparable to that which would be given if the intellect were found capable of dealing with these questions as with those that concern merely the phenomena of matter? Comprehension is the work of the intellect. Revelation is the method in which the knowledge of God comes to the human soul. He does not reveal himself to the intellect in order that he may be fully comprehended by that faculty, but within and to the entire man, that he may be loved, adored, and obeyed. In his work on Mental Physiology (p. 480), Dr. Carpenter speaks of certain departments of science "in which our conclusions rest not on any one set of experiences, but upon our *unconscious co-ordination of the whole aggregate of our experience* — not on the conclu-

siveness of any one train of reasoning, but on *the convergence of all our lines of thought toward one centre.*" These words, italicized by that author himself, well represent the form in which the knowledge of God is given to the human soul. It is the convergence of these lines of thought that run together from so many quarters which makes a web of argument far stronger to bind man than any single thread could be. This is a form of proof which, while it is when understood aright overwhelmingly convincing, gives also to all the elements of our complex manhood their proper work to do in its reception. In its reception it makes far greater difference whether the moral and religious sections of the whole channel through which the truth flows are open or not, than whether the faculty of the syllogism is comparatively large or not. Nor is there any effort to disparage intellectual processes involved, in thus insisting upon the complete and co-ordinated activity of the soul as furnishing the organon for the knowledge of God. All the strings of the harp must be in tune, or there will be discord, not harmony, when the breath of the Lord blows upon it.

It is the refusal to bring all the witnesses into court, or perhaps sometimes the inherited or acquired inability to exercise, according to its proper functions, some part of the complex manhood, which makes men atheists. It is the imperfect construction, or action, of some part of the whole organon for the reception of truth which makes men doubt. When doubt arises, what better can we do than appeal from Tyndall in his worse mood to Tyndall in his better mood? And, letting that thinker stand as the representative of men in general, when we appeal to Tyndall in his best mood of all, what less do we do than make the declaration that there is no better solvent than the new birth for men's intellectual difficulties?

We see the philosophical explanation for that fact of experience which so often causes us to wonder; viz. that men, who with equal intellectual culture examine the same evidence as to the truths of theology, come to such diverse and con-

tradictory results. Imagination, feeling, conscience, will, all these faculties go with the men into any sphere of investigation. And what the man brings back depends very largely upon what he takes out with him. To see through the microscope is one thing; but to interpret what one sees is another and much more difficult thing. Indeed, some sort of instinctive interpretation is involved in even the most casual seeing. When a man uses the telescope, microscope, or spectroscope, though his higher rational and moral faculties are even there co-operative, yet it is the previous culture and the present condition and use of senses, memory, and intellect, which are most concerned in securing the correct result. But it is with the former faculties rather than the latter, though with all combined into harmonious action, that the right result can be secured when the same man tries by searching to find out the Almighty. We should then neither wonder nor be frightened, when the most skilful surgeon takes his dissecting knife, and laying aside the instincts, emotions, and education which are favorable to religion, as he lays aside his coat, fails to discern God in the human body. We scarcely expect the geologist whose heart has never been broken with a blow from the hammer of divine truth to discover his Creator in the geologic strata. But another surgeon and another geologist, with no better and no worse reasoning faculties, will declare: The very stones are sermons; every nerve, vein, joint, valve and ganglion, is vocal with the praises of an omniscient and benevolent contriver. "If," says Frederic Robertson, "the chemist, geologist, physiologist come back from their spheres and say: 'We find in the laws of affinity, in the deposits of past ages, in the structure of the human frame, no trace or token of God,' I simply reply, I never expected you would. Obedience and self-surrender is the sole organ by which we gain a knowledge of that which cannot be seen or felt."

One of the most interesting of the phenomena which are given to the inspection of the student of theology, is found in the sharp reprisals made upon those who deny or mutilate

the knowledge of God by their own retrenched and mutilated natures. Those powers of the soul which cry out most mightily after the divine cannot be denied that for which they cry, without turning again to feed upon themselves, and thus to consume much of the whole manhood. Or we will say, rather, that in some form or other they *will* be fed, if not with bread, at least with husks. There are those whose minds refuse to join into one concept the Personality which the heart craves and the Absolute toward which we are led by the instinctive working of the philosophic nature. But the intellect, after reducing the idea of the Absolute to the utmost possible tenuity by abstracting one by one all the qualities which we wish for in God, still finds that the idea it has dealt with retains substance enough to cast a shadow of doubt over the validity of its own work. Dark enough is the shadow which is cast over the instinctive cravings after a Heavenly Father's forgiveness, care and love. Strauss, after departing farther and farther from his earlier proximity to evangelical views, finds at last in the conception of an impersonal Cosmos his only satisfaction as a philosopher; but cannot, after all, quite kill out the other activities of our complex being. Therefore "pride and humility, joy and submission, intermingle" in his feeling for the impersonal Cosmos. And when Schopenhauer makes the proposition, that the Cosmos is something which had better not have existed — that "it would, indeed, be better if no life had arisen on the earth any more than on the moon," — and scouts at Strauss' idea of a "law-governed Cosmos, full of life and reason" and worthy of religious veneration; then the latter gravely replies: "We consider it arrogant and profane on the part of a single individual to oppose himself with such audacious levity to the Cosmos, whence he springs, from which, also, he derives that spark of reason which he misuses." Surely, here again, when he was thinking he had got forever free of them, "enter the poor, old, dead horses of so-called natural theology."

Nor does the author of the phrase just quoted succeed

much better than Strauss in the effort to exclude these troublesome products of natural theology. It may be, the lack of success is partially due to the fact that *theology*, for the theologian and for the communist alike, *is natural*. Should a few more thousand years of human history succeed in proving this to the satisfaction of all disputants upon religious questions, it may turn out matter of universal wonder that any one, made in the image of him whom we all seek, could so mar that image as to find the satisfying idea of God in an impersonal Cosmos. But Matthew Arnold refuses to say whether his "Eternal that makes for righteousness" is person or thing; and in his "Reviews of Objections," as well as in his original work, furnishes, we fear, another instance of how sharp is the reprisal taken by a divided and wounded religious nature, when its normal action is not allowed to testify to the full and valid concept of God. Much that this author has written in his Literature and Dogma is valuable, and entitled to attention and gratitude from his numerous readers. There are, however, among many objections to Arnold's view these two; or, rather, two forms of one objection: first, if he proves anything, he proves too much for his own view; second, if he assumes anything, he assumes too little. For, this thinker, who is too cautious in forming his conception of God to venture upon the assertion that he is, or is not, a person, nevertheless is perfectly certain that there is "an Eternal Power which makes for righteousness." But in these words we have given the marks of a tolerably full concept, for the objective validity of which Mr. Arnold must either furnish proof or ask the concession of his readers. Should he furnish indisputable proof of the existence of such a power, none will be more thankful to him than those who believe in a personal God. No item in the whole bundle of proof for the existence of such a God is more important than that one which concerns the reality, potency, and obligation of righteousness. Should he, on the other hand, ask us to concede the existence of that which answers to his concept, none will

be readier to make the concession than those who believe in a personal God. For they themselves, in establishing the validity of their conception of God as opposed to his, need numerous similar conceptions along other lines of thought, not entered upon at all by Mr. Arnold. There are, however, those who do not believe in a personal God, and they will demand of the advocate of righteousness the sternest demonstration for the validity of all his conceptions. They will, we fear, in the duel of intellectual weapons, make Mr. Arnold's position as warm and uncomfortable as he himself has made that of the bishops of Winchester and Gloucester. How, then, shall he defend himself without calling for help upon other faculties and facts than those which have occupied him thus far? And if he do this, how shall he refuse to advance far beyond the uncomfortable and untenable midway position which he is now holding?

The truth is, that Mr. Arnold has been insisting upon one line of thought which, among all, has few superiors in its cogency of persuasion — not to say proof — to the belief in a personal God. If he has assumed the validity of his own fundamental thought, he has assumed too little. The complex phenomena of objective being and subjective impression have much more testimony to hand in, before their case is fully decided in the great court of history. Nor can we help the conviction that there is lurking in this phrase which he is so fond of repeating much more of meaning than its author is willing to admit. He is willing to admit, and holds for an indisputable truth, that there is an "Eternal Power, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness." This is, as we have said, a tolerably full concept. It is also a concept which by the very terms of its definition involves the assertion of an objective reality corresponding to the concept. The reality asserted is "not ourselves." Here is a tremendous leap from the thought of the thinker to the world outside — a leap, to make which has always puzzled the theologians, and in making which much argument for the existence of a personal God has been lost into the yawning

gulf of scepticism. Having got once fairly outside of ourselves so that we can assert without fear of contradiction the objective validity of what we think and observe concerning God, and having Mr. Arnold to thank for our safe transition, we look about us to see what has been brought over with us in this leap, so destructive always to perfection of logic, and yet so constantly and inevitably made by every man. This "not ourselves" is a power; which we are glad to learn, because we, too, firmly believe that force — one force — lies back of, and accounts for, the phenomena of conscience and moral conduct. Unity and power, if not omnipotence, have always belonged to our concept of God. Nor can we see why, so far as the testimony from the one line of thought Mr. Arnold follows is concerned, we may not claim that this power which makes for righteousness is one with the power which makes for harmony of motion among the stars, diversity of life upon the earth, the kingdom of God and the patent influence of Christ among men in history. It is also gratifying to learn that the "power not ourselves," whose existence this writer concedes, "makes for" any noble goal or idea, and especially for an idea and a goal so superbly grand as is indicated by the word "righteousness." But we cannot see, by our utmost effort of thought and imagination, how any thing or person can "make for" such a goal, or, indeed, any goal, without a self-conscious purpose. This inability may be our great weakness. But we believe it is our greatest strength to recognize in all phenomena that unity of tendency, that binding of the many under one law, that marching of an army of units, otherwise heterogeneous enough, under one great idea, to one great camp of rest, through one well planned campaign. "Makes for righteousness"; the words are for us empty air unless they speak of intelligence, order, final purpose. No effort of will can emancipate us from this instinctive interpretation of these words. And in this we believe all men coincide with us. Their language clearly shows that they coincide. If this power "makes for righteousness," in any sense which we

can give the words, this power loves the righteousness for which it makes and exerts itself. Here again, as in the case with the German philosopher so with the English critic, "enter the poor, old, dead horses of so-called natural theology."

But let us recall our thought to the point whence this digression has carried us. The reprisals, made upon those who deny to any part of man's complex organon for the reception of truth its proper function in forming the true concept of God, are sharp and inevitable. In some form or other the same thing which so much parade of logic is intended to keep out, will creep in again. Strauss cannot be satisfied with the Christian teaching of the Fatherhood of the Absolute; yet he, too, must bring in, though in mutilated form, a similar conception, a something which calls for humility, reverence, submission, and awe. Matthew Arnold cannot abide the view of the bishops of Winchester and Gloucester, and perforce argues valiantly, though unconsciously, for the validity of substantially the same view.

There is enough more of testimony; not the least important of which might be gathered from the case of the late John Stuart Mill. His final conclusions upon religious questions are as satisfying as any we can expect from one who confessedly discusses the questions merely as a matter of intellectual interest. Yet even he must, after all, introduce as a "hope," to which we are exhorted to cling, though it may very probably be fallacious, what he denies to us as knowledge, or even belief.

What can be more pathetic, and at the same time instructive, than Dr. Congreve offering a prayer at the "Festival of Humanity," and gratefully commemorating "the services of our common mother, the earth," unless it be George Eliot kindling her religious ardor to utter the hymn, "O may I join the choir invisible!" Surely there is instinctive faith, hope, and charity in many of these who know of no personal God, enough to furnish a score of ordinary Christians. Yet how misapplied, how largely fruitless, is made this irrepressible activity of the soul of man.

The view which I am advocating coincides, I believe, with the profound philosophy which underlies the immortal prologue of the Gospel of John. God without a self-revelation would be an unknown God. Our knowledge of him is the resultant, along all the lines of light, of the light which he has given to the soul. Out of the dark background of incomprehensible being, he comes forth, revealing himself in the divine personality of the Logos. Creation, life, and light, the ascending series of this self-revelation, culminate in the disclosure which the incarnation makes. Christ, who has been so aptly designated "God's sublimest idea of his human self," is the culmination of the Father's self-revelation, and the proof, as well, that we are capable, when we have become Christlike, of receiving the satisfying concept of God. As we find this concept forming within the soul, contributed through and nourishing all its complex activities, we find ourselves ready to endorse the words of a recent writer in the Contemporary Review concerning Mr. Mill: "How poor are his logical ethics, and his determination to compass the 'Highest' with the forms of the understanding, compared with what he has called (God forgive him!) the 'poor stuff' of St. John's Gospel."

But these instances of sharp and inevitable reprisal need not by any means be all taken from the mistakes of those who "try to compass the Highest with the forms of the understanding." They who give unrestrained exercise to the emotional nature in forming their concept of God are a warning as well. No violation of the reason can possibly make a permanent stand against the demands of reason that the concept of God, as formed within the human soul, shall be, not intelligible, for that it can never be, but, at the least, not irrational. More than the reasoning faculties can contribute, or even comprehend as contributed, this concept of God must contain; but any element contradictory to reason it must not contain. Different elements, the complete reconciliation of whose seeming opposition is impossible, may be held together. Whatever is really falsehood and

rubbish the continuous self-revelation of God in the individual and in history will proceed to sweep away. Views of the Divine Being and divine attributes which have their main roots in the senses and the passions — from the low conception of the Aztec priest as he holds to his bloody idol's mouth the warm heart of a human victim, or of the worshipper of that Allah who arbitrarily divides his lump of clay, and throws one part into paradise, another into hell-fire, to the high-flown mysticism of Rousseau — are no less faulty and sure to break down than the coldest inductions of the materialistic philosophy. Yet the senses and the constitutional passions, purified from selfishness in the discharge of their functions, are entitled to make their contribution toward the final result. This they will surely do.

The concept of God, then, is not one, the objective validity of which can be tested solely by the success or failure of any number of arguments, considered merely as arguments, along their different lines. It is rather a centre upon which converge many lines, not only of argument, but also of intuition, feeling, and purpose. *This concept is the resultant of God's revelation of himself to the human soul.* The whole complex system of activities is concerned, as an organon for the revelation, in that resultant. Just as the objective facts which answer to the concept are fitted to appeal to every part of man's complex being, so the impressions made in every part of his being answer more or less perfectly to this appeal. There are ideas called innate or cognate, "synthetic judgments a priori,"—to use the terminology of Kant,—cognitions which bear the marks of long processes of observation and reasoning, instinctive cravings whose influence can be traced through all the development of the individual and the race, spontaneous and voluntary activities of the higher emotional nature, tendencies that belong to the philosophic side of humanity — all blending together or struggling together, each designed and destined to have its appropriate function in forming the perfected concept of God.

If this view of the question, for the answer to which we

are seeking, has any valid claim to acceptance, it is evident, as has been said, that the enforcement and illustration of its validity call for an analysis of the concept and of the activities through which the concept is formed, in their relation to each other. To make this analysis exhaustively there is required such penetration and accuracy of insight as few will care to claim. To present certain specimens of a fragmentary sort is the utmost that I can now attempt. Let us, then, examine some of the manifold activities of the human soul, with a view to indicate what elements they contribute toward the formation and symmetrical development of this greatest of all concepts.

If the division adopted seem faulty, and the different lines of thought seem to cross and recross each other, let it be remembered that the division is only tentative and made with a view to illustration. Let it also be remembered that the co-ordinated and interlocked action of the different faculties is natural.

And further, we need have no expectation that at this late day any argument for the divine existence and attributes will have, as an argument, much cogency with those who have given themselves to disbelief and doubt. It is the very gist of the thought I am advocating that no written or spoken argument can at all adequately set forth the argument which pleads its cause in the vital centres and activities of man's being. In representing the truth before the intellect we may, indeed, do a helpful office to the intellect, and through it to the entire man; but it is not the same truth which God himself so effectually presents. On the other hand, to meet and answer every one of the arguments of theology for the being and attributes of God does not silence the pleadings that are denied conscious recognition, the voices that speak for the eternal Logos within the soul. It abuses the intellect without satisfying the man. For instance, that questioning after the sources of phenomena, which is part of the mainspring of all religion, shapes itself into a faith in an absolute First Cause. Granted that the faith is not

demonstrably correct, but stands before the intellect on a footing with the belief in an endless series of second causes, somehow or other the faith remains firm. And remaining, it must itself be accounted for. It therefore comes again and again before the intellect in such manner that the faith itself considered as a fact is an argument for its own validity.

Beginning the work of illustration with that which is so low down in the scale as to be too often overlooked, we find that the symmetrical action of the senses and of all the various nervous centres is concerned in the formation of the right concept of God. To assert this is to accept the facts, not to disparage either the science or the object of theology. Baring Gould's attempt to fix the physiological centres of religious activity may not be very satisfying, and others who differ from his view may succeed either better or worse than he. The case is all the same so far as we are concerned. Having once admitted the correlation which plainly exists between the vital activities of the brain and other nervous centres on the one hand, and the activities in thought and feeling of the conscious soul on the other hand, and having, with awe at the mystery, seen new proofs of God's wonderful working in all this correlation, we have no further painful concern as to future discoveries. Should the scientists show that so much and such brain matter is the invariable concomitant of the idea of God, or that such, and no other, molecular conditions and movements of the sensory ganglia go with a Christian's faith and love; what then? If the Father of all choose to make certain parts of the physical system of man the organon in part for his revelation of himself, it seems to us that gratitude and trust, rather than thankless distrust, are the feelings which properly correspond to his choice. The very existence of a brain and nervous system such as, found no where else in the animal creation, is found in man, and fitted to God's self-disclosure, is a proof of his existence. Nor is it strange if symmetrical action and culture of this system are important elements of the whole. "Pure thought" about this highest object of thought

is not attained by trying — vain attempt — to withdraw from all the conditions of thinking, but by using all the means, even the lowest, which we have given to us for receiving the truth. We cannot see how it disparages theology or throws doubt upon the divine existence, if it be shown that sound brain-fibre, and enough of it, are as necessary to the reception of the valid concept of God as the Hegelian dialectics. Indeed, well aerated blood is, no doubt, in many cases, quite as good a guarantee of true religious views as an over-abundance of monkish musings.

We watch that correlation between growth to the bodily organs and growth to the concept of God which is shown in the life of the child. We learn substantially the same lesson when we trace in history the growth of a race from a condition of savagery to one of civilization and Christianity. We are informed of the proofs which are adduced to the view that many, if not all, of the activities of the soul — memory, imagination, reasoning, emotion — have their invariable physical concomitants. We notice the undoubted truth that our own estimates of arguments, the different degrees of prominence which we at different times assign to different elements of our theologic notions, are largely influenced by varying physiological conditions. We hear some of our leading physiologists talk as though the different systems of theology were wholly due to different states of the liver in their exponents. In sympathetic response to their claims we wonder what fit of indigestion brought Tyndall into the mood in which he publicly gave his adherence to the materialistic philosophy and dissolved us all — would that he had spoken for himself alone — after death into the "azure of the past." Then, when we have separated, as well as may be, facts from opinions, we find enough to convince us, not that matter contains "the promise and the potency of every form and quality of life," but that God in his self-revelation to man does not leave out of the account man's material organism. That organism is part of the organon through which he reaches man.

Nor can we doubt the part which the senses play in furnishing materials to the intellect for forming the subordinate concepts which pertain to the one great concept, and for constructing the arguments which sustain and justify our belief in God. It is scarcely possible to tell what would be the effect upon the cogency of the argument from design, if the one sense of sight were taken away. Through the open and healthy senses there pour into the soul sights and sounds which constantly tend to nourish the idea of beauty as well as design, to stimulate the feeling of obligation, to train in choice the will, and so introduce and feed right knowledge of God. The senses and intellect lead Strauss to the belief in an impersonal "Cosmos, full of life and reason." Supplemented by the other parts of complex manhood, they lead others to the belief in a living, intelligent, and benevolent person, who is God. The search after cause and final purpose is conducted and stimulated largely by the activity of the senses. The knowledge that we are free, and so the belief in a free, personal First Cause like ourselves, is given to us very largely in connection with sensual impressions and in the voluntary use of the bodily organism. So comes and grows also the notion of force; a notion which is inextricably interwoven with volition, and which, carried out into the macrocosm from the microcosm of daily experience, and supplemented by other activities of man's complex being, guarantees, as the ground of all phenomena, one forceful, free, as well as intelligent and good being, who is God. In all the highest ideas of divinity we can trace the operation of the nervous centres, which are not to be considered as leaving a black residuum of falsehood, but as contributing through their open channels important elements of truth. They of themselves alone could never introduce to the soul the knowledge of God. But as parts of the whole they do contribute, in an important way, to its introduction and culture.

There are also more subtile, and often unnoticed, uses of the physiological conditions which accompany all thought and

feeling. Man's soul and body are not mechanically mixed. They unite, chemically (so to speak), vitally, and make one man. The functions and emotions and ideas which belong to fatherhood and motherhood are intimately connected with physiological conditions; but these functions, emotions and ideas wonderfully teach and stimulate our faith in the Fatherhood of God. How can the person who has not, either in instinct or in action, parental faculties, form the correct conception of God? The first babe, laid for its first nourishment upon the mother-breast, is meant to be an argument stronger than any syllogism for the parental nature of God. There is an Eternal which makes for personal love and trust; it is one with the "Eternal that makes for righteousness"; it is God. Those indefinable longings which accompany the greatest physical crisis of life are designed and used by the Divine Teacher to further his self-revelation within the soul. Hence one significant reason why this crisis is so often accompanied by a crisis in the spiritual life.

Another potent argument for the existence and operative energy of God is given to the intellect for its consideration by the *automatic* action of the nervous centres, and of those so-called mental powers which accompany such nervous action. We discover that the working of our machinery, both mental and physical, is largely conducted for us, rather than by us. Thus the proof of a force, comprehensive, rational, and concerned in the welfare of our being, is brought into most intimate connection with the mind. Day by day, and momently, we find the unseen hand moving us. A will, an intelligence, a love, "not ourselves," stand face to face with the conscious soul in the machinery, which we from our centre of volition, and *he* from his centre, both use. Nor can the force and scope of this fact be given in the form of an argument from design submitted to the criticism of the faculty of the syllogism. That sense of awe and mystery which ministers so effectually to faith in the divine is awakened and kept alive by the consciousness that we, in our own organs of body and mind, are played upon by this invisible

hand. When Mozart, without previous teaching, improvised and used so perfectly the pedals of the first organ with pedals which he had ever met, his father wrote: "This is a new gift of God." But especially, as I believe, is that sense of dependence which Schleiermacher made the root and trunk of all religion fostered by the means indicated above. At no other so sensitive point can a man be touched as at the point of control over the physical and mental faculties which he calls his own.

But we must leave this portion of the contemplated analysis, not because it is completed, but because we hope that a few hints will serve to indicate and certify the whole. It is the πρῶτον ψεῦδος of much so-called Christian dogmatics and un-Christian science alike that they deny the present, vital, and comprehensive relations which exist between God and his universe.

We turn now briefly to notice certain instinctive cravings which are concerned in forming the right concept of God.

The Rev. George D'Oyly Snow, in an interesting article on Natural Theology, published in the Contemporary Review for March, 1873, uses the following language: "In answer to the question, Where is God the maker? I have replied — it is no new-fashioned answer — I find him in my own dissatisfaction." It may well be doubted whether, among the many forces by which God draws men to himself, there is to be found another more effectual than that which consists in man's inherent dissatisfaction. The law of growth through craving is fundamental and capable of illustration from every form of animal life. Put life into matter, and you get as one of its earliest exhibitions the same phenomenon which remains with the life until its extinction — you get craving, which being met by supply becomes the minister of higher life and growth. The amœba, a small jelly-speck, driven by its instinctive craving, searches for that in the environment which is fitted to its use; and then makes its whole self into a stomach to wrap about the food which it has secured. Under excitement from this instinctive craving the locusts

go forth in bands, and, braver than the Amazonian warriors of Ashantee, scale walls and smother with their dead bodies the fires which oppose their progress. In the world of struggling races this instinctive unrest acts like a mighty hammer to spread out the nations and fuse them under its blows. In the souls of men this instinctive craving under various forms acts as the spur of the rider to drive men toward the divine in which alone they can find satisfaction and rest. For the selfishness, stormy passion, and unscrupulous gratification of this inherent desire for something more beyond, we cannot hold God accountable. But craving, pure and simple, dissatisfaction urging on and ministering to fuller life, is constitutional, and therefore divine in its origin. It is also in all its various forms connected with trust — in the lowest forms instinctive craving with instinctive trust; in the highest forms rational longing after holiness and God with free, self-conscious trust in God. It was the sense of want which led Augustine to Milan, and Nee Sima to America; and mainly through the leadership of this impulse both were brought to the true knowledge of God. The church father tells of "deep-seated craving," which he long tried to satisfy by "hunting after the emptiness of popular praise, down even to theatrical applauses, and poetic prizes, and strifes for grassy garlands, and the follies of shows, and the intemperance of desires."

It is to craving, in the form of dissatisfaction with the present sinful condition, that Christianity so confidently appeals. The sense of guilt is closely connected with these instinctive cravings. "So long," says the profound Müller, writing upon this topic, "as the longing after God sleeps in the soul, thus long sleeps also guilt." The idea of perfect justice, and in connection with this idea the conviction that there is a perfect executor of justice and a sphere wherein perfect justice is destined to reign, arises within the soul at first rather as a craving than a clearly formed conception. "Justice," says George Eliot, expressing with great beauty, as she is wont, the half-truth of moral and religious life —

"justice is like the kingdom of God — it is not without us a fact, it is within us as a great yearning." It is, indeed, within us as a great yearning, but it is also without us a fact, complementary to the yearning, and witnessed to by the yearning.

That instinctive craving for protection, and for the feeling of complete security, which is interwoven so closely with the feeling of dependence, is a, by no means, unimportant factor in forming the perfect concept of God. In those times of depression and weakness, which we all share with the great scientist, the strongest of us instinctively craves after an omnipotent helper and friend. The poet sings :

"In die Welt hinausgestossen
Steht der Mensch verlassen da."

But the man thus thrust out into the world, and standing there abandoned, feels, at the thought of his desolation and helplessness, a shivering which breaks the very bones of manhood and freezes its life-blood. And there instinctively springs up within the rightly constituted soul a hope and confidence in One whose children we are, and who notes the fall of the sparrow, and throws away at random not one hair of our heads. The impersonal Cosmos, the all-pervading law, when separated in thought from him whose force the law gauges in its amount and method, are cold food for such a craving.

But we are reminded that it is a matter for the inductive philosophy to determine how far these so-called instinctive cravings have any objective reality which corresponds to themselves, and that thus far the inductive philosophy in none of its various departments — astronomy, geology, biology, sociology — has found any such reality. Surely, in this life we crave many things which we do not obtain, even things which have no existence, as when children cry for the moon, or wish to shake hands with the man who lives therein. There are arguments which, as such, may be made more or less fully to meet this caution of the inductive philosophy. But we are now occupied with this thought, — that the

craving is a fact in itself, and as such, whether it justify itself or not before the inductive philosophy, will certainly make its influence felt in forming man's conviction as to the existence and attributes of God.

Closely connected with the craving just mentioned is the obverse craving for an object which we may love without limit, and defend at all hazards below the risk of losing the object itself.

Consider, also, what a capacity for indefinite admiration, and what craving after an object the admiration of which shall never go too far, can be awakened within the human soul. It is Coleridge, if I remember rightly, who calls attention to the meaning of that unbounded, and in itself senseless, feeling which the crowd has for its hero. This feeling is testimony to the strength of human craving after the ideally excellent and admirable. It is the incense burned to the idol for the sake of so much of the divine as is in it. The abandon in hoarse shouting after him who has been lucky in battle, the adoration (which so far outstrips real merit) given to the genius in discovery, oratory, painting, and song, are a lesson as to what capacity and craving for the admirable are within man.

Under this head, especial prominence should be given to the desire of happiness. The ill-defined and unintelligent experience of want develops into the definite, purposeful, and self-conscious desire for the object which will gratify the want. When the instinctive and fundamental cravings are met by the proper supplies the result is happiness. These cravings all, therefore, minister to the desire of happiness. It is through the experience which comes only when they are gratified, that there is awakened within the soul any distinctive desire for happiness as such. The infant instinctively craves food, warmth, air, light. The craving is automatic, and in its earliest stages has not taken the form of a self-conscious desire; but it ministers to the self-conscious use of that desire which is, as it were, the resultant of all forms of craving — the desire of happiness. This

desire, as it outstrips all means of its gratification which lie outside of God, tends to lead the soul to the true knowledge of him. In close connection with the development of this desire goes on the development of its corresponding idea, which is the idea of the *summum bonum*. As the man finds none of this life's good things serving to satisfy fully his craving for happiness, he learns that none of them corresponds to his ever-expanding notion of that which constitutes the soul's highest good, until, if the result of his life-training be fortunate, his yearning and his idea meet in the same object, viz. to know, to serve, and to enjoy God.

It is, however, in connection with the activities of the conscience that this desire makes its most important contributions to the right concept of God. The ethical nature of man chastens the desire, and the notion of God becomes not merely that of a Being who fulfils our utmost cravings for happiness, but, as well, that of a Being who requires the control of those cravings according to the voice of conscience. This desire in the sinful man inevitably turns into a fear lest the objects which can gratify it may be lost, whenever it is brought face to face with the conception of a Being both holy and full of power. The fear reveals still further the nature of God.

This desire of happiness also ministers powerfully to the sense of inscrutable mystery. With a mighty craving for happiness, and an exalted idea of the possibilities which, if realized, might fully meet the craving, we stand awe-stricken before the dark, inexplicable facts of resistance, pain, and moral evil. We find pain in the very bones of the universe. Resistance and other more significant causes of adversity are seen to be fundamentally necessary to life. Under the impetus of this craving for happiness, we are led into that struggle with the unyielding facts of the cosmos which trains both head and heart for the reception of the right concept of God. "Whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth" is written everywhere. By struggle, when its issue is happy, the head is brought to an enlarged view of the nature and work of

God. That large class of facts — the sting, the fang, the parasite, the devouring maw of the ocean wave — get the recognition which they demand from him who would rightly apprehend the divine. And the heart is led into trust, submission, obedience made perfect through suffering.

The will also, gaining a more rigorous development in the midst of the grave conflict which the desire of happiness necessitates for every man, more completely and clearly represents before the mind that free, limitless force to overcome evil and produce good, the type and earnest of which can be conveyed in no other way.

When the desire of happiness, penetrated with benevolence, goes outside of self, it directs research after the truth of history, so that this research throws new light upon the nature of God. It is pressure which drives individuals into political unity, and "kneads the cake of custom," as Mr. Bagehot has phrased the thought. We see how the separate families and tribes of men have, by the function of adversity, formed themselves into the higher organic condition of national life. Thus God in history reveals himself in one of his most impressive characteristics to the human soul. No more beautiful description of the methods of intellectual and spiritual vitality can anywhere be found than is given us in the duke of Argyll's "Reign of Law," where he unfolds the relations of the external force of the earth to the internal force which moves the sea-bird's wing. That soul can float beside the albatross, at rest, "where there is nothing else at rest in the tremendous turmoil of its own stormy seas," who has been trained under divine tuition to mount thither as the fowl does, beating down resistance from without by force that answers from within.

There are, doubtless, many to whom this view of God revealing himself to man through all these so-called lower parts of man's complex being, will be very objectionable. For, if we hold this view, there is quite enough in the total self-revelation of God to warrant us in asserting that we know something of his existence and attributes — that he is

powerful, intelligent, loving. But this is to assert that he is revealed to us as a Person — as, what Mr. Arnold calls, a "non-natural man." Such an assertion is, with some, gross anthropomorphism and anthropopathism. To transcend one's faculties by abuse of them, to imagine some πού στῶ for the logical lever outside of the cognizable and thinkable universe, is, for the Hegelian, the only way to know God. To furnish the faculties, all open and all symmetrically cultured, to the self-revelation of God is, according to the view here advocated, the only way to receive the full and satisfying impression from God. In correspondence with man's intellectual and emotional μορφή, or form, the revelation must inevitably be made. The only question is, whether the form furnished — the mould into which the objective reality is cast — shall be an entire or a mutilated organon. What parts of the whole it is most calamitous to neglect or mutilate we shall see better when we have briefly considered how some of the higher emotions of the soul are concerned in forming the concept of God.

"To find a legitimate satisfaction for the religious emotions is," says a leading scientist, "the problem of problems of our day." Among these religious emotions stand highest the three which the apostle exalts — faith, hope, and love. These are not, however, emotions pure and simple, but *attitudes*, rather, of the whole man, in which the intellectual and voluntary, as well as the emotional, powers have their part. To find "a legitimate satisfaction" for them is to bring them such an object as satisfies them, while it does not break the laws according to which the activities most prominent in scientific research have to be exercised. These activities present, in their connection, the phenomena with which they are concerned; but the religious emotions ever drive us behind and beyond the phenomena with their modes of connection to the person God. Through that loving trust, then, which the New Testament calls "faith," must the true concept of God be received to the human soul. This is the only rational, the only possible, way of its reception. Nor do we fail to trace the law according to which supply meets

want, through the channel of trust, from lowest form of life to highest — from the callow bird who, with eye uncovered, opens its mouth to an unknown mother, up to the philosopher who by self-conscious, free, and rational trust finds the God whom he could not find by undevout researches.

"By hope we are saved"; "He that loveth not, knoweth not God." That these religious emotions are as indispensable as they are instinctive is a truth, than which no demonstration of the intellect, or fact verified by the senses, can be plainer or more worthy of regard. Reasoning must prevent the imagination from leading these religious emotions into superstitious and harmful vagaries, but can never silence the voices with which they call the soul towards God.

Already the prominent, the incomparable influence that the condition of the moral faculties in man has upon the form, whether obscured or symmetrical, which the self-revelation of God takes within the human soul, has been more than once, by inference, asserted. Indeed, all the activities to which reference has been made are, in real life, of true ethical significance. The idea and feeling of duty, the sense of responsibility, tinge, if they do not permeate thoroughly, the whole sphere of mental movement. Even the automatic action of the nervous centres is not without its testimony to the great fact that man is gifted with a moral nature, with freedom — that he is made in the image of God. The rule of duty within him is inevitably taken as a pattern and a pledge of the great law of right without. His self-condemnation he instinctively interprets as the revelation of a condemnation from One who is greater than his heart and knoweth all things. This ethical sense of order, which binds together the otherwise heterogeneous and ethically insignificant phenomena of the life of the soul, demands an explanation of the intellect. The intellect, searching under the guidance of the great ideas of cause and final purpose, finds the explanation of such ethical order in One who is both rational and righteous — even God. But long before the intellect has certified this explanation, the voice of con-

science has gained practically a hearing as the voice of a person who loveth the righteous and maketh for righteousness.

But it is, I believe, the pure and strong action of the will which is needed above all else. It is that "heart of the heart" which, more than any other faculty in the complex whole, must be right in its activities in order that the soul may be a fit organon for the reception of the self-revelation of God. Under the influence of the ethical ideas and emotions, and in the two great forms of religious faith and love, it dominates and gives shape to the good man's conception of his Heavenly Father. For the verity of their conceptions, for their beliefs, hopes, and aspirations, men are no less truly responsible than for their conduct. We have already remarked how the idea of one force, dominating and marshalling in order the various phenomena of the cosmos, has its point of starting from our consciousness of exerting force in the control of our bodily organism and mental train. We have observed, also, how that struggle against resistance into which our desire for happiness throws us ministers to the full and complete concept of God. But it is in voluntary, rational self-surrender to a recognized Father and Lord that we discover the very gist of the condition of soul necessary to a true knowledge of divine realities.

One entire half of our complex being — viz. that which is mainly concerned in the intellectual and philosophic activities of man — has thus far been only subordinately treated in our illustration of the theme. Yet that other half is no less important and peremptory in its demands than the one which we have reviewed. The course followed in the Essay has been chosen in the belief that the reader will at once supply from the customary sources what I must leave unsaid. To hint at some of the elements in the complex whole which are contributed by certain lines of argument, and to mention certain of those comprehensive ideas which, either lying at the beginning of all processes of thought are called "innate," or crowning all actual thought may be considered as sure to dominate in all future religious beliefs, as well as scientific research, will be the utmost that can be at present attempted.

The sphere of legitimate and convincing argument for the existence and attributes of God is likely to be largely increased. That sphere covers all known phenomena of nature, of mind, of the history of the race, with its Bible and its growing experience in the progressive kingdom of God. The sciences of matter and physical forces are pouring rich treasures of newly-discovered phenomena and laws of phenomena into the lap of theology. She must spread out her lap, and with thanksgiving receive them. Science discloses only what she sees of the phenomenal; theology is to reveal and "see all things in God." For her the forces of the scientist are the manifold, irresistible, deathless energy of the Divine will; and the laws of the scientist are for her the methods, which she must humbly learn, in which that mighty will has its perpetual working. She must reject, promptly and forever, that view, which has been so damaging, that there is ever, anywhere, a severance of the connection between the Divine Workman and his perpetual work. "My Father worketh hitherto" is the testimony of God's universe and of God's Son. With this way of conducting researches, theology will draw from science now unimaginable stores of food for awe, reverence, trust, and love. Science, which halted so long after the church ran, will come on both feet, hastening to contribute testimony to the teachings of him who spake as never another.

The phenomena of history are utterly incomprehensible and incapable of rational treatment without the guiding concept of a God in history. But as they are known better, God will be known better. That unseen hand which has led and lifted the people is the hand of one who has a purpose to fulfil, and who will not tarry until he accomplish it.

Criticism, hostile as well as friendly, will be forced to show, not only how, but why, these books, so many in number, so diverse in authorship and characteristics, have been gathered, without self-conscious intent on the part of man, into one book — a whole, unique in origin, as well as influence upon the race. The phenomena of Christian con-

sciousness, so clearly traceable back for their source to the Christ of God whose name they bear, will be understood better, and he who is their source will be understood and loved better, as it becomes more and more clearly apparent that in no other way can a satisfactory account of them be given than by acknowledging Jesus as, par eminence, the Revealer of the Father. Mivart is grandly right when he declares: "From a sympathetic study of the whole universe ..... the conception of Almighty God becomes fully revealed to the human intellect."

Memory and imagination also contribute their parts to the complete conception of God — memory, which both upon its physiological and its psychological sides discloses the existence within us of mysterious, purposeful force; and imagination, which craves what a recent work has called an "infinitely precious familiarity with the conception of a morally perfect Being."

It is under the impetus and guidance of the cognitions of cause and design that all the various arguments for the divine existence and attributes are prepared and brought before the judgment. The validity of the arguments from cause and final purpose may be questioned; but the real work of these cognitions never fails to be accomplished. Science, though owing all its development to these ideas, still, strictly speaking, has to deal with neither; it deals with succession of phenomena, mechanical adaptations. The scientist, however, as a man endowed with a philosophic and religious nature is bound, at every step, to go behind the phenomenal, and find in a free will his efficient cause, in a benevolent mind his final cause. Science, as such, has absolutely nothing to say, because it knows nothing, about what lies at the bottom and works from behind the phenomena. It tells the how of One whom it can never discover. Cause and final purpose, becoming so allied in thought that we cannot but conceive of them as joined in reality, we are instinctively so led by the tendency to unify as to form the conception of one efficient and intelligent cause for all these phenomena.

Nor can we doubt that those great conceptions of perfect unity, order and universal law, which the best thought of the ages has been engaged in elaborating, will assert and maintain their place in the concept of God. As truly as the heart of man protests against the mechanical conception of the universe, so truly does the scientific and philosophic nature protest against any conception of the divine which does not exclude all arbitrariness and caprice. Right views of the supernatural and miraculous no more interfere with the validity of these great concepts than do right views of the material cosmos. For the natural and supernatural are not two mutually exclusive spheres; nor is the assertion of God's personality the denial of the universal "reign of law." God is the one person in whom free-will is never distraught by conflicts between reason and desire, and the very centre of whose personality is, as well, the source of all force, order, and law.

The intellectual as well as the emotional half of human development has its dim and shadowy places. And just as there are indefinable yearnings, so there are ideas which are half-ideas, half-dreams, which ever elude the attempt at fixing them and yet which are by no means given to delude us. They enter into much of our reasoning about God, and we know that our conception of God cannot be complete without including them. Yet they impart much of their own dimness to that conception which they are needed to compose. They seem like fragments of deliverances, which in their completeness are too vast to be made to souls constituted like ours. But the persistency with which they evade the most subtile attempts made to comprehend and analyze them is no greater than the persistency with which they insist upon having their place in forming the true concept of God. Nor does their existence within the realm of the concept vitiate its claim to validity. I am a person; and many of the elements which go to make up the complex whole I call myself, I can clearly recall in consciousness, examine, define, and comprehend. But other elements, not

excepting some upon which my whole existence as a person seems to depend, I cannot thus treat. They make me know that even my limited personality is greater than I can comprehend. Is it strange, then, if we do not comprehend the Absolute Person, the Eternal and Infinite Father? Eternal, absolute, infinite — it is by syllogisms, framed to catch and hold such forms as these, that pantheism leads on to the awful pit, into which falls all that is manifestly dear to the heart of God's child. It is, however, those same elements of the whole which give necessarily to the Christian religion its pantheistic — I have no better word — coloring; a religion which does not obscure, as the blackness of pantheism does, all that we know of God, but placing this in clear sunlight throws a cloud above, and urges us thus toward the regions where, as we may hope, the cloud will be more and more lifted.

Of the many reflections which this view as to the origin of the concept of God suggests to us, let one suffice.

If man, as a whole of balanced and symmetrically cultured parts, is the organon of truth, then as man in the totality of his being advances, God's self-revelation to him will become more and more complete, both as a concept simply and as a motive to right conduct. As Christianity moulds the character of men, its own doctrines will be seen to give, not the mere incidents, but constituent elements of the true knowledge of God. As it transforms the whole being of man, that transformed being will better and better serve the divine purpose of receiving knowledge, force, joy, fulness of life from the divine source. They who search for their Heavenly Father, as the old-time cynic searched for an honest man, with patent doubt and sneer, will never find him.

We know no better words with which to close than those last words from the immortal Confessions of Augustine": "What man can teach man to understand this? or what angel an angel? or what angel a man? Let it be *asked* of thee, *sought* of thee, *knocked* for at thee; so, so shall it be received, so shall it be found, so shall it be opened."

ARTICLE II.

THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION.

BY REV. FREDERIC GARDINER, D.D., PROFESSOR IN THE BERKELEY DIVINITY SCHOOL.

Among all denominations in America theology is studied chiefly in special institutions founded for this single and express purpose. Abroad, except among the Roman Catholics, it is for the most part pursued in the same universities and under the same general arrangements with other professional studies. The distinctive theological seminary or divinity school among Protestants is essentially an American arrangement, although since its introduction here it has also been adopted to a limited extent on the other side of the ocean. It has obvious advantages and disadvantages, but of these it is not proposed to speak beyond calling attention in passing to a single point. Abroad, the future lawyer, chemist, philologist, and theologian are members of the same academic fraternity, and may, if they please, be attendants together on more than one of the same courses of lectures. With us, the theological student is entirely isolated throughout his course. This necessarily tends to withdraw him from his fellows, to separate him in his habits of thought from them, and make of him a *specialist*. This tendency may be overcome, but it needs to be recognized. If after all our training, young men enter the ministry without intellectual sympathy with those among whom, and upon whom, they are to exercise their vocation, they are placed at the outset at a serious disadvantage. The broadest sympathies and the most complete knowledge of the methods and of the preoccupations of other minds are the essential qualification of the well-furnished minister of the gospel. If our system of preparing him for his work is opposed to the attainment

of these humanities, or even ignores them, it is in so far defective. In a very different sense from that of the heathen poet it is necessary for the clergyman to feel,

"Homo sum: nil humanum a me alienum puto."

The means of overcoming the naturally isolating tendency of our special schools of theology is undoubtedly chiefly in the hands of the students themselves; but they are not apt to be aware of the danger. It needs to be distinctly pointed out to them by their teachers, and their own intelligence awakened to providing the remedy.

One other general consideration demands a word before entering upon our proper subject. Young men in the theological, as in every other professional, school are going through the latest stages of preparation for their work in life. They need, therefore, to be treated as men, rather than as children. They need to be more and more emancipated from the condition of pupilage, and introduced to that of independent manhood. This is generally recognized in the relaxation of discipline, the withdrawal of all marking of recitations, and the like; but it may be doubted whether the importance is sufficiently recognized of accustoming them to think for themselves and preparing them to take their position in the world at the end of their course as independent entities, nay, responsible leaders of human thought. The young men of America are generally quite ready enough to appreciate their own advancement and the importance of their position; they are not so ready laboriously and conscientiously to prepare themselves for the responsibilities of that position. If they are allowed to complete this last stage of their preparatory course in an attitude of too great mental dependence, they are likely to continue such dependence through life, and to become partisan and one-sided. Independent and manly thought and action demands culture. At this last and most critical stage of preparation this culture is to be either checked and thus, perhaps, finally dwarfed, or to be encouraged and cherished, and thus prepared for a life-long growth and development.

The purpose of the theological school or seminary in its broadest statement is to fit men for the ministry. Such a school must afford opportunities for, and, in fact, must put before all other things, spiritual training, growth in the graces of the Holy Spirit, and the increasing conformity of the character and life to the example of Christ. But this fundamental and most necessary part of the training of the Christian minister does not come within the scope of the present Article, and it must, therefore, be passed by with the single remark that it ought to pervade the whole of the preparation. That no part of a theological course can be successfully accomplished without the spirit of prayer in both the teacher and the pupil is the necessary result of the organic law of Christianity. The fellowship of Christian faith and life establishes a peculiar bond between teacher and pupil in the divinity school, and the constant recollection of this fellowship should create the deepest and closest sympathy, and give to the pursuit of theology a peculiar interest and charm.

We are also constrained to pass over in these pages the element of practical work. In training men for the ministry this would be not less unwisely omitted than clinics and hospital practice in the study of medicine, or moot courts and the work of the attorney's office in training for the law. It is not, then, to be omitted or overlooked; but it should not be allowed to interfere with the intellectual training. It need not do so, and, under proper regulation, it practically does not. The activity of the ordinary layman in special work for Christ's sake does not hinder his attention to his ordinary affairs. So correspondingly, the activity of the theological student, on a more distinctly professional plane, and having a direct bearing on his own preparation for future labor, need not in any way hinder his present main occupation of intellectual preparation for the great work soon to be committed to his charge.

We are now ready to consider the principal subject proposed: The best Methods of Intellectual Training for the Ministry. Three different classes of men require to be con-

sidered: (1) Such as come to their theological studies with imperfect preparation; (2) such as, from the character of their intellectual powers, or their temperament, or from other causes, can never be expected to become eminent scholars; (3) the comparatively few who are hereafter to furnish the church and the world with scholars in the various departments of theology. With all these classes, in varying proportion, all theological institutions are required to deal. All of them are important, and the necessities of each must be fairly met in any satisfactory system of theological training.

The first class necessarily includes within itself every variety of defective preparation, from that which scarcely falls short of the normal standard to the minimum on which it is possible to build up any passable amount of professional education. There must, therefore, be much regard to individual circumstances and individual possibilities. It may be assumed that the normal standard of preparation, which is usually a college course or its equivalent, embraces just that amount of preparatory study at the close of which the student can most advantageously enter upon theological pursuits. Yet this standard itself is vague, not only in consequence of the great differences in the acquirements of the different graduates from the same college, but also of the great differences in the colleges themselves; and, at best, it can only be considered as a standard adopted in view of the exigencies of life, since a far higher one would form a still better basis for the study of theology. By those imperfectly prepared, then, we mean those who have failed to acquire that amount of education demanded by any respectable college as absolutely necessary to graduation. A higher standard than this will probably be found impracticable until our college standard is raised, and as this is done the requirements for entering our theological schools will elevate themselves without especial care.

Meantime, what is to be done with those who fall below this? Obviously, if placed in the same classes with those better prepared the character of the instruction in several

departments must be lowered to meet their capacities and attainments, and thus not only do they themselves receive an inferior preparation for their work in life, but they also hinder and lower that of the others. This is plainly both unjust and unwise; yet it is believed to be the most common of all hinderances to the efficiency of most of our theological institutions. It has been a still more crying evil in other professional schools, and has come to be so severely felt in them that a movement has already been inaugurated for its removal. From the nature of theology, however, the disturbance thus arising is greater here than elsewhere. What is the remedy? In the first place, of course, proper preparation should be insisted upon in all cases where it is practicable. A year or two of delay in entering upon the ministry is of very little consequence in comparison with a man's being properly furnished for his work in all the subsequent years of that ministry. Life, indeed, may be cut short at any time, but plans for that life can only wisely be laid in view of its average duration. But there are not infrequent cases in which, from advanced age or from other causes, the requirement of such preparation would be equivalent to the refusal of a theological education altogether, while yet the men in question seem well adapted to useful work in many parts of the Lord's vineyard. They must, then, be educated as well as circumstances allow, and yet they cannot be advantageously classed entirely with those who are better prepared at the start. The evident solution of the difficulty is in a special course, or courses, adapted to their wants. These need not be wholly different from the regular course, for there are several of the departments which may be studied by any intelligent man without especial preparation — not, perhaps, as advantageously, but, at least, without hindering the progress of his fellow-students. In other departments, however, there should be distinct and separate instruction. It is idle to say that they may as well attend the same lectures and other exercises with the rest of the students, and get from them such good as they can. A con

scientious instructor cannot fail to seek to make himself understood, and to have his teaching benefit all his hearers; and if some of these require more elementary instruction, he must consume the time and patience of the more advanced in giving it; and if some could make more rapid progress they must be held back for the sake of their companions. The experience of all teachers bears uniform testimony to the hinderance to the whole class of even a few more imperfectly prepared for the study in which they are engaged. They are a clog which, in justice to the others, ought not to be tolerated. Most instructors would far rather undertake the additional labor involved in special courses for them than be obliged to carry them along with the others. In part, excellent provision might be made for their instruction by the establishment of fellowships, which will be spoken of presently. If neither of these arrangements suffice, then either additional teachers should be provided, or else such students should be sent to other institutions where they can be properly cared for. If there could be any doubt on this point, it would only be necessary to look at our common schools, and compare the advantages of the country "district school" with those of the graded schools in our larger towns and cities.

The second class will always constitute the great majority of our students — those who come in their preparation within the somewhat vague limits of the normal standard, but who yet, from their tastes or their capacities, or both, can never be expected to become eminent scholars. This may not be the most interesting class, but our theological courses must necessarily be arranged mainly to meet their wants, and those who rise above, as well as those who fall below them, be provided for by special adaptations. They are to constitute the great mass of the active parochial clergy, and the tone of Christian teaching throughout the land must depend largely upon the impress made upon their minds. It is, therefore, all important to give them a sufficient knowledge of all departments of theology to enable them to pursue their

future work advantageously and respectably, to guard them from errors, and to furnish them with a proper theological balance. They should also be furnished with such insight into the vast fields of knowledge stretching out beyond their own attainments as may suffice to impress them with modesty, and possibly may awaken in some of them a zeal for a higher culture; but their strength ought not to be wasted in the vain effort to carry them beyond their powers or, sometimes, their wishes. For them it is particularly necessary that the theological course should be well proportioned in its several parts and, perhaps, even from time to time somewhat modified, as the powers of some eminent teacher may give an undue prominence to the studies over which he has control. As the instruction designed for this class constitutes the ordinary curriculum of our theological schools, nothing need be said of it beyond these general remarks, except to suggest one or two points in which we may aim to improve the ordinary methods of instruction.

Our methods, chiefly by lecture and by recitation, have been handed down from generation to generation and followed by us without much reflection as a matter of course. Meantime there has grown up around and among us a new set of studies, those of natural science, which are proved to have a very great charm for the human mind, and which are chiefly pursued by a very different method. Can we not in theology learn something from science, and impart to our studies also something of the freshness and charm which so fascinates the minds and awakens the eagerness of the students of natural science? With them, too, the lecture and the recitation are largely used, as is necessary in all instruction; but the tone and character of these is determined by another prominent feature in their system — the actual investigation of truth by the student himself under the guidance of his instructor. What would the study of chemistry be without the laboratory; or of botany without work in the field; or of zoölogy without dissection and comparative anatomy? Scientific institutions are ever increasing the

facilities for, and the requirment of, this sort of study. Physical laboratories have been only added to their appliances within the last few years, and still more recent is the furnishing of their course in mining with a full set of actual mining machinery, which their students are required to work practically as a part of their training. Even our colleges are coming more and more to work their scientific departments by courses of actual investigation in the various scientific laboratories. Of course, all this is done under the eye and the guidance of the instructor, and would be very useless labor for the tyro if it were otherwise. But it has for him all the charm of discovering the truth himself. It is a recognized principle that what is thus acquired becomes impressed upon the mind with a firmness of conviction that can be attained in no other way. Moreover, he thus learns to study for himself, and, if he have sufficient intelligence and skill, can afterwards go on to further knowledge by the same processes when, in the progress of life, he must necessarily lose the direction of his teachers. Can we not introduce very much more of the same system into our teaching of theology with corresponding advantage?

Superficial objections may easily be made to such a proposition. It may be said that the prime object of a theological institution is to teach its students, not merely to give them an opportunity to teach themselves. Strange pictures may be exhibited of the wild vagaries into which students would be likely to run if thus set upon working out their theology for themselves. But it is no more suggested that this should be done without careful guidance and instruction than that the student of chemistry should be turned loose in the laboratory to mix acids and alkalies, or heat fulminates, at his own sweet will. In fact, the method proposed would require an increase of labor on the part of the instructor in the intelligent guidance of the student, and the adaptation of the task to his capacity. But why should not the student be taught the criticism of the text by the actual handling, first in easy, then in more difficult cases, of the apparatus by

which the true reading is to be determined? Why in exegesis, after some training in its principles, should he not be required to work out expositions himself, and by showing him wherein and why he has gone astray in his earlier attempts, be led on practically to a sound system of interpretation? Why should he not be trained to prepare monographs on particular points or characters of ecclesiastical history, and to investigate for himself the causes or the consequences of certain particular events, his teacher all the while directing him where to find and how to use his material? Even in doctrinal theology much may be accomplished with the happiest results by teaching the student how to find out for himself from scripture, and from the history of the church, the due proportion of doctrine, and the proper limitations and qualifications of the statement of doctrine itself. In pastoral theology, the practical work spoken of at the beginning of this Article is already the foundation for the kind of teaching intended, only that it needs to be connected scientifically and systematically with the instructions of the lecture room. This plan is largely and most happily used in the *Seminar*, system in the German universities. Original work is required of all the members of the *Seminar* executed under the supervision of the professors; and, not infrequently, work has been done in this way of permanent value to the theological as well as to the general literary world.

The method suggested has been only imperfectly and inadequately described. Teachers who have made use of it at all are ever looking about for the means of giving it a wider application. It is capable of being so used as to give a new zest to the study of theology, and to fit men by means of that study in the seminary to become independent thinkers and sound reasoners in their later life. It has been naturally spoken of in connection with the largest class of students, but it applies to all, and is of especial importance in regard to that smaller class of which we come now to speak in the last place.

This third and last class is composed of those who are to become the future scholars in theology and the leaders of

theological thought. Their number relatively must be small, but in view of the future they constitute a very important class, and in any sufficient system of training their wants should be most carefully considered and amply provided for. Two considerations must form the basis of all plans in regard to them: (1) No man can be alike eminent in every department, and (2) every man must have a certain knowledge of all departments in order to prevent one-sidedness, and to give him, in a general theological culture, the proper basis for the higher researches in his own chosen specialty. The same considerations are at the basis of all higher education of every kind, and have elicited so much thought in other departments that we have much to guide us in their application to theology. Everywhere it is found that general culture must be insisted upon up to a certain point, and that beyond this the greatest result is to be attained by the introduction of specialties. So far it may be considered that we have only the enunciation of an indisputable maxim of all education. The difficulty is to fix the point where the general shall give place to the special. In fact, it may be said that all education is a continual progress from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, from uniformity and generality to differentiation and specialty. The earliest school instruction is the same for all, but before the academic course is run the pupils begin to be separated somewhat, either into different schools or different classes, according to their ulterior purposes in education. Having selected those who are to pursue a college course, and placed them there, experience has proved the necessity of introducing among them something of the elective system. This is not a question of whether one college may have carried that system too far, or another not far enough; it is believed to be already the conclusion of experience that something of the system must be adopted in all to develop the best results of a college course. The general statement must be the same for the study of theology, or of any other branch of knowledge; the general study must be pursued to a certain extent by all, and beyond

there must be electives for the higher training of each in his own chosen specialty. In following up the stream of knowledge as its branches ramify we must choose which of the branches we will pursue as our main study, and again, which of the branches of these, and so on to their ultimate ramifications. More than one, indeed, may be taken, and breadth is not to be sacrificed to thoroughness; still the general statement holds good, that the more advanced is any study the more special it must become. If this is generally true of preparatory studies, it must pre-eminently hold good of theology, which is the last preparatory study before the actual entrance upon the work of life.

But how shall this principle be applied to the study of theology? We are accustomed to regard the ordinary theological curriculum as embracing only that general theological culture which is necessary to every well-furnished minister; how can anything be deducted from this to make room for electives? Several methods have been proposed, prominent among which is the establishment of fellowships providing the means for post-graduate courses. Before considering these, let us distinctly set before our minds the object to be attained. A certain number of the better scholars are to receive the general culture deemed necessary for all, and, in addition to this, such special instruction in departments for which they have special taste or adaptation as shall fit them for the further pursuit of studies in those departments in after years. For this purpose the most obvious plan is that just mentioned, of establishing fellowships. This plan has the additional advantage, that the fellows could be employed in instruction in the special courses for those imperfectly prepared, and in other ways could be useful in the general economy of the institution. But excellent and desirable as it is, it may be doubted if it would be sufficient alone. It is unlikely that for a long time to come fellowships will be numerous enough to meet the required want. Again a post-graduate course requires a longer time devoted exclusively to study than can be given by many of those

whom it is most desirable to reach. In the hurry of our American life many of those best fitted for advanced study feel that they must press on; others, who can consent to the delay and can afford it, think to find a greater gain in a year of foreign travel, especially if a part of this can be in the East. Thus, while fellowships are exceedingly desirable and important, they cannot be entirely relied upon to meet the want. If they should become at all common, doubtless better provision would be made than there is now for courses of study adapted to them; but at present the absence of these is a further objection to placing much reliance upon them. At present, whatever is to be done practically must be accomplished within the term of the ordinary curriculum. What then can be done in this?

Practically the actual course of study in our theological institutions is, in many instances, something less than the theoretical requirement. Necessities arising from poverty, from sickness, and from a variety of other causes, almost always conspire to let men pass on and enter the ministry with something less than the accomplishment of the full curriculum. There has thus arisen a practical, though very indefinite, minimum of theological attainment, which is considerably below the normal standard. The suggestion is made that this ill-defined and scarcely acknowledged minimum should be openly acknowledged and distinctly marked; that it should then be absolutely required of all, and that the falling below this minimum standard should constitute an absolute bar to passing into the ministry; that above and beyond this the same amount of study should be required as is now demanded; but that it should be elective. For example: some knowledge of Hebrew should doubtless be required of all but those who pursue only a special course; and it should be required, not so much for the sake of the language itself, or in any expectation that its study will be continued beyond the seminary walls, as because a certain knowledge of its structure gives the student — often, perhaps, unconsciously — an insight into habits of thought and modes

of life of the people and the writers of scripture which can be acquired in no other way. In the scheme proposed, therefore, exemptions from the study of Hebrew should not exist at all, except for those professedly taking a partial course. But, on the other hand, it can hardly be doubted by any one separated by the lapse of several years from his theological course that a large part of the time usually spent upon Hebrew is to some of the students, if not time actually thrown away, yet time far less profitably spent than it might have been. Many, moreover, actually attain, as things now are, only the most elementary knowledge of the language. We would rescue this time for an elective, giving opportunity for greater progress in some other department; and, again, for some of the students we would rescue time from another department for a more thorough study of Hebrew with its cognate languages of Chaldee, Syriac, and Arabic. Similarly in ecclesiastical history; a certain knowledge of the general course of the church, of its great critical periods, and of the history of doctrine is absolutely essential to any theological culture, and should be absolutely required; but beyond this much is usually taught which makes almost no impression at all upon those who have little taste for history. After attaining what may be considered as the necessary knowledge of history, such students can evidently better give extra time and labor to some other department. It is unnecessary to particularize each of the several studies in this way; what is true of any one of them is, to a greater or less degree, true of all. There is something in all of them now nominally but not actually required, and this something, be it more or less, we would make elective, but elective in the sense that if not chosen some other elective must be taken in its place.

By such a system time would be saved in those studies to which the student is less inclined and, therefore, ordinarily (we speak of those having the maturity and the principle which must be supposed to belong to the theological student) less adapted; and the time thus saved would be devoted to those studies for which he has a special aptitude, or, at least,

in which he feels a special interest. The effect would be greatly enhanced if with this system were combined those modifications in the method of study which have been already suggested. By these means it is believed that, without imperilling the sufficiency of the ordinary course, a certain number of students may be carried far enough in particular studies to continue their pursuit in after life with zest and earnestness. As our course is at present arranged, the studious young man completes its requirements and enters upon life determined to keep up his studies, but with no very marked preference for, or advancement in, one rather than another. His parochial cares press upon him; he finds abundant occupation for his time; he studies a little in this department and a little in that; he soon finds that such dallying with a variety of subjects leads to very little result, and unless he be a man of strong purpose and of decidedly scholarly habits, he soon acquiesces in mediocrity, and comes to look upon the aspirations of his youth as vanished dreams. Had those aspirations had a more definite aim, and had he been carried through the first difficulties of advanced study upon any one subject, the result would probably have been very different. He would have known precisely what he wanted to study and also how to study it, and he would have been likely to study to purpose. A few generations of men thus trained to be scholars, some in one department, some in another, would tell powerfully upon the standard of theological culture in our land.

Can such a system be carried into effect with our existing means and appliances? Undoubtedly if carried to the extent which is desirable it would require more professional work, and ultimately more and special professors. But it may be brought into operation to a very important and useful degree just as we are. For the sake of its results as well as for the enjoyment of instructing them, most of our theological professors would gladly undertake a certain amount of extra labor for the benefit of special students whose electives would be directly in the line of their own chosen work. Beyond

this it would not be impracticable for men in one theological institution especially eminent in any department, by being relieved of something of their ordinary work, to help in another in their own specialty. When these means should fail the system would have advanced so far, and have developed so great usefulness, as to make a recognized demand for the establishment of special professorships, and meantime the men would have been in training to fill these when established. Thus we might even look forward to facilities in our own country for a degree of completeness and thoroughness of training in each specialty of theological acquirement which can now only be obtained by going abroad.

ARTICLE III.

AN EXPOSITION OF THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF GENESIS I. AND II.

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§ 5. "Without Form and Void."

"Now[1] the land was without form and void." It was the יַבָּשָׁה, "the solid land." It was in existence, and in the state here described. But, as God himself testifies by Isaiah

[1] The Hebrew particle Vav (וְ), like the Greek *καί*, has a great variety of meanings. Noldius, in his Concordance, specifies some seventy or eighty. It is sufficient here to say, that not infrequently it has the force of our word "now" in its sense of "at this time," as in our version Gen. iii. 1; xii. 1. And again, the force of "now" as a conjunction to introduce an explanation, as in Gen. xviii. 1: "*Now*, he sat in the tent-door," etc. In this case, the account which follows is "explanatory" of how, or in what manner, "the Lord appeared unto Abraham,"—the statement immediately preceding. The conjunction וְ intervenes to *indicate* this explanation. A case, we conceive, precisely parallel to the one in hand, "God created the heaven and the earth. Now (וְ) the earth was," etc. The Vav indicating a coming explanation of the preceding statement: "Now" (i.e. it was on this wise that God did create them) "the earth was without form," etc., to the close of the narrative. In either of these cases, the *natural* effect of the translation "and," which appears in our version, is to *reverse* the time-order of the statements. In Gen. xviii. 1, to represent that God *first* ap-

(xlv. 18) "*not*" such "did he create it." He found it (so to speak) in this state before he did that which he calls "creating it." His creating it took place *after* it had been such, and, of course, after it began *to be*.

Let us examine the clause before us particularly and in detail.

"The earth was." The land-earth was *in existence*. The language is very definite. It naturally signifies, to all pupil-readers, that the self-same land, or earth, which is the subject of the whole discourse — the self-same land-earth on which we live — was actually existing then just as now, just as we know it; that is, *substancely* the same — in no one sense and in no one degree different, except as hereinafter set forth. We have no right to think otherwise.

We say the language is very definite; not "God created earth; earth was," but "God created *the* earth. Now *the* earth was." There is the same emphatic, rigid, individualizing definiteness in the fourth commandment; though it wrongly disappears in our version: "On six days did Jehovah make *the* earth." No Israelite at the foot of the mount *could* have understood this as of any other or different earth than the very one on which he stood, unchanged, save by the making.

peared to Abraham, and that *afterwards* Abraham "sat in the door of his tent," etc. But the nature of the narrative forbids this construction; and so clearly that every reader reads "and," but understands "now," or, "on this wise it was." The same force, we conceive, pertains to the same particle in Gen. i. 2, and most pertinently. In this case, as in the other, a wrong index is given by the rendering "and." In neither case with "now" can any space of time be plausibly or naturally supposed between the first statement and what follows. In each case with "now" the brief statement and the explanatory are bound together, or rather are *identified* by the conjunction. And in each the conjunction *indicates* that the account following it is *explanatory* of the brief announcement before it. We have as much textual reason for saying that there is a hiatus of a thousand years, or of ten thousand, between the two clauses of Gen. xviii. 1, as for saying that there is a like hiatus between Gen. i. 1 and Gen. i. 2. The construction is precisely the same in each case. We do not regard the Septuagint as authority. Yet it is very noticeable how its translators in this particular case understood the Hebrew particle. In all other cases, throughout this chapter, they express it by καί; but here they express it by δέ. They do so also in iii. 1; x. 1; xii. 1; xvi. 1, where our version reads "now"; and also in iv. 1; xiii. 1; xiv. 1, where our version has "and."

On the eve of its creative experience, this *our* earth was. This unit mass was then. This, we say, is involved in the simple formula, "The earth (the solid) was." We have a right to say so, because the writer, not making distinction, by name or otherwise, between the earth proper before creating and after, *gives* us the right to say so. And if any one say that *that* earth was not a self *by* itself, or that *that* earth was another and a different self from *this*, then he must show good cause, and must find his cause in the text.

We make another memorandum. If the words "the earth was," by any adroit exegesis, can be so construed as not to express a real individuality, then, in the paper before us, we have no statement that our earth ever has been individualized, or even that it is now. If it is not in these words recognized as a unified body, separate from all other matter, then its unification is nowhere recognized through the whole account.

"The earth was *without form*" — a translation responsible for many mistakes and for much perplexity. The Hebrew word is (תֹהוּ) *tohu*. This word and its companion word (בֹּהוּ) *bohu*, "a void," are not defined in the context, and neither is repeated. Each has a meaning, which we must find if we can.

In one instance, the word *tohu*, "without form," is rendered by the phrase "the empty place" (Job xxvi. 7), explained in the next clause by (בְּלִימָה) "nothing." In one instance (Job vi. 18) it is rendered by the word "nothing." Each, rightly enough. It is also rendered "for nought" (Isa. xxix. 21), meaning for what is worth nothing. Again, it is rendered by the word "confusion," as applied to "molten images" (Isa. xli. 29). But as idols are neither confusion nor *no* things, the better rendering is, "worth nothing," as in Isa. xxix. 21. The same is its meaning when rendered by the word "vanity" (1 Sam. xii. 21; Isa. xl. 23; xliv. 9; xlv. 19; lix. 4). In other instances it signifies "a wilderness," "a desert," "a waste," "a desolation" (Deut. xxxii. 10; Job xii. 24; Psa. cvii. 40).

These are all the passages in which the word occurs, except

a few which we shall soon cite. However, we have really nothing to do with its meaning, except in its *terrene*, or *geographic*, applications. We take up, then, only its signification last mentioned, — a desert, a waste, a desolation, — as being purely applicable to the case in hand. With this *caveat*, however, — that as in the texts from which we have last quoted it we have no means of deciding, from the context, the antecedent condition or history of the several tracts of which it is predicated, — that is, no means of deciding whether they had always been desolations, or whether they had become such through some lack or by some judicial blight, — so in the case before us we have no means of deciding, from the context, whether the earth had been always a desolation, or whether it had been made such through some lack or by some judicial blight.

The first passage we cite as explanatory of the terrene signification of this word is "The city of confusion (*tohu*) is broken down" (Isa. xxiv. 10). Here the *tohu* (the wasteness, the desolation) of the city is explained by the words "broken down." A city of *tohu* is a city *in ruins*. This is graphically illustrated by the context: "The Lord maketh the land *empty* and *waste*, ... utterly emptied and utterly *spoiled*. . . . . In the city is left *desolation*, and the gate is smitten with *destruction*."

We now turn to the only remaining texts where this word is found, and where it stands (as in Gen. i. 2) in immediate connection with *bohu*, "a void." "For[1] he shall stretch out upon it [that is, upon the land of Idumea] the line of confusion (תֹּהוּ) and the stones of (בֹּהוּ, *bohu*) emptiness" (Isa. xxxiv. 11); that is, The Lord shall mete out to it the allotment of a *desolation* and the doom of *a void*. Now look

[1] In our version the pertinence and force of the Hebrew particle (וְ) Vav is lost by the translation "and." With this conjunction the sentence seems to have no business there. It has the aspect of an interpolation. We give to the particle the rendering "for," or "because," which seems to us to be imperatively required by the context. Thus read, the sentence, otherwise irrelevant, assumes the highest importance; indicating impressively the *cause* of the fearful judgments described in the preceding and in the following context. For this signification of the particle, see Gesenius in וְ No. 4; Noldius וְ No. 30, p. 298.

at the context: "The streams, pitch; the dust, brimstone; the land, burning pitch; thorns in the palaces of the kingdom, nettles and brambles in her fortresses; the whole country a habitation of dragons, a court for owls; a trysting-place for wild beast, satyr, screech-owl, and vulture; lying *waste* from generation to generation."

Such is the awful and graphic definition of the *tohu*, or "desolation," which was to be awarded to Idumea. But she was also to receive an allotment of *bohu* — "voidness," "emptiness." What was *that?* The context explains: The "great slaughter; the land soaked with blood; no nobles in the kingdom; her princes nothing; no one passing through her borders" — in *this* was to be her voidness, her emptiness, her *bohu* — a voidness of *life*. The ruin of her habitations, the *tohu;* her *depopulation*, the *bohu* which the Lord was to bring upon Idumea. Very clear illustrations, these, of these two words.

In Jer. iv. 23 we have the same entire phrase, both in Hebrew and in English, which occurs in Gen. i. 2: "The earth [was] without form and void." In verses 20, 27, the same word which is here carelessly rendered "the earth" is rendered "the land," and rightly; for the subject of discourse is *the land of Judah*. It is *this land*, or country, which the prophet prophetically describes as "without form and void"; literally and truly, "*a* desolation and *a* void." As with the text cited from Isaiah, so with this. Before it and after it are to be found the *illustrative* definitions of its terms.

"We are spoiled" — laid waste (Gesenius, שָׁדַד, Pual form). "Destruction upon destruction! The whole land laid waste, even to its tents and curtains; the fruitful place a wilderness; all the cities broken down; the whole land desolate." Here is its *tohu*, "desolation," dire and complete.

"Lo, *no man!*" Even "all the birds of the air fled! the whole city fled into thickets or climbed up upon the rocks; every city forsaken, and not a man dwelling therein." Here is the *bohu*, the "voidness" of Judah — voidness of *life* — not a man, not a bird.

In this case, as well as in the former, the ruin and the dispeopling of the land are represented as the effects of God's judicial visitation: "City and fruitful place broken down at the presence of the Lord, and by his fierce anger." Such, too, was the judicial visitation in the case we first cited (Isa. xxiv. 10): "The Lord had spoken the word; ..... *therefore* had the curse devoured the land."

We should take special note: In each case the *antecedent* conditions of the two lands, Idumea and Judah, is involved as part and parcel of the idea expressed both by *tohu*, their "desolation," and by *bohu*, their "voidness." This appears, because the antecedent condition *was* their condition when these prophetic words were given, and because the whole reality of each class of woe depended upon what the antecedents were. The "desolation" foretold was a desolation *in lieu* of things *constructed*, a ruin of what had been made for a shelter, or for a defence, or for a joy — palace, fortress, garden, field, stream. The formed things *wrecked;* the useful *made useless;* the beautiful *made repulsive;* the whole *made a ruin.* In like manner, the "voidness" was a voidness *in lieu of fulness* — no people where *had been* a people.

Not that Idumea and Judah *themselves* were to have no *configuration* ("without form"), either of geographic outline or of superficial feature, but that every useful and every beautiful form, whether shaped by nature or by art, which pertained to them, was to be laid in ruin. Nor, again, that Idumea or Judah were to become "void" in the sense of having no thing in them, or that they themselves were to become "nothingness"; such language would be absurd; but simply that, alive with people to day, they should become void *of people* to-morrow.

These, and Isa. xlv. 18,[1] are the only remaining instances in the Scriptures, except Gen. i. 2, in which the word *tohu* occurs; the only other ones in which the word *bohu* occurs. And here, as in Genesis, the two occur in marked and significant conjunction. But in these two instances they are

[1] See *ante* § 1, Vol. xxxiii. p. 514.

each accompanied with full and clear illustrations of their meanings. Their surroundings — that is, the defining context — we feel compelled to receive as their divine definitions.

In one instance, the word *tohu* describes the "desolation" peculiar to a ruined city. In the two other instances, it describes a like "desolation" on a larger scale. In each case it evidently expresses what it does not evidently express in those cases where it is rendered "desert" or "wilderness." In these latter cases it expresses a simple idea, — a bald fact, without any hint of its antecedents, — and is applied to districts which, so far as we know, contained no monuments of their past in the shape of ruins. In the three cases (Isa. xxiv. 10; xxxiv. 11; Jer. iv. 23) it presents a compound idea; that is, not merely the idea of desolation, but also that of previous constructions; and not only the idea of previous constructions, but of such constructions demolished. So that, in these three cases, we do not get an idea of the *whole fact* expressed by the word, unless we embrace that of a city or a country before occupied by "palaces," "fortresses," and other dwellings, by "fruitful fields" and refreshing "streams." *De-structure-ing* is what it means, not a mere lack of structures.

Therefore, to translate the word by the phrase "without form" may be literally correct, so far as it goes. But the phrase is fitted to mislead the English reader, and therefore is unfortunate. In English idiom its natural import is, "having itself no form," "being of no form." But this was not true of either the city or of Idumea or of the land of Judah. The city had outlines, or configuration, or form, before and after its ruin. So had each territory. But even if we render *tohu* "without *forms*," meaning without structures, natural or artificial, we present but a *negative* idea. Whereas its true import, as made evident by the context, is *positive* and *retrospective*, indicating former structures brought to ruins; indicating, of the city and of the country alike, that they did contain the *relics* of forms structurally destroyed.

In three instances, however, the word evidently represents only "a wilderness" or "a desert," and is properly so translated in our version. These words signify a tract without dwellings; often, without flourishing vegetation; sometimes, without any vegetation. In these instances there is nothing in the context by which we can judge whether the places so denominated were once, or were never, flourishing, fertile, and beautiful. But this we know — a tract blossoming as the rose does not prove that it was not once a desert (Isa. xxxv. 1). This, also, we know — a tract being now barren does not prove that it was not once a very garden of the Lord. And any one who may deny either statement has the burden of proof upon himself. But we know more — that many a tract of country, once teeming with wealth and beauty, *has become* a barren desert; that God's own choice vineyard has been laid waste, and judicially — so waste that ten acres of vines have yielded but thirty quarts of wine, and eight bushels of seed but twenty-six quarts (Isa. v. 10); that the holy land, once proverbially prolific, is now, comparatively, but a sterile waste. And this we do *not* know — that any one of those three districts of country to which *tohu* is applied in the sense of a desolation *was not once* as laden with harvests, or as glowing with verdure, as the most fertile tract which has ever graced the world.

There seems, however, to be some testimony upon this point. At the close of his creative work, — "creating the land unto an inhabiting," — "God saw *everything* which he had made, and behold, *very* good." Whatever of the land was accessible to inhabiters was inhabitable, truly fitted for their inhabiting — for the purpose, "very good." Not only the garden in Eden, but every place where the man or the beast might go. As it came from the creative hand the *whole* was "very good" — fertile, beautiful, good to dwell in. No stunted, imperfect, ungainly growth, no repulsive barren, no howling wilderness, no scorching Sahara, no thistles, no thorns. And whatever place the Bible has called *tohu* must have lapsed from its primitive goodness, and become such; its

very wasteness pointing to a beautiful past; like a cenotaph, speechlessly telling of an absent life and an absent glory.

These things being so, and it also being true that in three cases in which the word *tohu* is applied to portions of land its retrospective meaning is obscure, and that in three like cases such meaning is clear, is it wrong, is it presuming, is it chicane, to argue from the last to the first—from the clear to the obscure? If we reason that these several portions of land to which this term is applied *without* intimations of their former state had once been like those to which it is applied *with* such intimations, who shall convict us of going beyond the book?

We *do* so reason, and, we think, fairly. Reasoning that, in cases not illustrated, this term has a retrospective significance of thrift and fertility, we think we have our justification — enough, at least, to quit us of presumption or of trickery — in the same retrospective significance of the term where its significance is unquestionable; in other words, an exegetical justification, and, of course, an exegetical right. With one restriction, however, and only one; that is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Nay, more, we think we have the exegetical right to transfer to all cases in which this word occurs the very force which it holds where its force is clear. To all cases! and by exegetical right! Of course, then, to the only case not yet adduced—to the one important case in Genesis where the exigency requires a definition from without. In this instance, then, without assumption and for exegetical reasons, we claim:

That the word *tohu* in the Mosaic text imports not only an absence of all structures upon the solid land, but also the previous existence of structures there which had been *de*-structured.

Who can say rightfully, upon evidence taken from the paper itself, or upon other reliable evidence, that the solid land, then a *tohu*, "a desolation," had *not* before been a garden of wealth and beauty? We think we have as much right, and more, and upon Bible testimony too, to say that

it *had* been — provided there be nothing in the account we are studying to contradict or to make against us. And if there be nothing such and here, why should we not retain our definition?

The earth was also "a void." Except in this case, the word *bohu*, "a void," occurs in the Bible but twice. Those instances we have produced. In each case it indisputably expresses a void of *life*, of living *inhabiters*. But this is not all; the *wiping away* of living inhabiters is also signified.

As *tohu* signifies a de-structure-ing, so does *bohu* signify a de-people-ing. We may say, and with perfect confidence, that this is its true and only meaning; and we have no right to attach any other meaning to it in the first chapter of Genesis.

The earth was not a *vacuum;* for it was a *thing*. The earth was not a *vacuum;* for it was an entity, and a "solid" entity; not void itself of life, but having no life upon it, and having had life upon it before. Just like the *bohu* of Idumea; just like the *bohu* of Judah. It once had living inhabiters; but they had been swept away — living vegetations, living creatures. Can any one sustain, *Hebraically*, any other meaning of the word? And, if not, will it not be ungenerous to find fault with ours?

But more. It being certain that *bohu* means living inhabiters *gone*, the whole point of pre-existing *structural forms* is necessarily conceded. It is involved even in this very word. Judging, as we must, from our own knowledge and experience of life, we cannot hold the idea of living inhabiters without holding the idea of co-present habitations, or, at least, of other structural forms — vegetation, for instance — adapted to the wants and comfort of living inhabiters, and from which habitations proper might be constructed. And thus even the word *bohu*, over and above its own distinctive and peculiar import, seems to contain within itself the *very* strong intimation of such structural forms as are specially and plainly indicated by its companion word *tohu*. So that, when we apply only the word *bohu* to the world before its

creating, we do hold logically, even if unawares, the co-genial idea of pre-existing structural forms such as pre-existing lives do shadow forth.

In like manner, *tohu*, retrospective, contains within itself the *very* strong intimation of the co-presence of living inhabiters. For what were the structural forms *for*, were there no living inhabiters for them, or at hand, and about to be for them?

Thus the one word echoes the other, and the other the one. Twin words, sounding a pleasing harmony — twin words, each meaning the more when side by side; each pointing to the great past; each testifying, in its own way and responsively, of the tireless effluence of him who filleth all.

To conclude this matter: Even leaving out of account the debatable word *tohu*, or putting upon it such construction as caprice may elect or theory advise, the word *bohu* remains, unequivocal, inflexible. In each other case, accompanied by the same illustrative definings, which *we* are not bold enough to question or lithe enough to evade. In each other case it stands designating a former home of rational living beings. Therefore, having here no definition of any kind, it here stands either as an unknown quantity or as designating what it so clearly designates there — a former home of rational living beings.

The earth, then, at that point of its being where the sacred writer takes it up, was a (תהו) structureless "desolation" and (בהו) "a life-void"; not itself a confused chaotic mass, having no configuration; but a "solid," having had pertainings of individual forms, great or small, useful or beautiful, simple or complicated, — either or all; which parasite forms were now strewed upon it or entombed within it, part and parcel of it, spoiled, demolished, *in ruins*. No such form, except prostrate and "broken down," pertained to it now. They had pertained to it in their perfectness; but that was in its past.

But, moreover, this "solid," the earth, was "voidness," or "a life-void." Not that it was, and yet was "nothing-

ness." This would be using words without sense. And not that it had no thing pertaining to it and corporate of it; for the ruins of its forms were there — "broken-down" monuments of its mystic antiquity, scattered up and down, hither and yon, in wild and awful chaos; like the after wreck of cities, of fortresses, of palaces, of fruitful places upon the humbled bosoms of Judah and Idumea. "Void," indeed, but not void of things. "Void," indeed, but not void, and never void, of these. "Void," indeed, but only void of its old inhabiters. Like Idumea and Judah, it was now *bohu* — empty of its proper lives. It had had them; but they were gone. Whatever may have been the forms of the lives which had pertained to it before, they were extinct or banished. Once full of inhabiters, now peeled; as *after* it was with Idumea, when "all her host [inhabiters proper] had fallen down as the leaf from the vine, as the fig from the fig-tree." As *after* it was with Judah, when her inhabiters proper had left her cities "void," had scud to the thickets and scaled the rocks.

But yet again, at this point of its hoar existence the "solid" — the earth — was stripped of its old forms and of its old lives, *because* "broken down at the presence of the Lord by his fierce anger, in the day of his vengeance." And as it was after, "when God spoke, purposed, would not repent nor turn back," so it was with the earth, upon the eve of her new genesis, and as a token of the same displeasure, merged in tears and draped with blackness (comp. Jer. iv. 28; Gen. i. 2). Such were the *tohu* and the *bohu* of Idumea and Judah; and such — the Lord being our expounder — were the *tohu* and the *bohu* of the pre-Adamite earth.

We see now, in a new and clearer light, the peculiar force of God's own testimony on this very point: "Not a *tohu* [a waste, a desolated place] did I *create* the earth." [1] It could not have been brought into such a condition by a *creative* act; it must have been by an *un*creative act. Desolating and depeopling are not *con*structing, but *de*structing; not

[1] *Ante* § 1, Vol. xxxiii., p. 514.

genesistic, but *un*genesistic; not shaping, but *un*shaping; not making, but *un*making. To describe demolition and death, "creating" is an unfit word, an antagonistic word. Excepting events purely as such, it belongs only to constructing, to form, to life.

One word in justification of our course in finding the meaning of these important words. The mere fact that they appear here for the first time does not give them lordship over their brethren. It does not vest these identical words with the power of the keys.[1] Here they lack the lexical element. They are like unknown algebraic quantities, which we can work out only by terms which are known. With such terms, in other places, they stand in close connection, and by that connection they are illumined. What they mean in one place, they mean in another. Beyond, we find what they mean. From beyond we bring them, thus illumined, to this text, where the exigency calls for light. This is as lawful as in any other case. Such appeal to usage is always made by cautious interpreters.

If, however, some one yet urge that *tohu* and *bohu* elsewhere do get their meaning from *tohu* and *bohu* here, let us put the rule to a test. We find definitions (purely conjectural) of the words here, such as these: "formlessness," "darkness," "irregularity of outward extent," "a fluid or rarefied condition, with an absence of all solidity or cohesion," "chaos," or "abyss bottomless, unfathomable"; תְּהוֹם "the deep," and תֹּהוּ "a desolation" assumed to be synonymes. But if we receive such definitions, how will they answer in other places? Why, they lead us necessarily to the very strange statements: That *the land* of Idumea and *the land* of Judah were each formlessness; darkness; unsolid, uncohering fluidity; having irregularity of outward extent; chaos or an unformed mass; an abyss, bottomless, fathomless. We cannot so read the prophets, and therefore decline such a rule of interpretation, with our firm, but fraternal protest. Finding elsewhere, as we have done, the meaning of the

[1] Compare Prof. Lewis, in Lange, p. 132.

words, and transferring their meaning thus found, we avoid all such practical annoyance.

We therefore claim that, in applying to this Hebrew phrase on the first page of the Bible the definition of it which we find, in such varied and glowing language, on the other pages where it occurs, we are not rash, or bold, or pseudo-exegetical. We claim that we have taken our key from good hands, and that we have used it, under dutiful compulsion only, to unlock the text. Can any one, for a different interpretation, offer a better authority? If *tohu* and *bohu* do not mean what we have said, for pity's sake let some one better gifted tell us plainly, categorically, and on other grounds than mere surmise, what they do mean!

It may be revolting and humiliating — this idea that our own home is but an old Golgotha of an old past. But even if we repudiate the textual idea, we cannot be rid of the idea. We cannot be rid of the omnipresent and heraldic fact. The great text-book of fossils reveals it. Equally the great text-book of natural life; for this very life — vegetable, brute, human, alike — does but pillow itself on the ruins of life, and get its very aliment from the ashes of death. We eat the past; we drink it; we are vestured with it. Death is our life; our life is but death; and our deaths, in turn, will nourish lives to come. Every inch of earth is sepulchred. On the fatness of that sepulchre all life riots. Such has been the ceaseless chemistry of nature's laboratory since — the death of Abel? Such it was before. Adam, even in his innocence, must eat the herb-seed and the tree-fruit. For Adam's life the seed and the fruit must die. The sermon is a sermon in perpetuity. It is being preached to every generation. Its text for perpetuity is this very *tohu* and *bohu*. And it is placed here, on the first line of the world's history, purposely, it may be, — seasonably, without a may-be, — to humble us. That is all. If it be revolting to us, and repelling, it is not blotted out.

But does not this Golgothic idea cut us off from all connection with that shadowy past, physically, historically,

morally? Suppose it does. Should we hanker for the connection? Or, sceptical about such excision as conflicting with divine analogies, should we refuse it our faith if it is expressed in the record? Or ought such seemingly unseemly excision to modify our interpretation? But change the question. *Does* this idea preclude such connection? Why, the same planet which is our natal home was that of pregenesistic lives. Our lives are interlinked with theirs, by history, by kinship, so far as we are dust of the same dust, and to the same dust return. And as there is a moral vibration coming to us from the modern cemetery of our own construction, or from the ubiquitous cemetery of the post-Adamic world, so is there a moral vibration of even a more solemn tone coming to us from the older cemetery of the lives before. It touches us; and therefore we value, as a great moral lesson of which we would not be deprived, our pregnant interpretation of the phrase before us. The doom of those dead of that *bohu* forewarns us. As are the moral connection and the retrospective impressiveness of the Noachian deluge and its ensepulchred lives, such are the moral connection and the retrospective impressiveness of the pre-Adamic deluge and its ensepulchred lives.

Once more, the idea of a new construction out of an old past, and of a new life out of an old death, may jar with all that is most sublime in our traditional conceptions of this Mosaic narrative. It may be out of harmony with our wonted ideas of God's great work in *universal* nature. It is. It must be. But which string is in fault? And yet, in this simple *one*-world creating there is left for us as much of sublimity as we can manage. As much? No; a sublimity too large and too intense for our managing. We find it in the one dominant and pervading idea, disclosed hereafter, of a Logos-power, which only *wills*, and *it is*. Less of vastness in one little world and its creating, but co-equal sublimity. But captiousness is unseemly here. We should be only humble pupils before this oracle.

"Darkness was upon the face of the deep." This word

"the deep" (תְּהוֹם) is almost a synonyme of the word "waters" (מַיִם), with which the verse closes. The only difference seems to be that the latter word is used to designate *any* waters; the former, that particular mass of waters which God called "seas." The earth — the solid — was clad in waters. This is not distinctly stated here; but it is by the Psalmist (civ. 5–9) when describing the same event — "the laying of the foundations of the earth": "Thou didst cover it [the land] with the deep *as with a garment.* The waters stood above the mountains." Thus it was: The earth was mantled with waters; the waters were mantled with darkness. Such was the condition of the earth — the solid — when God took it in hand to "create it even unto an inhabiting."

Darkness was upon the surface of the watery mass; and the energizing power of God (Gesenius, רוּחַ, No. 4) was hovering over the surface of the waters; not yet operating upon, but ready to operate. The great deep — the sea (יָם, Job xxxviii. 8) — "broken forth as if it had issued out of the womb." Then did God make "thick darkness its swaddling-band, the cloud its natal garment." And now, as he was about to remand it, to enwomb it again, to shut it up once more "a sea with doors," the Jehovah-presence, silent, invisible, potent, like an eagle poised upon the wing (Deut. xxxii. 11) "was hovering" over this rebellious birth, just ready to bring back all things here to their old relations, to new order and form and beauty.

Let us review the ground over which we have passed, take note of some negative points to be kept in mind, and gather up those which have been textually unlocked. The negative points are important.

1. The earth does not comprise the *world*, but only its solid portion. 2. Nor does this signify that all the world was solid, except the waters. 3. Nor does it in the least degree indicate whether this solid, or whether this and the waters and the appertainings of each, had any describable shape — cubic, spherical, or otherwise. 4. Nor does it imply either that the solid had been solid always, or that it had not been solid always.

The points brought out are also important, and are very suggestive:

1. Before the "creating" there was a solid. 2. It was this very individual solid on which we live. 3. This solid had been the domicile of living creatures. 4. It had been graced with structural forms of natural symmetry and beauty. 5. It had been desolated; its lives and its forms alike extinct. 6. The mass remained, under deluge and under darkness.

These simple facts, we say, are suggestive. This world and that the same. We are, therefore, justified in reasoning from this to that. The one fact of identity indicates that we may, that we ought, that we are expected to. Indeed, we can hardly avoid it, if we reason at all. The fact is an index-finger, and we ought to see that to which it points.

1. This our world is not alone; that world, the same, not alone. The inference is indicated; that is all. It is not demonstration, by any means. We get at it, however, by something like a logical, although instinctive, propulsion, but which has an authority *sui generis*. To us it would seem very odd, very unlike anything we have ever seen; very unlike anything, but the fabled Phenix, of which we have ever heard, — a solitary world. Nature does not teach of such a thing. Reasoning does not. It is clean against all biblical analogies. Therefore we adopt our inference — that the old world, like the new (ours), was a world among worlds — a world having its fellows.[1]

[1] We cannot understand why it is so positively asserted by cosmogonic interpreters that the world "was not astronomically arranged" when in the state described in this second verse. We will state briefly our own views, without assuming to be dogmatical. When the first mass went off from the original incandescent nebula, its centrifugal force must have increased the distance between the two until the projectile had reached a point where the centrifugal and the centripetal exactly balanced each other. At this point, it seems to us, the separated body must have received orbital motion, and in ordinary cases, axial motion. The same must have been true in regard to other separated bodies; and also when these bodies, in like manner, were further separated. If we are correct in this, there could have been no time after the breaking up of the original nebula, when any one of the primitive photospheres was *not* "astronomically arranged."

But this throws us plump upon a coexisting cosmos, antedating the creating here described. Be it so. It throws us, too, upon the same cosmos. Be it so, also; we accept the position.

2. This our world peopled, and with structural forms for its people; that world peopled too, and with structural forms for its people. This not an inference only, but also a fact stated in the writing. From this fact we reckon. We cannot look upon it with a dazed and gaping mind; we have no right to.

We do not know, indeed, that those peoples were just like ourselves; nor that those surrounding forms were just like the forms surrounding ourselves. Of course, we do not know that they all had necessities just like ours; so that we cannot reason assuredly from ourselves and ours to them and theirs. Yet, so far as we can judge, in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, both the animal and the vegetable lives then on this same world must have had necessities like ours, in the main, and like surroundings to meet those necessities. They must have had a sun.[1] If so, their sun, ours; as their world, ours. And thus we are thrown again, by another route, but from the same Mosaic premise, upon a coexisting cosmos, antedating this Mosaic "creating," and identical with our own. With a double confidence, therefore, we accept the position. And with a double confidence we claim the position as one to which we are rightly led from our premises.

But we claim more. The writer, or rather his Divine Supervisor, tells us, before his history opens, that *this* world had been peopled — *this* world, which is in *this* cosmos, and under *this* sun. Now, can we possibly and rationally imagine this world in its aforetime, and having, as now, living

[1] Without pretentions to cosmic science we venture to make exception, away from exegetical ground, to the common assertion that "there was no sun" before the fourth Mosaic day. The remnant, after separations, of the grand original nebula was never extinguished. It has always been a sun. So also have been the remnants of its projected masses after *their* subdivisions. If so, there has *always* been one sun, from the first moment of primordial light, and *always* other suns, even before any worlds had ceased to be self-luminous.

denizens, yet without the same cosmos and the same sun? If not, then does the writer thrust us upon the position we have accepted; and he meant to do so. He meant to be understood as he knew that we should perforce understand him. He meant clearly to indicate that this world, when before inhabited, had the same astronomical surroundings and the same astronomical habitudes as now — the same sun and the same motions. What we claim more is, therefore, "by divine right." By this right we hold our position, and shall hold it, unless and until we find that our divine right is an illusion.

Pending this catastrophe, we ask: What right has any one to hold and to teach that the world was *not* astronomically arranged when it was *tohu* and *bohu?* What right to hold and to teach that then there was *no* sun? Again and again and again have we met with these (expository!) assertions; but we cannot remember that we have *ever met with a single reason given.*

ARTICLE IV.

IMPLEMENTS OF THE STONE AGE A PRIMITIVE DEMARCATION BETWEEN MAN AND OTHER ANIMALS.[1]

BY JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, D.D., LL.D., BERLIN, PRUSSIA.

WHEREVER on the face of the globe there is found an implement of any sort, we say, at once, Man has been here. It may be that, as in the caves in the Dordogne, there are rude sketches of art to associate the flint and bone implements with the handiwork of man; or, as in the lake findings in Switzerland, there may be traces of human habitations to identify the stone utensils with the building of the pile-dwellings; or, as in the shell-mounds (Kjokkenmöddings) of Denmark, a ruined hearth-stone and the bones of birds and animals of the chase, skilfully opened for their marrow, may point to man as the maker and user of the implements found in these heaps of refuse; and it may even happen that sometimes in the same place of deposit with the primitive implements of stone is found an indubitable relic of man himself, in a small fragment of the human skeleton. Yet in all these cases the implement itself, apart from its accessories, is an argument for the presence of man. The implement certifies the man as really as the man certifies the implement. This no one would think of disputing; but I give emphasis to the unanimity of science on this point, because of its bearing upon the primitive *differentia* of man as a species. We say, If man was indeed contemporary with these wild denizens of the caves, then these are the weapons with which he slew them, the implements with which he prepared them for his food; and the finding of the implements imbedded with the animal remains is evidence that man was contemporary with such animals.

[1] A paper read at the "Congrès International d'Anthropologie et d'Archéologie préhistoriques," at Budapest, Hungary, September 1876.

If we go back to the river-drift gravels, as, for instance, in the valley of the Somme, where we have no trace of human habitations or other works, and perhaps no authentic specimen of a human bone, but simply compare one stone with another, we say, again: Man was here at the remote period of this formation; for these flints are shapen, adapted to a use, and are no longer stones, but implements. We may raise the question whether the findings are genuine or forgeries, whether "the flint implements are of the same age as the beds in which they are found," or have come there by accident, or have sifted down from some later deposit; but if they are genuine, and of the same age with the drift, we hold them for conclusive proof that man was there in that age.

But in making this decision, do we not unconsciously impose upon ourselves with the tacit presumption that only man is capable of making and using an implement? Science cannot admit a presumption, except as a tentative hypothesis; she must rest all her conclusions on the known basis of fact. But that only man is capable of making an implement is a fact of observation and experience, and not merely a presumption *à priori* from something in the nature of man. Such a presumption is, indeed, valid as against physical nature. Wherever we perceive adaptation to an end we do immediately ascribe such adaptation, or the thing so adapted, to an intelligent purpose. Whether this reference of adaptation to intelligence is intuitive, or the result of cumulative experience, this is not the place to argue. Suffice it to say, that wherever adaptation is found, the conviction of the human mind is immediate, universal, and absolute, that there was enough of foresight and skill to produce that adaptation. But we never ascribe such foresight and skill, such intelligent purpose, to physical nature. Nature furnishes the stone and the iron; but nature does not make the hammer, the knife, the axe, the spear. Nature abounds in materials of which man can build himself a house; but beyond the cave in the earth and the leafy covert in the wood, she provides nothing

for his habitation. The crude material lies in the lap of nature; but the shaping of this material to any use or end requires a degree of intelligent purpose of which we find in inorganic nature no trace nor suggestion. Hence, as against inorganic nature, the presumption does hold *à priori*, that man, as a creature of intelligence, is alone capable of making an implement, of transforming inorganic matter into a tool for use.

But this presumption from the nature of man does not hold as against other animals. For, though intelligence must be presupposed wherever we perceive adaptation, yet whether other animals than man possess the kind or degree of intelligence requisite to fashioning an implement for a specific purpose, is a question of fact that only observation can determine; and observation has decided this in the negative. There is no instance on record of any animal making an implement for a special use or end. There are animals and birds that use the materials of physical nature with much ingenuity and skill in building their houses and nests. It is enough to instance the intelligence of the beaver in adapting stone, wood, earth, and water to his wants, and in surmounting the obstacles to his task in some less favorable site. There are tribes of *Simiae* that use stones and sticks for cracking nuts or as weapons of defence. But all this is far removed from the making of implements for a purposed use. The beaver chooses his stones and breaks or twists his sticks; but he never shapes a stone with which to cut and shape a stick. The chimpanzee takes a stone to crack a nut; but he takes it up a stone, and lays it down again a stone; he never shapes it to a hammer, fits it with a handle, to be reserved for this special use. The baboon throws a stone to wound or frighten his enemy. He never shapes the stone to a spear-head or a battle-axe, to be kept by him for the service of war. No animal goes beyond using the crude material that nature furnishes. He may use this skilfully and well, adapting it to his own necessities; but he does not improve upon nature, does not change the form of

her crude material, making of this an instrument for higher ends; does not make an implement in the sense which we attach to that word in the hands of man. Hence the implement is a line of demarcation between man and other animals. This fact, again, is well-nigh universally accepted by differing schools of scientists; though Mr. Darwin gives it but a qualified assent,[1] and Sir John Lubbock suggests that tool-making was at first a matter of accident.

But though the use of implements is acknowledged to be a line of demarcation between man and all contemporary animals, it is argued that existing species of *Simiae* have reached the limit of their development, but, there were prehistoric species which by natural selection attained higher and yet higher stages of progress, until the first type of man emerged, when the anthropoidal progenitor gradually became extinct. Hence it is said to be unfair to make the use of implements a demarcation between man and preexistent animals, or a characteristic of his standing in the scale of being.

To this objection there are two replies. First, in the present state of scientific knowledge, there is no tangible evidence of the existence of any such higher kind of apes. The links between the highest known species and man must have been many and long; but no trace of these has yet been found. True, this is a merely negative reply. But the existence of such species of apes is a pure *assumption* based upon analogy. Now the want of *data* — that is to say negative evidence — is logically valid against an assumption. Since then, the links of connection are wanting, this anthropoidal pedigree of man must be held in suspense as only an hypothesis. Darwin presents it with his accustomed modesty.[2] But Haeckel goes so far as to say, "we must necessarily come to the conclusion that *the human race is a small branch of the group of Catarrhini, and has developed out of long since extinct apes, of this group in the Old World.*"[3]

[1] Descent of Man, Vol. i. p. 49. [2] Ibid., Vol. ii. Chap. xxvi.
[3] The History of Creation, Vol. ii. Chap. xxii. (The italics are his own).

Now there is danger that an unproved inference put forth with such authority shall be prematurely accepted as the verdict of science. But though we would concede much license to hypothesis, yet in the name of science as well as of logic, we must protest against putting assumptions in the same category with facts, and drawing authoritative conclusions from hypotheses as if these were facts established before our eyes. Until, therefore, some trace is found of a tool-handling ape, we are warranted by all known facts in adhering to the use of implements as a primitive demarcation between man and other animals.

My second answer to the objection is, that it proves too much for the objector himself. The whole argument for the derivation of man from a lower form of animal is drawn from the correspondences between man and the inferior animals as we see those animals to-day. This correspondence is traced by Darwin in almost every particular — intellectual, emotional, and even moral. Huxley says, "No absolute structural line of demarcation, wider than that between the animals which immediately succeed us in the scale, can be drawn between the animal world and ourselves; and I may add the expression of my belief that the attempt to draw a psychical distinction is equally futile, and that even the highest faculties of feeling and of intellect begin to germinate in lower forms of life."[1]

It is the homology of man with the animal world *as it is*, and the manifold correspondences of known species of animals with man, as well as the general analogy of nature, that leads to the theory that man is derived from some lower animal progenitor. Well, we go back to the Stone Age, and there find man differentiated from animals in a most pronounced manner. The implements are evidence that man was there; but directly we come upon this demarcation we are told not to compare man *in this particular* with existing animals which he resembles in so many other particulars, but to presuppose extinct species of a higher grade that paved

[1] Man's Place in Nature.

the way from the stone to the tool! To use a homely adage, "One cannot burn the same powder twice over"; and one cannot use the same facts to establish both the positive and negative side of his argument. Mr. Wallace has set forth the lessons of the Stone Age with rare felicity. Having described the long processes of development in nature, he says, "At length there came into existence a being in whom that subtile force we term *mind*, became of greater importance than his mere bodily structure. Though with a naked and unprotected body, *this* gave him clothing against the varying inclemencies of the seasons. Though unable to compete with the deer in swiftness or with the wild bull in strength, *this* gave him weapons with which to capture or overcome both. Though less capable than most other animals of living on the herbs and the fruits that unaided nature supplies, this wonderful faculty taught him to govern and direct nature to his own benefit, and make her produce food for him when and where he pleased. From the moment when the first skin was used as a covering, when the first rude spear was formed to assist in the chase, the first seed sown or shoot planted, a grand revolution was effected in nature, a revolution which in all the previous ages of the earth's history had had no parallel; for a being had arisen who was no longer necessarily subject to change with the changing universe — a being who was in some degree superior to nature, inasmuch as he knew how to regulate and control her action, and could keep himself in harmony with her, not by a change in body, but by an advance of mind."[1] This we see already in the Stone Age. But whence came this capacity in man, or whence came man having this capacity?

It has been suggested that man came by accident to the use of implements; that the savage, beginning like the monkey with using a round stone for cracking nuts, accidentally discovered that he could crack other stones also,

[1] Anthropological Review, May, 1864, p. clxvii; also reprinted in "Natural Selection," p. 325.

and sharpen these for cutting; and, moreover, by thus eliciting sparks he made the accidental discovery of fire.[1] Now all this may have been; but it is an unscientific method to take our present knowledge of implements and their uses and prescribe from this the way in which the primitive man must have invented his tools. It is, to say the least, a curious accident that no such accident as is here imagined for the savage ever happened to the monkey; that it never occurred to *him* to crack a stone and shape it into a knife, or to gather sparks for kindling a fire. And it is still more curious — indeed unaccountable upon the theory of a kindred intelligence — that no monkey, baboon, chimpanzee has profited by the example of man in learning to make implements of the crude native materials about him. Different tribes of savages, it is believed, have separately stumbled upon these inventions; but in all the ages since the Stone Age, no tribe of *Simiae* has either stumbled upon such inventions or copied them from man. The most savage tribes learn from civilized man to improve their weapons of warfare; sometimes copy with deadly effect the weapons and tactics of their superiors; but no tribe of *Simiae* has yet learned to make the simple weapons of stone that even the rudest savage manufactures for himself. All experience teaches us that man is the only animal capable of fashioning an implement for a specific purpose; and hence the implements of the Stone Age are a primitive demarcation between man and other animals.

This fact has no necessary bearing upon the question of man's derivation as to his bodily frame; but it does mark very distinctly a point of departure in the crude pre-historic data of our race. The Stone Age is after all an age of human capacity, discovery, invention, and also of prophecy, and we need not be ashamed of our connection with it. Admitting that the first suggestion of a knife, the first hint of fire, came of the accidental striking of two flints together; in the same sense it may be said that the invention of the

[1] Sir John Lubbock's Pre-historic Times, chap. xiv.

steam-engine was accidental, being suggested by the vapor lifting the lid of a tea-kettle; and if we may accept the legends about Newton and Galileo, the discovery of gravitation was due to the accident of a falling apple; the suggestion of the heavenly motions, to the accidental swinging of a chandelier. In every case there was something in the man for the accident to work upon; the accidental sharpening of the stone sharpened his capacity into a purpose for adapting inorganic nature to his use; the first spark struck from the flint elicited a spark from his consciousness that kindled to a flame of invention. What we see in the Stone Age is man asserting his supremacy over nature by taking into his own hands her raw materials and shaping these to his higher uses. The first attempts are crude enough, and the progress to polished and ornamental implements, and to works in metal, is toilsome and slow. But the germ of great possibilities is there; the science of architecture is there; the science of engineering is there; the science of husbandry is there; all arts, manufactures, inventions are potentially there; for in building the cathedral, the fort, the viaduct, in forging Krupp's cannon, and the armor of the Thunderer, man is but carrying to higher and yet higher perfection that which he began to do when he first formed the rough materials about him into tools and weapons for his own use. He then began the mastery of nature through his adaptive intelligence and his purposing will. All that he has yet accomplished in subordinating and adapting nature to his ends has been through the development of the faculty that first taught him to shape an implement out of a stone. That line of demarcation separates man on the one side from physical nature by all that is possible in invention, and on the other side separates him from other animals by all that is actual in achievements over nature.

Hence the prominence given by science to the Stone Age involves no controversy with the philosophy of man. That age is not derogatory to man as philosophy would present him in his intellectual and moral attributes. The surveying,

measuring, choosing, purposing, conquering intelligence is already there, discriminating him from the brute not only quantitively, but qualitatively also. The old arguments of philosophy for the exaltation of man are indeed brought in question by modern science. Consciousness, language, reason, reflection, memory, imagination, the domestic affections, the emotions, and even the moral feelings — all these once assumed to be distinguishing prerogatives of the human species are now claimed in some degree for different animals. I shall not trespass here on this debatable ground. Science has first of all to do with facts, without regard to their bearing upon theories of philosophy and ethics. But it is science that offers us the Stone Age as an incontestable witness for man. And surely, the germs of the spiritual and the ethical are given in an intelligence that first addressed itself to the mastery of rude nature for human ends. The conquest of thought over matter began in the making of implements; and the first rude scratches to record memory, feeling, or fancy foreshadowed that supreme implement of thought by which man gives permanence to knowledge by the written page, records the phenomena of nature and the discoveries of science, and transmits to other ages the history of the race.

ARTICLE V.

HORAE SAMARITANAE; OR, A COLLECTION OF VARIOUS READINGS OF THE SAMARITAN PENTATEUCH COMPARED WITH THE HEBREW AND OTHER ANCIENT VERSIONS.

BY REV. B. PICK, ROCHESTER, N.Y.

LEVITICUS.

CHAP. I.

6 and he shall flay — Sam. and they shall flay; Sept. *καὶ ἐκδείραντες.*

and cut — Sam. and they shall cut; Sept. *μελιοῦσιν.*

7 the priest — Sam. the priests; Sept. *οἱ ἱερεῖς.*

8 the head — Sam. and the head; Sept. *καὶ τὴν κεφαλήν.*

9 ירחץ shall he wash — Sam. ירחצו shall they wash; Sept. *πλυνοῦσιν.*

a burnt sacrifice — Sam. עלה הוא it is a burnt sacrifice; Sept. *κάρπωμά ἐστι*; Syr. עלתא הו.

10 of the flocks — Sam. מן הצאן עלה of the flocks a burnt sacrifice.

קרבנו his offering — Sam. קרבני ליהוה his offering to the Lord.

לעלה for a burnt sacrifice — Sam. omitted.

At the end of the verse the Samaritan adds: אל פתח אהל מועד יקריב אתו at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation he shall bring it.

12 and he shall cut it — Sam. ונתחו and they shall cut it; Sept. *καὶ διελοῦσιν.*

17 he shall not — Sam. and he shall not ולא; Sept. *καὶ οὐ.*

CHAP. II.

1 frankincense thereon — Sam. frankincense thereon, it is an oblation מנחה הוא; Sept. *θυσία ἐστί.*

11 תקטירו shall burn — Sam. תקריבו shall bring; Sept. *προσοίσετε.*

CHAP. III.

5 on the fire — Sam. על האש אשר על המזבח on the fire which is upon the altar.

8 את דמו the blood thereof — Sam. את דם the blood.

9 and the fat — Sam. the fat.

13 sons of Aaron — Sam. sons of Aaron the priests; Sept. οἱ ἱερεῖς.
16 a sweet savor — Sam. a sweet savor unto the Lord ליהוה; Sept. τῷ κυρίῳ.

CHAP. IV.

5 that is anointed — Sam. המשח אשר מלא את ידו that is anointed who consecrates his hand; Sept. ὁ τετελειωμένος τὰς χεῖρας.
6 seven times — Sam. שבע פעמים באצבעו seven times with his finger; Sept. τῷ δακτύλῳ.
7 the blood of the bullock — Sam. the blood.
12 shall he carry — Sam. והיצאו shall they carry; Sept. (Codd. AB) ἐξοίσουσιν.
and burn — Sam. ושרפו and they shall burn; Sept. κατακαύσουσιν.
14 young bullock — Sam. young bullock without blemish תמים; Sept. ἄμωμον.
17 and sprinkle — Sam. and sprinkle of the blood מן הדם; Sept. ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵματος.
before the veil — Sam. before the veil of the sanctuary הקדש; Sept. τοῦ ἁγίου.
18 he shall put — Sam. and the priest shall put.
of the altar — Sam. קטרת הסמים of the altar of sweet incense; Sept. τῶν θυμιαμάτων τῆς συνθέσεως.
24 he shall kill — Sam. וישחטו they shall kill; Sept. σφάξουσιν.
27 any of the commandments — Sam. אחת מכל מציות any of all the commandments; Sept. πασῶν τῶν ἐντολῶν.
29 in the place — Sam. במקום אשר ישחטו את in the place where they kill; Sept. οὗ σφάξουσιν.
30 bottom of the altar — Sam. המזבח מזבח הצלה bottom of the altar of the burnt offering (id. v. 34).
31 הוסר חלב fat is taken away — Sam. וסיר חחלב as he takes away the fat (id. v. 35).
35 priest shall burn them אתם — Sam. priest shall burn.

CHAP. V.

5 כי יאשם shall be guilty — Sam. יחטא shall sin.
6 מחטאתו concerning his sin — Sam. על חטאתו אשר חטא ונסלח לי for his sin which he hath sinned, and he shall be forgiven; Sept. περὶ τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ ἀφεθήσεται αὐτῷ ἡ ἁμαρτία.
8 and wring off — Sam. ומלק הכהן and the priest shall wring off; Sept. καὶ προσάξει ὁ ἱερεύς.

11 he shall not put oil לו ישים — Sam. shall not pour oil לו יצק; Sept. *ἐπιχεεῖ*.

12 יקמץ הכהן the priest shall take — Sam. וקמץ he shall take.

17 ואם נפש and if a soul — Sam. ואם נפש אחת and if any soul.

20 With this verse the Samaritan, like the Syriac, Chaldee, and some Hebrew MSS., commences the sixth chapter.

CHAP. VI.

5 אומכל or all that — Sam. או מכל דבר or every thing; Sept. *ἀπὸ παντὸς πράγματος*.

6 unto the priest — Sam. omitted.

10 מדי בד his linen garment — Sam. מדי בד the linen garments.

15 for a sweet savor — Sam. the offering made by fire for a sweet savor אשה ריח ניחח.

17 of the offerings made by fire מאשי — Sam. of the offerings of the Lord made by fire מאשי יחוח.

20 בערב at night — Sam. בין הערבים in the evening.

22 and the priest — Sam. the priest.

27 thou shalt wash — Sam. he shall wash; Sept. *πλυθήσεται*.

CHAP. VII.

2 shall he sprinkle — Sam. יזרקו shall they sprinkle.

4 and the two kidneys — Sam. ואת כל החלב אשר על הקרב ואת שתי הכליות and all the fat that is upon the inward and the two kidneys; Sept. *καὶ πᾶν τὸ στέαρ τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐνδοσθίων καὶ τοὺς δύο νεφρούς*.

8 he hath offered — Sam. יקריבו they shall offer.

11 he shall offer — Sam. they shall offer; Sept. *προσοίξουσι*.

12 התודה of thanksgiving — Sam. לתודה as thanksgiving.

15 The end of this verse is, according to the Samaritan text, *medium legis*, פלגה דארחיתה, or as the Samaritan version reads, פלגה פלגה זעתה.

21 שקץ טמא abominable unclean thing — Sam. שרץ טמא unclean reptile; Chald. בבעירא מסאבא; Syr. רחשא; the Samaritan reading is also supported by five Hebrew MSS.

29 speak unto the children of Israel — Sam. ואל בני ישראל תדבר and unto the children of Israel thou shalt speak.

37 of the meat-offering — Sam. and of the meat-offering.

CHAP. VIII.

18 ויקרב and he brought — Sam. ויגש and he brought near; Sept. *καὶ προσήγαγε*.

30 upon his garments — Sam. and upon his garments.
his garments — Sam. ואת בגדיו and his garments.
31 of the congregation — Sam. אהל מועד במקים הקדש of the congregation in the holy place; Sept. *ἐν τόπῳ ἁγίῳ.*
33 ידכם your hand — Sam. ידיכם your hands; Sept. *τὰς χεῖρας ὑμῶν*; Syr. אידיכון.

CHAP. IX.

3 and unto the children — Sam. ואל זקני and unto the elders; Sept. *καὶ τῇ γερουσίᾳ.*
17 כפי a hand — Sam. כפיו hands; Sept. (Codd. AB) *τὰς χεῖρας.*
20 and they put — Sam. and he put; Sept. *καὶ ἐπέθηκε*; Syr. וישם.
21 as Moses commanded — Sam. כאשר ציה יהיה את משה as the Lord commanded Moses; Sept. (Codd. AB) *ὃν τρόπον συνέταξε κύριος τῷ Μωϋσῇ.* According to de Rossi (variae lectiones), twenty-seven Hebrew MSS. are in favor of the reading of the Samaritan.

CHAP. X.

4 Elzaphan — Sam. אליצפן Elizaphan; Sept. *Ἐλισαφάν*; Syr. ולאליצפן; Vulg. *Elizaphan.*
10 and to make a difference — Sam. to make a difference.
14 and the wave — Sam. the wave.
15 and thy sons — Sam. ולבניך ולבנתיך and thy sons and thy daughters; Sept. *καὶ τοῖς θυγατράσι σου.*

CHAP. XI.

3 ושסעת שסע and is cloven-footed — Sam. ושסעת שסע שתי פרסות and cleaveth the cleft into two claws; Sept. *ὀνυχιστῆρας ὀνυχίζον δύο χηλῶν*; the Samaritan reading is supported also by more than six Hebrew MSS.
9 these — Sam. ואת זה and these; Sept. *καὶ ταῦτα.*
10 in the seas — Sam. במים בימים in the waters, in the seas; Sept. *ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι, ἢ ἐν ταῖς θαλάσσαις.*
12 כל whatsoever — Sam. וכל and whatsoever.
13 they shall not be eaten — Sam. לא תאכלו you shall not eat.
15 את כל every — Sam. ואת כל and every.
16 and the cuckoo and the hawk after his kind — Sam. and the cuckoo after his kind, and the hawk.
19 the heron — Sam. and the heron.
20 כל all — Sam. וכל and all.

25 wash his clothes — Sam. בגדיו ורחץ במים wash his clothes and wash himself in water.
31 בכל among all — Sam. מכל of all; Sept. *ἀπὸ πάντων*.
32 יובא must be put — Sam. יבוא shall go.
36 מעין a fountain — Sam. מעין מים a fountain of water; Sept. *πηγῶν ὑδάτων*.
37 על כל זרע זרוע upon any sowing seed — Sam. על זרע זרע upon sowing seed.
45 the Lord — Sam. יהוה אלהיכם the Lord your God.
46 ולכל נפש and of every creature — Sam. לכל הנפש of every creature.

CHAP. XII.

7 and atone for her — Sam. וכפר עליה הכהן and the priest shall atone for her; Sept. *ὁ ἱερεύς*.
8 burnt-offering, and the other for a sin-offering — Sam. לחטאת ואחד לעלה sin-offering, and the other for a burnt-offering.

CHAP. XIII.

3 וראהו and look on him — Sam. וראה and see; Sept. *ὄψεται* (id. v. 5, 17, 27, 36).
6 וראה אתו see him — Sam. and see.
ולא פשח and spread not — Sam. לא פשע spread not.
9 a plague — Sam. ונגע and a plague.
18 בעורו is the skin — Sam. omitted.
20 מראה the sight — Sam. מראהי its sight; Sept. *ὄψις αὐτῆς*.
the hair — Sam. its hair; Sept. *θρὶξ αὐτῆς*.
22 and if — Sam. if.
32 הנגע the plague — Sam. הנתק the scall.
42 in the bald head or bald forehead — Sam. בקרחתו או בגבחתי in his bald head or his bald forehead; Sept. *αὐτοῦ ... αὐτοῦ*.
55 עינו its color — Sam. עיניו its colors.

CHAP. XIV.

4 ולקח and take — Sam. ולקחו and they shall take; Sept. *λήψονται*.
5 and he shall kill — Sam. and they shall kill; Sept. *καὶ σφάξουσι*.
6 the living bird — Sam. and the living bird ואת.
10 two lambs without blemish — Sam. two lambs without blemish of the first year בני שנה; Sept. *ἐνιαυσίους*.
13 he shall kill — Sam. ישחטו they shall kill; Sept. *σφάξουσι*.
14 ונתן הכהן the priest shall put — Sam. ונתן and he shall put.
16 with his finger seven times — Sam. seven times.

20 upon the altar — Sam. upon the altar before the Lord לפני יהוה; Sept. *ἔναντι κυρίου.*

24 the priest shall wave — Sam. he shall wave.

31 the priest — Sam. omitted.

37 and he shall look — Sam. and the priest shall look.

41 he shall scrape off — Sam. יקצעו they shall scrape off; Sept. *ἀποξύσουσιν.*

42 he shall take and plaster — Sam. יקחו וטחו they shall take and plaster; Sept. *λήψονται καὶ ἀντιθήσουσιν.*

43 he hath taken away — Sam. חלצו they have taken away.

44 פשח spread out — Sam. פרח broke out (id. v. 48).

45 and he shall break — Sam. ונתצו and they shall break; Sept. *καὶ καθελοῦσι.*

and he shall carry — Sam. והוציאו and they shall carry; Sept. *ἐξοίσουσιν.*

49 and he shall take — Sam. ולקחו and they shall take.

51 and the hyssop and the scarlet and the living bird — Sam. ואת שני התילעת ואת האזוב ואת חציפור and the scarlet and the hyssop and the living bird; Sept. *καὶ τὸ κεκλωσμένον, καὶ τὸν ὕσσωπον καὶ τὸ ὀρνίθιον τὸ ζῶν.*

52 with the hyssop and with the scarlet — Sam. with the scarlet and with the hyssop.

54 הצרעת of leprosy — Sam. וצרעת and leprosy.

CHAP. XV.

3 it is his uncleanness — Sam. inserts between טמאתו and מזובו: טמא הוא כל ימי זב בשרו או החתים בשרו מזובו he is unclean all the days that his flesh has the issue or his flesh be stopped from his issue; it is his uncleanness.

8 וכבס and he shall wash — Sam. יכבס he shall wash.

11 his hands — Sam. ידו his hand.

19 and he that toucheth — Sam. he that toucheth (id. v. 21, 24, 27).

CHAP. XVI.

4 the linen coat — Sam. וכיתנת בד and the linen coat.

his body — Sam. את כל בשרו his whole body; Sept. *πᾶν τὸ σῶμα.*

33 and for the priests — Sam. על הכהנים for the priests.

CHAP. XVII.

4 between הבריאו and להקריב the Samaritan inserts: לעשות אתו עלה או שלמים ליהיה לרצונכם לריח ניחח וישחטהו בחוץ ואל פתח

אחל מיעד לא הבראו to make it a burnt-offering or a peace-offering unto the Lord to their will as a sweet savor; and they did kill it outside, and unto the door of the tabernacle of the congregation they did not bring it; Sept. *ὥστε ποιῆσαι αὐτὸ εἰς ὁλοκαύτωμα ἢ σωτήριον κυρίῳ* (A, *κυρίου*) *δεκτὸν εἰς ὀσμὴν εὐωδίας, καὶ ὃς ἂν σφάξῃ ἔξω, καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν θύραν τῆς σκηνῆς τοῦ μαρτυρίου μὴ ἐνέγκῃ αὐτό* (Codd. AB).

among his people — Sam. among his peoples.

6 at the door — Sam. אשר פתח which is at the door.

8 יעלה that offereth — Sam. יעשה that maketh; Sept. *ὃς ἂν ποιήσῃ.*

13 מבני of the children — Sam. מבית of the house.

15 and he shall be clean — Sam. omitted.

CHAP. XVIII.

9 their nakedness — Sam. ערוחה his nakedness.

13 for she is כי — Sam. she is.

14 his wife — Sam. and his wife ואל.

21 להעביר pass through — Sam. להעביד to serve; Sept. *λατρεύειν.*

30 I am — Sam. כי אני for I am; Sept. *ὅτι ἐγώ.*

CHAP. XIX.

13 לא תלין it shall not abide — Sam. ולא תלין and it shall not abide.

15 ye shall not do — Sam. thou shalt not do.

thou shalt not respect — Sam. and thou shalt not respect ולא.

17 and not suffer ולא — Sam. not suffer אל.

19 thy field — Sam. and thy field.

20 בקרת תהיה there shall be a scourging — Sam. there shall be a scourging to her לו; Sept. *αὐτοῖς.*

they shall not die — Sam. he shall not die.

26 you shall not use enchantment — Sam. and you shall not use enchantment ולא.

27 ye shall not round — Sam. and ye shall not round.

thou shalt mar — Sam. ye shall mar; Sept. *φθερεῖτε.*

זקנך of thy beard — Sam. זקנכם of your beard; Sept. *τοῦ πώγωνος ὑμῶν.*

33 אתך with thee — Sam. אתכם with you; Sept. *ὑμῖν*; Vulg. *inter vos*; Chald. עמכון; Syr. עמכון.

CHAP. XX.

2 תאמר thou shalt say — Sam. תדבר thou shalt speak.

of the children — Sam. מבית of the house.

7 והתקדשתם sanctify yourselves — Sam. omitted.

7 for I am the Lord — Sam. כי קדש אני יהוה for I am holy, the Lord; Sept. ὅτι ἅγιος ἐγὼ κύριος.

8 my statutes — Sam. all my statutes את כל.

19 thy mother's sister — Sam. thy father's sister; Sept. τοῦ πατρός σου.

thy father's sister — Sam. thy mother's sister; Sept. τῆς μητρός σου.

23 הגוי of the nation — Sam. הגוים of the nations; Sept. τῶν ἐθνῶν; Vulg. *nationum;* Chald. עממיא; Syr. דעממא.

26 for I the Lord am holy — Sam. for I am the Lord.

27 they shall stone them with a stone — Sam. באבנים תרגמום ye shall stone them with stones; Sept. λίθοις λιθοβολήσετε αὐτούς.

CHAP. XXI.

2 for his mother, and for his father, and for his son — Sam. for his father, and for his mother, for his son; Sept. ἐπὶ πατρὶ καὶ ἐπὶ μητρί.

and for his brother — Sam. for his brother.

8 and thou shalt sanctify him — Sam. thou shalt sanctify him.

14 an harlot — Sam. וזונה or an harlot.

17 לחקריב to offer — Sam. להגיש to bring nigh.

20 in his eye — Sam. in his eyes.

21 להקריב to offer — Sam. omitted.

22 לחם אלהיו the bread of his God — Sam. omitted.

CHAP. XXII.

5 any creeping thing — Sam. שרץ טמא any unclean creeping thing; Sept. ἑρπετοῦ ἀκαθάρτου.

8 he shall not eat — Sam. they shall not eat.

11 וילד and he that is born — Sam. וילדי and they that are born; Sept. καὶ οἱ οἰκογενεῖς; Syr. וילדי.

18 and of the stranger in Israel — Sam. and of the stranger that lives in Israel ומן הגר הגר, Sept. τῶν προσηλύτων τῶν προσκειμένων ἐν Ἰσραήλ; Vulg. *qui habitant.*

21 any blemish — Sam. and any blemish.

23 shalt thou make — Sam. shall ye make.

24 and the bruised — Sam. the bruised.

30 you shall not leave — Sam. and you shall not leave.

31 I am the Lord — Sam. omitted.

32 hallow you — Sam. מקדשם hallow them.

CHAP. XXIII.

4 these are — Sam. ואלה and these are.
5 in the fourteenth — Sam. in the fourteenth day יום; Sept. ἡμέρᾳ.
8 in the seventh day — Sam. and in the seventh day וביום.
10 a sheaf — Sam. העמר the sheaf.
17 two wave-loaves — Sam. שתים חלית two loaves; Sept. δύο ἄρτους.
18 two rams — Sam. two rams without blemish תמימם; Sept. ἀμώμους.
31 any work — Sam. and any work וכל (id. v. 36).
36 on the eighth day — Sam. and on the eighth day.
38 besides your gifts — Sam. כל מתנתיכם besides all your gifts.

CHAP. XXIV.

3 Aaron — Sam. Aaron and his sons ובניו; Sept. καὶ οἱ υἱοὶ αὐτοῦ.
4 תמיד continually — Sam. עד בקר until morning; Sept. εἰς τὸ πρωί.
22 לכם unto you — Sam. לך unto thee.

CHAP. XXV.

5 that which groweth — Sam. and that which groweth ואת.
of thy separation — Sam. נזיריך of thy separations.
6 for thy servant, and for thy maid, and for thy hired servant, and for thy stranger — Sam. for thy servants, and for thy maiden, and for thy hired servants, and for thy strangers.
13 in the year — Sam. and in the year.
20 our increase — Sam. our increases.
21 the fruit — Sam. את תביאתה its fruit.
22 of old fruit — Sam. התביאתה of its old fruit.
25 if — Sam. and if.
35 וחי and he may live — Sam. וחי אחיך and thy brother may live; Sept. (Codd. AB) ὁ ἀδελφός σου.
47 the sojourner — Sam. ותושב or the sojourner; Sept. ἢ τῷ.

CHAP. XXVI.

15 ואם and when — Sam. אם when.
20 the tree of the land — Sam. ועיץ השדה the tree of the field; Sept. τοῦ ἀγροῦ.
31 your sanctuaries — Sam. your sanctuary.
39 in your enemies' lands — Sam. in their enemies' lands; Sept. τῶν ἐχθρῶν αὐτῶν.
44 בארץ in the land — Sam. בארצות in the lands.

CHAP. XXVII.

9 which they offer — Sam. יקריב which he offers (id. v. 11).
17 if from the year — Sam. and if from the year.
22 יקדיש he sanctifies — Sam. יקדיש איש a man sanctifies; Syr. גברא.
25 twenty gerahs shall be the shekel — Sam. twenty gerahs the shekel.
26 only the firstling — Sam. only every firstling אך כל; Sept. πᾶν πρωτότοκον.
30 of the fruit — Sam. ומפרי and of the fruit.
31 the fifth — Sam. and the fifth.

[זה ספר השלישי : קנין מאה ושלושים this is the third book (with) one hundred and thirty Kazzin.]

ARTICLE VI.

GOVERNMENTAL PATRONAGE OF KNOWLEDGE.

BY PROF. JAMES DAVIE BUTLER, LL.D., MADISON, WIS.

THE phrase "Knowledge is power" may be no older than Bacon; some say it is not so old; but the feeling it indicates runs back of all chronology and round the world. It is implied in the very name *man*, which means *thinker*, and which is as old as the pre-historic Aryan cradle.

In no portion of any community has the appreciation of knowledge in some form been more conspicuous than in the ruling class. According to Carlyle the first sovereign was called "king," being regarded, as by way of eminence, the *kenning* man, because he who *kens*, can. The feeling that knowledge is power we see in the African potentate when he saw the first plow turning up its furrow, exclaiming in royal rapture, "This will save me five wives." We see it in Peter the Great throwing his arms round the statue of Richelieu, and crying out, "Why were we not contemporaries? Then I would have given thee half my kingdom for teaching me to make the most of the other half." We see it in

Turks for ages baffled by Greek fire; and in savage chiefs always and everywhere seeking fire-arms, regardless of expense. We see it in Philip of Macedon writing that he thanked the gods less for his son Alexander than for Aristotle as his teacher.

Believing that *governmental patronage of knowledge* deserves more attention than, so far as I know, that theme has received, I propose, as the subject of the present Article, Some of the Modes in which Governments have Patronized Knowledge or Contributed to its Increase. Let us render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's. I am well aware that public patronage is often more selfish than private gifts are. Frequently it has cost nothing to those public functionaries who have been its almoners, so that satirists would compare them to Dr. Reincke Fuchs prescribing for the sick lion a plaster torn off from the back of the bear. Still the application may have been as salutary as if the fox had made his medicament by the sacrifice of his own skin. So the dollars of the self-seeking may prove as beneficent as those of the benevolent, wherever money is the sinews of science.

Governments have been forced to patronize knowledge for their own *interest*, and that both in war and peace.

War under great captains has always been a science, and it has both called into its service the best knowledge of its time, and it has done its utmost to improve that knowledge. Mark the endeavors persisted in through all ages to render fortifications, navies, arms, and every warlike munition more scientific. Remember among the ancients the walls of Babylon, of the Romans, of China; the bridges of Darius, Xerxes, and Trajan; the Roman roads; the engines devised for Hiero by Archimedes.

Not a few governmental works of peace are no less noteworthy as marking dates in the progress of knowledge. Of this class are the palaces of the Pharaohs, Caesars, and of mediaeval or modern sovereigns by hundreds; the treasuries, from that of Athens to that of the United States; the Athenian propylaea; statues and fountains everywhere; the ancient

Colossus at Rhodes, — the modern at Munich; Egyptian obelisks, Roman pillars, arches, and aqueducts; the German Walhalla; halls of legislation, from the Roman senate-house to the new-born capitol at Washington, or the parliament-house at Melbourne costing a million sterling. These are but a small part of the forms in which — thanks to the helping hand of government, accorded either for self-preservation or self-aggrandizement — there has been an endeavor to incarnate art or science in some new embodiment, and that, if possible, superior to whatever had been realized.

Governments have patronized various departments of knowledge less *indirectly*. Music and the drama are specimens.

The chiefest among singers and players have been court musicians, and through court patronage have reached their acme. So have poets also been developed. Pindar and Theocritus, the Athenian dramatists, Horace and Virgil, Ariosto and Tasso are familiar examples. You may even see in the British Museum the title-deed to a lot bestowed by a king of Assyria on his poet-laureate before Rome was founded. The success of one has given hope to all. It used to be said that whenever Calhoun took snuff all South Carolina would sneeze. So when the pencil, dropped by Titian, was picked up by the Emperor on whose dominions the sun never set; when Charles the First hung a diamond cordon round the neck of Rubens; when the Grand Monarque invited Moliere to dine with him; when Wedgwood's queen's ware was adopted by Queen Charlotte, and when Goethe was buried in the mausoleum of the Duke of Weimar, every artist in the world felt honored and was stimulated. The use of public wealth by Pericles to pay for the admission of the Athenian demos into the theatre, has been pronounced a collateral recognition of the arts which expanded into the most intelligent fostering that they have ever had.

France, like Athens in her golden era, has always been a patron of the drama. In 1861 its annual appropriation to Parisian theatres was a million and a half francs. The Parisian opera founded in 1671 by public funds, in 1840 was

receiving from them almost a million francs a year. The new Opera, "le plus grand theatre de l'univers," which was opened on new year's day 1875, built at a cost of more than ten millions of dollars, is a government work. A century ago Voltaire said that France owed her comedy and her opera to two cardinals, who were prime ministers, and the latest authorities testify that national funds have made the *Théâtre Francais* what it is, and that without such assistance it could not retain its position. German exactions never stopped that aid. It was only for two years that they cut it down.

Another of the modes in which governments have advanced knowledge is through establishing *universities*.

Such institutions have sometimes proved rather cisterns to preserve than fountains yielding anything new. Yet these reservoirs have usually given a momentum to the knowledge they contain which has impelled it forward, and have not been without collateral influences.

> "Thither, as to a fountain, countless stars
> Repairing, in their golden urns draw light."

They pave the way for each new generation of scholars to reach more rapidly the limits of actual knowledge, and point out the quarters in which they are to push forward in order to enlarge it.

Next to the Academy at Athens founded by Plato and afterwards endowed in part by King Attalus, the earliest university on record was established by Ptolemy at Alexandria, nearly three centuries before Christ. Its faculties were three, — philosophy, philology, and medicine. It included a tropical and a zöological garden. It did something for the mathematical discoveries of Euclid, and for those of Ptolemy in geography and astronomy, which have been leavening the world for two thousand years.

The institution established by Constantine in A.D. 320 at Constantinople, boasted twelve Professors, who were maintained at the public expense. Thus, in the words of Newman: "First carried forth upon the wings of genius, and dissemi-

nated by the energy of individual minds or of single cities, knowledge was extended to and fro in the basin of the Mediterranean. Introduced, in course of time, to a more intimate alliance with political power, it received the means at the date of Alexander and of his successors, both of its cultivation and of its propagation. It was formally endowed under the Ptolemies, and at length became the direct object of the solicitude of the government under the Caesars." At the University of Rome in 1514, the Professors were one hundred and one. Their salaries were paid by the government. It may hence be inferred that those in similar mediaeval institutions of earlier origin were likewise so paid. Among such institutions were the University of Wittenberg, the cradle of the Reformation, founded twelve years earlier, in 1502, by a Saxon prince, with nine others in Germany still older; Oxford, where Oriel College was established by Edward II. in 1326; Bologna reckoned the oldest of all, dating from 1119, Salamanca from 1200, and Paris from 1215.

Whatever facts can be gleaned concerning the endowment of these and similar mediaeval institutions show them to have had patronage from the ruling powers. In 1050 the French king, Robert Capet, furnished board to a hundred clerks while they attended the lectures which were the seed that grew into the University of Paris. In 1365 the University of Vienna was chartered, as well as granted grounds, buildings, and exemption from taxes, by the reigning prince. In 1477 the University of Tübingen, at its foundation, was, by the favor of the pope, vouchsafed the avails of five benefices and of eight canonries. The University of Pisa being endowed by the pope with tithes, it was contended by some that Galileo, inasmuch as he was a layman, was disqualified for holding a professorship. The University of Leyden, at its foundation in 1574, was endowed by the Dutch republic, in the very darkest period of the struggle against Spain, with a handsome revenue, principally derived from the ancient abbey of Egmont. Universities never were so much encouraged by governments as at the present day. A new one

founded by Austria at Czernowitz, on her eastern frontier, was opened on the fourth of October 1875. The Prussian appropriation for the Berlin University in 1874 was 930,980 marks. (A mark is twenty-six cents.) In the same year Great Britain appropriated for her universities £52,027, and the Czar sent a donation of 25,000 rubles to that in Tomsk in Siberia. In 1875 the Berlin Federal Council voted 100,000 marks for the University of Strasburg.

In the same line with universities as nurseries of knowledge, ought to be classed *special schools* supported by government for imparting and increasing the best science in special departments.

Specimens of this sort are our national Naval School at Annapolis, costing $200,000 a year; West Point Academy, maintained by a much larger appropriation, $345,362 in 1874, and similar seats of science in several European states. At the head of all military academies stands the War-school at Berlin. The number of officers who can be here admitted is limited to forty a year. These students are selected after a rigid examination from a much larger number of candidates who have been seven years in preparation, and three of those years in military service. Advancing from such a starting-point what can their goal be in their specialty but the utmost limit of the attainable?

No class of men have done more to extend the bounds of human knowledge than professors in higher schools. Such names as Vesalius, Galvani, Volta, Galileo, Torricelli, De Saussure, Newton, Laplace, Berzelius, Oersted, Bopp, Boeckh, Ritter, Niebuhr, Curtius, Mommsen, will be remembered by every one, and hundreds more may be counted in biographical dictionaries. Professors, however, superannuate, die, or depart, but universities are professors who remain, never grow old, continually learn, as well as teach. They are either, as Bacon holds, "mines resounding on all sides with new works and further progress," or, at least, they are like the "tower of David builded for an armory, whereon there hung a thousand bucklers, all shields of mighty men."

The several States in the American Union, and foreign nations perhaps without exception, exempt from taxation the property of institutions dedicated either to the advancement or to the diffusion of knowledge. Our general government not only admits their imports free of duty, but, thanks to Agassiz! it lets all the alcohol they consume for scientific uses escape the domestic excise!

For promoting higher education the United States, previous to 1862, had patented 1,119,440 acres of land, and in that year added to its grant 9,600,000 acres for so-called agricultural colleges. The total outlay on public schools in 1874 was $74,000,000. The school lands, amounting to 62,428,413 acres of the public domain, — a larger area than England, Scotland and Wales, — are intended rather for the diffusion than for the increase of knowledge. But all diffusion of knowledge increases it, if not objectively, at least subjectively. If it does not add to the sum of what may be learned, it adds to the sum that is learned. Accordingly, all public outlays for schools, however primary, and all laws compelling school attendance, promote knowledge. The recent appropriations for public schools from public funds in several states have been as follows: In 1873–74 Great Britain, £1,971,692; in 1875 France, 36,683,939 francs; in 1874 Italy, 21,946,213 francs; Prussia, 21,587,799 marks of twenty-six cents; Russia, 13,135,089 rubles of eighty cents. (These educational statistics are compiled from the one hundred and twelfth volume of the "Gotha Almanac.") But in addition to the rubles above credited to Russia, under the title public instruction (*öffentliche Unterricht*), which may include higher as well as lower schools, other appropriations are mentioned as made in the province of Finland; namely for "*worship* and instruction" 1,887,712 marks of twenty cents, and for "people's schools and *prisons*" 726,100 marks. Linking together the outlays for religion and schools is natural, where church and state are still wedded in union, but the coupling of schools and prisons is not so easy to be accounted for. In 1871–72 the outlay of Austria and Hun-

gary for education was 12,860,051 gulden of forty-eight cents.

Governments may minister to the growth of knowledge by *legislation* concerning *benefactions*.

In 1723 one Betton, an Englishman, bequeathed the income of his estate, year by year, for the redemption of captives in Barbary. When such captives could no more be found, and the estate had become worth half a million dollars, parliament turned it into a fund for supporting free schools, and thus delivering from a worse bondage than that in Barbary. In the same spirit, in 1875, a Royal Commission reported that the trust deeds of educational funds now yielding £1,500,000 annually, but so tied up by testamentary restrictions as to be now of small use, ought to be modified, as their donors if now alive would doubtless modify them, so as to make those foundations more suitable to the requirements of the present day. They seek to escape the letter which killeth, but to give free course to the spirit which imparts life and rejuvenescence.

The earliest *library* of which any history remains was a governmental creation. It was in Egyptian Thebes, in the palace of Osymandyas, who flourished in the fourteenth century before our era. What modern explorers identify as its ruins was pointed out to me in the Memnonium. Over its door, according to Diodorus Siculus, was the legend, ψυχῆς ἰατρεῖον, "The soul's house of cure," or dispensary. Such was the Greek interpretation of the figures of Thoth and Saf, the inventors of letters. Among other ancient libraries amassed at public expense those of the Pergamean king Attalus, and of the Ptolemean university are especially notable.

Of modern collections all those pre-eminent in size or value, such as the Vatican, as well as those in London, Paris, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, have been gathered by governments. Japan had in 1875 already accumulated in her educational department thirty thousand foreign books. The outlay on the library of Congress — the largest in America —

for the year 1873 was $54,928. In 1857 the city of Boston completed for its public library a building costing, with its lot, $365,000, and has ever since rendered it efficient aid. In September 1875 its volumes amounted to 288,816. The best medical and surgical library in our country, comprising more than 25,000 volumes in that specialty, is that of the surgeon-general of the army, which is enlarged by an annual outlay of $10,000. An equal sum is expended in preparing an exhaustive catalogue. The State of Wisconsin in aid of the library of its Historical Society now makes an annual appropriation of $8,000; its volumes in 1875 were 32,319. Several governments have passed enabling acts, by which cities and towns are empowered to lay taxes for the formation and maintenance of local libraries. Such a permissive bill, allowing a maximum tax of a penny in the pound, was enacted by the British Parliament in 1855.

In addition to forming general libraries governments have taken special pains to preserve their own *archives*, which all serve as materials for history. Those of Spain at Simancas are world-famous. In Venice the reports of ambassadors, when they were the only reporters abroad in the world, and other State papers, fill more rooms than any tourist has pedestrian pluck enough to traverse. I rambled through some scores; but turned back when told that the whole series ran up to two hundred and ninety-eight.

A Royal Commission appointed by parliament in England in 1869, within the next six years had compiled important documents relating to constitutional law, science, and general history from no less than four hundred and twenty private collections of manuscripts. The British State Paper Office, according to Dr. Drake, who spent years in it, occupies a space which all the records in the United States in 1860 could not fill. The cost of filling such an historical armory may be conjectured, when we remember our government paying ten thousand dollars for manuscript documents relating to French discoveries in the northwest, thirty thousand dollars for the Madison papers, twice as much for the com-

bined writings of Washington and Jefferson, and a still larger sum for a few confederate documents. In 1875 Portugal paid £7,000 for manuscripts illustrative of its early history. Public authorities, local as well as national, are growing doubly careful of their papers. Antwerp and Bologna are two cities among many which are just now bestirring themselves to set in order their records,

> "Picked from the wormholes of long-vanished days,
> And from the dust of old oblivion raked."

Moreover, a Hand-book of the German and Austrian Archives was announced in October, 1874, by Dr. Burkhardt, keeper of the archives at Weimar. This volume will describe not only the public archives of the German States, but also those of the towns (some of which as Frankfort-on-the-Main, Nuremberg, Goslar, Worms, etc., possess extremely valuable archives), and those of the provinces. A congress of German archive officials was called to meet at Eisenach in 1875. In 1874 even semi-barbarous Egypt laid out $10,000 on her archives.

At Frankfort, above mentioned, the writer saw among the Town Hall manuscripts what is regarded as the protograph of the Golden Bull or constitution of the German Empire, dating from 1356. In the far West he was also shown among the wonders of Salt Lake City, the "House of the Mormon historiographer," an office not to be found in many older States. *Fas est et ab hoste doceri.*

Archives are manuscripts, and they are much more. They are largely *architectural.* Accordingly, many governments have promoted knowledge by preserving structures, "where stones themselves to ruin grown are gray and death-like old." For this purpose they have expended money and enacted protective laws as well. The popes have done much to keep the monuments of the Cæsars from being burned for lime, or incorporated with modern buildings, or from tumbling down for want of props and buttresses. Speaking of the action of Roman pontiffs regarding the demolition of pagan edifices, Gibbon remarks: "No positive charge can be

opposed to the meritorious act of saving the majestic structure of the Pantheon."[1] England, France, and Germany have also long done something in this direction. Among the mediaeval castles visited by the writer which owe their ruinous perfection to governmental conservation, he recalls, in Scotland, Stirling, Dumbarton, and Edinburgh; in Germany, Heidelberg and Stolzenfels; in Spain, the Alhambra; and in France, most notable of all, restored under M. Viollet-le-Duc by the State, Carcassonne, a section cut out of the age of the Visigoths and of Saint Louis, brought safe into the present, and set down unaltered before our eyes. May it endure forever!

Governments have advanced knowledge by outlays on *printing* and *publishing*.

They have thus committed written documents to a more trusty and trustworthy guardian than any fire-proof vault, even to the art preservative of all arts. So have they sometimes made known to the world, — or to fit audience though few, — the lucubrations of investigators which book-sellers, and hence the world, would have let die, because they were in advance of their age. Take for a few specimens, "Monumenta Germaniae historica," issued for half a century under the superintendence of Pertz, and now under a commission, dividing the labor which had become too arduous for any one man; engravings of the *musée Francais* for which the first Napoleon paid 400,000 francs; the Sanscrit Lexicon, which Russia has granted an annual subsidy of £300 for twenty-five years; "Egyptian Monuments," as published by France, Prussia, and Egypt, in about fifty folios; the Rig-Veda, with its commentary, — the oldest book in the Aryan world, and perhaps the largest, filling fifteen thousand pages — for a quarter of a century in publication by the East India government, and completed in 1874; voluminous reports of the British Royal Commissions; Nautical Almanacs, both British and American, — more than one hundred volumes of the former; thirty quartos on the Documentary

[1] Decline and Fall, Chap. lxxi. Note 26.

History of New York, eighteen on that of Massachusetts, eight of Connecticut Colonial Records, ten of Rhode Island (though she be small as a diamond), unnumbered folios of American archives; sixteen annual volumes of Washington astronomical and meteorological observations, twenty-five of the exploring expedition, six of Schoolcraft's Indian Tribes, etc. British writers express surprise at the mine of knowledge — archaeological, ethnological, philological, geographical, historical, and general — contained in the volumes issued by their East India government presses. An exhaustive statistical survey by fifty-nine collaborateurs is now in publication, of which five volumes appeared in 1875. In 1874 Bradford, a Vermont town of fourteen hundred and ninety-two inhabitants, directed its "selectmen" to pay the oldest minister there, Rev. Dr. Silas McKeen, $500 for a history he had written of the place, and to publish his work. Similar measures had been previously adopted in the Massachusetts towns, Pittsfield, Lexington, Marlborough, etc. Indeed the number of towns in our country, and out of it, which have thus perpetuated their local history, it would not be easy to count. I wish it were harder.

As an aid to scientists, governments have built *observatories*, styled by John Quincy Adams "light-houses to the skies."

Such astronomical stand-points are described as reared by kings and caliphs in Alexandria and Bagdad, — in the latter place with a quadrant of fifteen cubits radius. 1576 is the date of the earliest observatory in modern times, which was built by a Danish King for Tycho Brahe, unless we call by that name the lookouts at Sagres of Prince Henry of Portugal, a century earlier. Other observatories were erected at public charge at Dantzic in 1641, Paris 1667, Greenwich 1675, Copenhagen 1704, Russia 1725, Bagdad in 1788, by Louis XVI. in order to test Arabian observations on the very spot where they had been made, and at the Cape of Good Hope in 1828, by Great Britain. A century ago George III. paid Herschel £200 a year, and enabled that astronomer to fabricate the telescope which discovered the

first new planet discovered in modern times. That old forty-foot tube suggested to the monarch his only *bon mot* in sixty years. "Come," said he to a bishop, "I will show you the way to heaven"!

Observatories, so called, and those of great astronomical utility, had been erected in America previous to the nineteenth century. The only one known to Lalande in 1790 was that of Dr. Rittenhouse, in his garden at Philadelphia. It was a small but pretty octagonal edifice of brick, dating from about 1780. But more than ten years before, Rittenhouse had constructed a wooden observatory, which was five months in building, at his residence in Norriton; another had been reared in the State-house square of Philadelphia, and a third at Cape Henlopen light-house; all three for viewing the transit of Venus in 1769, "which had drawn the attention of every civilized nation in the world." Here also was government patronage, for the Provincial Assembly of Pennsylvania voted £100 for a telescope, to be bought in London by our Dr. Franklin, for a state observatory, and an equal sum for incidental charges. For observing the same transit, there was, at least, a temporary station established at Harvard College. Moreover, eight years earlier, the sloop "Province" had been fitted out at public expense to convey a Harvard Professor to Newfoundland, for observing the transit of Venus in 1761. So the United States in 1805 paid $1000 to procure a telescope, transit, and clock for its first surveyor, General Mansfield, that he might ascertain meridians, and base lines, for measuring the public lands in the great West.

In 1825 European observatories had multiplied to one hundred and thirty, but not one worthy of the name was then to be found in America. The appropriation for one, which had been recommended by John Quincy Adams, was overwhelmed with ridicule in Congress. His recommendation was not vouchsafed even the coldly courteous postponement which had been accorded to a similar proposal in 1815, when a committee had reported in favor of adopting

it "whenever attention to objects of a pressing nature and of more immediate importance will permit." Under the reign of the second Adams, the average congressman's creed was that of Biron in "Love's Labor Lost":

> "Those earthly god-fathers of heaven's lights
> Who give a name to every fixed star,
> Have no more profit of their shining nights,
> Than those who walk and wot not what they are."

In 1836, however, our scholarly President saw an observatory, the first on this continent, in operation at Williams College, — though not built by public money, — and in 1843 his own hands laid the corner-stone of another at Cincinnati, — also a private establishment. But he also survived to behold his views adopted by the national government, which opened its first observatory in 1843 at West Point, and the next year at Washington. The latter establishment now boasts the largest refracting telescope in the world. It was mounted in 1873, with an object-glass of twenty-six inches; no other measures more than twenty-five. Another refractor of twenty-six inches is reported to be now (1876) in making for an observatory in Vienna. The annual outlay for the Washington observatory is at least $20,000. Here, as elsewhere, government bounty has stimulated private munificence. In 1852 a well appointed observatory in Australia was presented to the State by a Mr. Brisbane, and in 1874 $700,000 were given by a Californian, James Lick, to build and furnish an observatory on our Pacific slope which will have no rival in the world, or will have one only in the czar's marvel at Pulkova, which since 1834 has been reputed matchless. In the palace of Wallenstein at Prague, I was conducted into a hall where the sides and ceiling were frescoed with astronomical figures, and a staircase led up to a tower from which Seni, the Italian astrologer of that aspiring prince, was dismayed, or delighted, at the signs of heaven. Had Wallenstein's dream of empire been fulfilled, his tower would have become one of the earliest among governmental observatories.

In 1868 I visited the site of Robert College, an American

foundation on the Bosphorus. Its President, Dr. Hamlin, pointed me to the grand castle of Europe just at hand, now dismantled, and which he was confident of obtaining gratis from the Sublime Porte for an observatory. We climbed its drum-donjon, or principal tower, and he showed me how its makers — "building wiser than they knew" — had, four centuries ago, admirably adapted that pier to astronomical purposes. To expect the gift of a grand tower from the Grand Turk seemed to me very natural, for I had just come from Cairo where, surprised that the American missionaries were living in a palace on one of the finest sites in the city, I had learned on inquiry that it had been presented them as a free gift by the pacha "who," said they, "loves our science more than he hates our religion."

Governments have furnished scholars materials with which to work by creating *gardens* and *museums*.

Aside from the tropical flora caused to grow at the Ptolemaic University, the earliest public garden for scientific purposes is set down as having been laid out in Pisa in 1545, though some believe that one existed in Venice two centuries before. Others, formed at public expense for medical or botanical purposes, are mentioned in the sixteenth century at Montpellier, Leyden, Leipsic, and Hampton Court; in the seventeenth at Paris, Upsala, etc. Superior to all others at present is that at Kew, near London,

"In narrow room nature's whole wealth, nay more."

Its Palm-house cost £35,000, and all things are in keeping. In the national garden at Washington a conservatory, costing $25,000, had been finished before 1870; and for the garden which it adorns the appropriation in 1873 was $52,345. Its head gardener has been sent on a horticultural tour to all the great gardens of the world. Connected with the Washington garden is a National Herbarium, the accumulated results of the various government expeditions and surveys, as well as irregular contributions from a great variety of miscellaneous sources. In the employ of this department botanists have been commissioned for manifold explorations. Thus Dr.

Palmer in 1869 traversed New Mexico and Arizona on a collecting tour, and brought home to the national hive not a few plants before unknown to science.

In addition to gardens, governments have established museums, and age by age have multiplied and enriched their departments. In this matter the British government may not have been so liberal in proportion to its resources as some others, yet its expenditures for buildings alone on the British Museum during the second quarter of the present century were £850,000. During the year 1872 its outlay for the running expenses of that repository was £111,304, and for building £29,091, as well as the so-called science and art department £224,875, and enough on National Galleries to make a total of £388,972. In subsequent years these expenditures have still increased. That for science and art in 1875 was £320,000.

Moreover, the international exposition of 1851 convinced England that she was behindhand in art, and that art is the greatest auxiliary to industry, — "adding to every power a double power," — and hence it led to the formation of the Kensington Museum, the expenditure for which, previous to 1873, had amounted to six millions of dollars, in exact figures £1,191,709 17*s.* 4*d.*, and which within twenty years numbered 13,560,624 visitors. No museum has become grander, or is now growing faster, than Kensington. In October 1874, the curiosities from the East — the accumulations of a century at the India House — were transferred to it. In 1875 it received sixty-two cases of curiosities from Teheran, amounting to more than two thousand pieces — the result of the skilful judgment of a foreign gentleman during nearly twenty years residence in various Persian provinces — and has established a section devoted to Persian art, which is a new thing in the world of museums.

A British Royal Commission now urges the national endowment of research, and to add to the cabinet a minister of science, on the ground that all departments of government have permanent need of scientific assistance, and that

economical advantages result from every scientific step forward. In 1874 a national art gallery was formed at the antipodes, in Melbourne, and £500 were voted by the provincial parliament towards the establishment of a picture gallery in Sydney — a site better known to half the world as Botany Bay. Thus a good thing is going into Nazareth, or originating there.

Few European States are destitute of national museums, as large and excellent in proportion to their wealth as are those of Great Britain. That in Berlin appropriates 40,000 thalers a year for plaster casts alone, — copies of sculptural masterpieces. It is not long since it paid 22,000 thalers for certain Moabite potteries, which have proved sham antiques.

Though the word "museum" was familiar in Athens and Alexandria, the thing which it now denotes may not be anciently discernible except in Rome. The collection of Augustus would pass for a museum of natural history. "He furnished his palaces," says Suetonius (Aug. § 72), "not so much with the ornaments of statues and pictures as with groves and walks, as well as objects noteworthy for antiquity and rarity, as at Capri the monstrous limbs of huge and savage beasts, which are called "giants' bones" and "arms of heroes."

The earliest of modern museums, in the sense of a collection of fine art specimens, is said to have been that of Cosmo de Medici, the Florentine prince, who died in 1464. Such treasuries naturally rose first in Italy, where art treasures were at once most numerous and soonest appreciated. Several museums, at first formed by opulent and enthusiastic individuals have been bought and perpetuated by governments. Hügel, an Austrian Baron, made researches, with many assistants, in Greece, Egypt, and India from 1831 to 1837. His collections comprising 32,000 specimens in natural history, with multitudinous coins, manuscripts, and other antiques, were bought for the imperial museum at Vienna. The Suermondt gallery, — one of the most notable private collections of old masters,—with the well-nigh unrivalled etch-

ings of Albert Von Everdingen (costing 6000 thalers), and 11,000 antique coins, mostly Oriental, costing £16,000, in 1874 passed into the Berlin Museum. The articles added in three years after 1872 were 44,337.

The pictures of Angerstein, the great Russian merchant of London, bought by Great Britain in 1820 for £60,000, were the germ of the National Gallery. The Hunterian museum of anatomy, styled by Professor Owen "the seed of all the surpassing discoveries since made in palæontology," was also bought by the British nation in 1799.

The British Museum originated in 1753 by parliament paying £20,000 for the collections of Sir Hans Sloane. Among its other accessions through the purchase of other private collections, have been the following: those of Cotton, Harley (costing £10,000), Lansdowne, George III., Burney, Townley (£28,000), Elgin (£35,000), the Blacas gems (£48,000), Payne Knight, Sir William Hamilton, etc. A London lawyer, Francis Hargrave, as he passed to and from his office, was a snapper up of unconsidered trifles at the book-stalls. He thus filled such a savings bank as the museum curators held cheap at £8,000. The entire outlay of the museum previous to 1860 had been £3,000,000.

The rudiments of an American governmental museum may be discerned in the numismatic curiosities of the Philadelphia mint, as well as in whatever the general government, from its exploring expeditions and other sources, has aggregated around the Smithsonian nucleus. A city museum has been commenced in New York. The Park Commissioners have appropriated half a million dollars to procure grounds and buildings for collections in natural history, and the treasures of Verreaux which it cost him, aided by a large outlay from the French government, a generation to gather, have been purchased.

But national museums are not confined to Christendom. In London, Paris, and Berlin Egyptian marvels are so multitudinous that in each of those cities my feeling was, "Egypt is empty, and all her wonders are here." But in Boulak, a

suburb of Cairo, I encountered a magazine of relics so rare and unmutilated that the genius of the Nile might well say, "Behold, these are my jewels!" A few representative specimens sent to the World's Fair in 1867, won unbounded admiration. The appropriation for Boulak from the khedive in 1874 was $26,858. The Turkish sultan also is both striving to regain whatever Schliemann has carried into captivity from Trojan Hissarlik, and has founded a museum in Stamboul, which he means shall outdo the Egyptian khedive's. What a remove from his predecessor who, less than fourscore years ago, when giving the Earl of Elgin permission to explore Athens, added regarding the chiefest works of Grecian chisels, that "if any stones there appeared interesting to him," he was welcome to them. Among the sultan's recent purchases are the largest and finest Japanese vases ever made, and seventy-four cases of antiques from Cyprus.

Another mode in which governments have promoted the progress of knowledge is by *prizes*.

A mode of ascertaining longitude at sea was early felt to be one of the chief desiderata in navigation. To any one who would supply this need Spain, in 1598, offered 1,000 crowns; Holland, soon after, 10,000 florins; and England, in 1714, £20,000. In the race for these prizes many men, and among them Galileo, made valuable advances; though they failed to find the key to longitude; and Harrison, the actual finder, while after a thirty years' struggle making his fortune, developed an idea worth a thousand fortunes. Harrison found longitude, as is well known, by means of a chronometer. His success is the more memorable, because secured by the self-same expedient which Sir Isaac Newton had just then declared must fail. In 1724, Newton's words were, that "he believed no clock could be so justly made and regularly ordered as to keep the ship's way for any considerable voyage without the loss of many leagues." The first trial of Harrison's clock, on a voyage from England to Jamaica, showed a variation of only one minute and one fourth from absolute exactness in crossing the Atlantic.

England has offered several other grand prizes, as, in 1743, £20,000 for the discovery of a northwest passage, (found by McClure, in 1851); in 1776, £5,000 for approaching within one degree of the pole; in 1819, £5,000 for pushing west of 110° in Baffin's Bay, which was gained by Parry's men; and in 1849, £20,000 for the rescue of Sir John Franklin, in addition to £2,000 offered by Lady Franklin.

The legislature of New York, in 1871, offered $100,000 for the best model of a steam-vessel not liable to the objections which had long prevented the use of steam on her canals. After two hundred plans had been submitted, they secured the improvement they sought, and paid the reward to William Baxter, who had produced a boat which transports freight at twice the former speed and at one half the former cost, and that with no injury to the canal banks.

Australia promised a large reward for a specific cure of diphtheria, and is said to have paid it for a preparation of sulphuric acid which has proved a panacea. The deaths by that disease in the city of New York, during the last half of October 1874, were two hundred, wanting seven. The French institute confers an annual prize of 10,000 francs, drawn from the imperial treasury, for the most useful invention of the last five years.

Public authorities have bestowed gifts on advancers of knowledge not merely to stimulate their activities, but after their work has been done. They have thus encouraged those who came afterward. "One good deed dying *thankless* slaughters a thousand waiting upon that." Great Britain paid Parry and McClure each £5,000 for Arctic discoveries, and Rowland Hill £13,000 for his plan of penny postage. A pension of £300 was granted to Dr. Johnson, in 1762, seven years after his dictionary was completed. It was natural that Johnson should hesitate to receive a pension, since as a lexicographer he had defined it to be "pay given to a state hireling for treason to his country," and a pensioner as "a slave of state, hired by a stipend to obey his master." His hesitation, however, was not lasting. When he decried

pensions he was the dog at the foot of the tree, who barks because he cannot climb; but when the dog's mouth is full he barks no more. Pensions of the same amount as Johnson's were given, among others, to Dalton and Faraday, not for anything that they were to do, but for what they had done; others to Newton, Miss Herschel, and Henry Bell, who, according to my Scotch guide-book, was "the first person that applied the steam-engine to river navigation, in 1811"; to Archibald Smith, who lately applied mathematics to improve the shape of ships; as well as on the continent to thousands, as Leibnitz, Hevelius, Descartes, D'Alembert, Botta, Bonpland, Daguerre. After Galileo had invented the telescope his salary was increased five-fold by Venice.

In 1860 ten European States united in contributing 400,000 francs as an honorarium to Morse, for his telegraphic inventions. The testimonial of the United States to Fulton was more tardy. Not till thirty-one years after his death did Congress award to his heirs $76,300 in part for the benefits he had conferred on his country by his improvements in the application of steam to navigation. One of the speakers before the Scientific Association, at their Portland meeting, in 1873, gave a startling account of a philosophic convict in Siberian exile, while making researches in the canyons near the mouth of the river Lena, coming upon five living mammoths, twelve feet high and eighteen in length; and being in consequence granted a full pardon. However false this discovery may have been, its pretended result is quite in keeping with the gracious favors — "benefits of clergy," as it were, or freedom to a slave for finding a big diamond — which governments have been wont to bestow on advancers of knowledge. In former ages the stock story to illustrate the idea was about an artist who had painted a matchless crucifixion for the pope, and was therefore pardoned by his holiness for having crucified a man in order to portray his agonies more true to life.

Somewhat analogous to prizes and pensions in fostering the growth of knowledge are governmental *copyrights* and *patents*.

The earliest mention of a copyright is in Venice, in 1469. The first in France was in 1507, and in Spain three years later. The first appearing in England was in 1662, and in the United States in 1790. Patent rights in England date from 1624. The number granted there up to 1870 was 73,621. In the United States, between the same date and 1790, the number was 121,308, and in the single year 1873, it was 12,864.

In a mode not so unlike patents and copyrights as at first appears, governments encourage knowledge when they make it a crime, as New York has just done, to practise medicine or surgery without examination and license from some competent authority. Great Britain excludes all such quacks from collecting bills and from governmental employment. In France, Germany, and other continental states, no person can exercise any of the so-called liberal professions unless he has obtained a degree at a state university. While this usage is objectionable as increasing governmental patronage, it doubtless heightens the thoroughness of professional education. On the other hand, when a professor in Salt Lake city, who was my cicerone through the university there, deplored its low estate, my answer was: "It is no wonder. Your government holding that the sick are cured by miracle, preachers taught by inspiration, and lawyers worthy to be outlawed, how can it cherish knowledge?"

In the interest of knowledge governments have granted charters, and sometimes endowments, to *learned societies*.

One of the earliest of these associations, incorporated at Florence in 1657, demonstrated the incompressibility of water. Its apparatus is still to be seen there, in the Tribune of Galileo. But the French Academy claims to have had a name to live from 1635, and so to be a score of years older than its Italian sister. About 1663 it was divided into several branches, and its members began to be paid an annual stipend. These branch academies have now flourished during more than two centuries. They are yearly subsidized by the government with about half a million francs, and by

indirect aids perhaps worth still more. Hope of enrolment in some one of them is a spur to every young scholar in France; and the prizes, aggregating about 50,000 francs, which they annually confer, have not only maintained many a poor genius, — as Thierry for fifteen years, — but are chiefly striven for as honors, and as affording hopes of better things beyond.

Affiliated to home-academies, France has set up others abroad — one in Rome, dating from 1661, and another in Athens, from 1846. In these schools the artistic youth of France, who have carried off the highest prizes at home, enjoy for years a frugal maintenance, with the best helps for their aesthetic training. The yearly stipend for each youth is at present 2,500 francs. Among the painters developed in the French Academy at Rome were the two Davids, two Vernets, and Baudry, whose master-piece at the new Opera just now puts him at the head of French artists. Denmark, Prussia, and Russia also send young men of promise to study abroad, with allowances similar to those vouchsafed to French artists. Among those thus despatched to Rome were Thorwaldsen from Denmark, and Brühloff from Russia. The latter built St. Petersburg forty years since, as truly as Christopher Wren did London two centuries ago. But of late no state has sent more scholars abroad, to tax all the world and bring home the best of its knowledge, than Japan.

The British Royal Society, being incorporated in 1662, is not much younger than its French rival; but it has not basked in the sunshine of much national bounty. It was, however, endowed by Charles II. with a hospital, which it sold for £1,300. It was further allowed to claim the bodies of executed malefactors. But until 1790 English law prescribed that criminals, if women, should be burned ("si sit mulier, in igne comburatur"), "out of regard to the decency due the sex," as Blackstone has it; and if men, should be usually disembowelled, and quartered or beheaded, and boiled, if poisoners. It is, therefore, doubtful whether the criminal remains were worth much for further dissection.

In 1837 the Royal Society received a national appropriation for a magnetical observatory. It is not unlikely that it now shares in the annual appropriation to learned societies — a grant which in 1872 amounted to £12,450 pounds. At all events, it receives £1,000 a year to be distributed to scientific investigators. Moreover, in compliance with its recommendations, the British authorities have set on foot many costly observations, experiments, and expeditions. Cook's voyages, lasting a dozen years, and girdling the globe more than once, are a specimen. So is the squadron despatched to the north pole, under Captain Nares, in 1875.

Such are loyalty and gastronomy in England that government has never there done so much for learned societies as when its patronage has taken the form of *dinners*. It is an established custom that some member of the royal family shall dine with the royal academicians. Such governmental condescension, according to Hazlitt, lifts them all up forever, securing them both length of days and a table well spread to the end of them. He mentions as specimens Nollekens, Northcote, West, Flaxman, Fuseli, and Cosway, all longevitarians, and all flourishing at once. As a further proof how potent prandials appear to Englishmen, it is worth noting, that in 1875 the South American States having failed to pay interest on their British debts, their officials in London were not invited to the lord mayor's diplomatic dinner.

Other governments besides England have followed, at great expense, the suggestions of learned societies. The French expedition under La Perouse in 1785, which it was hoped would rival Cook's, was started through the French Society of Natural History. A United States astronomical expedition to the southern hemisphere took observations from 1849 to 1852, in accordance with instructions which had been submitted for approval, or criticism, to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Counsel was sought from the Smithsonian Institute for the Arctic cruise of the "Polaris."

In this way, through the long and strong arms of political rulers, the eyes and the intellects of experts, and often their

whole bodies too, have gone abroad throughout all the earth. Of the papers printed by the Royal Society, each adding its fraction to the stock of knowledge, the State Historical Library of Wisconsin contains one hundred and fifty-four quartos, though the series is not complete. Similar volumes already published by kindred associations during two centuries seem likely, like Banquo's royal line, to stretch on to "the crack of doom." Or, we may compare them to an endless rope, which an Irishman pulled and pulled till he was tired, and then in language more rough than reverent, declared that the other end of the blessed thing was *cut off*.

Among the societies for the increase of knowledge incorporated by states, and receiving governmental aid and comfort, direct or indirect, are those in Berlin, originating in 1700, St. Petersburg in 1724, Sweden in 1741, Denmark 1742, Munich 1759, Portugal 1779, and the American Academy 1780. The Smithsonian Institution at Washington, though of private origin, has always been assisted by Congress. Its grounds, their improvement, printing their reports, and $15,000 a year for the care of collections, are a portion of Congressional favors.

He that hath, to him shall be given. Accordingly the societies most assisted by public funds have also shared most in private munificence. Thus the private gifts bestowed on the British Museum during a dozen years previous to 1835, were valued at two millions of dollars. The museum founded by the British government in Kensington soon became a center of gravitation for all the art-treasures and curiosities owned by the community around it. When parliament hesitated to buy the Angerstein collection for founding the National Gallery, one member, George Beaumont, said, "If you buy it, I will give you mine to increase it; and mine cost seventy thousand guineas." In the year 1874 a Signor Ponte bequeathed a fortune of three fourths of a million francs to three learned societies, one in London, one in Paris and one in Vienna. Stanziani, an Italian grown rich in Russia, has left much to a society in Rome.

Men of titles by dint of patronage often seek, and find, a welcome in learned societies. "The reason is," says some cynic, "that nobles love to fancy themselves scholars, and scholars love to fancy themselves nobles. Hence lords seek to be among wits, and wits to be among lords, each hoping to be known by their company."

Governments have sometimes been patrons of knowledge by *importing* from abroad *philosophers* capable of raising the home standard.

They have not procured such imports without awarding to men of genius more of emolument, honor, and free scope than those celebrities had enjoyed at home. They thus rouse to a higher pitch the ardor of all students in the country from which they call one away, while they stimulate him to do his best in his new field. In France "greatness of reward," as Bacon says, "whistling for the ablest men out of all foreign parts," bringing Cassini from Italy, Roemer from Denmark, and Huyghens from Holland, wakened each to new activities in a wider sphere. Japan during the last decade has imitated this policy of France. Weimar did in the days of Herder, Wieland, Schiller, and Goethe. Frederick the Great kidnapped for a grenadier recruit every very tall non-enlisting foreigner he could seize, and took as much pains to make his own those men who were colossal in mind.

In 1609 Galileo wrote from Venice to a Tuscan friend: "Daily I discover new things, and if I had more leisure I should do much more. But so long as I find it necessary to depend on lectures for support I cannot have leisure enough." Thereupon, in 1610, Tuscany invited Galileo to a sinecure of 1000 crowns a year, that, being exempt from all duties, he might be better able to pursue those studies which had already resulted in marvellous discoveries. This maintenance he received for thirty-two years; that is as long as he lived. "His strength was to sit still," for leisure enabled him to produce that, "Dialogue on the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems," which has been moving the world ever since, and will move it forever. In a similar love of "en-

dowment for research" Max Müller, while continued as an Oxford Professor on half-pay, has been relieved of all educational duties. The following note from the most learned of British kings shows his patronage of learning: "Chancellor of my exchecker! I will have Mr. Casaubon paid before me, my wife, and my (sic) barnes. James Rex".

But of all nations Russia, downward from Peter the Great, has most delighted to enlist foreign talents and acquirements in her service. Notice three instances out of hundreds.

Pallas, invited from Holland by Catharine, revelled for six years in the paradise of his specialty, heading an exploring tour throughout Eastern Russia, and then, as he liked the Crimean climate better than all others, was installed in a handsome residence there, was paid for his collections one third more than they had cost him, yet was permitted to retain them to the end of his life.

The English traveller, Simpson, who in 1843 committed himself to a Russian courier in order to be put through from Pekin to Moscow, at first made his way with infinite delay and difficulty, neglected or even insulted. All of a sudden everything was changed. Horses were ready everywhere in a moment, and all relays went on the gallop. Every delicacy was proffered, and Simpson became the observed of all observers. When he demanded an explanation from his conductor, the answer was: "I saw we should never get through Siberia at the rate we started, so I whispered to postillions, who told postmasters, that you were nothing less than a Chinese ambassador posting incog to the czar, and that I should not wonder if you turned out to be own brother of the Celestial sun or moon. You see the result." Humboldt's journeys, whithersoever he pleased in all the Russias, were like Simpson's triumphal progress, and that with no danger of his delectations collapsing through its being found out that the reputed celestial dignitary was an obscure adventurer.

Again, Murchison, the British geologist, was invited to direct the Russian surveys, — a post in which his duties and delights pointed all one way, — and afforded such appliances

and means to boot, as no man in his profession had ever commanded. Then, besides imperial pay, he was knighted and decorated with the grand cross. Thus has Russia sought to bring the glory and honor of the nations into it.

In the way of honorary titles no government has been more liberal than the British, and nowhere does this sort of patronage seem to have been more effective than in Great Britain. Sotheby, writing in 1861, gives sketches of one hundred and fifty-three men who had been knighted by English sovereigns within the last two centuries for their advancement of knowledge.

Governments have advanced knowledge by defraying the expenses of special scholars while *travelling* or *residing* where they could best promote their specialty.

Such investigators have circled the earth in every zone, and their missions have been widely diversified. French, Danish, Russian, and Prussian artists have been mentioned as maintained while making the most of themselves at Rome, the nurse of high art. Canova, so maintained there by Venice, and Sir John Soane, by George III., are two more of a legion. Sustained by government patronage, specialists have gone far and wide for explorations, observations, or collections — astronomical, geographical, geological, archæological, æsthetic, or miscellaneous. Great Britain commissioned Fellows, Newton, and Wood for Asia Minor, — where the former discovered at Cnidus the veiled Demeter, "one of the most beautiful antiques brought to light in modern times," — Layard farther East; as early as 1765 it sent Bruce into the heart of Africa, and then Park in 1804, Clapperton in 1825, the Landers in 1830, Barth in 1849 to Timbuctoo, and in later years many others besides Dr. Livingstone. The researches of Schomburgk in Guiana, who discovered the Victoria Regia, were paid for by the British government.

France early dispatched Tournefort and Galland to the Orient, and Picard to Denmark, Richer to Cayenne, Condamine to Peru, and Maupertius up the gulf of Bothnia till he saw no night for fifteen times twenty-four hours. De

Tocqueville's mission to investigate the American penitentiaries is well known, as well as that of Chevalier to examine our railroads. Not less important for the increase of knowledge was the despatch of Renan to Italy, and afterwards to Syria, or Cuvier to Holland, Mariette to Egypt, LeCaille to the Cape of Good Hope, Lalande to Berlin, or DeCandolle through Napoleon's empire when it was widest, or Gay Lussac half way to heaven for aeronautic observations. Instances of German missions for the good of knowledge, were Liebig's journey to Paris, Agassiz's to the United States, Roth's to Syria, Sepp's to Tyre, and Mommsen's epigraphic tour, — all at public expense. Russia sent Tischendorf to Arabia, Pallas far and wide in Siberia, and Humboldt in princely pomp overland to China, building scientific stations all along his route. A corps of explorers in the Aral-Caspian region have just returned to St. Petersburg. The Egyptian khedive in 1874 fitted out the archaeologist Brugsch Bey magnificently for the cosmopolitan convention of Orientals in London, having called him from Göttingen in 1871. Various public authorities in the United States have patronized researches abroad, both historical and of other descriptions.

In 1849 New York commissioned J. R. Brodhead to search the archives of England, Holland, and France for original documents referring to its history. At the end of three years he had collected eighty manuscript volumes, and returned in a ship which Mr. Bancroft declared "more richly freighted with new materials for American history than any that had ever crossed the Atlantic." A commission analogous to that of Mr. Brodhead was given by Maine to the German Professor, J. G. Kohl, who has hence produced a volume, published by that State, in reference to its discovery by the Northmen.

The labors of investigators abroad have been often rendered more successful through governments giving them the prestige as well as the pay of *official* position.

Loftus was appointed on the Turko-Persian boundary commission, Rawlinson was made Consul in Bagdad, Botta in

Mosul, Livingstone in Quilimane, Professor Pitman in Jerusalem, Cesnola in Cyprus, Niebuhr ambassador at Rome, Professor Henry head of the light-house board, Schoolcraft Indian agent, Squier chargé to Central America, and Thomas Hogg, the florist, marshal of the American embassy to Japan; each installed in the niche he was ordained to fill.

Governments have drawn largely on their regular officials for the advancement of knowledge.

Venice, downward from the year 1268, required reports, styled "Relations," from her agents abroad, and for centuries she touched the world at more points than did any other state. She thus unawares imperceptibly rendered her archives the most valuable among all the sources of European history. Under Louis Napoleon French engineers elucidated by topographical surveys the battle-fields mentioned in the Commentaries of Julius Caesar, and French soldiers were placed at the disposal of Renan to aid by excavations his Phenician researches.

In 1819 meteorological measurements were ordered at all the United States forts by the Secretary of War, and they have continued to be made ever since. Reports derived from more than fifty millions of such observations have been published by the government. They afford such climatic knowledge of even our most unexplored territory as few of the oldest States could previously show. The engineer corps of the United States army have been occupied ever since the close of our civil war in the work of examining and mapping its battle-fields. Those east of the Alleghanies were exhibited in a government atlas issued in 1870. Throughout our history that corps have led the van in American scientific research.

The inspector-general of Italian prisons, Beltrami Scaglia, was lately commissioned to examine the penal system of Great Britain. Many British consular reports are noble monuments. A good specimen is those made by a hundred consuls "respecting the condition of the industrial classes in foreign countries." The reports made to our own govern-

ment either by the diplomatic corps or by special agents, would form no small library. In 1870 three of the army engineers were detailed to examine and report on the sea-coast defenses of Europe. Delafield and McClellan's reports on the art of war in Europe from 1854 to 1856 need no mention.

Governments, aiming to increase knowledge of some sort, have engaged in *exploring expeditions*.

So many such expeditions were fitted out in the first half of the fifteenth century by Prince Henry of Portugal that his revenues were exhausted, and he died in debt. Similar enterprises were continued by his successors, till the southernmost point of Africa had been doubled, and a new highway to the East Indies laid open. The voyages of Columbus were of the same character with those of the Portuguese, and were governmental enterprises. After his grand success and that of Cabot, whose first voyage, however, was a private undertaking, England and France joined in emulous endeavors for bringing to light the dark places of the new-found hemisphere. But Spain and Portugal jealously hedged up the southern routes to the East Indies by both capes. Hence other nations, especially England, Holland, and Russia, being excluded from the south, sought a passage to India either by the northwest or by the northeast. As Cape Horn was never doubled till 1646, Spain, by blockading the Magellanic Straits, shut up the Pacific door. In the endeavor to find or force a new route to India, adventurous parties were sent out by land and by sea, and their zeal was roused to the highest pitch by princely prizes offered for success.

In 1741 two British ships sought to pass northwest from Hudson's Bay; in 1773 the orders of Captain Phipps of the royal navy were to steer for the north pole. His highest latitude was 80° 40′. The discovery of the Arctic Ocean by Hearne in 1772, and by Mackenzie in 1789, was made at the charge of the Hudson Bay Company, — the only government ever known north of Canada until the attempt to establish one in Manitoba half a dozen years ago. No sooner was the

long agony of Napoleonic wars over than Great Britain resumed the Arctic explorations. The expeditions of Ross in 1819, and others afterwards, as of Parry in 1827, of Franklin in 1845, with those in search of that lost hero, are computed to have cost the empire £800,000, besides immense sums contributed by individuals and something of aid extended by the United States and American citizens.

The independent expenditures of our country in Arctic adventure are already considerable. Congress voted $150,000 for the party sent to rescue Dr. Kane. The Polaris crew, notwithstanding the death of Captain Hall, is reported to have penetrated nearer to the pole than any band before them, namely to 82° 16′ or even 83°. A project is now on foot in Washington to build a vessel specially adapted to Arctic conditions to engage in another race for the north pole.

In 1875 Great Britain sent up Smith's Sound the "Alert" and "Discovery," two model steamers for arctic navigation, with picked crews, to be followed in 1876 by a relief ship. This expedition is so much superior in appointments to all before it, that the Edinburgh Review calls it "the first which any government has carefully and deliberately fitted out to find the north pole." Should it fail in this grand endeavor, it must succeed in making discoveries in geography, geology, meteorology, and magnetism, — adventuring where there is ample room and verge enough for more than one Columbus — a *regio incognita* of more than two millions of miles. The Russian voyages of Admiral Wrangell from 1820 to 1824, were only a continuation of persistent endeavors during the century before, to examine the Siberian coast and the ocean north of it. In 1875 Russia explored the Kara Sea north of Siberia, and discovered a navigable route from the Yenisei — an arctic Mississippi — to Europe. Professor Leutz who, in 1823 was sent around the world with Kotzebue by Russia, is now confessed to have anticipated the theory of oceanic circulation, which was at first supposed to have originated with the English Professor Carpenter, and that less than half a dozen years ago. From 1858 to 1872 Swedish ships were pushing

northward in the icepack above Spitzbergen. The latest among Arctic findings is north of Russia, a region called Francis Joseph, in honor of their emperor, by the Austrians, who discovered it in 1873, though with little government aid. The ship left when already twenty-one months frozen in there, and the crew reaching Nova Zembla only after ninety-six days of ice-travel, have not discouraged Austria. She immediately fitted out two more polar companies, and many of the old hands volunteered again. A polar expedition, dispatched from Northern Germany in 1869 largely by private enterprise, persevered in its search till one of its ships was crushed in the ice. It is now plausibly maintained that "the polar regions are the most important parts of our globe for the study of all the natural sciences, — for terrestrial magnetism, for meteorology, and for geodesy especially."

In voyages primarily for advancing commerce, yet not without regard to the good of knowledge, Portugal and Spain were foremost to engage. The whole *mundus incognitus* was so divided by the pope, "out of his pure liberality, infallible knowledge, and plenitude of apostolical power," between these nations, that Portugal had all the east and Spain all the west of a point two hundred and seventy leagues west from the Azores. Nor did either for some time encroach on the other. But after the Portuguese, in 1510, had seized the Spice Islands, the envious Spaniards pressed westward with double vigor. Magellan, a Portuguese deserter in their service, discovered the Straits which bear his name, and pushed on to the Spice Islands entering, as it were, their back door. One of his ships doubling the Cape of Good Hope achieved the first circumnavigation of the globe in 1522, — fifty-seven years before any English ship performed that voyage. In ascertaining the pope's line of demarcation between the east and the west, the rival proprietors patronized astronomy, fitting out longitudinal commissions, and convening according to Prescott, "more than one congress, as at Badajos, in which all the cosmographical science of the day was put in requisition." So hard was it to decide where the east and the west meet.

In the geographical progress of the last century, England, as the leading commercial nation, has naturally taken the lead. Next to the voyages of Byron in 1764; Wallis in 1766; Carteret in 1767; Cook, already alluded to, in 1768 and for a dozen years after, came Bligh of the Bounty on a botanical mission in 1787, and then Vancouver for four years after 1791. In 1817 Basil Hall explored the Japan Sea; and Sabine, both equatorial and polar latitudes in 1820. Between 1831 and 1836 the "Beagle" was carrying Darwin, now so famous, round the world. In 1838 the "Arrow" was dispatched to examine the Falkland Islands. Similar British expeditions are beyond counting. In 1791 Great Britain commenced a hydrographic survey of her own coast, so elaborate that after an outlay of many millions, and fourscore years of scientific toil, the task is not yet ended. The outlay on the ordnance, or topographical survey of England in progress from 1784, had amounted, up to 1875, to £4,200,000. Through her cruising squadrons, she has also drawn up half the accurate charts of navigable waters now in existence. About 1830 Captain King made charts of the Straits of Magellan. That of the Mediterranean by Admiral Smyth is invaluable to classical commentators. While sailing up the Gulf of Finland in 1867, I observed that my Captain's charts were all English. No Russian circumnavigated the world before Krusenstern in 1806.

Since 1868, British vessels, particularly the "Porcupine," "Lightning," and "Challenger," have surpassed all former achievements in regard to deep-sea soundings, temperature, currents, and dredging. Their thus ascertaining the thermal stratification of 15,000,000 square miles is pronounced by the highest authorities, "the grandest single contribution yet made to terraqueous physics." The "Basilisk," in 1873, visiting hitherto unexplored portions of New Guinea, discovered a new route from Singapore to Australia. The interior, also, of many unknown regions has been recently explored by parties sent forth at British charges. Livingstone, whose career has so lately closed, more than a quarter of a

century ago was already the official head of an expedition up the Zambesi river. All the frontiers of the British Indian empire have been passed, and the northern, eastern, and western *terrae incognitae* penetrated by public agents. Every Russian conquest in those regions has also been an invasion of the great Asiatic unknown, and has borne scientific fruit, and more of it year by year.

But our country's grand explorations have been within its own limits. The United States Coast-Survey was projected in the first year of our century; but no work was done, save measuring a base line near the Hudson, till 1832. Since then operations have gone on, with slight interruptions, with an outlay constantly increasing, till in 1873 it had risen to $852,828.75. Triangulations from the Coast-Survey are every year extended further and further into the interior, with a view ultimately to form a geodetic connection between the Atlantic and the Pacific. A scientific basis will thus be laid for American maps of such accuracy as is now impossible, and as very few governments outside of Switzerland have as yet attained, in showing the surface of their territory, and the relative positions of rivers, mountains, and towns. The survey of Lake Champlain, having been four years in progress, was completed in October, 1874. It is claimed by Professor Pierce, head of the Coast-Survey, that triangulation by quadrilaterals, originating in that service, and of such exactitude as to "distinguish and divide a hair twixt north and northwest side," is sure to be adopted everywhere abroad, and that the instruments for the purpose, and skill also to make the most of them, must be sought in America. One unexpected result of this survey is its proving California, which had long boasted of 188,981 square miles, to be more than 30,000 miles smaller than that. Cutting a huge half-moon, — a monstrous cantle out, it has robbed the Golden State of much more territory than Prussia tore away from France.

The United States exploring expedition, between 1838 and 1842, costing $400,000, which in 1840 discovered the Antarctic continent, — about the same year with the French

and English, but before either of them, — and Commodore Perry's visit to Japan in 1858, added much to the stock of human knowledge. Dana, the geologist, sailed in the former; and it yielded precious material to the chief of our botanists, Gray, and to the conchologist, Gould. The orders issued to its commander, Lieutenant Wilkes, were, to determine the existence of all doubtful islands and shoals, to ascertain the geographical position of as many as possible, as well as in other ways to extend the bounds of science. Many minor voyages have been made by our national vessels abroad in the interest of science. Instances are, the cruise of the "Dolphin," in 1851, and Lieutenant Herndon's ascending the Amazon the same year; the "Water-Witch" sailing up the LaPlata, in 1843; four vessels under Ringold, in 1853, into China seas; and the "Ashuelot" steaming, in the summer of 1874, a thousand miles up the Yang-tse-Kiang.

United States engineers, and those of several nations, have explored and mapped many routes between Panama and Tehuantepec, in order to determine the most feasible point for an inter-oceanic ship-canal — an improvement necessitated by the Suez success. As preparatory to the exactitude of present Western land-surveys, many reconnoissances had been prosecuted. The same year in which Louisiana was purchased, — namely, 1803, saw forty government employes on their way to ascend the Missouri, which had never been ascended by whites, and, crossing from its source to navigable waters which were assumed to flow on the western slope, to pass down them to the ocean. This trans-continental journey was not accomplished till late in the third year of forced marches, and was the first ever made in United States latitudes; though further north Mackenzie had, a dozen years earlier, penetrated from Hudson's Bay to the Pacific. The exploration by Lewis and Clarke cost only $11,000, besides its scanty outfit. It was followed by Pike, an army officer, ascending both the Mississippi and the Colorado to their supposed sources; by Schoolcraft, in 1820, voyaging from Detroit to the head of

Lake Superior, as a government geologist; by Major Long, after traversing all the continent between Texas and the Great Lakes, going up the Platte River to the peak which bears his name; by Fremont, from 1842 to 1846, who laid open the Pacific slope; by Sitgreaves, in 1852; by Marcy on the Red River, etc.

To enumerate the manifold exploring expeditions which our government has sent out would exceed the limits of this Article. A list of ninety-two, despatched by the War Department west of the Mississippi since that under Captains Lewis and Clarke, was laid before Congress in 1874. There had also been five trans-Mississippi boundary commissions. Tracing well nigh a hundred enterprises in which our army thus increased scientific, as well as military knowledge, one might almost say its chief end had been to serve as the handmaid of science; even as the Italian army is now described as the schoolmistress of the Italian people. The conscripts of Italy, when drafted into service, are a majority of them illiterates — *analphabetici;* but they are forthwith put into regimental schools, and promised a discharge as soon as they can read and write. The stimulant to become *alphabetici* is as powerful as that of the boy with a goblet of wine at the furrow-end upon the plowman on the shield of Achilles. In most cases the plans of operation and results of these government expeditions have been praiseworthy. Yet they were sometimes open to criticism. On the grand Mormon anniversary of Salt Lake, in 1869, where the writer chanced to be present, one speaker stated that Fremont, when westward-bound, had found the north end of Salt Lake salter than any sea; that, returning by a more southern route, he fell in with a body of fresh water which he mistook for the south end of Salt Lake, and then puzzled himself to guess how the same lake could be half salt and half fresh.

Congressional doubts as to what route ought to be preferred for an inter-oceanic railroad led to a thorough research onward from 1857, along many lines north and south of the latitude which was finally chosen. These surveys, em-

bracing climate, soil, botany, zoölogy, geology, as well as physical geography, and published in thirteen corpulent quartos, form a magnificent contribution to the world's knowledge. They are now being supplemented by more minute trans-Missourian investigations, conducted by Hayden, Raymond, and especially those by Clarence King on the fortieth parallel, which is the average latitude of the Pacific railroad. One result of these recent surveys has been to multiply knowledge concerning our fossil flora. In 1850 only eighteen species were described by Brogniart in his *Végétaux Fossiles*. The number now known exceeds one thousand.

The British craving for trans-continental railroads within the territory of British America has induced Great Britain, during the last ten years, to make a more thorough examination of vast spaces westward from Manitoba than would otherwise have been thought of for a century. The first among our States to ordain a geological survey of its territory was North Carolina, in 1824, which was only two years after France, first of all nations, began hers. Every State in our Union, probably, has made some appropriation in order to know itself geologically.

Among government expeditions organized primarily for astronomical observations, and incidentally for the cause of other knowledge, the most considerable are those for observing the transit of Venus. That transit in 1769 led to Cook's circumnavigation of the globe. It brought other English observers to St. Helena, French astronomers to Mauritius and Coromandel, Danes to Lapland, and Germans, especially Pallas and Klaproth, with imperial escorts overland to Kamschatka. It was inspected, in all, from seventy-three stations. The passage of Venus across the sun, on the eighth of December, in 1875, was an astronomical jubilee. It was scrutinized all over the globe by experts under the patronage of many states. Italy fitted out an astronomical commission for India. Five principal stations were selected by England, — viz. Alexandria, Oahu, Mauritius, New Zealand, and Kerguelen's Island, — twenty-seven by

Russia, eleven by Germany, and six by the United States. Some of the stations taken by our astronomers were in China and Japan; and $150,000, besides the use of government ships, were granted by Congress for assisting the observations.

France has patronized astronomy, as well as other knowledge, more on the land than on the seas. Her first voyager round the world was Bougainville, between 1766 and 1769, two hundred and forty-seven years after the first Spaniard, and one hundred and ninety after the first Englishman, and only thirty-seven years before the first Russian. The first circumnavigation by a United States ship-of-war was completed in 1834. France may have been discouraged by the fate of La Perouse, who was sent out, in 1785, with two frigates, emulous of rivaling the glories of the English Captain Cook. In 1788 he and his ships vanished so mysteriously that for generations no trace of them could be detected by the strictest search. Yet in 1800 the French Admiral Baudin went on a national scientific voyage to Australia, and Freycinet on another in 1817, and in 1822 Duperry on still another. France was first to ascertain, in 1669, the true length of a degree — an error regarding which, so long as he persisted in it, rendered Newton's great discovery impossible. France maintained for years a scientific corps in Peru to test the accuracy of her home-measurement of a degree. In 1693 she despatched a party headed by Charelles to Alexandria for repeating the observations of Ptolemy on the very spot where he had made them; and in 1788 Beauchamp was directed by Louis XVI. to build an observatory in Bagdad, with a view to test the results reported there under the caliphs. In 1850 another national expedition, including Oppert, went forth from France to Mesopotamia. No one needs to be told that explorers supported by French authorities were first to traverse and to make known the interior of North America, especially the valleys of the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, as well as the basins of the Great Lakes.

France has spent much on archaeology. In 1798 a corps

of savans accompanied Napoleon to Egypt, and by his aid gave the world the first accurate account of Egyptian wonders. In 1828 Champollion and five other specialists were sent thither by France, in conjunction with Rosellini and six companions maintained by Tuscany. While Italy was controlled by the great Napoleon, more excavations were made in Rome and Pompeii than in any previous period of equal length. The disinterment of Caesar's palace on the Palatine since 1860, by Louis Napoleon, was the greatest single antiquarian labor of the present age in Rome. Some might not call this labor governmental; but it was certainly paid for by French tax-payers, and ordered as by him who taxed them at pleasure, saying, "L'etat! c'est moi!" Regarding the art-patronage of Prince Napoleon there may be room for doubt. This prince during the empire received about 15,000,000 francs, most of which he disbursed for the benefit of science and art. As he did not earn this public money, one is tempted to class his gifts, far more than those of Maecenas, among public, rather than private, liberalities.

The occupation of the Morea by a French army, in 1829, was fruitful in classical findings there, thanks to the soldiers' taking scholars in their train. French conquests in the north of Africa, also, have lighted up that land of darkness. The ruins of Carthage have been explored, and many a relic has thus been rescued from its grave. Soleillet has penetrated Central Sahara and the oasis In-Calah. One result of levelling at the Syrtis near Tunis has been the appropriation of some millions by France for a cut from the Mediterranean, which will form in Sahara a sea as large as Lake Erie. In 1864 a French exploring party in Cambodia fell in with the gigantic ruins of Ankor, and have now filled the imperial palace at Compiegne with their harvest from farther India. In 1875 another party of French officials started up the Congo, bound for the basin of the upper Nile.

Prussia in patronizing knowledge took the field later than England and France, but will not be long a whit behind them. Her scientific researches in Egypt, under Lepsius,

for four years onward from 1842, added much to the findings there of France, England, and Italy, and, in Humboldt's words, "threw much light upon the whole of antiquity." She has now a monopoly, as it were, of Greece, has set a large corps at work there,—particularly at Olympia in 1875,—and will doubtless reveal to us many a Pompeii.

Among the late advices from Germany there is an announcement that the kaiser has granted 25,000 thalers in aid of scholarly adventurers in equatorial Africa, and 40,000 thalers annually for plaster-casts of Italian sculpture. In 1870 the world heard with astonishment that the Prussian invaders of France had maps showing all the strategic minutiae of every locality. It has been plausibly asserted that, had the French penetrated into Germany, it would have been seen that their acquaintance with the lay of the land there was no less exact. In topography, as in other matters, self-knowledge is often that which is last acquired. Whatever may have been the comparative knowledge of the two nations, the strategic advantage accruing to Prussian invaders from their intimacy with the physical geography and topography of France will everywhere double the governmental encouragement which those sciences have hitherto received.

In 1817 Austria and Bavaria despatched a scientific delegation to Brazil, which made researches there through the three following years. Their collections form the most interesting scientific museum in Munich. The earliest work of Agassiz was a treatise on the fishes brought home by this expedition. Its title was: "Pisces quos collegit et pingendos curavit Spix, descripsit Agassiz."

In reference to Syria, it is worth noting that a corps of explorers was sent thither by France under the charge of Renan. This was thirteen years after Lieutenant Lynch of the United States navy, in 1848, had boated down the Jordan with a party of fifteen, mainly at the expense of our government. Excavations in the Holy Land, partly at the charge of Great Britain, were commenced in 1867. A survey of the region this side Jordan, including the peninsula of

Sinai, is now being made by British officers, and is already more than half done. It is said to be as accurate as the world-famed ordnance survey of England itself. The ruler of Egypt has caught the fever of research. No corps so large as that at the head of which he placed Sir Samuel Baker has ever essayed to pierce the heart of Africa. Not only has he sought out primitive Korans, and found some dating almost from the lifetime of Mohammed (that of Gaafar, written in Cufic on gazelle-skins, dates from 720), he is also now surveying the Nile-basin, with a view to turn a stream from it into what the Arabs call "the Dry-River Valley," hoping to double the arable acreage of Egypt, as a pre-historic Pharaoh did by excavating Lake Moeris.

Moreover, Italy, unified and liberalized, is now raising its own classical treasures from their graves, as in Rome and Herculaneum, with an energy undreamed of in any former era. The latest finding in the latter city is a female bust of pure silver, life size, in admirable preservation and of high art. In the eternal city excavations under director Rosa, *veterum volvens monumenta virorum*, have lately done more to show the plan of the Flavian Amphitheatre and its adaptation to its purposes than had ever been achieved. At twenty-one feet below the level of the ellipse has been laid bare the ancient arena, paved with *opus spicatum*, or herring-bone work. Elevators, which ten years ago had not been introduced in Boston hotels, have been brought to light in the Colosseum, and those on so grand a scale that they were evidently intended to raise and lower elephants. Among the findings on the Esquiline alone, in 1874, Mr. Hemans, son of the poetess and correspondent of the London Academy, enumerates 17 statues, parts of 57 others, 8936 coins, 39 inscriptions, dining forks, which had always been supposed altogether a modern invention, and five sarcophagi. The municipal archæological outlay for 1875 was 3,040,000 francs.

Scientific expeditions supported by smaller states have often rivalled those of the great powers. The beginning of modern knowledge concerning Arabia and Persia is due to a

band of travellers, among whom Niebuhr, father of the historian, was at last chief, — maintained for seven years, from 1761 to 1768 by Denmark. No other party has accomplished more at so small expense. Other Danish expeditions have been those of Oersted and Forchhammer.

Discoveries made at the charge of the Hudson Bay Company I have credited to government patronage. So I do those made under the auspices of the Levant Company. That association, incorporated by England in 1605, was for two centuries an absolute *imperium in imperio* on all shores of the Mediterranean to the east of Italy. It could tax, imprison, bastinado, banish. It appointed all consuls, and even ambassadors, as Lords Elgin and Montague. Among its employes were Pococke, Maundrell, Shaw, Salt, and a score of other scholars, — owing their places to scholarship, — and to whom Christendom owes the blessings of inoculation, as well as disarming the plague of panic terrors, and to whom England owed almost all she learned during two centuries concerning the Orient — its art, science, literature, and manners.[1]

Governments have patronized knowledge through enabling philosophers to test their theories by *experiment* and *observation.*

Alexander the Great, as Pliny informs us, placed at the disposal of Aristotle, when preparing to write his "history of animals," several thousand hunters, fishers, and fowlers, who laid at the feet of the philosopher whatever they could capture in the three kingdoms of nature. Aristoteli, summo in omni doctrina viro, aliquot millia hominum in totius Asiae, Greciaeque tractu parere jussa, omnium quos venatus, aucupia, piscatusque alebant, quibusque vivaria, armenta, alvearia, piscinae, aviaria in cura erant; ne quid usquam gentium ignoraretur ab eo; quos percontando quinquaginta ferme volumina illa praeclara *de animalibus* condidit.[2] The amount thus expended is estimated by Athenaeus (ix. 398 *e*) at eight

[1] See "Account of Levant Company." London. 1825.

[2] Pliny, Natural History, Vol. viii. chap. 17.

hundred talents, and that in an age when a single talent was tantamount to the highest daily pay of six thousand soldiers. A century later Archimedes, the first born of ancient mechanical philosophers, was reinforced by King Hiero so powerfully that he half believed his patron would furnish him a fulcrum on which to rest a lever for lifting the world.

Patronage of alchemy was a patronage, albeit blind and wasteful, of knowledge. For, says Bacon, "the search and stir to make gold hath brought to light a great number of good and fruitful inventions." Laudanum and Glauber's Salts (*sal mirabile Glauberi*) are not a tithe of the medicines we owe to alchemists. The black art student, Agricola, by governmental aid first made chemical analyses and discovered bismuth. Bottger, furnished by Saxony with a hundred and fifty thousand dollars with which to seek the philosopher's stone, found Dresden porcelain. Charles the second, of England, at his restoration in 1660, brought over a famous alchemist from Paris and built for him in St. James's Park a very fine "elaboratory." But the patrons of alchemy can no more be numbered than can the devotees of avarice and credulity.

All the deer in Windsor Park were given by Charles I. to Harvey, the discoverer of the circulation of the blood, for dissection. Whether the monarch gave him the venison too, chroniclers do not relate. For testing Halley's theory concerning variations of the compass, that philosopher was put in command of a British ship, with which he made ocean voyages for several years, returning to England in 1700. The same act of parliament which offered a prize for ascertaining longitude at sea also authorized commissions to defray the expense of longitudinal experiments. In 1805 Robert Fulton was afforded opportunities by the British government to experiment with his submarine torpedoes, and in 1807 was granted $5000 by the authorities in Washington for testing again his torpedo theory. In 1842 $15,000 were granted to Colonel Samuel Colt, inventor of the revolver, for the same purpose.

The Prussian admiralty is reported to have lately purchased of an English inventor the secret of the so-called "fish-torpedo" for harbor defences. In 1800 Prussia gave the chemist Achard a farm for experiments on beet sugar; — the beginning of a manufacture, afterward encouraged in France when stripped of her sugar-islands, by the premium of a million francs for the best method of making it, and which to-day renders half Europe independent of the sugar-cane and tropical islands. The manufacture of beet sugar — beginning so lately and on so small a scale — will repay a million-fold the fostering care of Germany. In 1874 the tax on it in the German empire yielded more than that laid on any other article, namely, 35,451,300 marks, while that on salt was 32,350,470, and that on distilled liquors 30,761,670. But extracting sugar from beets seemed so chimerical a project to the average English mind, that one of the most popular of Gillray's caricatures shows George III. standing on the channel coast, and throwing a huge beet across to the French emperor, and bidding him make sugar of it.

In 1843 the United States Congress erected a line of telegraph for Morse from Washington to Baltimore. Who can estimate the influence of this appropriation of $30,000 in hastening on the telegraphic era? An index of telegraphic progress in thirty years is afforded by the outlay on telegraphs of $834,169 in 1872 by the government even of Brazil. Again, had not the inventor Ericsson been permitted to try his propeller on a United States steamer in 1841, the navies of the world might still have been sailing ships. Had not our government given the same genius its patronage for building the unique, new-fangled Monitor, who can calculate the disasters that would have followed in the wake of the triumphant Merrimac?

In 1817 the canton of Geneva established a botanical garden simply to aid DeCandolle in his botanical researches. In 1872 De Lôme was granted £1600 by France, that he might try aeronautic experiments. In 1847 Agassiz, having executed his American commission for Prussia, was about to

return thither, when he was offered by the head of our coast-survey, Mr. Bache, — who held that tools belong to him that can use them, *tractet fabrilia faber*,— its aid in his researches. This offer was the secret of Agassiz's deciding to end his days here, deaf to tempting European invitations. It enabled him at will to push researches on all shores from Maine to Texas, as well as along the Pacific. It bore him up the Amazon and round Cape Horn. It gave him more hands than those of Briareus. At first he could not credit his good fortune, which was more than Aristotle's; or his feeling was,

> "Give me a gash, put me in present pain,
> Lest this great sea of joys rushing upon me,
> O'erbear the shores of my mortality,
> And drown me in their sweetness."

The Washington authorities by making Professor Henry, — who is the chief executive officer of the Smithsonian Institution,— president of the light-house board, do science a service as well as themselves. They afford him abundant facilities for experiments in optics and acoustics, which would otherwise be impossible, as well as for testing plausible theories.

Governments have sometimes patronized knowledge by relaxing for its benefit the severities of war.

> "The great Emanthian conqueror bid spare
> The house of Pindarus, when temple and tower
> Went to the ground."

In the very heat of our war for independence, Dr. Franklin, as Plenipotentiary of the United States in France, forbade American privateers to molest the squadron with which the British discoverer, Captain Cook, was circumnavigating the globe. France, in the interest of science, is said to have laid a similar interdict on her cruisers. It is certain that Franklin did, and on those of Spain also. In acknowledgement of Franklin's magnanimity the British Admiralty sent him, as from the king, a presentation copy of Cook's voyages and a gold medal. In 1813 Davy, the scientist, was allowed by Napoleon to make a chemical tour on the continent of Europe, when it was shut up against all other Englishmen.

Through upholding some form of *religion*, governments have patronized knowledge.

Among the seven wonders of the classical world all save two were religious monuments; namely, the pyramids and the mausoleum, the colossal statues of Apollo at Rhodes, and of Jupiter at Olympia, and the Ephesian temple of Diana; and all were national works. So were the architectural miracles of Karnak, Jerusalem, Baalbec, and Athens, as well as those in India and farther east.

After the fall of paganism every government which favored Christianity favored the advance of knowledge. For the last millenary the grandest architecture in the world has been displayed in European cathedrals, the larger part of which were built at public expense. The funds obtained by the pope through the sale of indulgences for lavishing on St. Peter's were as really public money as was that fund raised in England by a parliamentary tax on coal for erecting fifty churches in London by Sir Christopher Wren. So were the sums secured by priests in Rouen for licenses to eat butter in Lent, and then laid out in building there one of the most massive church towers in France, called "*La Tour de Beurre*, parcequ'elle fut construite de l'argent payé par les fidèles pour obtenir la permission manger du beurre pendant le carême."

Through the church also governments have patronized sculpture and painting no less than architecture. The master-pieces of most of the masters were executed for the ornamentation of churches. They have usually been paid for by public money, — money exacted rather than voluntarily contributed. In maintaining Christian clergy, governments have done a service to knowledge. The maintenance of Christian teachers from the revenues of the state began with the first Christian emperor, Constantine. Charlemagne at the opening of the ninth century was the legal author of tithes. Thus was furnished a physical basis which is often a *sine qua non* of intellectual advancement, — the ποῦ στῶ which Archimedes wanted as a pre-requisite for moving the

world. Ecclesiastics thus fed, have done as much as any other class for the increase of knowledge. Such names as Roger Bacon, and "gunpowder Schwarz," both friars; Grosseteste a bishop; Basil Valentine, who invented percussion powder, a Benedictine, cannot be surpassed among mediaevals. The only man in the ninth century known to have maintained the rotundity of the earth, was a bishop. Petrarch was a prebendary, as some one says, "fattening upon benefices while writing about philosophy." Copernicus was a parish priest. The monks of Salamanca entertained Columbus for two years, and supported his scheme of discovery after it had been condemned by the university. The foremost founders of libraries and museums were popes.

When Milton visited Rome in 1638 — his biographer, Professor Masson, writes — the popes and cardinals had come to regard the patronage of learning and the arts as a part of their official duties. To build new edifices, surround them with gardens and fountains, and adorn them with sculptures and paintings; to preside at meetings of the academies and to hold large reunions in their own palaces, at which all the learned were assembled, and at which the best singing in Italy was to be heard, to collect books and manuscripts, and to employ librarians to catalogue and keep them, — such were the occupations of the Roman cardinals.

Some portions of papal patronage are underrated when we view them from a Protestant stand-point. Thus Borghese, who had laboriously and scientifically arranged the papal numismatic treasures, was paid, at his own request, by permission to eat meat on Friday. Protestants would choose a largess of meat, choosing pork rather than permission to partake of it, loin rather than license. But Borghese was well paid, for he was well satisfied. Cardinal del Monte, having begged a telescope from Galileo, sent him in return a certificate of indulgence, as it were celestial pardons for celestial prospects. Never, however, can we forgive the seven cardinals, who silenced, and as it were paralyzed, Galileo during the last nine years of his life — though the

pope was too wary to sign the decree, and the actual imprisonment of the sage lasted no more than twenty days, and that in "the best and most comfortable rooms of the holy office."

In nothing, perhaps, is the papal power of literary patronage more enviable than in its protection of libraries, which no locks, or police, or penalties among Protestants can secure from kleptomaniacs. The invaluable library at Santa Maria Sopra Minerva, — the very spot where Galileo was incarcerated, — is open to all the world, and yet its books are safe. Their palladium is this. Over its door, in letters which he that runneth may read, you see a notice that whosoever carries a book through that door is, by that very act, *ipso facto*, excommunicated. On the whole Newman has reason to say: "Not a man who now talks bravely against the church, but owes it to the church that he can talk at all."

Various outlays of the United States in the cause of knowledge have been mentioned in the course of this Article. But it may help to a better appreciation of our national contributions of this nature if we look, in a table, at the principal annual appropriations. Those for the official year ending with June 1874 were as follows: Coast-Survey, $852,828; West Point, $345,362; Naval School, $200,000; Naval Observatory, $42,600; Nautical Almanac, $20,000; Congressional Library, $54,646; Surgeon-General's Library, $10,000; National Museum, warming and repairing, $27,000; Testing strength of materials and experiments with new systems of guns, $153,000; Botanical Garden, $54,646; Making Maps, $30,000; Storm Signals, $88,000; Transit of Venus, $150,000; Western Explorations, $125,000; Bureau of Education, $34,850; Statistics (astronomical, etc.), $65,440; making a total of $2,253,372. But the actual outlay for the good of knowledge will probably amount to nearer three millions than two. In addition to this, President Grant, in compliance with a resolution of Congress, has invited the statistical association to hold their next, and ninth, congress in the United States.

Under the patronage of Belgium, Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Italy, Holland, and Russia, that society has held one congress in each of those states. Should it accept our invitation, doubtless it will find our authorities shrinking from no outlay needful to render its first welcome in the New World a match for any reception that has greeted it in the Old.

Buckle and some others have depreciated patronage, counting it of little worth, and have even decried it as killing with kindness. "Glory," says Lord Camden, "is the reward of science. When the bookseller offered Milton £5 for 'Paradise Lost,' he did not reject it, and commit his poem to the flames, nor did he accept the miserable pittance as the reward of his labor. He knew that the real price of his work was immortality, and that posterity would pay it." But the foregoing facts — though their results, for want of space, have been only incidentally alluded to — seem to evince that patronage has done much in advancing knowledge. Its benefits would have been seen to be much greater, had showing private as well as public aid been my purpose. Yet candor demands the admission that pecuniary favor has done far less for genius than for talent. Genius "is made better by no mean, but genius makes that mean." Genius creates; talent explains and applies. Genius is spontaneous; talent is called out. Genius, stamped in nature's mint of ecstasy, can snatch a grace beyond the reach of art, and needs not, like talent, the aid of art. It is the wind, which "bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh." Talent is steam, developed by man and under human control. So it is well said:

> "Talk not of Genius baffled; Genius masters man.
> Genius does what it must, while Talent does what it can."

Homer achieved immortality, without library, or printing, or perhaps writing. But who ever did before him? And how few have since! It is the nature of the aid ministered to talent, rather than to genius, by patronage, which has now been unfolded.

Governmental patronage of knowledge, as now passed in review, has been shown founding and furnishing universities and learned societies, building and equipping libraries and museums, laying out botanic gardens, collecting and publishing archives, offering prizes for advances to be made, rewarding them when made, importing men more precious than the wedges of Ophir, paying the charges both of single experts and of scientific parties sent forth — either within their own territories or to the uttermost parts of the earth and sea and air — to test the deductions of theorists and extend the area of knowledge, reinforcing explorers by official prestige and by opportunities for observation and experiment, lavishing money on religious establishments, and mitigating the rigors of war — a policy which has increased the number of students of truth, as well as their ability and zeal in their pursuit.

The Grand Seignior, when the Italian painter Bellini showed him the head of John the Baptist in a charger, declared the rendering of the muscles not natural, and, to justify his criticism, had a slave decapitated on the spot. This story, however false to fact, is true as illustrating the alacrity of many governments in testing, regardless of expense, the theories of students in all departments, and hence extending the area of knowledge.

Such patronage as we have now considered, beginning with the dawn of enlightenment, has grown with its growth in all the principal nations of the world. It is now most conspicuous in those which lead the van of civilization. It is increasing in every one of them to-day. Seeing what has been in the action of governments for the good of knowledge, no man can doubt what will be; just as on the western borders of Wisconsin, when we behold how far the Father of Floods has flowed, we cannot doubt but he will flow farther, "spreading broad and more broad till he reaches the sea."

ARTICLE VII.

NATURAL BASIS OF OUR SPIRITUAL LANGUAGE.

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VI. — THE SUN OF RIGHTEOUSNESS.

From circumstances in which the readers of the Bibliotheca Sacra have no interest, the writer of these Essays cannot extend them so far as the nature of the subject may seem to demand. He is aware that many departments of the general subject remain to be developed, including such wide and suggestive topics as agriculture, architecture, domestic economy, food, garments, personal ornaments, amusements, occupations, trades, navigation, commerce, education, superstitions, diseases and medicines, death, funerals, and mourning, crimes and modes of punishment, miscellaneous manners and customs, and other things, almost innumerable, which have contributed more or less to the wealth of our religious language, but which do not readily group themselves around any common centre. Many of these considerations must be relegated to some future period.

The present Number will be devoted to certain topics which show that as the time drew nigh when the religion of the Bible ceased to be exclusively, or even mainly, confined to the Hebrews, the verbal vehicle — the names, metaphors, figures, and symbols — also ceased to be exclusively Palestinian. When, in the fulness of time, Christ came, and introduced that dispensation which contemplates all lands and is to include all people, these names, symbols, and similitudes became likewise universal, and many of them even Western and European. In a word, the natural basis for this part of our spiritual language must be sought for outside the Holy Land. To establish and illustrate this important fact, we select our

first example from the last chapter of the Old Testament. This selection will also show that some of these terms admit of indefinite expansion. So the amount of revelation — if the expression be allowable — which they contain will vary according to the knowledge and antecedent education of the recipients. This is pre-eminently true with regard to the sayings and parables of our Lord; but even such familiar words as Creator, Redeemer, King, Shepherd, and many others, will impart more or less of important truth in proportion to the previous culture of those who employ them. No better example of this principle can be selected than the prophetic title given to the promised Saviour by Malachi: "Unto you that fear my name, shall the Sun of Righteousness arise with healing in his wings" (Mal. iv. 2). The attributes and offices of the material sun, obvious to all mankind, and which probably suggested the application of this name to the promised Redeemer, are, light-giver, ruler of the day, and source of genial warmth and universal life. Now, although these attributes and offices of the sun are in no way confined to Palestine, but common to all lands, yet our specific line of argument seems to demand that we find something in this country, or in the conditions and customs of the Hebrew people, which enhanced, in their estimation, the preciousness of light — light in the habitation, in the city, and in the road; and this, we believe, can be shown without difficulty by the following considerations: First, as to light in the habitation. The ancient houses in this country were destitute of windows, — those of the poor absolutely so, — and thus they continue to be until the present hour. If there were any apertures, besides the door, for the admission of air and light, they were very small; and, as there was no glass in existence, or at least none available for windows, these apertures were closed either with stones, boards, or other opaque materials. Consequently, their rooms were gloomy and dark. This condition of things may be illustrated by the parable of the woman that had lost one of her ten pieces of silver. She *lighted a candle*, and swept the house to find it.

The house was dark, and a lighted candle was necessary, even though the search may have been made in the daytime. And so it would be still in most peasant houses. To be without a light-giver of some sort — lamp or candle — is now felt to be a great hardship, even by the very poor. They have a superstitious dread of passing the night in utter darkness. It is a singular fact, also, that even the Arabs in the open desert are utterly unwilling to encamp where they cannot procure brushwood with which to kindle a light. Nothing but imminent danger of attracting the notice of enemies will induce them to pass a night in darkness.

Again, a lamp or lantern was very necessary in passing through the narrow, crooked, and vaulted streets in the cities and towns; and the same is true now. So, also, along the narrow, perplexed, and blind paths, — the only roads in primitive times, — persons were in great need of some kind of light to enable them to thread their way in safety, where slippery rocks overhang yawning chasms, into which one false step might plunge them to inevitable destruction. As is well known, much of the travelling in hot countries is done at night, and, although the days are bright enough, the nights are often intensely dark. We have ourselves been suddenly enveloped in dense fog when journeying by night over the broken hill-country of Judea. To advance was impossible. One could not see the ears of his own horse; and to proceed under such circumstances is sheer madness. We had to lie down on a smooth rock, and watch for the morning — a bit of experience which imparted a deeper meaning to the complaint of the Psalmist: "My soul waiteth for the Lord more than they that watch for the morning, — I say, more than they that watch for the morning" (Ps. cxxx. 6).

These and other circumstances which might be mentioned rendered light precious, and darkness both dangerous and depressing. The light of the sun was especially delightful. His coming forth was welcomed by all the good and honest, and only the thief and the robber and the savage beast shunned the day. At early dawn the whole world wakes

up; the birds sing; the flocks are led out to feed upon the mountains; children gather in groups for play and frolic; and man goes forth to his labor, until eventide brings all home again to refuge and repose.

Now, to borrow imagery and figure and illustration of moral and religious matters from such physical phenomena is so natural that it has been done, to some extent, in all ages, and even by the most untutored savages. The analogical process by which the spiritual is evolved from the material is often performed unconsciously. For example, it requires a distinct act of recollection ere we are aware of the fact that knowledge is light only in a figurative sense, and that ignorance is not actual darkness. An individual is seen to grope his way along a blind path in the night by the aid of a lamp — a very common, yet complex operation; but the mind readily compares this physical performance to man's moral conduct. His course of life is his path. To walk in it wisely and safely, knowledge, instruction, truth, are needed. This is his moral lamp, without which he gets bewildered, lost, ruined. Hence the propriety and beauty of such expressions as, "Thy word is a lamp unto my feet and a light unto my path" (Ps. cxix. 105); "The entrance of thy words giveth light" (Ps. cxix. 130).

The consequences of walking in moral darkness are so tremendous that no language can overstate the value of true spiritual light and guidance. And as all men are, in this matter, by nature in equal darkness, that which reveals the future life and all its momentous concomitants and relations is absolutely the most precious boon that can be bestowed upon the human race. In this consists the transcendent value of the word of God. It is *the* lamp of life — man's only sure guide to heaven. Hence, too, the propriety of calling our blessed Lord the Sun of Righteousness. When on earth he himself unhesitatingly claimed to be the Light of the world, and repeatedly declared that those only who received him were children of light, while all others abode in darkness.

With these preliminary remarks on the general subject,

let us turn to the special consideration of this magnificent title, Sun of Righteousness; and we shall find that the *sum of divine revelation* embraced in, or which may fairly be deduced from it, enlarges and expands indefinitely, just in proportion to the extent and accuracy of the information which is possessed by those who use it. Abstractly and absolutely the most imposing and impressive sight in this world is the *rising sun*. Were we not familiar with it from earliest infancy, were it possible to behold it for the first time in mature life, it would appall the bravest heart, or overwhelm with wonder, awe, and terror. Essentially this is true in all lands and climates; but there are situations and circumstances in this country which add immensely to the magnificence of the event, — something that redeems from extravagance even such singular descriptions as that in the nineteenth Psalm. While driven about over the vast plain of Sharon by the rebellion of the Tullaheen against Mohammed Ali, some forty years ago, the writer had frequent opportunity to watch the mighty irresistible on-coming of the "growing day." From the faintest possible line of silvery light, trembling in uncertainty along the mountain-tops of Judea, the process rushed on apace, changing momentarily from glory to glory, until the whole hemisphere was aglow with blended hues, — grey, peach-blossom, rosy red, passing rapidly into pure pearly white, — shimmering, palpitating and flashing in fussy earnestness, until, at length, the golden doors of the Orient flew open wide, and up blazed the king of day from his tabernacle behind the eastern hills, like a bridegroom coming out of his chamber, like a strong man rejoicing to run a race. Instantly his lordly presence was felt and acknowledged by all the world; nay, even before he came forth from his tabernacle there had been a busy, bustling half-hour of preparation to receive and welcome him. If disposed to smile or doubt, go stand alone, as we have stood, at early dawn on Sharon's flowery plain, and watch the manifest and manifold worship of nature towards the coming king of day.

> "Sweet is the breath of morn, her rising sweet,
> With charms of earliest birds."

It is enough almost to make one a Parsee to witness and to hear it all at such a time, in such a place. A thousand larks, high up among the listening stars, salute the very first rays of that flush along the dappled east. All nature hears their call, shakes off dull sleep, and hastens to join the general welcome:

> "The lowing herd, the sheepfold's simple bell,
> The pipe of early shepherd, dim descried,
> In the lone valley echoing far and wide;
> The hum of bees, the linnet's lay of love,
> And the full choir that wakes the universal grove."

Even the vegetable world shares the general joy. No sooner does the sun appear than the flowers bend forward in mute reverence, turn round smiling to his ardent gaze, throw open their jeweled cups, and cast abroad their sweetest perfumes. This silent adoration of ten thousand times ten thousand flowers is most beautiful and impressive.

All this is poetical enough, you say, but what spiritual significance it has may not be so obvious. You do not see it! Why, it shows that an undevout man is the only atheist in the universe; and it may well start the inquiry, whether or not we ourselves meet the Sun of Righteousness when he arises, with any analogous welcome; or, whether, like midnight robbers and beasts of prey, we fear and shun his light. Does it annoy us, interfere with our business, or chosen pleasures? Does it make unpleasant revelations, leading us to act the very reverse of mute nature, to close up the heart, flee his presence, and, like Adam after the fall, seek concealment among the trees of the garden? But, besides these very practical inquiries, we may learn from this devout behavior of nature, this morning psalm of universal adoration and praise, to regard the world and all its furnishing and fitting up as one vast temple, every part of which has been glorified by the presence of the Lord, whose proclamation, by the last of the prophets, runs thus: "From the rising of the sun to the going down of the same, my name shall be great among the Gentiles; and in every

place incense shall be offered to my name, and a pure offering" (Mal. i. 11). Moreover, the contemplation of these things tunes one's own harp to join the general anthem of thanksgiving. A hundred times while wandering through the solemn aisles of this august temple, especially about Hermon and goodly Lebanon, have we heard from voices manifold the welcome summons: "Oh come, let us worship and bow down; let us kneel before the Lord our maker;... let us come before his presence with thanksgiving, and make a joyful noise unto him with psalms. For the Lord is a great God; and a great King above all gods. In his hand are the deep places of the earth: the strength of the hills is his also. The sea is his, and he made it; and his hands formed the dry land" (Ps. xcv. 2–6). And at such times, and in such society, it is the most natural thing in the world to call upon the "mountains, and all hills; fruitful trees, and all cedars; beasts, and all cattle; creeping things, and flying fowl; kings, and all people; princes, and all judges of the earth; both young men and maidens, old men and children, to praise the name of the Lord; for his name alone is excellent; his glory is above the earth and heaven" (Ps. cxlviii. 9–13). Equally beautiful and devout are the thoughts in the sixty-fifth Psalm: "Thou makest the outgoings of the morning and evening to rejoice. Thou visitest the earth and waterest it; thou greatly enrichest it with the river of God, which is full of water; thou preparest them corn, when thou hast so provided for it. Thou waterest the ridges thereof abundantly; thou settlest the furrows thereof; thou makest it soft with showers; thou blessest the springing thereof. Thou crownest the year with thy goodness, and thy paths drop fatness. They drop upon the pastures of the wilderness, and the little hills rejoice on every side. The pastures are clothed with flocks, the valleys also are covered over with corn; they shout for joy, they also sing" (Ps. lxv. 8–13). I pity the soul that cannot understand this song; or understanding, cannot sing and shout with the little hills, the flock-clothed pastures, and the corn-covered valleys. Where, in the entire range of pastoral poetry, can

you find such an exquisite picture of natural scenery and rural happiness? But we must again observe that the originals are eminently Palestinian. The poet-painter sat before the living, singing, shouting model, and did little more than copy from what the Great Master's hand had perfected from the "beginning." We never look upon these master-pieces of Nature's workmanship without joining in the exhortation of the Psalmist: "Let the heavens rejoice, and let the earth be glad; let the sea roar, and the fulness thereof. Let the field be joyful, and all that is therein; then shall all the trees of the wood rejoice before the Lord" (Ps. xcvi. 11, 12).

But, to resume the consideration of this glorious name, Sun of Righteousness. Science has furnished the modern worshipper with a splendid addition to its manifold significance as understood by ancient prophet and poet. So long as the geocentric theory was taught and believed, this little globe of ours was supposed to be the centre of the universe, and the sun, moon, and even the distant stars, were thought to be only so many lamps hung out in heaven, or whirled round the earth, for man's accommodation. But the heliocentric theory has changed all this, has magnified the sun almost beyond conception, and enthroned him in the centre of a magnificent planetary system, throughout which he not only dispenses light and heat, life and beauty, but over which he presides as lord and lawgiver. He assigns to all their stations, marks out their orbits, and guides and controls their complex revolutions. There is no confusion, no jostling one against another, no discord; but all move round him in heavenly harmony,

> "Forever singing as they shine,
> The hand that made us is divine."

Now, he must be very blind who does not see in this a glorious analogy, illustrating the spiritual position and offices of the Sun of Righteousness in the "kingdom of heaven." In this divine domain he is the controlling, guiding, governing centre. He appoints the station of every member of the

great family, marks out their orbits, and upholds them in all their endless, diversified movements and relations. He is the beginning, middle, and end, the Alpha and Omega in the Christian world. They are no Christians, after the scriptural model, to whom this Sun of Righteousness does not sustain these complex and precious relations.

But we must not forget that on this theme all human language fails, all figures fall infinitely below the incomparable Being to be described. The sun, immeasurably the largest, most glorious, and most powerful object in our system, is but his faint shadow. Though his bright beams flash athwart the universe, though his going forth is from the end of heaven, and his circuit unto the ends of it, yet his glowing fires are kindled by the breath of this Sun of Righteousness whereof we speak. Moreover, vast and bright and potent as is our sun, yet shall his tabernacle be taken down, his light extinguished, his warm beams quenched. The heavens are the work of thy hands, Sun of Righteousness. They shall perish, but thou shalt endure, — yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment; like a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed. But thou art the same, and thy years shall have no end; and long before the tabernacle shall be struck and the old vesture changed we shall have ceased to sustain any relation to them. The light and heat and attraction of the sun will soon be nothing to us; our own frail tabernacles will ere long fall at the touch of death's icy fingers. But this will terminate none of the Christian's relations to and with the Sun of Righteousness. These are unchangeable and eternal. Death itself is but a servant sent to loose the cords that bind the believer to earth, that the emancipated spirit, drawn by mighty attraction, may rise up to the all-glorious centre of the soul and the mansions of the blest. Happy they who shall thus be caught up from earth to heaven — to the city of our God, where there is no night; and they need no more candle, neither light of the sun; for the glory of God lightens it, and the Lamb is the light thereof. The Sun of Righteousness never sets upon the New Jerusalem.

Beautiful and mysterious and multitudinous are the influences and operations of the sun. He sends his windy messengers for the humid vapors of the ocean, and gently distils them over valley and plain, hill-top and high mountain, causing grass to grow for the cattle, and herb for the service of man, and springs with water-brooks to run among the hills and give drink to every beast of the field. He not only matures our golden harvests, loads our orchards with fruits and our vineyards with rich clusters; but he also adorns man's dwelling-place with all that is pleasant to the eye, grateful to the smell, or sweet to the taste. He gives to the rose its blush, and to the lily its purity, paints "the yellow cowslip and pale primrose," and robes all nature in refreshing green. Nothing can flourish cut off from communion with the blessed sun. In dark caves, or even in thick shades, all are of feeble growth and sickly hue. They must have sun shine, and bask in his warm beams. These conditions are not only necessary for the perfection of their beauty, but for their very existence. Now, there is another garden, about which the wise king sang songs and the Great Teacher spoke parables. Properly planted and cultivated, it yields flowers and fruits as superior to this world's brightest and best as heaven is to earth. But no fragrant flowers will bloom, no precious fruits ripen, here, without the vivifying rays of the Sun of Righteousness. You may attempt to supply their place by a thousand torches of your own kindling, but in vain. Nor will artificial heat quicken them into life, or perfect their growth. If the Sun of Righteousness does not shine upon them, the plants will languish, the flowers be mere sickly, scentless imitations, and the fruits will drop off like untimely figs. Let the Christian look well to his own garden. "Let him get up early to the vineyards, and see if the vine flourish, the tender grape appear, and the pomegranates bud forth" (Song of Sol. vii. 12). If not, — if there be neither blossoms of promise nor ripening fruits, — — be assured it is because he has shut out from his plants the life-giving rays of this blessed Sun. Nor is improvement

possible until he restore that without which they cannot live. In this spiritual garden the fruits are love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance; and such virtues neither flourish in the heart nor ripen in the outward life without constant communion with this Sun of Righteousness.

Go, take your stand, where the writer has often stood, on some lofty terrace of Lebanon, and watch the gathering tempest beneath your feet. The sight is grand and awful. Dark clouds from the sea drive, in wild uproar, against the ragged cliffs; winds rage; the sea roars; lightnings flash; and mighty thunders shake the deep foundations of the everlasting hills. But where you stand all is bright and tranquil, rejoicing in the warm beams of a cloudless sky. No alteration had passed upon the sun. The change is altogether in the lowlands of earth. Thus it is in the spiritual world. The Sun of Righteousness remains yesterday and to-day and forever the same, without shadow of turning. The change, if to us there be any, occurs only in the moral atmosphere in which we live and have our being. We become enveloped in the fogs which gather over the sickly marshes of selfishness and sin. There is a height these earth-born vapors never cloud, these moral miasms never invade. We must go up higher would we bask in cloudless sunshine. But mistake not the sunny summits we speak of for the frigid heights of ambition. We once toiled up to the topmost pinnacle of Hermon, and, though the southern base was glowing beneath the blaze of a midsummer sun, the northern side was buried deep under the cold snows of winter. The sky was clear, the sun bright, the day intensely hot; but the temperature of that snow was not raised, not by the hundredth part of a degree. You cannot warm snow. Syria's burning sun could not even mitigate its frigid temper. So neither can the Sun of Righteousness warm frosty ambition into spiritual life. It must be dissolved, melted, and driven away from the heart, or man's moral winter will never give way to balmy spring. Alas, how many snowy

nooks and frozen corners there are in every Christian's heart! And how many there be who show nothing but retiring surfaces and northern declivities, deep buried beneath the ever-accumulating snows of indifference, infidelity, and spiritual death.

Some one may suggest that an instructive analogy might be found in the death of winter and the resurrection of the vegetable creation to new life at the return of spring. But this thought comes from another country and a different climate. It would scarcely have occurred to a poet born and bred in this sunny land of Palestine. Nevertheless, it is legitimate, and very suggestive, and is one of those conditions which render this divine title, Sun of Righteousness, the common property of the entire human family. When in her annual revolution the earth turns her broad bosom towards the north, the fields put on sackcloth, and mourn; the flowers disappear; the leaves, sere and dead, fall to the ground; the atmosphere becomes cramped with cold; wind rages against wind, and tempest wars with tempest; long night comes on, and rigid frost binds all things fast in its icy fetters. Nor is there any ransom from this sad state, until earth again returns towards her lord — bright king of day. Then surly winter retires towards the unblest pole, while southern gales dissolve the snow, and gently fan the face of youthful spring. Now, there is a winter of the soul, when the heart grows cold, and darkness and gloom enshroud the moral horizon. How has such a melancholy winter come over the soul? Simply by withdrawing from the Sun of Righteousness. While basking in his love, the heart cannot grow cold, nor can faith and hope fail. If, therefore, doubts perplex, fears assail, Satan tempt, the world ensnare, and evil passions seduce, the cause is in ourselves, not in Him. He remains unchangeably the same glorious source of light and life and love.

Again, should our planet ever apostatize from her allegiance to the king of day, and start rebellious from her orbit to wander beyond the pale of that solar family to which she

belongs, what would be the result? Not easy to say certainly. The effect of such an hypothetical adventure would depend very much upon the direction taken by the erratic apostate. It might bring about some such catastrophe as that *ice period* about which geologists speculate so profoundly. The temperature might be so cooled down that all the moisture in the circumambient atmosphere would be congealed, and the entire globe wrapped in a winding-sheet of more than polar ice. Of course, every animal that roamed the forest, every bird that sailed the blue sky, every fish that sported in the deep, would perish. Nothing could survive the invasion of such a winter. Every fountain, too, would be shut and sealed up; nor would there be one babbling brook on all the earth, to give by its motion and its murmur even this sad manifestation of life. It would be the reign of absolute death. Now, should such a catastrophe befall our planet there could be no redemption but by returning to her rightful lord in her proper orbit. The sun alone could dissolve these icy fetters and emancipate the captive earth. He only could unchain the fast-bound brooks and send them laughing down to refresh the joyful fields; for he it is that clothes meadow and plain and swelling hills with painted verdure, wakes up the groves with hymn of birds and hum of bees, and bids air, earth, and old ocean teem with life.

Imagination can easily discover a startling analogy between this frightful fancy of the geologist and man's moral catastrophe. Our whole race has thus apostatized from the Sun of Righteousness, and not one solitary soul has escaped the ruin of this mad revolt; nor can there be redemption for any except by return to this Sun of Righteousness that has risen over our world with healing in his wings.

It is time to bring these manifold analogies to a close; and we notice but one more. The name was originally suggested, we suppose, by the fact that the sun is the great dispenser of light and heat to the earth. But light has another side, so to speak, and one which aptly illustrates an element in the character of the Sun of Righteousness. The natural

sun is a revealer of things that seek concealment in the dark. How many enemies, dangers, and deformities lie hidden beneath the veil of night! What deeds of darkness are then enacted unseen! To beasts of prey and savage man the rising sun is full of terror and dismay. Light is no comfort to them. Now such, in some sort, is the state of this apostate world. Man dwells in profound darkness. Beneath this moral midnight a thousand hideous evils lurk and work in secret. Pride swells, and anger burns, and malice plots, and deceit betrays, and hypocrisy makes up her double face, oppression maddens, avarice screws down her vise, and murder dyes her red hands in blood, and every ugly and monstrous sin and crime are perpetrated in the dark. But let the piercing rays of the Sun of Righteousness flash athwart this darkness, and the whole mass of deformity is instantly discovered. What a revelation is this! The heart, thought to be good and said to be pure, is seen to be deceitful above all things and desperately wicked. The tongue, full of honeyed accents and courtly phrases, is a world of iniquity, which setteth on fire the course of nature and is itself set on fire of hell. Much of religion is now seen to be smooth hypocrisy, making long prayers to devour widows' houses. Fasting, clad in sackcloth, puts on her sad countenance to be seen; and charity, giving alms with sound of trumpet, turns out to be nothing but hateful selfishness. Now, sin and moral corruption are not created by the Sun of Righteousness any more than the natural sun perpetrates the enormities which his rising reveals. The light merely discovers what already existed; and, moreover, the revelation by this Sun of Righteousness is not made with the purpose of scattering abroad terror and despair. On the contrary, these evil things are unveiled that they may be hated and forsaken. Dangers and spiritual enemies are pointed out that we may be on guard against them. The way of escape is marked out along with the tremendous necessity of flight. The same light that shows man the slippery places on which he stands, and the gulf beneath them, illumines also the path

of safety. Or, to change the figure, this Sun that reveals man's mortal disease, spreads over him, at the same time, those wings beneath which are all the healing medicines he needs.

Let us dwell for a little on this attribute of wings. It may be said that the idea of ascribing wings to the sun is not original with the prophet; and also, that it might occur to any vivid imagination. Wings are a natural symbol of celerity, with the farther attribute of soaring, or sailing through the air, self poised, and resting on nothing apparent to the eye. Thus the sun comes forth from his chamber in the east. Up he soars with amazing velocity, above the hills, above the mountains, in triumphant majesty and power. His going forth is from the end of the heaven, and his circuit unto the ends of it. Wings were the only known apparatus by which such flight through empty space could be made, and it was natural to accommodate the sun with them. Grecian mythology added horses and chariots and charioteer, with other absurd fables,— details which suggest only ludicrous comparisons, wholly unworthy of the Supreme Being. But remembering the age in which Malachi lived, we may be quite certain that he was familiar with the winged globes with which the architects of Egypt and Assyria adorned the entrances to their cities, temples, tombs, and other monuments. We not only see them all along the Nile, and amongst the marvels of Nineveh, on the banks of the Tigris, but also on the sculptured rocks of Dog river, and on many of the ruins of ancient temples and public edifices in various parts of Palestine and Syria. And it is worthy of notice that not until after the Hebrew writers became acquainted with the Assyrian and Babylonian architecture, where wings were attached to almost everything, — to bulls, and imaginary creatures in endless number and variety, — did they employ these winged conceptions and terms in their writings. But from Ezekiel's visions to the gorgeous costume of the Apocalypse we can trace the influence of this familiarity with these architectural ornamentations on the style of the Hebrew

prophets and poets, and from them our scriptural language has been largely enriched. This was in entire accord with all other parts of the Bible. No one acquainted with Egypt, for example, can fail to discover that Moses was not only learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, but that he drew largely upon that learning in the fulfilment of his great mission. The peculiar education which a prophet received from the circumstances under which he was born and bred in no way affects the reality of his inspiration. So far as this is concerned, it matters not whether he write in Hebrew, Chaldee, or Greek; whether he derived the drapery and costume in which he clothed his message from the city or the country, from Egypt or Palestine or Assyria; and therefore, there is nothing derogatory to the prophetic status of Ezekiel, Daniel, or John in the fact that they drew much of their figures and metaphors from Babylon, Nineveh, and the Graeco-Persian cities of Asia Minor. Malachi may have learned to assign wings to the Sun of Righteousness from the same source. The architectural figure was before his eyes; he did nothing but spiritualize it.

The farther idea of ascribing medical virtues to these wings is, I believe, entirely original with Malachi; and there is something in it very beautiful and consolatory. It reminds us that man is not only ignorant and wants light, but also diseased and requires to be healed. And, alas! it needs no argument to prove that the whole world, from end to end, is one vast moral hospital, crowded with sin-smitten patients, in every conceivable stage of the dismal plague. And this ascription of medical virtues to the wings of the Sun of Righteousness brings forward another of his most precious attributes. He is the Healer of the nations; the great Physician. In his almighty wings are heavenly medicines adapted to every disease, infallible remedies for even the most desperate. These mighty wings overshadow the whole world, and hence the significance and beauty of entrusting to them the healing medicines for the race. Hovering over all, a refuge and shield to all, they can gently distil into

every sick and dying heart the balm that comforts and restores to health; that raises even the dead to a new, a higher, and an eternal life. In the poetic parts of the Bible especially, wings are frequently mentioned, and with various moral and spiritual significations. In the Psalms they are represented as a covert, or place of protection. This figurative idea was probably suggested by the conduct of the hen in gathering her brood beneath her wings at the approach of danger. This was certainly the action which lies at the basis of that pathetic lament of our Saviour over Jerusalem: "How often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not!" (Matt. xxiii. 37). No other example in nature is more striking and suggestive; and though, strange to say, there is no other evidence that our barn-door fowl was common in the early ages of the Hebrew nation, yet the frequency of this comparison, or metaphor, in the Psalms and elsewhere, renders it probable that, from the time of Ruth at least, both the act and the actor were familiar sights in Palestine. Boaz says, quite naturally, to Ruth: "The Lord recompense thy work, and a full reward be given thee of the Lord God of Israel, *under whose wings thou art come to trust.*" It is true that reference may be here intended to the wings of the cherubim that overshadowed the mercy-seat; and the figure, thus explained, is both appropriate and beautiful; but I am inclined to believe that the thought was derived from the act of the mother hen, which Ruth could fully understand and appreciate. At any rate, other fowls and birds, which we know were common enough in Palestine, manifested similar care and affection for their young. The fair Moabitess must have often seen the sparrow and the swallow, the lark and the dove, thus warming, comforting, sheltering, their unfledged families with parental love. This is clearly the point in the promise made to him who dwelleth in the secret place of the Most High, under the *shadow* of the Almighty: "He shall cover thee with his feathers, and under his wings shalt thou trust" (Ps. xci. 1, 4).

There is also another figurative application of wings which is eminently poetical. In the one hundred and thirty-ninth Psalm, David says, in reference to the omnipresence of Jehovah: "If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me" (9, 10). This personification of the morning, and endowing it with *wings* is very beautiful, and is perfectly original with the sweet singer of Israel. Moreover, its connection *with the sea* indicates its Palestinian origin. David had doubtless often watched the glorious orb of day blaze up above the eastern mountains with a mighty bound, and *wing* his burning beams with lightning speed over the blue Mediterranean westward, far westward, into that mysterious domain where endless night was supposed to reign supreme. To flee to the uttermost parts of this shoreless sea appeared to the Oriental apprehension the most secure hiding-place in the world. Jonah seems to have entertained the foolish idea that he could there escape from the presence even of the Lord himself, and actually made the attempt with the wings, not of the morning, but of a Phenician ship. But the inspired Psalmist well knew that even in the utmost parts of this unexplored region the hand of the Lord would find and hold him prisoner.

Wings of the morning! Nothing on this subject, within the entire range of poetic imagery, sacred or profane, is more beautiful. Poets of every age and century, from Homer to Longfellow, have exhausted the powers of imagination, and the tricks of their art, to glorify the early morning. They have personified her in many a fanciful character, and baptized her with many a pretty name. They sing of her golden gates, her dewy couch, her rosy fingers, her smiling face, her crimson blush, her sparkling eyes, her fragrant breath, her dazzling robes, with endless epithets and attributes besides; but not one of them approaches, in sublime simplicity, this metaphor of the Psalmist, in its connection with the mighty thought of the poet: "If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of

the sea, even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me" (cxxxix. 9, 10).

The phenomena of storms in almost every land will suggest the expression "wings of the wind"; but there are certain circumstances and features in this border-land between southern and eastern deserts, and the rugged mountains and deep defiles of Judea, which impart great additional power to such poetical conceptions and combinations as the following: "He bowed the heavens, also, and came down, and darkness was under his feet; and he rode upon a cherub, and did fly, — yea, he did fly on the wings of the wind" (Ps. xviii. 10). There is something so sudden and terrific in the rush and roar of these tempests that the spirit, appalled, cowers before them as though the day of doom had come, Breaking forth from his pavilion of dark waters and thick clouds of the sky, the storm-spirit flies abroad, careering in frenzied exaltation and huge delight at the mighty uproar. But we cannot farther pursue this theme, rich and suggestive as it is. Prolonged, however, as has been the discussion, and wide its range, it has not led us away from the chief purpose of these Essays — that of illustrating the natural basis of our rich spiritual nomenclature.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE SLAVIC RACES AND PANSLAVISM.

BY REV. CYRUS HAMLIN, D.D., CONSTANTINOPLE.

THE three great races that divide the European continent and largely control the course of human events have had a remarkably different history. The Latin race reached its acme of power and glory while the Germanic race was barbarian and the Slavic race was unknown. Brief references were made to it by the ancient Greek writers; but they contain little that is definite or satisfactory.

The Latin race was the law-giving race before its reception of Christianity. It had searched deeply into the foundations of justice in all the relations of social and civil life. To its stern and cruel nature Christianity added the sweet attributes of mercy and benevolence; but as a race it had become corrupt beyond redemption. Its blood was renewed by pagan peoples; but the spiritual principles of the gospel were so early paganized that its civilization has been unsteady, overshadowed by centuries of darkness, fitful and extravagant in its modern progress. It seems now to have lost that leadership of the human race of which it has so much boasted.

The German race came later into history; but its march has been steadier and firmer. Rough and strong, it was slow in acquiring the polish and grace of the Latin in literature, art, morals, and science; but its influence has become predominant upon them all. It has renovated the religion which the Latin race paganized. Its science and its military power are too well known to need remark. A recent French writer confesses that the German race has become "respectable and respected"! There is little material in a Frenchman's brain to receive such an impression,

and if made it never lasts. Perhaps Sedan and subsequent events, rapidly following like lightning strokes, have burned it in.

Napoleon III. hoped to restore the confessedly lost "equilibrium of the Latin race" by the Mexican empire of Maximilian, and then by the Franco-Prussian war. The results of these measures only proved to the world that the German race, including the Anglo-Saxon, is the present leader of Europe. Its pre-eminence in arts, arms, science, and philosophy will hardly be questioned, unless by Frenchmen. It has an expansive power possessed by no other race. The nations it has planted, the power of assimilating other races to itself and its institutions, indicate a power and law of growth not possessed in the same eminent degree by any other European race. It is not simply the mother of children, but the mother of nations. Its strength is its own. It comes from within itself as a race. The so-called Latin nations are such by virtue of the Latin religion rather than by blood. France numbers herself with them as "the eldest son of the church." But no force can unify France, Italy, and Spain. The Germanic nations in Europe easily coalesce so as to form a great empire. German unity has been the watchword; and German power on the continent has been the result.

The Slavic race differs widely both from the Latin and the German. It is more religious, but less progressive. It submits to despotic government, and loves it, and has no aspirations after freedom. This race appeared in Europe in the sixth century, but without any decisive influence upon the course of events. Being safe from foreign attack by inhabiting the inaccessible regions of Russia, its natural increase has been great. "The Panslavic Benevolent Society of St. Petersburg" estimates the total number of Slavs in Europe at 90,365,633. But this great race is very far from being the unit which Russia wishes to make it. It has great tribal distinctions of a peculiar character, obscure in their origin, but often a source of vehement jealousies and op-

positions. The Panslavic Society — which originated in Austria, in an effort to awaken and purify the Slavic literature and dialects — has been made by Russia a mere political engine, to which she has added the term "benevolent." These tribal differences are worthy of notice, as they reveal, if not one of the weaknesses, one of the annoyances of the great empire. The Panslavic Benevolent Society of St. Petersburg has simplified some things that were confusing. In its Ethnographical Chart it gives the following numbers and nomenclature, differing in many points from previous authorities: Russians and Ruthenians, 66,129,590; Serbo-Croats, 5,940,539; Slovenes, 1,287,000; Slovaks, 2,223,830; Czechs, 4,815,154; Poles, 9,492,162. These numbers do not make the grand total above by almost half a million; possibly in consequence of some typographical error. In all respects they differ from previous numerous, but are probably nearer the truth. The names are simplified, but with a suspicious political bearing. The 66,000,890 designated as Russian and Ruthenian have been divided as, Great Russians, 35,000,000; Little Russians, 15,000,000; White Russians, 2,000,000 to 3,000,000; Bulgarians, 5,500,000; amounting to only 58,000,000. These five and a half millions of Bulgarians are of priceless value in the eyes of Russia. They are Turkish subjects dwelling in European Turkey. They are her chief channel of entrance into Turkish politics. She claims them as her brethren by race and religion, and she feels all their sufferings as her own.

The Bulgarians have been regarded by most writers as a Turanian race, — of the same blood and race with the Turks. The Panslavic Benevolent Society does not even allow them a tribal distinction from the "Great Russians." A glance at their *physique* is sufficient to prove the society too benevolent in this regard. It has hitherto signally failed in *Russianizing* the Bulgarians, and it now tries to prove them already pure Russians by blood. Those who look to the physical aspect of the people alone would never doubt their Turanian origin. They are neither Russians nor Ruthenians;

but, on the other hand, they can hardly be Turanian. Their language is a pure Slavonic dialect. It is difficult to believe that so powerful a tribe, maintaining its unity, should ever so completely lose its mother tongue as to adopt another totally different, and leave no indications of the change. But the Bulgarians, if not of Tartar origin, are certainly a distinct tribe of Slavs.

The Servians and Croatians have always been regarded as separate tribes of the Slavic race. The Bosnians and Herzegovinans and Montenegrins belong to them. About half their number reside in Turkey, and half in Austria. The Poles are about half in Russia, the other half divided between Austria and Prussia. The Czechs are the Bohemians and Moravians of Austria; they constitute the most progressive and enlightened portion of the Slavic race. They furnished reformers — John Huss and Jerome of Prague — before the reformation. The evangelistic movement was arrested by a bloody arm, but the Slavs of Bohemia have always showed a tendency to liberalize Romanism, and the Protestant element from that people has been a very noble one.

The Croatians, especially as found in Herzegovina and Montenegrin, are the fiercest of all the Slavic tribes. It makes but little difference of what religion they are, — Catholic, Greek, or Mohammedan, — they have shown no desire for a milder and better civilization. Some recent attempts at schools in Montenegrin are the only exception. These regions have always been the hot-bed of revolt; and Russia finds ready and fit instruments for disturbing the quiet of the indolent man on the Bosphorus. Why the Panslavic Benevolent Society of St. Petersburg should have put the two tribes together under the term Serbo-Croats, it is difficult to see. If a compliment to the Croatians, it is hardly so to the Servians.

If the above were all the differences that sunder the Slavic race, the unification of it would not be so obviously impossible. With more culture the dialects might melt into one common language, and tribal animosities and jealousies might pass

away under the powerful leadership of Russia. But the mightier force of religion stands in the way. This great race has been *religionized* from four different sources — Rome, Constantinople, Geneva, and Mecca. Two of them are of minor consequence, politically considered. There are one and a half millions of Protestant Slavs in Hungary, a small body of Moravians in Germany, and about nine hundred thousand Mohammedan Slavs in Northern Turkey. These are in Bosnia and Servia, and the Panslavic Society calls them Serbo-Croats. There are, besides these, as many more Slavic converts to Islam scattered over European Turkey, intermingled with the Osmanlis Turks. The designation of nine hundred thousand Mohammedan Slavs in the Ethnographical Chart of the Society is simply absurd, unless confined strictly to Servia and Bosnia, and even then it would fall below the popular impression. Nineteen and a half millions are the estimated followers of the papal faith. There are six millions, or as the Panslavic Benevolent Society says 6,221,556, of schismatics and uniates in Russia. They have patiently borne the severest persecution for centuries; but even Russian absolutism has not been able to wear them out. They are known by different names, indicating different sects as, Rasskolnics, Mennonites, Molokans. The policy of extermination has sometimes raged against them, but as they have always been quiet and peaceable citizens, industrious, and frugal, the persecution has been of late years relaxed. A few have succeeded in escaping into Turkey, where they enjoy religious liberty, and a few have emigrated to America. The existence of these sects is a signal example of the power of religious convictions against imperial force.

Those portions of the Slavic tribes that are papal or protestant use the Latin alphabet, the rest the Cyrillic. About 21,000,000 the former, and 69,000,000 the latter; the Panslavic Society says 69,346,671. Each alphabet abhors the other, and will not allow that it is fit to be read. The alphabets indicate the two different sources from which the Slavic tribes were christianized — Rome and Constanti-

nople. The Greek monks, Cyril and Methodius, are honored as the great missionaries to the Slavs in the ninth century. They gave them an alphabet, which is, for the most part, a modification of the Greek capitals, with additions to their number, and it bears the name of its author, Cyril. These religious differences are the great obstacles to Panslavism. More than twenty-eight of the ninety millions firmly reject the Russian church. Persecutions, violent and relentless, the advantages offered to proselytes, the progress of the age, the revolutions of centuries, all are powerless to unite these masses that have fallen off from the great body, or have never been united to it.

It may be said that the Germanic spirit moulded the German communities into one, without regard to religious faith. The Roman Catholic was, in a measure, faithful to fatherland, as against the French. Why then should not Panslavism, in like manner, mould all the Slavonic peoples into the Russian policy, and animate them with its spirit?

The following considerations may throw light upon this question:

The civil and religious organization of the government is not such as to inspire confidence in dissidents from its faith. The emperor can not only say, "l'état c'est moi," but also, "l'église c'est moi." He is equally the head of church and state. For a long time the Russian church was organized under a patriarch in nominal subjection to Constantinople. Peter the Great abolished the patriarchate, and in 1721 established the holy synod, the president of which is the minister of public instruction. Synod and president are alike the creatures of his will. The church is a branch of the imperial government. This is a far more effective union of church and state than the papacy has ever realized. The civil power is fully competent to support the largest claims of the spiritual power, and has never to wait for the support of princes to carry out its designs. Its power and authority, temporal and spiritual, are all within itself. The emperor crowns himself and communes himself, as being

both sovereign and high-priest. A government which is such a perfect union of spiritual and temporal despotism, can never have the confidence of dissident sects. Where there is no freedom there can be no enthusiastic loyalty among the oppressed sectaries. The catechism, which is taught to every peasant and every peasant child, consecrates, from childhood up, the idea of the temporal and spiritual headship of the emperor. It is a chief article of religion in the minds of the masses. It is absolute subjection to one human will. This makes every Russian look upon republicanism with abhorrence and contempt. He regards it as atheistical and absurd. Russia professes, for political reasons, great friendship for us, and her officials make sport of the ease with which we are cajoled and deceived.

Again, the *administration* of the church is such that the Panslavic Society and the doctrines of Panslavism will be inoperative outside of the church. An absolute spiritual despotism reigns over all ecclesiastical affairs. The government professes to tolerate all sects; but so severe has been its pressure to force Protestants and Catholics into the Russian church, in violation of solemn pledges, that the Evangelical Alliance sent a large and influential deputation in 1873 to remonstrate. No one outside of the church is allowed to preach the gospel even to Mohammedans. The liberty which has penetrated all papal lands has found no foothold in Russia. The Protestant missionary cannot even enter the land as a traveller, except to pass through it by some designated route; and should he vary from it the police will force him back. The extreme severity with which the people are guarded from all evangelistic efforts has no parallel in modern times. Russia trusts wholly to the unification of force, and she can have only so much as that secures. The Polish officers who are driven to the communion by the bayonet do not therefore love the church.

The Panslavic Benevolent Society of St. Petersburg hopes to influence all the Slavs of Turkey to become ready and efficient instruments of Russian ambition on the Bos-

phorus. With the Mohammedan portion it can do nothing. With the Croatians of Herzegovina, political intrigue has been successful. With the Bulgarians, the largest and most highly prized Slavic fragment of the great race, there has been positive success in certain directions. There has been a great awakening of national life. There is among them a very earnest desire for education. They have broken loose from the government of the Greek church in direct opposition to the wishes of Russia. The general freedom of the press and of education in Turkey, and the aid of existing schools and colleges, have contributed to an unexampled progress, but not wholly under Russian guidance. She is distrusted, and cannot mould this Bulgarian fragment of the race to her will, although she now proclaims a perfect brotherhood with it. While she has formed a party she cannot lead the whole people. The most influential and intelligent portion would prefer autonomy with Turkey as suzerain, to the all absorbing and despotic power of Russia. Panslavism goes with the Bulgarians but part way, and stops short of the designs of Russia. Her crushing despotism bars its way.

Between the Slavic and the Islamic despotisms in Russia and Turkey there is a difference little understood. In the former, the government officials are generally educated men; in the latter, uneducated. The universities of Russia are sufficient to furnish officers for the army and navy, and for the civil service. The departments of law and medicine are well filled. In Turkey there is a theory of education, but little of practice. The "ulema," the elite, attain that dignity through a system of education, *Koranic*, and wholly unfitted to modern times, or to any times. And even this system is disregarded, and a more ignorant set of men never governed an empire than have governed Turkey since the death of Aali and Fuad Pachas.

The Russian emperor has an executive force, and can make his power felt at points the most remote. The Turkish emperor is weak, and his distant ministers defy or evade his orders. He is surrounded by deception, and really knows

little of his own situation with respect to affairs internal or foreign. Under a government so weak and inefficient industries suffer, and official oppression is generally unrebuked. But, on the other hand, the Turkish emperor leaves to the towns and villages, and to the different sects in religion, a degree of freedom in self-government, in education, and in religion, which has raised the Turkish peasantry far above the Russian. According to the most reliable statistics that can be obtained of the two countries, the proportion of readers in Turkey is double that of Russia. Both countries after the Crimean war liberated their serfs. The Bulgarian serfs in Turkey have risen in civilization and intelligence with unexampled rapidity, while the liberated serfs of Russia remain in the most deplorable barbarism and misery. The one despotism allows freedom of action in certain things of priceless value to man; the other does not allow it.

Commerce and the arts would doubtless flourish under the severe and regular administration of Russia; freedom of thought, intelligence, and religion under Turkish rule. Under the former the missionary work is possible, and in point of fact is progressive; under the latter it is impossible. No missionary foot ever desecrates the "holy soil of Russia." While some scores of Moslems have been baptized in Turkey, and are living there unmolested, no convert from the Russian church has been allowed to profess any evangelic faith, nor is even a Mohammedan or pagan permitted to adopt any form of Christianity but the Russian, with all its picture and saint worship, its auricular confession, priestly absolution, and transubstantiation, with their logical train of errors.

"The Eastern Question," then, involves not simply the predominance of an ambitious power over the civilized world, but the domination of a spiritual anti-christian despotism over all freedom of thought, over the press, education, and all religious development so far as its influence can reach. It involves the advent of a new papacy, with an army and navy fully competent to make its will obeyed in both

Christian and pagan lands. When it shall possess not only the Black Sea, but the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, and by consequence the Mediterranean, who shall then limit its power? Is this advent consistent with the interests of the civilized world?

ARTICLE IX.

DR. P. ASMUS ON INDO-GERMANIC NATURAL RELIGION.[1]

BY PROF. M. BESSER, KLOSTER U. L. F., MAGDEBURG.

Who will not hail with joy a promise of light and order amid the chaos of special investigations on the field of Indo-Germanic religions? Order; for it is evident, from the very title, that the author means to consider the whole subject from one point of view. He uses the singular — "The Indo-Germanic Religion," not "Religions." Light; for the additional title, "A Contribution to the Philosophy of Religion," shows that the author has a philosophical intention in this treatment of a part of the history of religion. How far this is an advantage would appear from a consideration of the principles involved in the philosophical parts of the book, especially of the Introduction. This latter is in two parts — one discussing the Theory of Apprehension, and one the Philosophy of Religion. But a consideration of this kind we must postpone till the second and final part of the work appears; for the author cannot give his decision on the questions on the philosophy of religion until he reaches that part of the work. For it is promised that the second part shall treat of the Absolute Deity, investigating the mode in which he appears as such in the different religions. Further, it will treat of the spiritualization of the Indo-Germanic natural religion; and finally, of the relation of this religion to Christianity.

Of the Introduction we will say here only that the author seeks a basis for investigations in the philosophy of religion by a refutation of the philosophy and theology which assert that God cannot be known. He holds firmly, with Hegel, that thought can penetrate the Absolute — that the Absolute is comprehensible by us. Reviewer thinks there should be in the Introduction a discussion and definition of the conception "religion," and also that there should be established some standard by which the

[1] P. Asmus, Dr., Privatdocent der Philosophie a. d. Universität zu Halle. 1 Band: Indogermanische Naturreligion. Halle: Verlag von Pfeffer. gr. 8. S. 287. 1875.

development of the Indo-Germanic religion is to be estimated. In the course of the book the author seems to regard the Christian religion as the absolute standard of comparison; and yet he postpones to the second volume a discussion of the relation of the Indo-Germanic religion to Christianity. The work when complete is meant to exhibit the Indo-Germanic religion as seen in its most important representatives. The author expects to point out in these a progress from natural religion to a spiritual religion. The volume before us treats of the first stage — the natural religion of the Indo-Germanic peoples. It contains four sections, in which the most important features of the Natural Religion are discussed as they appear among the chief of these peoples — the peoples of India, the Persians, the Greeks, and the Germanic peoples. The first section seeks to show that the religion of the Indo-Germans was never polytheistic, but henotheistic. The author places fetichism as the lowest religious stage. It makes a god of some single one of the many things about the soul which are known through the senses. (According to the most recent discussions of fetichism, especially that of Waitz and Gerland, "Anthropology of Uncivilized Peoples," and that of Tylor, "The Beginnings of Civilization," we ought to give up regarding fetichism as a separate religion. It is evidently only a secondary phenomenon in connection with a religion.) When the mind can make abstractions from the separate impressions on the senses, but does not yet rise to a unity of all things, regarding certain classes of things as absolutely separate from one another, and fixedly so, then the advance has been made from fetichism to polytheism. In the region of natural religion, henotheism is the next higher stage of development; but in the region of spiritual religion a polytheistic moral dualism stands higher than the henotheism of natural religion. (The author presupposes an absolute standard in this estimation of higher and lower stages of development which he makes. But he has not clearly defined any such standard).

Again, in the henotheism of natural religion the author makes three divisions of development — a fetish henotheism, a polytheistic, and a pure henotheism. Henotheism does not require that *one* Deity only, as opposed to many, be consciously placed at the head of all things; for we would call that monotheism. But it requires that, although there be an acknowledged plurality of divine forms, yet the divine unity lies in the background of the religious consciousness. This unity, then, reveals itself in a plurality of persons. (Henotheism, which had been thought of by Schelling, and for which, with its correlate kathenotheism, a name was coined by Max Müller, has with our author the significance of a principle affecting the whole system.) The form of henotheism is the only one under which natural religion can be properly classed. For natural religion knows no qualitative distinction between the divine and the earthly. Therefore polytheism is incongruous with it. Polytheism claims that

there are absolute distinctions in things, in spite of the actual absence of distinctions in its theory of the universe. The idea of God in the Indo-Germanic religion is a childlike, unreflecting henotheism, because of two characteristics which it bears. First, the gods shade into one another, without any fixed lines of separation, and they can exchange places. Secondly, the divine and earthly are regarded as the same in essence. Our author proves the presence of these two marks in the Indo-Germanic religion by pointing out the parent-myths of India, of the Persians, the Greeks, and the Germanic peoples. He finds them to be *divine deeds*, and that the idea of acting persons, deities, grows out of these. The Indian parent-myth, which we must recognize to be the mythical basis among all Indo-Germanic peoples, starts from the idea of a thunder-storm as a battle for the rain which is held captive in the clouds. The chief god of the heavens — the storm-god — conquers the dark cloud-demon, and by this victory gains water and fire — rain and lightning, or, it may be, the sun, which had hitherto been hidden behind the clouds. Our author distinguishes this parent-myth, as the sexless myth of the skies, from the sexual, in which the rain — the precious moisture — taken captive by the cloud-demon, is personified as a female deity. The act in the myth is then not the mere release, but conjugal embrace, from which rain and lightning come as fruit. The third form is the myth of the earth, in which the god of the skies approaches the earth for conjugal embrace. He sends the rain as fructifying seed into the receptive bosom of the earth. The original Indo-Germanic myth is the sexless myth of the skies. In India and among the Persians are found only the beginnings of the other two forms of the myth. Among the Greeks the original form is modified almost entirely into the sexual sky-myth, and this is then changed into the myth of the earth. Among the Germanic peoples all forms are represented, but oftenest a combination of the sky-myth and the earth-myth. Since the individual divine personages have to be developed out of these elementary acts, we can see how easily the gods could shade into one another; and, on the other hand, we can see that the essence of the divine coincided exactly with the essence of the earthly. Thus the parent religious myths show the henotheistic character of the Indo-Germanic religion.

In conformity with this character, each deity is absolute deity, because it has a part in the one divine element. The fact that each is defined and separate does not take from them the character of absolute deity. Our author's second section seeks to show how the individual divine forms came into existence, although this absoluteness existed. The essential quality of each deity consists in the function with which he comes into appearance in the myth. Accordingly, the individual deities are really later things than the myth; since in their individuality they do not originally exist, but they come into existence by a separation from the

myth as a whole. For example, the entire individuality of Indra has its ground ultimately in the one predicate of the Rain-getter, the killer of Vritra. The several divine personages which are developed in the Indo-Germanic religion do not belong to the highest stage of henotheism, but to polytheistic henotheism. This is a different stage from the fetish henotheism, of which we have also a few traces. It does not, like the latter, identify a single sensuous object with the absolute deity, and yet it shuts God up into a sphere distinct from other spheres of actual existence, without reflecting that, by virtue of his being absolute, he really extends beyond that limited sphere.

If the absolute nature of God could become visible as an absolute appearance, then we would have the highest stage of natural henotheism; but we would then be out of the sphere of religious things, although still within the sphere of nature. For a man cannot have religious feeling towards a pure generality. That feeling demands a definite, concrete God. The plain contradiction here — viz. between absoluteness and single personality — cannot be reconciled while we remain in the domain of natural religion. It is not even touched, much less solved, by advance of conception of the divine form of existence from that of one beneath the human to the human, which advance appears in polytheistic henotheism. No matter how exalted be the mode of appearance of any god in the natural religions, yet the god always sinks back again to the condition of some elementary function. And here we have proof that in this stage of religion a mere element is the contents of a deity. This way of viewing nature makes the single divine persons differ merely quantitatively in their relation to the genus, god. Personality as such, with its real value, is not recognized. It remains a mere fluid thing. The gods are unable to raise themselves really above the condition of merely representing elementary principles. While this faulty relation exists between the single divine persons and the absoluteness which these persons are supposed to represent, we can understand how some way will be sought to elevate the divine person to the level of absoluteness belonging to the divine class as a whole.

The third section of our book shows that the atttribute of immortality is the means used to this end in the Indo-Germanic religions. The nature-god was the expression of an element in nature. If, then, a god was to be regarded as a person, this personal individual could not be regarded as a mere copy or specimen, or a mere modification of the general type. Agni is "fire" in general. Considered as a person, he cannot represent merely *one* fire; but he must, as a single person, embody a representation of the whole class, fire. Here, therefore, it was necessary to have in the system a mode of representation which would relieve the difficulty. In order to take up its position on the high level of representation of the element contained in a whole class, the divine person

was obliged to drink some magic draught. In accordance with the whole mode of viewing things in natural religion, the solvent of the difficulty must be an external participation in something by means of which the divine individual would obtain immortality, unchangeableness, and intensified power of life. We find that such a means was used in all the Indo-Germanic mythologies, and generally it took the form of drinking some draught. In India the draught was of soma and amrita; in Persia, of yellow and white haoma; in Greece, of ambrosia and nectar. The Greeks used, also, for this representation, the apple of the Hesperides and Dionysos, who was a personification of the drink of immortality, as is the Indian Soma. Finally, the Germanic peoples had the odhrörir and the apple of Idun. This drink was always regarded as intimately connected with the divine person, and without it the gods could not fully occupy their respective spheres. Natural religion flourished so long as this childlike connection of ideas lasted. But with the dissolution of this union, and the comprehension which had to follow that these divine persons, as such, were finite, begins decay.

The fourth and last section of the book describes this decay of natural religion, and exhibits the various stages thereof in their correspondence with modern phenomena in theology and philosophy.

The Indo-Germanic gods were indeed absolute; and yet this absoluteness showed itself in the individuals in their shading into one another, and thus making it evident that the fundamental, essential principle in them all was one and the same. Each individual deity possessed both the moments which the religious relation requires — absoluteness and definiteness; and each should have exhibited the unity of these, but, in reality, did not do so. For the relation of these two moments to one another could be viewed only quantitatively in natural religion, where the spiritual idea of personality had not yet become known. Therefore the unity of finiteness and absoluteness could no more be grasped under that system than could the unity of the whole and the part. The decay of natural religion begins at the point where that contradiction which the natural gods actually carry about in themselves becomes practically evident. It appears most plainly in the relation of that drink of the gods to the gods themselves. For this drink of the gods, which represents the element belonging to the whole class of gods, was regarded as belonging to the very self of the divine person when the system was at the height of its flourishing. Herein lay the childlike identification of class and person. But gradually this drink came to be regarded as something separable from the divine person. In consequence of this, the unity of the divine person and the absolute class-element (water, fire), which had been brought about by the draught, became dissolved. With this dissolution, as it became manifest in practical results, began the decay of natural religion. In the consideration of this separation of the divine drink from the divine person,

an important question is, whether the drink was originally regarded as a provision for life which the gods had with themselves, or whether it had to be given them by men in their offerings. The latter is chiefly the case among the Indians and Persians, whilst among the Greeks and the Germanic peoples it is not supplied by human hands. The consequence of this difference is, that among the Indians and Persians the discovery of the finiteness of divine persons was connected with the soma-offering; for it was observed that the gods were dependent on the will of the sacrificer. Among the Greeks and the Germanic peoples other influences brought to light the finiteness of the gods, and thus brought about the decay of natural religion.

Having thus shown, in general outlines, what is the course of the book, let us make a very few closing remarks.

The treatment of the religious mythology of the Indo-Germans indicates a thorough acquaintance with the literature on that subject, and contains a rich store of combinations, which will be specially welcome to the mythologist. But a discussion of religious mythology has been given, instead of the promised history of religion. This complaint can hardly be removed by pointing to the reference to the soma-offering, which is merely incidental. The system of religious representations which a people have is not identical with their religion. Our author has not given clearly his definition of religion; and whatever that definition be, it evidently does not give due regard to religious observances, worship, etc., nor to the religious influence on the domain of the will. For the author has found no occasion for reference to religious observances in his discussions. We cannot say whether this fault is a consequence of the author's fundamental views of the philosophy of religion, until his second volume appears. Still, a thoughtful discussion of the religious mythology of the Indo-Germans is, of course, a valuable contribution; and this treatment of it which lies before us does excite a strong desire to see the second volume, and justifies us in commending the book to wide perusal.

ARTICLE X.

JOHN THE BAPTIST.[1]

The work referred to in the note at the bottom of the page is one of much value. It is evidently the result of careful study and thorough research. Its style, however, is faulty in certain very important respects. The matter which it contains might easily, we think, have been presented in a form much more compact, and the author's drift and meaning been made much clearer. The subject of the book is one of unusual interest — one on which not a great deal has been written, at least in our language, and in regard to which, if we mistake not, the ideas commonly entertained are somewhat vague, not to say incorrect. We shall dwell for a brief space on a few of the topics treated of in this book; begging the reader to bear in mind that we present not our own views, but such as we understand to be those of Dr. Reynolds.

John is exhibited to us in the New Testament as a priest, a Nazarite, a prophet, and more than a prophet. John was a priest; he belonged to that particular line of the descendants of Levi to which by divine ordination priestly functions were restricted. We do not hear, indeed, of John's ever taking any part in the temple service; yet the conjecture is not an altogether unlikely one, that the mere fact of his belonging to the priestly class gave him a peculiarly strong hold on the minds of the people; that his words of warning and denunciation were, on this account, listened to with the more reverent spirit; that in this way they were the utterance of one who spake with authority. The office of religious instructor had been committed by divine appointment to the priests. It had not been altogether unusual, in previous periods of Jewish history, for prophets to be chosen from among the priests. This we know to have been the case with Jeremiah and Ezekiel. These men spake with the more effective energy, because they felt that they had a prescriptive right to speak, and a corresponding claim to be heard. There was something in the very nature of their office to cause them to speak with the most emphatic energy, whenever the interests of religion and morality were at stake. We might reasonably presume that, conversant as they were obliged to be with moral and religious themes, their minds would be impressed beyond others with the untold importance of these themes, and that their language, while

[1] John the Baptist. The Congregational Union Lecture for 1874. By Henry Robert Reynolds, D.D. 8vo. pp. 525. London: Hodder and Stoughton; New York: A. S. Barnes and Co. 1874.

adverting to these themes, would have an energy which could not easily be resisted. Sometimes even a selfish motive might be mingled with these more elevated considerations. They might feel that as morality and religion decayed, so would the honor in which the priestly class was held be lessened; and on this account they might be prompted to speak on topics of a religious nature with an earnestness which otherwise they would not exhibit.

There was that in the functions appertaining to the priestly office which, in proportion as they were performed in honesty of heart and in a spirit fully in sympathy with their deep significance, or, on the other hand, with only a faint consciousness of this significance, could have had none other than the most ennobling and purifying influence, or else an influence the most hardening and debasing. The solemn ideas which the priestly functions were fitted to suggest relative to the immaculate holiness of God, to the infinite evil attached to all sin, to the limitless compassion of Jehovah, which could prompt him to pardon sin thus characterized by extreme turpitude — such ideas must either have been actually taken into the mind, and been made matter of earnest thought, and been allowed their proper effect upon the soul, or else, by a positive act of the will, been denied access to the mind — an act which none other than a will most depraved and corrupt could have put forth, and whose only result could be to extend and deepen the very corruption in which it had its source. One need not wonder at the vehement language in which the Psalmists and the old prophets were wont to denounce the temple services, when performed, as no doubt they too often were, as mere ritualistic observances, without any proper consciousness, on the part of the priests, of their moral import. This language of condemnation is none too pungent, whether one thinks of the offence which such affecting rites gone through with thoughtlessly and formally must have been to a pure Divinity, or of their degrading and hardening effect on the character of the worshipper. On the contrary, how benign that effect when these rites were discharged in a fitting mode, with a mind fully penetrated with the sentiment of humiliation, of penitence, of thorough devotion to Jehovah, which these rites were intended to represent. Are we not at liberty, then, to speak of John as emphatically a priest, even though no priestly functions were visibly and outwardly performed by him, because his was pre-eminently that character which corresponded exactly to the nature of the office — a character into which was incorporated that profound view of sin, that conviction of the need of thorough penitence and moral renewal, that earnest love of pure righteousness by which that character ought ever to be marked? There was in John well nigh a perfect embodiment of what a priest should be.

The priest, under the Jewish dispensation, was a representative of the people. He entered in their name into the tabernacle; he sacrificed, he burned incense, he prayed, he acted out the proper symbol of repentance for

his own sins and those of the people. There are now certain moral perils ever attending the existence among a people of such an order of representative priests. The conviction not unnaturally comes to be entertained that the priests, in taking upon themselves this representative character, assume at the same time the moral responsibilities of those in whose name they act, and that the people are by this means relieved of them — that, if the priests perform with comparative faithfulness these delegated functions, the whole work is accomplished; the people who stand without are nothing but spectators. Perhaps not altogether consciously, but yet really, the feeling would exist that the priests alone were under obligation to pray, to repent, to devote themselves to Jehovah. Such a feeling is too much in harmony with a depraved mind not to be awakened. May we not conceive it, then, to have come within the proper scope of the priestly office, especially in the case of John, who was both prophet and priest, to rebuke in the most impassioned terms such a destructive moral perversion?

This perversion, if it were worth while to demonstrate its illogical and unscriptural character, was at variance with the scriptural idea of the priesthood. The priesthood was, indeed, in an important sense, of a representative character; but in assuming this character, the priests did not free those for whom they acted from the most solemn moral responsibilities. What the priest did each worshipper was also bound substantially to do. The priests audibly uttered words, they visibly acted out symbols, that were meant to represent feelings supposed as a matter of course to be active in the breast of every worshipper — feelings that ought to exist in the mind of each one, just as distinctly, and to be just as really the offspring of reflection gone through with by every one on his personal relations to the Divinity, and on his own transgressions, as could be the case if no mediating priest came between God and himself. Unless the spirit of the Jew corresponded fully to the outward act of the priest, the priest, for that Jew, might as well not have existed. Such a Jew did not, in any proper sense, worship, nor burn incense, nor sacrifice, nor repent.

It was, certainly, a very fitting element in the preparation for the advent of Christ, that a forerunner like John should appear, — himself one of the priestly class, and adorned well-nigh perfectly with all the substantial excellences of the priestly character, — to warn the people, both by words and by act, that no mere formal sacerdotal mediations could secure either to the priest or the people a participation in the kingdom of God; to imprint it on their minds that, although they were outwardly the people of God, and even a royal priesthood, and the very children of Abraham, yet, without personal repentance and personal faith in him that was to come, — a faith that would demonstrate its genuineness by the strictest obedience to every moral law, — they must inevitably all likewise perish. In no one did the elements of the priestly character of the true child of

Abraham, the outward sanctity, the elevation of spirit above the world, show themselves in a purer form than in John; and yet we hear even him avowing that he had need to come to Jesus Christ, that Christ was alone the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world. We must believe that John made real to his own consciousness the peculiar significant features of the priestly office, its function as a mediator between Jehovah and sinful men, and that by this means there must have been given a startling emphasis to his declaration that Christ was the Lamb of God.

Of John it was declared that among those who were born of women there had not arisen a greater than he. There may have been, in this statement, a tacit reference to the priestly character of John, and to the pre-eminent degree in which the priestly qualities were exhibited in him; and yet it was added, by our Lord, that he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than John. The time for the cessation of the priestly office had come; the best of priests was to be the last. Sacrifices and offerings were to be required no more; and with them was to disappear all need of sacerdotal functions. A more spiritual kingdom was to be organized; and every man, independently of all human or angelic mediation, was to come boldly to the throne of grace, on which is seated the Shepherd and Bishop of our souls; and the man who can enter into the significance of this spiritual kingdom — a kingdom independent of meats and drinks and offerings and ritualistic services — is greater than the best of those who are subject to a law of ceremonial observances.

It can hardly be regarded as other than a fanciful supposition, that the severe and stern language in which John was wont to address his auditories, was due to a certain fierceness of temper characterizing the tribe of Levi. It has been ascribed, also, to a military element alleged to belong to the Jewish priesthood. One is altogether at a loss, however, to discern in the priestly character any traces of such an element. The severity of John's language may be attributed, with better reason, to the fact that his mind was engrossed to such a degree by that which is unearthly that he was thus in the habit of looking at moral evil in its true colors, divested of that deceptive show of unreal beauty with which one who is conversant with men, and busy in the eager pursuit of simply worldly purposes, comes at length to clothe it. John, so used to solitary communion with God and with spiritual objects, saw in sin only that which was evil and loathsome. He sympathized too thoroughly with the mind of Jehovah to regard it in any other aspect; and he could speak of it only in those stern tones which suited with such distinct conceptions of its odious qualities. And surely these tones of rebuke were none too stern and pungent in order to rouse to anything like a proper moral sensibility — such as was demanded by the near approach of him whose fan was in his hand — a nation so spiritually degraded as were the Jews.

John the Baptist was a Nazarite, as well as a priest, in spirit, if not in

name and form. He was to be great in the sight of the Lord, and was to drink neither wine nor strong drink. We know how well his life tallied with this prediction. He was in the deserts; his raiment was of camel's hair; a leathern girdle was about his body; and his meat was locusts and wild honey. He acquired in this way a resemblance to the old prophets. It has been affirmed that he was literally a Nazarite, and had taken upon himself their peculiar vows. The principle on which these vows are said to have been based, — that evil is the necessary concomitant of matter and the result of contact with it, that the soul can attain to perfect purity only as it keeps the flesh in subjection and suppresses every appetite and desire whose seat is in the body, — is not exclusively an Oriental doctrine. Few doctrines have been of wider influence than this. It has been maintained not by Christians exclusively; for it is well known how thoroughly pervaded with this doctrine are Brahminism and Buddhism. It is not strange, then, that its presence should be discerned among the Jews at a very early period. At the same time, we are not at liberty to believe that the Bible at all countenances the idea of any necessary connection between matter and moral evil. Matter, in all its manifold forms, and with all its properties, whether essential or accessory, is the product of God's creative energy. The body of man, with all its appetites and susceptibilities, is the offspring of the same Divine power; and these various forms of material existence were all pronounced by the Creator to be very good. False and unscriptural, therefore, as we conceive the underlying principle of asceticism to be, yet its existence is by no means an astonishing fact. Fruitful of evil as the bodily appetites have ever been found to be in many of their manifestations, it is not wonderful that their utter subjugation, and that by the most violent means, should often have been aimed at, because regarded as the necessary condition of moral growth.

The abstract principle on which asceticism rests — that the body must not be allowed to gain control over the spirit — no one, of course, can blame. The exaggerated forms which this principle has often taken, and the violent means by which it has attempted to secure its intended results, alone deserve censure.

One would not, perhaps, be justified in affirming that all the manifestations of an ascetic spirit which we detect in John were exactly in accordance with the Divine mind in regard to him. He may, or may not, have been left in regard to this, to a certain extent, to the freedom of his own will. It is enough that an ascetic spirit was manifested by him. His favorite dwelling-place was in the desert. His food and apparel were of the coarsest description. In every way he mortified the flesh. As his raiment was not such, so neither were his manners such, as were found in kings' houses. Few things would be so likely to give him a strong influence over men as these peculiarities. They were among the causes which gained for him the title and the influence of one of the old prophets.

It is a very obvious thought, that John's peculiar mode of life was not that in accordance with which the children of the kingdom were expected to model theirs. Jesus Christ did not so model his. There is nothing in his teachings, there is nothing in his example, to warrant the notion that a literal abandonment of the world, or the violent extinction of every natural instinct, is required of men. There are enjoyments in which the follower of Christ is justified in participating; Christ so took part in a marriage festival, and mingled in banquets with his fellow-men. He condemned no one merely for engaging in worldly pursuits. So far, indeed, as the life of John indicated a comparative contempt for that which is earthly, so far as it showed that moral good, that rigid conformity to the law of God was preferable to any worldly emolument, so far it merits universal imitation. The spirit which animated John should be cultivated, even if it fail to manifest itself in the same outward form. One of the final causes of John's asceticism may have been to illustrate in a striking and palpable, not to say exaggerated, form, the nature of that unworldly temper which all men are required to cultivate; just as it was one of the final causes of the character of Christ to show that it was not needful, in order to reach a spiritual elevation above the world, to sever one's self literally from the world. One can be in the world without being worldly, can mingle with men without being sinfully like them.

The vow of the Nazarite, such as we may suppose to have been assumed by John, in spirit, if not in form, involved, as one of its most important features, a complete consecration to the special service and worship of God. This, very obviously, was the import of the vow in the case of Samuel. Even before his birth he was devoted to the life of a Nazarite; and his whole subsequent career bore witness to the correct insight into the nature of the vow which had been gained by him, and to the thorough and uncompromising earnestness with which that vow, in all its comprehensive significance, was fulfilled by him. A similar consciousness we may suppose to have actuated John. And it is not difficult to recognize the fitness of such a spirit — involving, as we have seen that it did, the complete consecration of one's self to God — to John's special function as the forerunner of Christ. It seems to have been a matter of importance that a perfect ideal, at least so far as that was practicable, of a sanctity that could be reached without a personal knowledge of the historical Christ should be held up to the view of men, so that they might see that, as in this respect as well as others, there had not risen a greater than John the Baptist, yet even the least in the kingdom of heaven was greater than he.

It has been suggested that the retirement and long residence of John in the wilderness may have had, as one of its impelling motives, the wish to fulfil more completely that portion of the Nazaritic vow which forbade all contact with a dead body. The Nazarite was required to shun such

contact in every conceivable instance, and with the most scrupulous care. He could not close the eyes of his dead parents, nor stand by the side of their graves. So far as he was concerned, the dead were to bury their dead. That natural affection which ordinarily prompts one to linger by the side of a dying friend, and to be eager to perform every service even to the lifeless remains, the Nazarite was required to suppress. Was it meant, in the fact that John in spirit, if not in form, took this vow, to give an outward illustration of what Christ required of his disciples — that they should hate father and mother, compared with him, and not stop, when the summons to duty was given, to bury even the parent? Did not John give in this a real, it may be outwardly an exaggerated, pattern of what every one is required to be in spirit, if not in outward form? John practised this self-renunciation, this disengagement of himself from all earthly ties, by a literal separation of himself from the world. In this point of view, no one had surpassed him. But the man who enters into the kingdom of heaven learns to practise the same virtue in a higher and nobler form. He learns how to be in contact with the world, and yet not to be polluted by it. He does not avoid the sin of excessive attachment to worldly kindred by literally forswearing that attachment, but, what is better, by restraining it within its proper bounds. It has been said that the best safeguard against temptation is distance from temptation. But this maxim is unworthy the man of a truly Christian courage. The one who actually confronts the enemy, and overcomes him, deserves more honor than he who remains unhurt by shunning the sight of his foe.

It would be a rash assertion that Nazaritic asceticism has no features in view of which its adoption as a mode of life may be recommended. There have, without question, been periods in the world's history when a resort to asceticism on the part of individuals may certainly have been expedient, if not obligatory. That it was ever meant to be the common mode of life, that the religion of Christ properly understood leads to it or justifies it, that the avowed end of the honest ascetic — the strictest moral purity, the closest communion with God — cannot be gained save by means of asceticism, are assertions which the scriptures do not uphold. There never, probably, was a better illustration of the power of asceticism in the production of Christian virtue than what was given in the person of John the Baptist; and it still remains true that, while among those who were born of women there had not risen a greater than John the Baptist, he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than John.

John, also, was a prophet. The process through which one who was called to be a prophet gained the requisite knowledge was neither the deductive and syllogistic nor the inductive method. There is a region of truth where neither of these processes can have play. The spiritual world, — the infinite God by whose presence it is pervaded, the intense hopes and fears, the aspirations after holiness, and the conviction of sin,

the consciousness of a close relation to the eternal, and of a capacity for, and a yearning after, moral perfection, — the spiritual world is one in which truth is reached by another method. It is here that the intuitional power is called especially into exercise. Truth is seen. The intrinsic evidence which it ever possesses compels the assent of the mind. It is not deduced as an inference; it is not a generalization from observed facts. The conviction of its being the truth is not the result of a comparison of the intuitions of one mind with those of another. Such a comparison is scarcely possible. One man cannot always give to another such a verbal statement of his convictions as shall exactly and completely represent them, and thus render a comparison practicable. One cannot so give utterance to his emotions in view of some pre-eminently beautiful object or some singularly glorious achievement as to make it sure that the hearer shall apprehend the exact quality and intenseness of his emotions; and yet, whenever such honest utterances are made, even in an inadequate and imperfect form, they give rise to a corresponding mental condition in the susceptible hearer, such as enables him to verify their justness by the perception of their harmony with his own consciousness, and, at the same time, may have the effect, in their turn, of giving intenseness and purity to his emotions, and of widening the field of intellectual vision which he is able to traverse. If it be not true that in every mind, however constituted and however circumstanced, religious sentiments and religious knowledge exist in some degree of purity, it would still seem indisputable that in all minds there is the susceptibility of religious sentiment, that in few minds is there a perfect lack of that sentiment. There are objects around every man — the sky over his head and the earth beneath his feet, the sunshine and the storm, the processes of growth and decay everywhere going on, the inscrutable relations he sustains to others, the affections and modes of conduct felt by him to be obligatory even in spite of himself, the anticipation of recompence and the dread of retribution sure to arise in view of the discharge or the neglect of such obligations, — these are sure to awaken into action the religious sentiment. They conduct the mind to religious truth. They arouse the belief in a holy Jehovah. They create, almost necessarily, the conviction of an existence beyond the grave, on the one hand, of bliss; on the other hand, of suffering, as the unavoidable result of a godly or a sinful life.

The various systems of religion which have existed in the world, instead of being the result of any scientific process, would seem rather to have been the product of moral intuitions. The religious susceptibility is quickened, the action of which sooner or later gives birth to notions and doctrines that at length shape themselves into a system of religion. The product of this mental state is Brahminism and Buddhism and the Grecian and Roman mythology; and we are not wrong in believing that that action of the Holy Ghost on the mind whose result has been the system

which we denominate Christianity is analogous, in important respects, to this condition of aroused religious susceptibility. Christianity as to its principles, though not its distinctive historical facts, has become in this way an object of human knowledge.

The Hebrew prophets were men in whom this faculty of moral intuition existed in its highest and purest forms; and their views of moral and religious truth, consequently, were characterized by unusual distinctness and a peculiarly vivid consciousness of moral obligations resting upon them. Their office was one of the strongest influences which shaped alike the intellectual and the religious character of the Hebrews. No literature has had more to do in moulding the religious destiny of the entire race than that of the Hebrews; and this literature, to a very large extent, is the offspring of what may be termed the prophetic mind. And in an age such as that in which the Hebrews lived, and relatively to an end like that for which they were set apart as a peculiar people, this influence of the prophetic mind may justly be affirmed to have been indispensable. It would not have been enough to deposit in certain written documents those historical facts and that doctrine of God which constitute the Hebrew faith, and to leave them to be studied by each successive generation for itself. Religious belief, on this condition, would speedily have died out. What was needed was, that there should be an order of men in every generation who, by means of their quickened religious susceptibilities, the clearness of their own intuitions, should get a knowledge of these truths, and proclaim them with that force and earnestness which can be possessed only by him who has in this way gained a knowledge of them; who can testify to that which he has himself seen and heard; to whom, as it were, the word of God has been directly spoken, and who thus should preach the preaching which God should bid him.

The prophet is one who speaks for God, and not one who merely predicts future events. The words, indeed, which he uses may be, and indeed must be, those in which moral truth is wont to be clothed, and whose significance therefore could be apprehended by the hearer; but the thought must be that which only God could inspire. God talked with Moses as a man talketh with his friend; and there was to be raised up afterwards a prophet like unto Moses. There floated in the mind of the Jewish people, in every period of their history, an expectation, sometimes quite definite and at others more obscure, that this prophet was to appear. The day for the fulfilment of this hope it was the work of John to usher in.

There was an unlikeness between the priestly office and the prophetic at which it is worth while to glance. The functions of the priest were formally of a ceremonial character. They could be outwardly discharged by men in whose hearts none of the sentiments of which they were symbolic had a place The prophetic office was of an entirely different character. The prophet had no ritualistic services to go through. He was only to

speak that which his own mind, controlled by the divine energy, prompted him to utter. His ministry was confined to no place, and had no limit of time. Yet one can easily conceive that the functions of both priest and prophet may have been united in one individual; and in the event of such a conjunction, a moral dignity and sacredness must have been given to the priestly office such as would make even its ritualistic services to become a most forcible religious instructor. He must have been a cold-hearted spectator indeed who could have witnessed unmoved the performance of priestly duties by one in whose mind existed at the same time the convictions and feelings peculiar to the prophet. And, on the other hand, the stern tones of denunciation, such as the prophet was commissioned to employ, must have lost somewhat of their repulsive character as they came from the lips of a true priest, of a mediator between God and the sinner. John was, indeed, a prophet, and there had not risen among men a greater than he; but, in order to attain to the full excellence both of prophet and priest, it was needful to enter into sympathy with the spirit of the kingdom of God.

A very prominent trait in the character of the prophet was its independence. He was the mouth-piece of God. He was to utter nothing but what God spake. There was no responsibility to man resting on him. The sorest evil which men could inflict on him because he spoke to them faithfully was utterly unworthy of regard when put in contrast with the fearful woe which unfaithfulness to Jehovah would bring upon him. We can scarcely conceive of a temptation to swerve from the line of duty which could have been effective on the mind of one who like the prophet was an ambassador from God to man. In no prophet that had arisen had this spirit manifested itself more strikingly than in John. It was this which gave him power to speak in such fearless tones of rebuke to the supercilious Pharisees and to the haughty and tyrannical Herod.

We have dwelt in this somewhat desultory manner on certain topics treated by Dr. Reynolds, for the purpose of giving an idea of the matter which his work contains. The work, in our judgment, will repay thorough study, more, perhaps, for its stimulating qualities and for what it may suggest, than for the absolute value of the opinions which it advances. We are happy to see that an American edition of the volume has been published.

ARTICLE XI.

PROFESSOR MAX MÜLLER AND HIS AMERICAN CRITICS.

LIKE the mills of the gods spoken of by the heathen poet, the Quarterly Reviews grind slowly — much more slowly than the daily and weekly press. Whether or not they grind more surely it would be presumptuous in us to say. At any rate the subject of this Article cannot have passed wholly from the minds of the class of readers who are most interested in our pages; and there are several incidental lessons to be learned from the misunderstanding which has arisen between Professor F. Max Müller and his American critics which are too important to be lost. If, however, some of the reviewers ask concerning this Article, as they have asked of some others that have appeared in the Bibliotheca Sacra, how we stretch the word "Sacra" to cover the subject here treated of, we reply, that justice, charity, and the Christian courtesies of civilized life are to be reckoned among sacred things. The efforts of some of our high-toned political journals to infuse, during this Centennial year, a more judicial and rational spirit into our party politics, can but be greatly hindered by the example of such literary criticism as we are here compelled to notice. If we can render them any aid from our quarter, by rebuking that intemperance of speech which in this case has invaded even the higher critical journals of the land, we will gladly do so.

Furthermore, Professor Müller really seems to us to have received scant justice at the hands of the most of his American critics, and gross injustice from some; and his reputation is so great and of such a nature that he has a special claim to some words of defence on this side of the water and before the theological public. Our readers, we cannot doubt, are of a class to have a peculiar interest in his good name. His missionary addresses, and his wide correspondence with missionaries; his lectures on comparative religion and mythology, and upon Darwinism and language; the philosophical acumen which he has shown in his treatment of the origin and growth of language; and, finally, the prominent position he has occupied in resuscitating Sanscrit, the sacred literature of India; all this, and much more, give him a claim upon the attention of educated Christian teachers. It is not, then, an ordinary case of individual controversy; for nothing which such a man does in the line of his special calling is of private interpretation. We would not, however, set ourselves up as umpires upon all the matters in dispute between him and his American critics. Several of the points in controversy pertain to

Sanscrit literature, and other recondite matters, which must be left to the decision of scholars who have paid special attention to those subjects. In our criticism, in the Bibliotheca Sacra of last July, we carefully limited ourselves to such points as were within the range of ordinary scholars, and upon some matters spoke with so much brevity as, perhaps, to be obscure.

It will be a great gain if those who indulge in writing caustic book reviews, shall be put on their guard and rendered more modest by observing how misunderstanding and ill-feeling have arisen in the case under consideration. The occasion for no small part of Professor Müller's rejoinders, is to be found in Professor Whitney's two volumes, entitled "Oriental and Linguistic Studies," which are mainly collections of book reviews published in the periodical literature of this country. Like too many who do much of that class of labor, Professor Whitney, so it seems to us, had for a long time used words of criticism recklessly, without due consideration as to the full amount of opprobrium which was contained in them; and without sufficient regard to the question whether this style of criticism were called for. Indeed, he confesses, himself, that his form of expression is sometimes too strong. In criticising the sharpness of Professor Müller's reply, we should remember that he is speaking in self-defence, and has much more liberty in that position than would otherwise be proper. We wish that with the rest of the good which may come out of the evil of this personal controversy, it might open the eyes of readers as well as writers, to the dangers which arise when the taste for book reviews is largely cultivated and gratified. As in the case in hand, this class of literature is almost sure to be destructive rather than constructive. The temptation is well-nigh irresistable for the critic to revel in sparkling phrases, which skim the surface of the subject only, and are prized chiefly for the sting they leave behind them. Science will have gained much when there shall be less desire to see adversaries demolished, than to see the truth rising in the grandeur of her own proportions.

We find, for instance, one of the critics saying, that Professor Müller charges his American rival with having "*stolen*[1] from his accuser much of the best he had put forth as his own." The same writer represents Professor Müller as accusing Professor Whitney of having "*purloined* from his own [Müller's] Science of Language," what was most valuable in Professor Whitney's "Language, and the Study of Language." And it is said that Professor Müller has made a "bungling and strained effort" "to prove a *flagrant plagiarism*" against Professor Whitney. The critic, moreover, regards his review as a defence of the "*integrity* of our American scholar." Now these offensive words are not found in Professor Müller; and due attention to the general scope of his replies will show that the animus of them has to be read in between the lines. Another

[1] Italics our own.

point elaborated in the aforesaid review gives us opportunity to expand a remark we dropped six months ago; namely, that the questions over which the dispute waxes hottest belong to "metaphysics." For example, Professor Müller classified language among physical sciences. The reviewer in question "marked not less than fifteen passages" in a single lecture, in which Professor Müller seems to hold that "growth, or change [in language], is completely beyond the control or agency of man." We venture to affirm that no one can write intelligently fifteen pages upon the question, whether language is a "physical science" or a "historical science" without seeming to speak as many as fifteen times on both sides of it. To our apprehension, Professor Müller and Professor Whitney have both written well upon the subject; and the difference between them is not so profound as the public is led to imagine. In his first series of lectures on the "Science of Language," published fifteen years ago, Professor Müller well remarked, that "the process through which language is settled and unsettled, combines in one the two opposite elements of necessity and free-will." Certainly students of theology should be able to appreciate the difficulties which beset the scientific treatment of such a subject, in which there is individual freedom of the agent who uses language, and, at the same time, a law of development so uniform that these acts of freedom can be studied like any other law of nature. Man has both a free-will and a nature. The question pertaining to the "origin of language," which brought this unfortunate personal controversy to a head, is, like that regarding the "origin of species," largely one of terminology. In either case, evolution is but a method of creation; and resolves itself in the end into a mere question as to how long the steps are through which the progress is attained. Evolutionists may be held to the etymology of the word *gradual*, which they use so much.

Another critic makes use of the following among other ornamental expressions:[1] "Critical *bosh*," "he finds a genuine mare's nest." Furthermore, in the case of epithets which, from difference in ideas of propriety, or in national idiom, misunderstanding, if there were any, would not be at all strange, Mr. Müller is said to have had the "hardihood" to regard them as personalities, and three of the instances are called each a "*sham*." Again, "odious forgery" is applied to a case where Mr. Müller's quotation marks are perhaps wrong, and perhaps not, but where certainly no injustice is done to his antagonist. It is even affirmed, in a certain case, that the "*onus*" comes on Professor Müller of proving "that he has not *sought to deceive*" his readers "by false statements," or to "coerce them by artful insinuation ..... into false inferences." It is the case of Professor Müller's reference to an exchange of favors between the two scholars, explained towards the close of this Article. Finally the

[1] Italics in this section are from the critic's own armory.

concluding paragraph is said "to lack no essential of a falsehood." — a charge appropriate only before an open court.

Still another critic, in one of our most high-toned journals, has spoken of Professor Müller's "*falsification* of the facts of the controversy," and charged him with having interpolated a passage in an important quotation, from his own writings, for the "*obvious design* of disguising" its original meaning. It will be seen on the slightest reflection that this was a charge of no small gravity, and should not have been made unless the writer had first traversed the whole ground, and carefully canvassed all the reasonable hypotheses of innocent error, on one side or the other. The passage which we now quote with the preface and comments of the critic in question, was given as a "characteristic specimen" "of the manner in which Professor Müller quotes from his own writings." "To show that as long ago as 1854 he [Professor Müller] was no stranger to the correct distinction between vowels and consonants, he quotes from his Proposals for a Missionary Alphabet, published in that year as follows: 'If we regard the human voice as a continuous stream of air emitted as breath from the lungs, and changed [by the vibration of the *chordae vocales*] into vocal sound as it leaves the larynx, this stream itself as modified by certain positions of the mouth would represent the vowels' ..... In quoting this passage, Professor Müller has interpolated the words which we enclose in brackets ..... with the obvious design of disguising its real sense, which would be anything but suitable for his purpose."

A correspondent pointed out to the above-mentioned accuser that there were two editions of the Proposals for a Missionary Alphabet, one for the use of the Alphabetical Conferences, to which it was submitted for criticism in 1854; the second printed early in 1855; and that the corrected edition contains the passage exactly as Professor Müller had quoted it. Whereupon the reviewer, frankly confessing his ignorance of the second, and authorized, edition, made the correction; with, however, the somewhat contradictory statements that it was done "cheerfully," and, at the same time, "with reluctance"; and, because his "correspondent was somewhat urgent." He then, however, ventured upon an accusation against Mr. Müller of another kind, but scarcely less grave, viz. of "uncommonly sharp practice" in proceeding to "solve his puzzle," not by "the rule of *interpolation*, but by that of *double position*"; gratuitously charging him, moreover, with having "professed to quote from the edition" of 1854. Professor Müller was replying to a charge of ignorance upon a point made against him in 1866, and had remarked in passing, "This was in 1866, whereas in 1854, I had said," etc.

A little application of inductive reasoning on the part of the writer who makes these statements should have suggested to him a more charitable solution of the puzzle; a solution which we, though laying no great claim to ingenuity, venture to presume is the correct one. Professor Müller's

proposals were printed at first for the use of the members of the Conference, and were much modified in the course of their discussions. They were *published* by him *early* in 1855, as an Appendix to his Survey of Languages. In publishing them he had added, simply for the sake of completeness 'by the vibration of the *chordae vocales*'; for what else is there to change breath into vocal sound *as it leaves the larynx*, but the *chordae vocales?* They had, we believe, Kempeler's experiments performed for them during the conferences, and were not likely, therefore, to be in the dark on the office of the *chordae vocales.* Unfortunately the writer of the review in question consulted a copy of the Proposals which was for use during the progress of the Conference, and with him the riddle admitted of one solution only — Professor Müller had falsified his own book. The reviewer admiting his carelessness, accuses Mr. Müller of uncommonly "sharp practice," "double position," etc. And why? Because Professor Müller thought he had a right to revise his "Proposals" in 1854, before he published them in 1855. Even if Professor Müller had foisted in the passage in 1855, the critic's charge would collapse all the same. And why all the whirlwind raised from first to last about the use of the terms "surd" and "sonant"? Why do not these critics try Professor Czermak's experiments to which Professor Müller has referred them? They would very likely find that the old technical terms, "hard" and "soft," are by no means so inadequate as they imagine. More recent phonetic rsearches have established this still more clearly. As to Professor Müller he was neither ignorant of the terms "surd" and 'sonant" in 1854, nor did he repent of them, as he is now said to have done, early in 1855. He simply used them promiscuously with "hard" and "soft," "tenuis" and "media," — all the terms expressing different aspects of the same letter.

By others still, Professor Müller is represented as having treated American scholars in general with disrespect. He has, indeed, spoken in mild rebuke of the license allowed in this country in the use of offensive words in the expression of dissent; and in that we think he is sustained in the epithets from our current literature which we have transferred to this Article. Of such freedom in criticism we would speak in more pointed terms of rebuke. We have failed to find, however, any contempt, on Professor Müller's part, for American scholars in general.

When we look at the facts, we find them not only different, but the very opposite of what is represented. We confess to hearing, too often, in America, such expressions concerning the philosophy, and theology, and erudition of other nations, as appeal to the latent national predjudices always too prevalent in society. Professor Whitney even (and we are disposed to judge him charitably) has repeatedly attacked German scholarship in an unbecoming manner. Having in part received his education in a German university, he too has joined in the vulgar outcry against "German nebulosity," etc. He speaks of "that profundity, not quite un-

known in Germany, in which a minimum of valuable truth is wrapped up in a maximum of sounding phraseology."[1] "Even or especially in Germany. . . . . ," he writes, "many an able and acute scholar seems minded to indemnify himself for dry and tedious grubbings among the roots and forms of comparative philology by the most airy ventures in the way of constructing Spanish castles of linguistic science.'[2] Finally, Mr Whitney's tone is throughout too much that of one who has rescued the science of language from the incongruities and absurdities of European scholars. Is it possible, to be more offensive to German scholars, — to say nothing of European scholars in general, — as distinguished from American scholars? What has nationality to do with science? And how unfortunate to appeal to national susceptibilities in purely scientific questions! But let us now quote what Professor Müller really said of American scholarship. So far from speaking disrespectfully of American scholars in general, he, on the contrary, expressed his surprise that Mr. Whitney, being an American, should write in a style so un-American. In this we fear he was too charitable towards us. He was ready to make allowance for Professor Whitney's use of expressions which in England sound more offensive than in America, and said: 'I believe there is far more license allowed in America, in the expression of dissent, than in England; and it is both interesting and instructive, in the study of dialectic growth, to see how words which would be offensive in England have ceased to be so on the other side of the Atlantic, and are admitted into the most respectable American Reviews.'[3]

But, after making full allowance for this in judging of Mr. Whitney's style, he added: "America has possessed, and still possesses, some excellent scholars, whom every one of these German and French savants would be proud to acknowledge as his peers. Mr. Marsh's Lectures on the English Language are a recognized standard work in England. Professor March's Anglo-Saxon Grammar has been praised by every one. Why is there no trace of self-assertion or of personal abuse in any of their works?"[4] This certainly is not what would be called abuse of American scholars in general. And surely the scholar should be the very last man to make capital out of national susceptibilities. The true man of science claims and receives citizenship in the whole world; and should feel equally ashamed to flatter nations as to flatter kings.

We should mention that a German translation of the fourth volume of the "Chips from a German Workshop" has appeared. In this the letter of Professor Whitney to the Academy (London), written December 9th, 1875, together with Professor Müller's reply of the 8th of January, 1876, are both republished in full.[5] With the comments and proposition which follow,

[1] Oriental Linguistic Studies (1st Series), p. 292. [2] Ibid. p. 315.
[3] Chips from a German Workshop (Am. ed.), Vol. iv. p. 422. [4] Ibid. p. 431.
[5] Translation by Dr. Fritzsche, Leipsig. 1876. See pp. 321–352.

Mr. Müller, regretting much the waste of strength which has already been occasioned by it, proposes to end the personal controversy. He reiterates his desire to submit nineteen of the twenty points before made, to the arbitration of three of Mr. Whitney's best friends, enumerating Professors Stenzler, Kern, and Kuhn, contributors to the Petersburg Lexicon. The fifth point, viz. "Whether Professor Whitney thought that the words *light*, *alight*, and *delight*, could be traced to the same source," is withdrawn on the strength of Mr. Whitney's assurance that he did know the diversity of their etymology. Mr. Müller, however, comforts himself by showing that he had company in his error, since the person who indexed Mr. Whitney's volume had construed the matter in the same manner, referring to this passage to show that "use and not etymology determines the significance of words"; while in the German translation the corresponding examples chosen are all connected etymologically.

Professor Müller recalls attention to the fact that he has written in self-defence, and has not made an unprovoked attack; and that he restrained himself from retaliation during a long period, until his silence was called scornful; and that he was drawn into the controversy at first, in defence of a friend, and not of himself. Notwithstanding Mr. Whitney's strictures in regard to the smallness and date of the favors he (Whitney) has received from Mr. Müller, the latter still fortifies his claim to great forbearance by the fact, that he did Mr. Whitney favors after he had been the subject of uncalled for, and what he regards as abusive criticism. A part of the favor was, however, that he kept silence for ten years, from 1865 to 1875. Mr. Whitney is shown to have been forgetful in his statement that when Mr. Müller first received him in 1856 neither of them had written a word on the "Science of language." Mr. Müller had long before that time published an edition of the Rig-Veda with Sâyana's Commentary, which Mr. Whitney had treated slightingly, ignoring Mr. Müller's name entirely in referring to it. Professor Müller had, also, previously published his Proposals for a Missionary Alphabet; and his Survey of the Languages at the Seat of [the Crimean] War, whilst his treatise concerning the Turanian Languages, which Professor Pott himself, while sharply assailing, at the same time styled one of the most significant contributions to the science of language, was written in the year 1853. In an open letter[1] to Signor de Gubernatis, Professor of Sanscrit in Florence, Professor Müller entreats him to arrange a peace conference at St. Petersburg, or anywhere else, and promises afterward, in the former custom of duelists, to offer his hand to his enemies as friends. He proposes and desires that de Gubernatis, Dr. Stanley, and M. Regnier be the umpires, but would be willing, if Mr. Whitney so prefers, to make umpires of Stenzler, Kern, and Kuhn, though not self-confident enough to accept as umpires their colleagues, Boehtlingk, Weber, and Roth.

In conclusion, let us explain the point of view from which we have

[1] See, as above, p. 333 ff.

penned these lines. We were going over the writings of the two authors mentioned, to see what help they could give us on the subject of Darwinism, when to the great detriment of our study, and to the disturbance of that mental satisfaction with which we were contemplating the Centennial festivities of the year, the tempest of this personal controversy came down upon us, and overwhelmed us with dismay; for we were compelled to acknowledge that, though in this matter the foreign press might not be guiltless, the American press was certainly guilty; and "if they do these things in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry?" If our literary critics so abound in libellous accusations, what can we hope from those who are less influenced by the amenities of Christian life. We hope what we have written will not be interpreted wholly with relation to this personal controversy, but that it will be regarded as a patriotic and Christian effort made from within the nation to correct an evil tendency, which we had hoped was on the decline. It seemed to us better that some one should utter this protest who could not be suspected of national prejudice, rather than leave the matter to be treated by those outside. On this view of the case we beg our friends in other lands to remember these outbursts no more against us; or, at least till the calmer and more benignant elements of our character have opportunity to reassert themselves, that they regard these things as among the privacies of our national life.

G. F. W.

ARTICLE XII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

A. GERMAN WORKS.

The following are some of the more important theological works which have recently appeared:

Pastor Th. Diestelmann: Luther's Last Conversation with Melancthon on the Eucharist Controversy, the Historical Testimony, and the various Opinions thereabout re-examined, with reference to Luther's whole Relation to the Controversy. Die letzte Unterredung Luther's mit Melanchthon über den Abendmahlsstreit, nach den geschichtl. Zeugnissen u. den darüber ergangenen Urtheilen, sowie mit Rücksicht auf Luther's ganze Stellung zum Abendmahlsstreit neu untersucht.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht. 1874. pp. 368. l. 8vo. 7 Mark. The author seems to be certain of a result which will not please the high Lutherans, viz. that Luther did say that after his death something must happen in this affair, for he himself had said too much in it.

Dr. Fr. Kirchner, Lic. Theol.: Leibnitz's Position regarding the Roman

Catholic Church. With special Consideration of his so-called Systema Theologicum. (Leibnitz's Stellung zur katholischen Kirche.) Berlin: C. Duncker. 1874. pp. 86. l. 8vo. 1½. Mark. We read that, according to this pamphlet, Leibnitz's expressions which caused Rome to claim him were simply efforts to secure reunion of Catholics and Protestants, and his views expressed in them are directly at variance with the central doctrines of the Roman Catholic church.

Dr. A. Hilgenfeld, Church-councillor and Professor in Jena: Historical-critical Introduction to the New Testament. (Historisch-kritische Einleitung in das Neue Testament.). Leipzig: Fue's Publishing House (R. Reisland). 1875. pp. 828. l. 8vo. 13 Mark. Whatever brings sharply to sight the opinions of a particularschool enlightens on the history of present opinion; it also makes prominent special facts; and it may help to unearth valuables which others would pass over. We doubt the ability of the strongly prejudiced spirit this writer usually shows to give a more valuable "Introduction" than those we have. We fear that defects from the calm, catholic way of the best students will counterbalance even the benefits which Hilgenfeld's long study might bring. Schrader's De Wette, or, still better, Camphausen's Bleek, is likely to be still preferred.

Delitzsch, John (Dr. Phil., and now Prof. Extraordinary): The Doctrinal System of the Roman Church. Part I: The Fundamental Dogma of Romanism; or, The Doctrine of the Church. (Das Lehrsystem der römischen Kirche. 1 Th.: das Grunddogma des Romanismus, oder die Lehre von der Kirche.) Gotha: R. Besser. 1875. pp. 413. 8 Mark. The very title of the work interests; for it points out where we must really begin, if we are to understand thoroughly that church's nature and its present efforts. But we desire a treatment of it by far more surely first-class hands.

Gustav Volkmar: Paul's Letter to the Romans. The Oldest Text interpreted by a German Translation; and a Commentary treating especially of the Plan of the Epistle and the Relation of Part to Part. With a Literal Reprint of the Vatican MS. (Paulus Römer-brief. Der älteste Text deutsch u. im Zusaenmmhange erklärt. Mit dem Wortabdruck der Vaticanischen Urkunde.) Zurich: Schmidt. 1875. pp. 164. l. 8vo. 4⅘ Mark. Here is noteworthy the just reaction against Tischendorf's great preference for his Sinaitic text. The Vatican will probably ere long have generally decided favors a the older and more valuable text. A valuable feature of this commentary is the regard paid to the thread of Paul's discourse and to the clear exposition of the connection of all the parts. The author promises a series on the Epistles.

Siegfried, Dr. C. Prof.: Philo of Alexandria considered as an Interpreter of the Old Testament intrinsically, and in respect of his Historical Influence. With Studies of the Greek of Philo. (Philo von Alexandria

als Ausleger des Alten Test. an sich selbst u. nachseinem geschichtlichen Einfluss betrachtet. Nebst Untersuchungen über die Gräcität Philo's.) Jena: Dufft. 1875. pp. 418. l. 8vo. 9 Mkar.

Ehrenfeuchter, Dr. Fr.: Christianity and Modern Modes of viewing the World. (Christenthum und moderne Weltanschauung.) Göttingen: Vandenhoek and Ruprecht. 1876. pp. 416. l. 8vo. 8 Mark. The three chapters of the work — 1. The Genesis of the Modern Way of Thinking; 2. Christianity and its Relation to that Way of Thinking; 3. Review of the Course of the Newer Theology — show the writer to be too faint-hearted respecting the results of recent discussions. Yet he seems to describe well. The very title deserves reproof, as does the use of a similar term by many among us. "Modern ways of thinking" are unhesitatingly implied to be something over against Christianity. On an examination, one finds that this is a cry at least two thousand years old; and yet much of what was once "modern way of thinking" has become a very old way of thinking.

Plitt, Dr. Gust. Prof.: Jodokus Trutfetter of Eisenach, Luther's Teacher. A Portrait of him as he wrought. (Jodokus Trutfetter von Eisenach, der Lehrer Luther's, in seinem Wirken geschildert.) Erlangen: Deichert. 1876. pp. 60. l 8vo. 1 Mark.

Graecus Venetus. Pentateuchi, Proverbiorum, Ruth, Cantici, Ecclesiastæ, Threnorum, Danielis versio graeca. Ex unico bibliothecae S. Marci Venetae codice nunc primum uno volumine comprehensam atque apparatu critico et philologico instructam ed. Osc. Gebhardt. Praefatus est Fr. Delitzsch. Cum imagine duplicis scripturae codicis lithographica. Leipzig: Brockhaus. pp. 594. l. 8vo. 15 Mark. This marvellously careful edition of the Venetian Greek MS. of the Old Testament is, unfortunately, of little value to the restorer of the text of the LXX, as the origin of the MS. is so late (likely fourteenth century). An interesting translation of יהוה is given in ὁ ὀντωτής or ὁ ὀντουργός. Compare Prof. de Lagarde's important Article, demonstrating that יהוה, the name by which the Hebrew knew God, is a Hiphil nominal form, and means, He who causeth to be or to stand, or the Promise-keeper. The exegetical and homiletical value of this fact is great. This Article will shortly appear in our pages by special permission of the author.

Baumgarten, Herm.: The Religious Development of Spain. An Address by Herm. Baumgarten, delivered Feb. 22, 1875, in St. Nicolas Church, in Strasburg. (Die religiöse Entwickelung Spaniens.) Strasburg: Trübner. 1875. pp. 38. 8vo. 1 Mark.

Levy, Dr. J., Rabbi: Lexicon of Newer Hebrew and Chaldee for the Talmudim and Midraschim. With Appendices by Prof. Dr. H. L. Fleischer. 3 Vols., in 12 to 15 Parts. Part 1. (Neuhebräisches und chaldäisches Wörterbuch über die Talmudim u. Midraschim. Lief 1.)

Leipzig: Brockhaus. 1875. pp. 112. h. 4to. 6 Mark. Such a work from a master hand would be an almost priceless treasure. But from a review by one of the very few who can judge accurately — Th. Nöldeke, of Strasburg — we feel we must wait still for what is desired. He allows that it is best to make a joint lexicon for the two languages, Hebrew and Aramaic ("Chaldee" is a misnomer), for the literature in question. He says the difficulties are enormous in the way of a thorough work of the kind. "There is still a serious lack of really usable and strictly scientific preliminary works of recent date such as are indispensable in the preparation of the lexicon. The necessary intimate familiarity with the language and with the contents of the voluminous literature could scarcely be united, in one man, with the methodical exactness and the accurate knowledge of the related languages and dialects, above all of the Syriac, which the author of such a work must unfailingly possess. Works of older date which would help are in good part sadly destroyed or defaced. Even a critical lexicographer could only lessen the number of monstrosities of words, for he could by no means resolve them all. The meaning of many words, too, is very uncertain. Therefore a critic of the lexicon must in any case be lenient." Nöldeke goes on to show that the best leniency would only strongly condemn this lexicon; points out superficial knowledge, great unlikeness to the careful, scientific method of Fleischer, from whom he might have learned; false etymologies, — as, for example, Greek etymologies of words which are good Aramaic; wrong Arabic etymologies; false punctuation, or, indeed, the attempt to punctuate at all when for many words we not only are ignorant, but must be so. He condemns the purely alphabetical arrangement given, instead of that by roots, which for Semitic lexicons is alone allowable. By the way, be it remarked that this same blemish is one of the faults scarcely pardonable in Fürst's Hebrew Lexicon. Nöldeke puts this work of Levy's pretty nearly in the same category of insufficient efforts with Dr. Payne Smith's attempt to prepare a Syriac lexicon, and says: "As the chief merit of the book may be reckoned its completeness for the Jerushalmi and for the elder and most of the younger Midraschim; whereas Buxtorf was quite insufficient for these." The size of the book and its price will be so great that far greater brevity in the articles should have prevailed.

Kayser, Prof. Ang.: The Pre-exilic Book of Early Israelitish History, and the Enlargements of the Book. A Contribution to the Criticism of the Pentateuch. (Das vorexilische Buch der Urgeschichte Israels und seine Erweiterungen. Ein Beitrag zur Pentateuch-Kritik.) Strasburg: Schmidt. 1874. pp. 198. l. 8vo. 4 Mark. This seems to be another careful step along one of the lines of investigation into the origin of the Hebrew sacred books. Since Graf and Kuenen and Duhm have written there has been added an intense interest to the study. Of

course, the philological questions are, after all, the crucial ones. We urge earnest preparation on young American theologians, that they may be able not only to judge results, but may themselves investigate. Semitic philology must be thoroughly cultivated. The universities and colleges must undertake their sadly-neglected duty in this matter.

Bröcker, Dr. L. O.: Studies concerning the Gospels and the Life of Jesus. (Untersuchungen über die Evangelien u. das Leben Jesu.) Hamburg: Grüning. 1874. pp. 202. l. 8vo. 4 Mark. The book discusses carefully the historical credibility of the Gospel narratives.

Luthardt, Dr. Chr. E.: Is John the Author of the Fourth Gospel? (Der johanneische Ursprung des vierten Evangeliums.) Leipzig: Dörffling and Franke. 1874. pp. 224. 8vo. 3⅔ Mark. The leader of the Leipzig school — the high church, or, as one might say, the Puseyite, party in Germany — has too much of the character of a strong party leader to let us easily accept all he advances, even in a question of biblical criticism. For does one not always feel the question in one's mind: Does the supposed interest of his church interfere, here or there, as misleading motive? A reviewer in Germany, after pointing out much that is questionable in the book, says, truly: "Luthardt's publication, in the book, of a list of all the literature on the Gospel of John is a good service done; but it certainly warns every student not to increase the list by a single book, if he cannot furnish thereby something indeed peculiar, something which unquestionably brings the question nearer solution."

Keim, Dr. Theod., Prof.: History of Jesus, related compendiously in accordance with the Results of Modern Scientific Theological Research. For Non-theological Readers. Third Revision. Second Edition much altered, and with a Critical Appendix. (Geschichte Jesu nach den Ergebnissen heutiger Wissenschaft für weitere Kreise übersichtl. erzählt. 3 Bearbeitung. 2 vielf. veränderte, mit krit. Schlussworte verm. Aufl.) Zürich: Orell, Füssli, and Co. 1875. pp. 398. l. 8vo. 8 Mark.

Preger, W., Lic. and Prof.: History of German Mysticism in the Middle Ages. An Original Investigation and Delineation. Part 1. History of German Mysticism down to the death of Master Eckhart. (Geschichte der deutschen Mystik im Mittelalter. 1 Theil.) Leipzig: Dörffling and Franke. 1874. pp. 488. 8vo. 9 Mark. Evidently a book to be cautiously used, with constant examination of the author's authorities, and yet containing much that is valuable.

Ritschl, Prof. Dr. Albrecht, of Göttingen: The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Atonement. Vol. II. The Biblical Material of the Doctrine: Vol. iii. The Positive Construction of the Doctrine. (Vol. I., of which an English Translation exists, is on "The History of the Doctrine.") (Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung u. Versöhnung. II. Bd. Der biblische Stoff der Lehre. III. Bd. Die positive Entwickelung der

Lehre.) Bonn: A. Marcus. 1874. Vol. ii. pp. 377; Vol. iii. pp. 598. 18vo. 15 Mark. How can we joyfully enough express our welcome to this grand work of a master workman? An epoch-making book it certainly is. We hesitate not to call Ritschl the leader of the school which now does and must take the front rank among students and expositors of theological thought. Not only in Germany will this be true. The work must be translated, and will be not a standard text-book, — that unfortunate thing which always enervates, — but a leading monument and teacher, telling others how theological work must be done, and showing to what results a vigorous and strictly scientific theologian, working thus, has come — how he has formulated the essential principle of Christianity, which all Christians hold now, in common with their Master and with all real Christians in the ages since he founded his religion. He has especially deduced from this common principle the doctrines named above; that is, he has shown what that principle of Christianity means in view of the broken and reformed relation of men to God. But he has also shown how all doctrines — that is, the expressions of the reflecting Christian concerning all religious things or relations — may be constructed. In this day, when a leading periodical, claiming to treat matters scientifically, writes, "Theology is effete," as if the science of any phenomena could become effete so long as the phenomena exist and human minds are not effete; when young men turn towards this empty style of talk with satisfaction, — yes, young men who have actually started in the study of that science, "the systematized knowledge concerning God," as one well defined it — when these things are so, we say, it is like bread to one threatened by a tyrant with starvation to receive a thoroughly logical investigation of the phenomena and rigid construction of their science. Not only will this book be satisfying as that of a scientific theologian searching for and showing truth, unfettered by the prejudices of traditionalists or of revolutionists; but it already rallies all classes of both extreme parties. We must here add a word in view of a recent Article in a religious journal, which innocently longs for a method of reaching the essential truth, and yet oddly says, in praise of Dr. Bushnell: "He begins by discarding logic from the field of theology as an inadequate and illegitimate instrument." Verily may such a school of theologians be soon effete; for effete, certainly, is their theology. We only point, in evidence, to this rigidly logical, scientific work on the central Christian doctrine; for by logical conduct it actually does that work, part of which the New England theology had done for us. We long for a translation. Doubtless some parts of it would startle contracted thinkers, as the New England theologians did. We are glad to promise, by Dr. Ritschl's special authorization, an early publication in our pages of a discourse by him containing for the public the essence of Vol. iii. Following this, we will publish, at his request, a translation of his treatise on "Conscience."

B. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN WORKS.

THE MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF CREATION, THE MIRACLE OF TO-DAY; or, New Witnesses to the Oneness of Genesis and Science. By Charles B. Warring. 16mo. pp. 292. New York; J. W. Schermerhorn and Co. 1875.

That the first two chapters of Genesis bear the positive impress of divine inspiration we should hold with the author of this book. Whether with him we should call the production a miracle or not, would depend upon the definition of that word. Our author takes the view that the Mosaic account of creation is intensely literal, and compares it to the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. The words of the prophet awaited the tragedy of the crucifixion for their full explanation. Likewise the sublime sentences which introduce us to the current of biblical doctrine and history have awaited the development of material sciences in the nineteenth century to reveal the extent of their super-human wisdom. That an account of the creation should be adapted to the wants of the world, both in the times of the Jewish commonwealth and in this age of scientific discovery is, to say the least, marvellous.

This adaptation to diverse conditions of civilization could be secured in two ways; of which one is to use language in so pregnant a sense that it should be capable of expanding in meaning as science developed. This is the theory of our author. By reading between the lines he believes he can put the whole body of modern science into the first two chapters of Genesis.

Another means of securing the remarkable adaptation of which we have spoken might be to use language such that all questions of mere science could be kept out of it. We surmise this latter plan would require as much and as direct divine supervision as the first; and that it is probably the plan which inspiration has pursued. Our author, on page forty-three, compares the record of creation to "that kind of history styled Annals." It is suggested to us on high authority that, "Memorabilia" would be a better word.

The main design of the Mosaic introduction is so manifest that it seems to us unwise to dissect too minutely the language which expresses it. Dissection is likely to do to a sentence what it does to an animal — destroy the life of it. Is it not more and more evident from the investigations in the valley of the Euphrates, whence Abraham emigrated, that the costume of the Mosaic cosmogony is that of the Chaldaean legends, but shorn of their polytheism and their innumerable absurdities? The Mosaic introduction asserts, both in general and in detail, that one God is the creator of all things, and emphasises his personality. It was to bear witness to that idea that Abraham left his fatherland. How this idea of the divine unity and personality is bound up in the passage as a whole, independent of the word designating God, appears in a substitution our

author makes of "Natural Causes" for "God" (p. 156). "In the beginning Natural Causes created the heavens and the earth..... And the Spirit of Natural Causes moved upon the face of the waters. And Natural Causes said, Let there be light, and there was light. And Natural Causes saw the light, that it was good," etc.

But we must close our review with regret, simply remarking that the author is reverent, ingenious, and familiar with all the varied tools he uses. We hesitate about accepting his method of interpretation and adjustment. We nevertheless heartily commend it to the attention of all who are making a special study of the subject treated of. G. F. W.

THE RELIGION OF EVOLUTION. By M. J. Savage, Author of "Christianity the Science of Manhood." pp. 253. Boston: Lockwood, Brooks, and Company. 1876.

We confess that we have not read this book through. We have, however, read sufficiently in it (one hundred and thirty pages) to ascertain that the author has a very inadequate and distorted view of the orthodox system of theology. We are heartily sorry both for him and for the Bible, when he attempts to state its doctrines and their relations to the hopes of the great body of Christian believers. What dissuaded us from farther perusal of the book has been the research upon which we were sent to test the credibility of the hypothesis by which the author reconciles the existence of evil with the goodness of God. It seems that we have been beside ourselves in thinking there really was any such thing as evil at all. Even the word itself, like Enoch of old, is not; for our author has translated it, and "all evil is nothing more nor less than maladjustment" (see p. 100). "If you can find any form of evil that cannot be wrapped up in the word 'maladjustment,' then you will find what my thinking has failed to discover" (see p. 101). We are sorry to learn, however, that "maladjustment" has been very much protracted in times past. "God is in no hurry" to get rid of it, since he has "eternity to work in," and has, during the millenniums of the past, only now got us on to "the threshold of what is" to be (see p. 91). When maladjusted, also, man "finds disturbance, pain, calamity, sickness, death" (see p. 101). Through "maladjustment" the powers of nature are continually working men "harm" and "ruin" (see p. 102). A maladjusted location of a city like Pompeii, even though it be from ignorance, results in "calamity" which is only "on the whole beneficent," and is connected with "incidental evils" (see p. 103). "Moral evil is only moral maladjustment." "But the selfish hunger is strong, and his [man's] moral sense is weak and blind..... Habit grows until it becomes a disease" (see pp. 108, 109). Furthermore, we are told that "if physical, intellectual, and moral calamities come, it will be small comfort to you to know that your own ignorance or carelessness is the devil that brings them" (see p. 110). That is just what we have always thought,

and corresponds closely with the words of the prophet: "O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself; but in me [Jehovah] is thine help." We fear that the evolution of our author will not provide so good help as was already provided for the Jews several centuries before the Christian era.

We presume our author is, without knowing it, orthodox in his views of eternal punishment; for if an omnipotent God, with eternity past to work in, has not yet eliminated all "maladjustment," we do not see what grounds we can have logically, to believe he will ever succeed in doing it. We are bound to remark still further, that we have not found any dictionaries that define the prefix "*mal*" by the adjective "good." We remember, however, some unpleasant remarks in scripture about certain persons who called it good; but, we are glad to say, they have never been successful in giving the usage currency.

To be serious, it is not the least of the merits of orthodoxy that it is manly, and calls things by their right names. It faces difficulties and mysteries with as little resort as possible to words which may, indeed, "wrap up" the truth, but never can unfold it. R.

How are the Dead raised, and with what Body do they come? An Inquiry into the Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Dead, as taught in the New Testament; with particular reference to the Question of a Future Existence of the Human Body. By John Hall, late Principal of the Ellington School. 16mo. pp. 216. Hartford: Brown and Gross; Elmira, N. Y.: Hall Brothers. 1875.

Hon. John Hall, the author of this volume, died October 2, 1847. He wrote the treatise with great care several years before his death. It is now published by his surviving children.

The theory of Judge Hall is, that the *dead body* will not be raised to life, but that the *soul*, "a truly substantial and organic being," will rise and live forever. This soul is a "spiritual mass," an *organic* mass, and is therefore called a "spiritual body"; and after the death of the "material mass" it will exist, "relieved from a cumbrous load of impediments." Without adopting the author's theory we may say that he has expressed it clearly and defended it ingeniously. He was a conscientious and independent thinker. In his style he follows the laws of *logic* rather more carefully than those of *usage*.

Messianic Prophecy: its Origin, Historical Character, and Relation to New Testament Fulfilment. By Dr. Edward Riehm, Professor of Theology, Halle. Translated from the German, with the approbation of the Author, by the Rev. John Jefferson. 16mo. pp. 266. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong. 1876.

Prof. Riehm is well known to our readers as an evangelical and excel-

lent, as well as learned, theologian. His present volume lacks the unity and completeness which would have belonged to it, if he had originally designed to publish it as a treatise by itself. It is a collection of Articles published in successive numbers of the Studien und Kritiken. It is a valuable work, and merits a careful study.

PRIESTHOOD IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. The Congregationalist Union Lecture for 1876. By E. Mellor, D.D. 8vo. pp. 423. New York, Chicago, and New Orleans: A. S. Barnes and Company. 1876.

Under the term "priesthood" Dr. Mellor includes "not merely the function of offering gifts and sacrifices unto God, but any form of official mediation between man and God by which it is assumed that, in virtue of ordination or any exterior rite whatever, certain persons acquire prerogatives which enable them, exclusively, to dispense salvation to others" (p. 3). Dr. Mellor aims to show that the New Testament acknowledges no such priesthood (1) in name; (2) in office; (3) in specified qualifications; and (4) that "such priesthood is precluded by the whole genius of the Christian dispensation" (p. 12). Having shown that there are only two offices in the Christian church, — that of presbyters and that of deacons, — and that the office of bishops is identical with that of presbyters, Dr. Mellor proceeds to examine "some of those functions which the Christian priesthood, falsely so called, assume to possess the exclusive prerogative of discharging." He aims to show that there is no warrant for the pretension of Christian ministers to perform *priestly* functions at the altar and the confessional. His arguments will not be accepted by the Romanists, the high-church Episcopalians, and many Lutherans, but will receive the decided approval of the Baptists, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists. Dr. Mellor writes with perspicuity and vigor. His treatise will be highly prized by candid men, whether they fully agree with him or not.

THE SCRIPTURAL HARMONY BETWEEN PRIVATE JUDGMENT AND CHURCH AUTHORITY, as chiefly apparent from the Four Gospels. By Rev. William Maw Shaw, M.A., Vicar of Yealand Conyers 12mo. pp. 271. London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Company; Manchester: J. E. Cornish. 1874.

The author of this volume is a Calvinistic and devout Episcopalian. He opposes ritualism, but is a thorough "churchman," as the English use the word. He defends, on biblical grounds, the right of private judgment; defends the Athanasian Creed; defends a high, but not the ritualistic, theory of the sacraments; condemns the practice of auricular confession; condemns also the high church theory of the priesthood, yet justifies the use of the term "priest" as designating a church officer. The volume is an

instructive one, and gains our respect for its author. It differs in many particulars from the work, noticed above, of Dr. Mellor, but agrees with it on some of the fundamental questions relating to ecclesiastical polity and forms.

Moses: A Biblical Study. By J. J. Van Oosterzee, D.D., Author of "Year of Salvation," etc. Translated from the Dutch by James Kennedy, B.D. 12mo. pp. 362. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford and Armstrong. 1876.

Dr. Van Oosterzee has a happy talent for exhibiting the practical truths suggested by the biblical histories. He does this with great simplicity and neatness. He does not depend, like Dr. Guthrie, on illustrations from modern history; nor, like Melville, on a rhetorical structure of sentences. He has little or no illustration; and pays but little attention to rhetorical artifices; but he is easy, natural, devout; instructive also, and impressive.

The Word of Life; being Selections from the Work of a Ministry. By Charles J. Brown, D.D., Edinburgh. pp. 330. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1874.

When he published this volume Dr. Brown had been for thirty-six years the pastor of the Free North Church, in Edinburgh. The volume is in many respects uncommonly interesting. It contains good specimens of the author's habitual method of preaching. He enforces truth with much solemnity, plainness, and power. He adopts the style which was common in this country one and two hundred years ago, but is less common now. This is especially noticeable in his words on the atonement. For instance, he says, in his sixteenth sermon, that "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, having borne *that* curse — being made the curse of the law for us" (p. 206). "The righteous God will bring his curse on no guiltless one. It may be questioned whether he will ever bring suffering of any kind on one absolutely guiltless. But it is certain he will not bring his *curse* on the guiltless..... There was a mysterious manner, yet most real and true, in which Christ was not guiltless, — yea, in which he who alone in all the world was without sin was, to speak with the deepest reverence, of all guilty ones in the world the guiltiest" (p. 207) "Thus did he, to speak with profoundest reverence, deserve and behove to endure the divine curse — due to the blasphemies and persecutions of Saul; to the aggravated denials of Peter; to the crimes of the thief who hung on the cross beside him; to the unnumbered iniquities of all who shall be saved by him to the end of the world" (p. 209). "Ah, they [certain opposers of Dr. Brown's theory] are blind to what is the very soul and glory of the gospel, that Christ, in a mysterious sense, yet most real, *was* the guiltiest of all, — that the Lord did verily lay on him the

unnumbered iniquities of his people — not their punishment only, but their iniquities first, and then their punishment, their curse. As Luther speaks, 'We must as well wrap Christ, and know him to be wrapped, in our sins, in our malediction, in our death, and in all our evils, as he is wrapped in our flesh and blood.' 'God sent him into the world, saying to him, Be thou Peter, that denier; be thou Paul, that persecutor, blasphemer, cruel oppressor; be thou David, that adulterer; be thou that sinner who ate the apple in paradise; be thou that thief that hung on the cross.' 'If thou wilt deny him to be a sinner and accursed, deny also that he was crucified and dead. For it is no less absurd to say that the Son of God (as our faith confesseth and believeth) was crucified and suffered the pains of sin and of death, than to say that he is a sinner and accursed. But if it be not absurd to confess and believe that Christ was crucified between two thieves, then it is not absurd to say also that he is accursed, and of all sinners the greatest. These words of Paul are not spoken in vain: "Christ was made a curse for us." "God made Christ, who knew no sin, to be sin for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him"'" (pp. 210, 211). "There is no doubt that the fire of all the burnt-offerings of the law, whether it came down immediately from heaven to consume the victim, as on various memorable occasions, or was kindled naturally, was the emblem of the Divine holiness and justice, consuming the substitute lamb on which the sin had been laid — the sacrifice in place of the sinner. What a picture of Christ made a curse, enduring the fire of 'the wrath of God revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men!' What a picture of the prophet's, "Awake, O sword, against my shepherd, and against the man that is my fellow, saith the Lord of hosts; smite the shepherd!' What a picture of Him who cried, 'My heart is like wax; it is melted in the midst of my bowels. My strength is dried up like a potsherd; and my tongue cleaveth to my jaws; and thou hast brought me into the dust of death'" (p. 213)! "When Jesus was led forth out of Jerusalem, and there crucified between the thieves, it was as if all the innumerable multitudes of sinners whom he represented had been in that hour carried out, and had there endured, in their own persons, the curse of the divine law due to their whole ungodliness, unrighteousness, pride, falsehood, vanity, uncleanness, rebellion, and I know not what other crimes and sins. Writes Dr. Owen, in his treatise on the Divine Justice, 'Unless God, the Judge and Ruler of all, after having thoroughly examined the nature, hearts, breasts, ways, and lives of us all, had thence collected whatever was contrary to his law, improper, unjust, and impure, — whatever displeased the eyes of his purity, provoked his justice, roused his anger and severity, — and laid it all on the shoulders of our Redeemer, and condemned it in his flesh, it had been better for us, rather than to be left eternally entangled in the snares of death and of the curse, never to have enjoyed this common air, but to have been annihilated

as soon as born'" (p. 214). Of course, when Dr. Brown speaks of Christ as guilty and ill-deserving, he does not mean that Christ had a *personal* guilt and ill-desert, but that he was guilty and ill-deserving as the *Surety*, Representative of the elect — the public person to whom the sins of the elect were "transferred," "imputed."

In his twentieth sermon Dr. Brown gives a specimen of the verbal reasoning so common in past centuries: "There are those, in the main sound enough in the faith, who are sensitively jealous of such language as the following, — I repeat a question of our Larger Catechism, with the answer to it, — 'With whom was the covenant of grace made? The covenant of grace was made with Christ as the Second Adam, and in him with all the elect as his seed.' They are jealous of this as savoring, they think, less of scripture than of the systems and theologies of men. Indeed? Then let the words of the text be read again: 'Eternal life, which God, that cannot lie, promised before the world began.' To whom could the promise be made, while yet there was no creature in existence, save to Christ? And *for* whom? Assuredly not to Christ for himself, but for his people, his seed. Thus have we, in almost as many words, the answer of the Westminster divines, that 'the covenant of grace was made with Christ as the Second Adam, and in him with all the elect as his seed'" (pp. 284, 285).

Lectures on the Gospels. For the Sundays and Chief Festivals of the Church Year. By Joseph A. Seiss, D.D., Pastor of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Holy Communion. Complete in two volumes. 8vo. pp. 1160. Philadelphia: Lutheran Book-store; Smith, English, and Company. 1876.

These volumes are printed in an attractive style, and are enriched with a valuable Index. This is an excellence unusual in volumes of sermons. We are surprised in reading that "a full series of discourses on our [Lutheran] Pericopes, whether of Gospels or Epistles, has never hitherto been furnished in the English language" (p. vi). The sermons abound in excellent sentiments, well expressed.

Dr. Seiss thus avows his belief in the general atonement and the freedom of man: The reason why so many persons are not benefited by the preaching of the gospel is not "because of some foregone decree of God, which has forever shut out some from all chance of being anything but reprobates. God has his decrees. The universe is built on them, as well as the economy of grace; but he has sent a chillness into no one's blood, or a hardness into no one's nature, or reserved an unalterable discrimination of saving ability against no one's call, which makes it impossible for some to hear any other way than to everlasting condemnation. The grace to comply with the gospel is co-extensive with the invitation to exercise it. 'God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son, that *whoso-*

ever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life' (John iii. 16). And from that '*whosoever*' no man, woman, or child in being is excluded, or can be excluded, except by the self-exclusion of unbelief" (Vol. i. pp. 326, 327). "If a man is by pre-necessity a wayside hearer, of course no fault can be found with him for not receiving the seed as the good-ground hearer. Harvests are not to be expected from highways and beaten footpaths..... It is assumed all through, in all the calls and offers of the gospel, that there is ample capacity and capability on the part of every one to receive the offered salvation unto full fruition of blessedness" (Vol. i. pp. 328, 329). "The idea is not that God from eternity so interferes as to ordain some to inevitable perdition without opportunity for a better destiny," etc. (Vol. i. p. 336).

Regarding the nature of the atonement, Dr. Seiss expresses himself in a style similar in some respects, but in other respects quite dissimilar, to that of Dr. Brown, as reviewed in the preceding book-notice. He says that Christ "consented to suffer whatever suffering was due to sinful humanity." He took upon him every penalty of the law, "the same as if he had himself been the perpetrator of all the sins of all men. The law said the sinner must die; and he agreed to lay down his own life as the criminal. The law excludes the sinner from the favor and blessing of God; and he consented to endure such exclusion, as we see in that awful cry: 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' And in every particular, of his own free accord, he took upon his innocent and holy self to endure, feel, and bear in his own lone person whatsoever was due in justice to all the defects and crimes of all sinful humanity" (Vol. ii. pp. 980, 981).

In another lecture, speaking of this cry of the Saviour, Dr. Seiss says: "But we dare not press it too far. Really, Jesus was not utterly forsaken. The first words of the exclamation, twice repeated, express an abiding confidence, prohibiting the idea of complete abandonment. To be able to look up to that great Spirit 'from whom all things proceed, and on whom all creatures depend,' and in words of truth and reality to say of him and to him, 'MY *God*, MY *God*,' is still to be possessed of assurance of his presence and all-sufficient aid, leaving no gap of unbridged desertion between him who uses it and him to whom it is addressed. And when the suffering Saviour could still see and realize that God was his GOD, dark and awful as was the eclipse that had come upon his soul, it would be erroneous to suppose that all the moral and spiritual ligaments between him and the eternal Father had been clean severed.

"Nevertheless, the expression reveals a depth of woe and darkness into which he was plunged, which had about it the aspect and terrors of a total abandonment by God. All the assistance, peace, joy, and comfort by which God ordinarily stands by those who trust in him were suspended. It was as if the Father had effectually and forever retired from him. He

had not let go his hold and confidence in God; but he had come into horrors of experience, as if lost to all hope. It was not only the anguish of a man in conflict with awful physical sufferings and death, not only the mental and inward pangs of shame, mockery, and scorn so profusely heaped upon his sensitive soul, but a deeper and more spiritual horror — the mysterious and awful launching upon him of that curse of God which ever clings to sin. He had taken the place of the guilty, and he experienced the penalty which belongs to transgression. And it was as if hell itself had been emptied upon his soul, causing him to feel throughout all his mysterious person the thrill of condemnation and wrath due to the sins of a fallen world" (Vol. i. pp. 502–504).

It is easy to see that this last extract modifies the extracts made in the preceding paragraph. Similar modifications appear elsewhere in these volumes.—We regard the lectures as a rich contribution to our homiletical literature.

Sermons on the New Life. By Horace Bushnell. Revised edition. 12mo. pp. 456. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1876.

A uniform edition of Dr. Bushnell's works is now in process of publication, and will doubtless command an extensive sale. The present volume we regard as containing the best of his sermons. The nineteenth of these sermons is a typical instance of an author defending the very doctrine which he thinks that he opposes, and opposing the very propositions which he thinks that he defends. "*Every great man contradicts himself.*"

Christian Nurture, By Horace Bushnell. 12mo. pp. 407. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1876.

We have never regarded this volume so valuable as the one noticed above, although this is published first in the series. It contains many original views, and many stirring passages. The perusal of it quickens the mind, and makes, on the whole, a good impression. There is, however, more rhetoric than logic in the treatise; and some of its statements would be more deleterious than they are, if they were not contradicted by other statements in other parts of the treatise.

Love Enthroned: Essays on Evangelical Perfection. By Daniel Steele, D.D. 12mo. pp. 416. New York: Nelson and Phillips; Cincinnati: Hitchcock and Walden. 1875.

With many of Dr. Steele's positions we heartily agree. Many of his statements need qualification, we think. Often when an author regards a proposition as strictly true, he may wisely modify it because it is implausible. He may have many things to say, but his readers cannot bear them now. We will cite a few sentences as specimens of what we mean.

We think that the following will awaken more prejudices than they will secure convictions; and if such statements are made at all they should be accompanied with qualifying comments. "We do not deny that some souls have been brought into communion so intimate as to distinguish the persons of the Trinity. There is indisputable testimony on this point The Marquis De Renty, the most spiritual mind which France has produced, professed 'to carry about with him an experimental verity of the Holy Trinity.' Rev. Thomas Collins, an eminently successful Wesleyan preacher, who dwelt ever on the serene summits of perfect love, whose words were thunderbolts to the hearts of sinners and worldly professors, had a similar power of discriminating between the persons of the Trinity. Esther Ann Rogers, Lady Maxwell, William Bramwell, John Smith, and Charles Perronet, intimate that they have communion with each Divine Person distinctly. We are of the opinion that these are exceptional and abnormal experiences, notwithstanding that Dr. Owen, in his quarto on Communion, teaches that the earliest and purest Christian ages held that this experience is attainable by all advanced believers. The scriptures which come the nearest to a promise of such an experience are John xiv. 17, 23. It is a fair interpretation of the first that under the illumination of the Comforter, revealing and glorifying Christ in the believer's consciousness, his supreme Deity shall be demonstrated: 'Then shall ye know that I am in my Father.' The second text assures the believer that the Father and the Son shall come and abide with him. But to only a few is the telescopic power given to resolve this double star into two distinct orbs. To every other retina turned toward it the two appear as one."

The Pastoral Epistles; the Greek Text and Translation, with Introduction, Expository Notes, and Dissertations. By Patrick Fairbairn, D.D., Principal of Free Church College, Glasgow, author of "Typology of Scripture," "Revelation of Law," etc. 12mo. pp. 451. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong.

Sound judgment and careful statement characterize the writings of Dr. Fairbairn. Few men have proved themselves so worthy in private life, and so useful in public stations. We regret that we shall receive no more of his elaborate treatises.

Commentary on the New Testament. Intended for popular use. By D. D. Whedon, LL.D. Vol. iv. 1 Corinthians; 2 Timothy. 12mo. pp. 461. New York: Nelson and Phillips; Cincinnati: Hitchcock and Walden. 1875.

Like the preceding part of this series, the present volume contains many terse, pithy, memorable remarks. It is clear, concise, well adapted to the people, and worthy to be studied by clergymen.

Biblical Commentary on the Prophecies of Ezekiel. By Carl Friedrich Keil, D.D., Doctor and Professor of Theology. Translated from the German by Rev. James Martin, B.A. 8vo. Vol. I. pp. 428; Vol. II. pp. 434. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York; Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong.

The learning of Dr. Keil is as apparent in this as in his other works. The plates in the second volume make some of its descriptions more easily intelligible than such descriptions often are. The perspicuity of the work would sometimes be increased by breaking up one paragraph into three or four briefer paragraphs. The author's style requires such aid from the translator.

Dr. John Peter Lange's Commentary on Exodus and Leviticus.

This is the second volume of the Commentaries on the Old Testament in the well-known series, edited by Dr. Philip Schaff, and published by Scribner, Armstrong, and Co., New York. It contains Dr. Lange's Introduction to Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers, translated by Rev. Howard Osgood, D.D., Professor in Rochester, New York, pp. 50; The Commentary on Exodus, or Second Book of Moses, by Dr. Lange; translated by Charles M. Mead, Ph.D., Professor of the Hebrew Language and Literature in the Theological Seminary at Andover, Mass., pp. 179; The Commentary on Leviticus, or Third Book of Moses, by Frederic Gardiner, D.D., Professor of the Literature and Interpretation of the Old Testament in the Berkeley Divinity School, Middletown, Ct.; in which is incorporated a translation of the greater part of the German Commentary on Leviticus, by Dr. Lange. pp. 206. A large part of the Translation of Lange on Leviticus was prepared by Rev. Henry Ferguson of Exeter, N. H. Our own opinion at the commencement of Dr. Schaff's series was, that it were better to adopt the main plan pursued by Dr. Gardiner, than to make the series entirely a translation from the German. An American commentator understands the wants of American readers, and the best method of meeting them, better than a German commentator can understand or meet them.—This entire volume is an excellent one.

The Genius of the Gospel: A Homiletical Commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew. By David Thomas, D.D., Author of "A Homiletical Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles," etc. Edited by Rev. William Webster, M.A., Late Fellow of Queen's College, Cambridge, Author of "The Syntax and Synonymes of the Greek Testament," etc. Seventh Thousand. 8vo. pp. 560. London: Dickinson and Higham.

Mr. Webster regards this volume as superior to Chrysostom's Homilies and Simeon's and Lange's Homiletical Commentary. He says of the author: Nil falsi audet, nil veri non audet dicere. We cannot see all

the reasons for Mr. Webster's high praise of the volume; yet we think well of it. We agree with him in regarding it as distinguished by three features, — "reality, common sense, fidelity."

The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Analogy and Course of Nature. By Joseph Butler, LL.D., Lord Bishop of Durham. Edited by Joseph Cummings, D.D., LL.D., President of Wesleyan University. 12mo. pp. 395. New York: Nelson and Phillips; Cincinnati: Hitchcock and Walden. 1875.

Butler's Dissertations on Personal Identity, and the Nature of Virtue are inserted in this volume; also, Professor Henry Rogers's Biographical Sketch of Butler; also various foot-notes of Dr. Cummings, Dr. Chalmers, Dr. Fitzgerald, and of other editors of the Analogy; also a copious and excellent Index to the whole. The text is that of the second edition of the Analogy, as prepared by Dr. Fitzgerald. We have examined this edition with some care, and consider it an admirable one.

The Philosophy of History in France and Germany. By Robert Flint, Professor of Moral Philosophy and Political Economy in the University of St. Andrews. 8vo. pp. 609. New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong. 1875.

In this volume Professor Flint has given us the results of much reading and of patient thought. We are pleased with his style, and his spirit is excellent. With many of his criticisms we coincide fully. Of certain German and French writers he has given some interpretations which are different from our own. They may be correct, however, for all that; as there are not, perhaps, ten men who agree with each other entirely in interpreting those writers. We look forward with much pleasure to the appearance of the second volume.

Public Libraries in the United States of America; their History, Condition, and Management. Special Report, Department of the Interior, Bureau of Education. Part I. pp. xxxvi, 1187; Part II. pp. 89. [10,000 copies printed.] Washington: Government Printing Office. 1876.

Merely to print the table of contents of this elaborate work — the titles of the thirty-nine chapters, would suffice to show that it is a monument of industry in the accumulation of information from a wide, difficult, and comparatively unexplored field, and of skill in reducing and presenting the material thus obtained; that it contains an outline history of the important libraries of every class in this country, from the beginning down to the present time, excepting, for obvious reasons, private libraries and the ephemeral Sunday-school libraries; that it gives the present condition and working-plans of our principal libraries of each class with considerable

fulness of detail; that it is a practical working manual for the librarian and for all concerned in the administration of any considerable library; that it is a directory for the student, the librarian, the publisher, and the reading public; that it is, in a word, an encyclopaedia of library science and a thesaurus of library statistics.

This publication is peculiarly opportune. During the past twenty years our libraries have increased in number, in value, in size, in accessibility, in resources, and in readers, to a degree surprising even to the professional librarian. Private benevolence, which of late bestows upon our endowed schools an average of at least five million dollars annually, has recently been much engaged, under similar motives, in the kindred work of founding public libraries, — sometimes as a memorial, sometimes as a monument, usually, also, as a dutiful expression of personal interest in the present and future welfare of the community more directly benefited. The national government in its various departments, the several states, cities, and towns, schools of all grades, the learned societies, are valuing libraries more and more; and the tax-payer accepts the public library as one of the necessities of the new civilization, and votes large appropriations for its establishment and maintenance. The Boston Public Library contains 300,000 volumes, and expends $120,000 a year. This report comes freighted with the experience of the best libraries and the best librarians, to direct this generous expenditure of public and private wealth, and save it from perversion and waste. Justin Winsor and A. R. Spofford and C. A. Cutter and W. F. Poole, and almost a score of other practised hands, discuss in separate papers the chief points of library-administration from the practical side, and in a way which makes the book a course of instruction for library officials, for readers, and for those who would do good by their donations in this direction.

These volumes appropriately issue from the Bureau of Education. General Eaton's organizing mind is seen in every part. There is a competent editorship, an array of able coadjutors, a fulness and a method which bespeak the military spirit applied to the affairs of peace. Private enterprise could not have elicited the information here presented. Certainly private enterprise would not have undertaken it. Competent critics affirm that no other government has issued a similar work of equal research and scope. No other country needs it so much as ours. Mr. Cutter's "Rules for Cataloguing," constituting Part II., will be the classic on that vital point in library work. Other papers — the one on Theological Libraries (Protestant), "by a librarian" too modest to allow his name to attest its excellence — will prove, in their way, invaluable to all whom they reach. Scholars, philanthropists, statesmen, and patriots will urge upon Congress generous appropriations for this bureau, to enable it to complete the projected series of special reports on different phases of our education, of which this is the first.

C. F. P. B.

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE FIRST BOOK OF ESDRAS.

BY REV. E. C. BISSELL, D.D., MISSIONARY OF THE A.B.C.F.M., AT GRÄTZ, AUSTRIA.

THE title which this book bears in the English Bible, and which we here adopt, was first given to it in 1560, by the translators of the so-called Genevan version. The Church of England, however, in its article of religion relating to the Scriptures, promulgated two years later, and again in 1571, following the usage of the Vulgate, calls it the "Third Book of Esdras"; our present canonical books of Ezra and Nehemiah being known, respectively, as "First," and "Second Esdras."[1]

In the Old Latin, Syriac, and Septuagint versions, on the other hand, it was designated as the "First Book of Ezra," and held a corresponding position in the order of books. This was doubtless due to the nature of its contents, which include a somewhat earlier period of history than the books with which it is associated, and not, as Movers[2] and Pohlmann[3] strangely conjecture, on account of its superior age. The Codex Alexandrinus and some MSS. of the LXX name

[1] Cf. Cosin, Scholast. Hist. of Can., p. xx, and Westcott, The Bible in the Church, 281 ff.

[2] Kirchen-Lexicon, Art. Apok. Lit., and Loci quidam Historiae Can. Vet. Test. 30.

[3] Tüb. Theolog. Quartalschrift, 1859, p. 257 ff.

the work ὁ ἱερεύς, — Ezra being regarded as a priest *par excellence;* while Jerome, in his *Prologus galeatus* or "Helmed Prologue" (to give a free translation to this title), reckons the work among the "apocryphal" books of the Old Testament, under the name of "Pastor," and is followed, in this respect, by some writers at a later period (Petrus Comestor, c. A.D. 1170). On the basis of this fact it has been asserted, even by so sagacious a critic as Credner, that Jerome classed the well-known *Pastor Hermae* with the Old Testament Apocrypha.[1]

By Isidore of Seville (Origg. vi. 2) the book is entitled the "Second Book of Ezra"; Nehemiah and the canonical Ezra being regarded as the First Book. In times still more modern, writers have inaccurately applied to it such titles as the "Pseudo-Ezra," and the "Apocryphal Ezra," which might easily lead to confounding the work with what is known in the English Bible as "Second Esdras." A fit title, both as it respects convenience and definiteness, would be the "Greek Ezra"; this distinguishes the book alike from the canonical Ezra with its Hebrew original, and from the "Apocalypse of Ezra," which is extant in a Latin text only.

I. *Contents and Scope.* — The contents of the book are as follows:

Chap. i. agrees in general with 2 Chron. xxxv., xxxvi.
ii. 1–15 agrees in general with Ez. i.
ii. 15–30 agrees in general with Ez. iv. 7–24.
iii.–v. 6 is of unknown origin.
v. 7–73 agrees in general with Ez. ii.–iv. 6.
vi.–ix. 36 agrees in general with Ez. v.–x. 44.
ix. 37–55 agrees in general with Neh. vii. 73–viii. 13.

Different opinions prevail respecting the aim of the work DeWette[2] says, that no object of the "characterless compilation" is discoverable. Ewald, Fritzsche, Keil, and others, however, agree that the object aimed at seems to have been to give a history of the restoration of the temple. The Old

[1] Geschicht. d. N. T. Kan., pp. 273, 312, 313. Cf. Bertholdt, Einleit. in d. Alt. Test., p. 1006, and Diestel, Geschicht. d. Alten Test. in d. christ. Kirche, S. 182.
[2] Einleit. in d. Alt. Test. ed. Schrader, 1869, S. 565.

Latin version, indeed, led the way in this opinion, having given as the subject: *De restitutione templi.* In the language of Bertholdt (Einleit. in d. Alt. u. Neuen Test. p. 1011), "He [the compiler] would bring together from old works a history of the temple from the last period of the legal cultus to the time of the rebuilding of the same and the restoration of the appointed service therein." To this it should, perhaps, be added, that special and undue emphasis is put upon the generosity of Cyrus and Darius in their relations to the rebuilding of the temple, apparently as furnishing a fit example for other heathen rulers.[1]

II. *Arrangement of Materials.* — With this supposed aim of the book the arrangement of its matter, so far as it can be said to have any arrangement, appears to agree. In the first chapter, the author places the account of the celebration of the Passover under Josiah, and carries the history forward to a period just previous to the Babylonian Captivity. He then passes over in the second chapter to the reign of Cyrus, giving an account of the return of the Jews under the leadership of Sanabassar [Zerubbabel], the attempt at rebuilding the temple, and the prohibition of the work by Artaxerxes. In chap. iii.–v. 6 comes the only independent portion of the work, in which it is narrated that, after a great feast given by Darius, three young men, who formed his body-guard, held a discussion in his presence on the question, "What is mightiest?" Zerubbabel is represented as one of these three young men (?), and secures the victory in the contest. He is able, consequently, to obtain the king's consent to the return of the Jews. Then follows, chap. v. 7–73, a list of the families that returned (in the time of Cyrus!), an account of the resumption of work on the temple, the opposition encountered, and an interruption for two years (!) until the time of Darius (!). Chaps. vi.–vii. continue the history to the completion of the temple and the restoration of its service, which took place under the direction of Zerubbabel, and

[1] Cf. Ewald, Geschicht. d. Volk. Is. Aufl. 1864, iv. 164; Keil, Einleit. in d. Alt. Test. Aufl. 1873, S. 708, and Zotenberg's Translation of the "History of Daniel" in Merx's Archiv, 1869, Heft iv. 397–399.

during the reign of Darius. Then follows, viii.–ix. 36, a narrative of the return of Ezra at the head of a colony, the history of his dealings with those who had married foreign wives; and, at the close, ix. 37–55, the public reading of the law.

By placing the order of the history in the related parts as found in the canonical books side by side with that adopted by our author, the evident confusion of the latter will be still more apparent.

Order of Canonical Books.	1 *Esdras.*
1. Return under Zerubbabel.	1. Return under Sanabassar [Zerubbabel].
2. List of those returning.	2. Attempt to rebuild the temple, and opposition of the Samaritans.
3. Efforts to rebuild the temple and opposition of the Samaritans.	3. Cessation of work by order of Artaxerxes.
4. Cessation of work by order of Artaxerxes.	4. Resumption of work by permission of Darius.
5. Resumption and completion of the work by Zerubbabel in the reign of Darius.	5. A list of persons who returned with Zerubbabel [in the time of Cyrus !]
6. Return of Ezra with a caravan.	6. Resumption of work on the temple which the Samaritans cause to cease.
	7. Completion of temple by Zerubbabel during the reign of Darius, who uses against the opposing Samaritans a decree of Cyrus.
	8. Return of Ezra with a caravan.

Naturally, the difficulties presented to the critic by this arrangement have been among the most perplexing of the book. Indeed, the palpable contradiction and absurdity of representing, among other things of a similar character, that the Samaritans effectually opposed the rebuilding of the temple under Zerubbabel *after* his return from Darius with plenipotentiary powers, and that such opposition continued until the *time of Darius*, when it was overcome by appealing to a decree of Cyrus, are so gross that most writers make no attempt at explanation. De Wette (Einleit. ed. Schrader S.

566) characterizes this arrangement as false and nonsensical. And Hervey in Smith's Bible Dictionary (Art. 1 Esdras), holds that efforts "to reconcile the different portions of the book with each other and with Scripture are lost labor."

Josephus, who made considerable use of the book, sought in vain to bring its several parts into chronological order. He made a series of suppositions to which, although they are evidently suppositions only, he did not scruple to give the form and force of historical statements. He represented, for instance, (1) that Zerubbabel returned to Babylon from Jerusalem; and, as a matter of personal friendship, was made one of his body-guard by Darius; (2) that the Samaritans were refused permission by the Jews to participate with them in the rebuilding of the temple, on the ground that the latter had received their permission from Cyrus *and from Darius;* and (3) that the disappointed Samaritans then complained to Darius, not that the Jews had again begun to rebuild, but that the *work was proceeding* too fast (Antiq. of the Jews, xi. 3–4). Josephus did not seem to consider that the age of Zerubbabel must have disqualified him from being one of the "young men" (*νεανίσκοι*) mentioned (v. 5), or that his other explanatory statements fall far short of covering the ground of our author's difficulties. For a notice of additional misplacement of the facts of this history of Josephus, see Ewald, Geschicht. d. Volk. Is., iv. 167.

There can be little doubt that the immediate occasion for the series of contradictions in which our author involves himself, is to be sought in the narrative of the debate before Darius. This seems to have been with him a principal point of attraction, and its false glitter blinded him to the deficiencies of his work in other parts. Fritzsche supposes that the original hero of this part was not Zerubbabel, but his son Joakim (? v. 5), and that the former name, as the more illustrious, had been substituted (iv. 13) previous to the compilation of our present book. But, ingenious as this suggestion is, it seems to us less probable than that the name of Zerubbabel was originally introduced into the legend

under the mistaken impression that the Sanabassar, elsewhere spoken of as conducting the first company of captives from Babylon, was some other person than Zerubbabel. This critic's theory for explaining the confused arrangement is as follows: After the author had given an account of the return in the time of Cyrus, he passes at once, in order to come without delay to the history of affairs under Darius, to the official prohibition to build by Artaxerxes. Then, since according to his text in the original fragment, the historical position of Zerubbabel had been changed, in that he was understood to have conducted a subsequent caravan to Jerusalem during the reign of Darius, he first relates this fact, and then, without being conscious of the anachronism, takes up the list of those returning in the time of Cyrus (cf. Einleit. zum Com., S. 6 f.)

But it may well be questioned whether any supposed haste of the compiler to get forward in his narrative to the time of Darius could have been the occasion for his omitting, in its proper place, so conspicuous and closely-connected a part of the history as a long list of names which he deems of importance enough to justify its subsequent introduction. Herzfeld's effort to support the forced supposition of Josephus, that Zerubbabel returned a second time to Babylon, by appealing to Zech. i. 7; iii. 8, 9; vi. 13 cannot be regarded as successful.[1]

III. *Author, Time, and Place of Compilation.* As helping to a decision of the question, who the compiler of our book was, and when and where his work was done, the original portion, chap. iii.–v. 6, appears to be of special importance, both on account of its own peculiar character and the interest with which, as we have seen, he himself regarded it. That the writer of this portion of the book did not live in the time of the Persian kings, seems evident from the fact, that he uses the phrase "Medes and Persians," and "Persians and Medes" interchangeably;[2] that he lived in Egypt appears

[1] Geschicht. d. Volk. Is. I. 321–323; cf. Keil, Einleit. in d. Alt. Test. 706, and Fritzsche, Einleit. zu diesem Buch. S. 7.

[2] Hitzig, Geschicht. d. Volk. Is., S. 277.

probable from his allusion (iv. 23) to "sailing upon the sea and upon the rivers" for the purpose of "robbing and stealing";[1] that he wrote after the period of the reception of Esther and Daniel into the canon, is indicated by the language chap. i. 1, 2 ff.[2] But was the compiler of the book himself the author of this independent portion? It is scarcely to be supposed; and the idea is entertained by no considerable number of critics. Still, the fact that he came into possession of it at all, and used it with so much esteem, while it bears in contents and form so evidently the stamp of the Alexandrian school, cannot be without its weight.

The evidence to be gained from other parts of the work on the points before us is less decisive. Fritzsche's opinion that the author was a Hellenist, living in Palestine, which he supports only by a single doubtful reference to the book itself (v. 47), can hardly pass for a probable conjecture. On the other hand, Dähne's argument,[3] which Langen[4] ably supports, to prove an Egyptian origin for the entire work from certain marked peculiarities of its language, seems to be entitled to more weight than Fritzsche (Nachträge zum Com.) is willing to allow it. It might also be added, that while no lack of interest in the contents of such a book could be predicated of the Jews of the dispersion, there would naturally be far more need felt for a Greek translation of this kind in Egypt than in Palestine.

After what has been already said, it will be evident that the date of the compilation cannot be fixed with any degree of definiteness. The acknowledged use of the book by Josephus furnishes a limit in one direction. Most critics, in fact, agree in assigning it to the first or second century before Christ; Fritzsche deciding for the former period as the more probable.

[1] Cf. Graetz, Geschicht. der Juden., 3te Band, 2te Aufl. S. 39 f., and Gutmann, Einleit. zu diesem Buch, S. 214.

[2] Cf. however, Herzfeld, Geschicht. III. 73.

[3] Geschicht. Darstellung der judisch alexandrinische Religions-Philosophie, II. 116 ff.

[4] Das Judenthum in Palästina, S. 175 f.

IV. *Sources of the Work and Character of the Text.* — Even a cursory comparison of the text of our book with that of the canonical writers in parallel passages, will at once disclose the fact that, while there is a general agreement, there are, on the other hand, in detail, not a few cases of variation and disagreement, for some of which it is difficult, with our present information, satisfactorily to account. These deviations, which formerly led biblical students to the too hasty conclusion that the book was quite valueless, have, in later times, by a natural but extreme reaction, been regarded by some as evidence that the author used another recension of the Hebrew text, and one, in more or fewer instances, superior to the Masoretic. An overwhelming majority of the diverse readings of our book, however, may undoubtedly be referred to the acknowledged fact, that its author sought, as a matter of primary importance, to make his work smooth in language and clear in thought; and that to attain this object he did not hesitate to use whatever text he may have had before him with the utmost freedom. And since this is admitted to be the fact, it would appear to be a more reasonable course to seek an explanation for the really very few instances where a supposed *better reading* is followed in the general spirit and drift of the work, than in the bold theory of another recension of the original text.

Ninety-nine one hundredths of all the passages which disagree with the extant Hebrew original may probably be classed under the following heads:[1] (1) *Passages in which the author seeks to avoid hard Hebraistic expressions*, viii. 6, cf. Ez. vii. 9; (2) *where he shortens, for the sake of smoothness, to avoid repetition, or for other reasons*, i. 10, cf. 2 Chron. xxxv. 10–12; ii. 16, cf. Ez. iv. 7–11; vi. 3, 4, cf. Ez. v. 3, 4; (3) *makes changes or omissions in superscriptions to letters*, ii. 15, 16, cf. Ez. iv. 7–11; v. 7, cf. Ez. ii. 1; (4) *gives different lists of articles*, viii. 14, cf. Ez. vii. 17; viii. 20, cf. Ez. vii. 22; (5) *omits names from lists*, v.

[1] Cf. Keil, Einleit. *ad loc.*, and Trendelenburg, in Eichhorn's Allgemeine Bibliothek der bib. Lit., I. 177 f.

5ff., cf. Ez. viii. 1ff.; (6) *adds for the sake of clearness or completeness*, i. 56, cf. 2 Chron. xxxvi. 20; ii. 5, cf. Ez. i. 3; ii. 9, cf. Ez. i. 4; ii. 46, cf. Ez. iv. 7, 8; ii. 18, cf. Ez. iv. 12; v. 46, cf. Ez. ii. 70; v. 47, cf. Ez. i. 1; v. 52, cf. Ez. iii. 5; v. 66, cf. Ez. iv. 1; vi. 18, cf. Ez. v. 14; vii. 9, cf. Ez. vi. 18; vi. 9, cf. Ez. v. 8; v. 41, cf. Ez. ii. 64; (7) *makes an explanation*, ii. 17, 24, 25, vi. 3, 7, cf. Ez. iv. 8, 13, 17; v. 3, 6, ii. 19, cf. Ez. iv. 13; ii. 20, 26, cf. Ez. iv. 14, 19; ix. 38, cf. Neh. viii. 1; (8) *changes on doctrinal grounds*, i. 15, cf. 2 Chron. xxxv. 15; i. 28, cf. 2 Chron. xxxv. 22; (9) *would honor the temple*, i. 5, cf. 2 Chron. xxxv. 4; ii. 18, cf. Ez. iv. 12; ii. 20, cf. Ez. iv. 14; (10) *makes a mistake*, ix. 49, cf. Neh. viii. 9; (11) *substitutes an equivalent*, v. 36, cf. Ez. ii. 59; (12) *changes the form of proper names*, v. 69, cf. Ez. iv. 2; vi. 3, cf. Ez. v. 3; viii. 41, 61, cf. Ez. viii. 15, 31; v. 8 ff., viii. 26 ff., cf. Ez. ii. 2ff., viii. 2 ff.; (13) *introduces changes for no discoverable reason*, i. 34, cf. 2 Chron. xxxvi. 1; viii. 24, cf. Ez. vii. 26; viii. 69, cf. Ez. ix. 1.

With respect now to the question of the immediate sources of the book, the opinions of critics may be divided into two general classes: those who hold that it is a direct translation from the Hebrew, and from a text in some instances superior to that which has come down to us; and those who hold that, with the exception of the independent portion, iii.–v. 6, it is simply a free, and somewhat altered, working over of a former Greek translation of the canonical books, either the LXX, as Keil maintains, or a different one, as maintained by Ewald, Dähne, Langen, and others. Ewald formerly advocated the first theory, but in the latest edition of his history fully abandons it (Geschicht., iv. 166). It still has the support of such critics as Michaelis, Trendelenburg (and Eichhorn), Bertholdt, Herzfeld, De Wette (ed. Schrader), and Fritzsche. It is to be said, however, that some of the last-named scholars content themselves with justifying this view either by a single citation or two from the work itself, or, as is quite common, refer to the supposed critical results of

Trendelenburg's study of the same (l. c. pp. 178–232).[1] Michaelis makes the sweeping declaration, that the readings of the Greek Ezra *not seldom* appear to him to be preferable to those of the canonical books, and that now one, and now the other is to be followed.[2] But in the course of a somewhat thorough study of the entire book before us, in which we have taken continual counsel of Michaelis's able and useful work, we do not find that his assertion is by any means borne out by his own use of the apocryphal author. Bertholdt adduces a single passage. Herzfeld makes no citations where he treats of this point, but promises to note passages which are pertinent as they shall incidentally occur in the course of his history. DeWette (ed. Schrader), who is content to hold the theory of a different recension of the Hebrew text without maintaining that it is a superior one, directs attention to the investigations of Trendelenburg. Finally, in the nearly seventy pages of Fritzsche's work, including Introduction and Commentary to our book, we cannot discover on actual examination that he is ready to maintain in more than about a dozen instances that it has readings superior to the traditional text, and these include the entire number of passages cited by Trendelenburg, and adopted by Eichhorn, as supporting the same theory, with the exception of two of minor importance.

We may, therefore, conclude that if there is any real ground for this opinion, whose bearings are so important, it will be found in these fourteen passages. But, at the outset, we make the discovery that in five of them our author, in departing from the current Hebrew text, essentially follows the LXX version of the same passages in the canonical books. Hence, in the face of an alternative theory that the book itself is a compilation from the LXX version, they cannot fairly be used as evidence to support the theory of a Hebrew original, and much less of one with a text superior to the

[1] Eichhorn adopts without change this work of Trendelenburg's in his Einl. in d. Apokr., pp. 335–377.

[2] Anmerk. zum Ez., S. 40.

Masoretic. These passages are as follows: i. 43, cf. 2 Chron. xxxvi. 9; v. 69, cf. Ez. iv. 2; viii. 29, cf. Ez. viii. 3; viii. 32, cf. Ez. viii. 5; viii. 36, cf. Ez. viii. 10. The remaining instances we will now proceed to examine in detail.

(1) The first is i. 27 (cf. 2 Chron. xxxv. 21). Our author translates as follows: *ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ Εὐφράτου ὁ πόλεμός μού ἐστι*, "for my war is upon the Euphrates." The Hebrew, at this place, literally translated is: "but against the house of my war;" i.e. "the family with which I wage war," "my hereditary enemy" ["have I come out this day"]. It is maintained that the author of the Greek work before us must have found in his Hebrew text, and read, פְּרָת, instead of בֵּית of the present text; and that it is a better reading. The Hebrew, as it stands, is pronounced "hard and unnatural"; while 2 Kings xxiii. 29 is cited as a parallel passage, where it is declared that the war mentioned was actually on the Euphrates. But to this it may be replied first, that the LXX does not translate this passage in 2 Chron. at all; thus leaving our author, on the supposition that he might otherwise have been influenced by its rendering, to his own devices. And secondly, the passage as it is found in the Greek Ezra has every appearance of being a paraphrase, and the supposition that it is such would be in entire harmony with the usual course of this book in instances of "hard and unnatural" Hebraisms. Moreover, the passage cited from 2 Kings would seem to favor the theory of a paraphrase by our author, quite as much as any other. Again, if the Hebrew be here "hard and unnatural," light is shed upon it from other parts of Scripture where a similar Hebrew form is found; cf. 1 Chron. xviii. 10; 2 Sam. viii. 10. And finally, the text as it stands is sufficiently clear; while, historically, it is far more significant than that which it is proposed to substitute for it. The latter point is well illustrated by Michaelis. Cf. Anmerk. zum 2ten Buch d. Chronik, S. 296.

(2) The second instance is i. 35 (cf. 2 Chron. xxxvi. 3), *καὶ ἀπέστησεν αὐτὸν βασιλεὺς Αἰγύπτου τοῦ μὴ βασιλεύειν ἐν*

Ἱερουσαλημ. The translation of the Hebrew here is as follows: "and the king of Egypt put him down [removed him] at Jerusalem." It is supposed that the word מַעְלֶה has fallen out from the present text, but was to be found in that used by our author. It might be granted that the passage would read more smoothly if this word were to be admitted; and also, as is maintained, that it is ordinarily found in connection with similar expressions in the Scriptures. But, on the other hand, these two reasons would, undoubtedly, have had great weight with the author of our book to lead him to introduce the word into the text if he did not find it there, while the exceedingly faulty rendering of the immediate context shows that he did not scruple to make any changes which seemed best to him. Still more to the point is it, however, that the LXX has interpolated in the preceding verse in 2 Chron. a passage from 2 Kings xxiii. 33, which ends with the very expression before us, viz. *τοῦ μὴ βασιλεύειν αὐτὸν ἐν Ἱερουσαλήμ.* And it is a far more likely conjecture, that he adopted the suggestion thus brought to his hand by the LXX, than that he had a different reading of the original text before him.

(3) The next passage is i. 46 (cf. 2 Chron. xxxvi. 10). The Hebrew as it stands is translated: "and made Zedekiah, his brother, king over Judah and Jerusalem." Now we learn from parallel passages in the canonical books themselves — 2 Kings xxiv. 17, 18; 1 Chron. iii. 15 — that Zedekiah was not really a brother, but an uncle of the preceding king. And the LXX likewise has *καὶ ἐβασίλευσεν τὸν Σεδεκίαν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Ἰούδαν καὶ Ἱερουσαλήμ.* But it can scarcely be said that the Greek Ezra has a *better* reading here, for it does not translate the word in question at all; illustrating once more in this case a marked habit of the book, viz. to avoid supposed difficulties when possible. Hence, the commendations bestowed on our author by Fritzsche,[1] Bertheau,[2] and Graf[3] at this point, seem hardly

[1] Com. *ad loc.* [2] Com. zum 2ten Buch d. Chronik, *ad loc.*
[3] Die Geschicht. Bücher d. Alt. Test., S. 183.

to be deserved, especially if we consider that the Hebrew as it stands may not be even in error. Calling a nephew a brother is, indeed, just what is done in the case of Abraham and Lot, and is a usage not strange to the Old Testament.

(4) Again, we are referred to the discrepancy in the number of vessels which it is said Cyrus delivered to Sheshbazzar to be carried to Jerusalem, ii. 13 (cf. Ez. i. 9–11). According to the canonical book the entire number is represented as being five thousand four hundred. But we find, on adding the number of separate articles as there given together, that the sum is only two thousand four hundred and ninety-nine. In the Greek Ezra, on the other hand, the sum of the separate articles exactly corresponds to the whole amount as there stated. Hence, it is proposed to emend the former account by the latter. But a glance should satisfy any one that there is no reasonable proportion in the number of vessels among themselves as given in the apocryphal work. There are said to be, for instance, just as many gold as silver chargers; but the number of silver basins is given as two thousand four hundred and ten, while the gold basins number but thirty. Moreover, Fritzsche agrees with Trendelenburg that a mistake is made in the Greek Ezra in interchanging a Hebrew word which means of the *second quality*, מִשְׁנִים, for שְׁנַיִם; and hence the whole number has been made too great by two thousand. The most that can be said, therefore, is that the Hebrew text here has suffered corruption, and that neither account can be regarded as strictly accurate.

(5) The next case, v. 9 (cf. Ez. ii. 2), is simply a matter that relates to the proper dividing of a verse. The phrase which Trendelenburg thinks should be placed as in the apocryphal, rather than as in the canonical work, is simply the superscription to a following list: *Ἀριθμὸς τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθνους καὶ οἱ προηγούμενοι αὐτῶν.* And if the division of verses were at all a matter with which we have any concern in this connection, we still cannot understand by what rule it is judged that the phrase in question has a more correct

position at the beginning of one verse than at the end of the previous one.

(6) Again, in ix. 2 (cf. Ez. x. 6), Fritzsche, Bertheau, and others think that the Greek Ezra shows that the reading וַיָּלֶן שָׁם was before it, rather than that of the extant text וַיֵּלֶךְ שָׁם. Its translation is *καὶ αὐλισθεὶς ἐκεῖ*, "and remained [lodged] there." It must be admitted that the two Hebrew words have a very close resemblance, and might easily be mistaken for one another; also, that by substituting the former for the latter, a smoother sentence would be secured. Moreover, in this case, the facts are against the supposition of a dependence of our author on the current text of the LXX, which translates the Hebrew by *καὶ ἐπορεύθη ἐκεῖ*. But, on the other hand, the immediate repetition of the same thought in the Hebrew, supposing its present form to be genuine, would furnish an occasion not likely to be left unimproved by our author for exercising his talent for contraction, or making a paraphrase, and the context might easily suggest to him the form which he has adopted. Still, the repetition of a thought in this manner would be no sufficient reason for distrusting the genuineness of the passage (cf. vs. 5, 6, and 1 Sam. ii. 14). DeWette's rule for determining the true reading where the MSS. of the New Testament differ, is certainly quite as applicable in many of the cases of variation which the present book brings before us. He says: "That reading to which the origin of the others may be traced, is the original. The more obscure and difficult reading is to be preferred to the clearer and easier; the harder, elliptical, Hebraizing, and ungrammatical, to the more pleasing and grammatical, ... the shorter, to the more explanatory and wordy." [1]

(7) The next passage cited is ix. 16 (cf. Ez. x. 16). It is held that our author read, וַיִּבְחַר לוֹ, *καὶ ἐπελέξατο ἑαυτῷ*, instead of וַיִּבָּדְלוּ. Undoubtedly the extant Hebrew is corrupt. But only the copula וְ is wanting before the word אֲנָשִׁים to restore what seems to be the correct reading; and since all

[1] Introd. to New Test. (Frothingham's trans.), pp. 80, 81.

the old versions, with the exception of the Syriac, supply this copula in rendering the passage, it is quite unnecessary to resort to the theory proposed.

(8) Once more, it is said by Fritzsche, in his Introduction to this book (p. 7), that the reading in Neh. viii. 9, where Ezra and Nehemiah are represented as prosecuting a common work in Jerusalem at the same time, is historically improbable; and he would, therefore, adopt the reading found in 1 Esd. ix. 49 as the correct one. But, in the first place, the reading of our book is not such that the statement made in the book of Nehemiah is denied; nor is another statement made which is irreconcilable with it. In the Greek Ezra the whole passage is not given. The title of the satrap of Syria is given, but not, as in the canonical book, the name of the person who held the office. From this silence of our author it would seem to be too weighty an inference which Fritzsche would draw. And secondly, to characterize as historically improbable the opinion that the work of Ezra and Nehemiah in Jerusalem was for a certain period of their lives contemporaneous, is allowing too little weight to a theory which, according to Nägelsbach (Herzog's Real-Encyc., iv. 173), is held by a majority of biblical students.[1]

With respect, now, to the question of a direct Hebrew original for our book, which, of course, is to be distinguished from the more important point just considered, a few additional passages have been cited in support of such a view, on the ground that they agree better with the Hebrew than with any extant Greek translation. None of them agree literally with the Hebrew, however, while all such variations from the LXX may be accounted for on the quite credible supposition (see below) that for the book before us a text of this version was used differing in many points from the one that has come down to us.[2] On the other hand, there

[1] Cf. on the subject, Winer's Real-Wörterbuch, Art. Neh.; Hävernick, Einleit. in d. Alt. Test. *ad loc.*; Herzfeld, l. c. II. 55; Vaihinger, Stud. und Krit. 1854, 122 ff.; Ebrard, Stud. und Krit. 1847, 679 f.; Ewald, l. c. iv. 168–213.

[2] See Keil, l. c., p. 705.

are positive reasons, of no little weight, which bear in the contrary direction. They are such as these: the frequent literal agreement of our work with the LXX in the character of the Greek used, even where the *words are unfamiliar and rare*, viii. 86 (cf. Ez. ix. 13); ix. 51 (cf. Neh. viii. 10); the fact that the LXX is so often followed with more or less fidelity, in its *deviations* from the Hebrew text, i. 3 (cf. 2 Chron. xxxv. 3); i. 9 (cf. 2 Chron. xxxv. 9); i. 13 (cf. 2 Chron. xxxv. 13); i. 23 f. (cf. 2 Chron. xxxv. 19, 20); i. 33 (cf. 2 Chron. xxxv. 26); i. 38 (cf. 2 Chron. xxxvi. 5); ii. 30 (cf. Ez. iv. 23); that in the case of deviations from both the Hebrew and the LXX, the readings of our book are more easily referred to the latter than the former, viii. 92 (cf. Ez. x. 2). These examples, which with a single exception Keil has taken from two chapters of the Greek Ezra, it is believed might easily be almost indefinitely extended, if a more thorough examination were made.

It would seem, then, that if anything were still wanting to confirm the theory of a Greek original for our book, which, if not exclusively used, was left only for an occasional reference to the Hebrew, it might be found in the fact of the extraordinary variations in the text of the different MSS. of the LXX. According to Jerome (Ep. ad Suniam et Fetelam, also Praef. in Paralip.), there were two copies of this work, the older one being much the less faithful to the Hebrew. And an examination of extant MSS. furnishes abundant reason for crediting this statement. Taking, for instance, the Roman edition of the LXX (1587), based on the famous Vatican Codex as a standard, and comparing with it other MSS., we shall find eighty places where some of them disagree with it while agreeing with the Hebrew, and only twenty-six places where they, at the same time, disagree with it and with the Hebrew. Moreover, when there is variation from the Hebrew, it is chiefly shown in the addition or omission of words and clauses.[1]

[1] Cf. Selwyn's valuable Article on the Septuagint in Smith's Bib. Dict., and that of Fritzsche in Herzog's Real-Encyc., I. 226 ff.

V. *Historical Estimate of the Book.* — Josephus is the first writer who shows any acquaintance with the Greek Ezra. In his work on the Antiquities of the Jews, it seems to have been his favorite book of reference for that part of the history which it includes. It was most probably the smooth and graceful style of the author, which, as has been already shown, was one of his most marked characteristics, that specially attracted this Jewish historian. That he would not have been hindered from using the work on account of its apparent discrepancies when compared with the holy books of his nation, is evident from the manner in which, as we have shown above, he attempts to pass off his own suppositions as history. That he was not insensible to its want of accuracy appears from his efforts at correction. The statement of Movers,[1] made also by Pohlmann,[2] that Josephus in no case leaves the Greek Ezra to follow the canonical books, is not justified by the facts. Cf. i. 9 and i. 36.

By Christian writers during the first five centuries after Christ, the book is frequently alluded to, but it is impossible to say, in all cases, in just what estimate it was held; or, indeed, whether it or the canonical Ezra was meant. Diestel, referring to the article of Pohlmann just cited, says, that *most* of the church Fathers, excepting Jerome, held the work for canonical.[3] But if this be true it is not shown by the citations of Pohlmann. Of the score of church Fathers, Greek and Latin, whom he adduces, the great majority give no certain evidence in the citations made from their works that they valued the work before us as "holy Scripture." Cyprian and Origen do, indeed, introduce it under the well known formula, *ut scriptum est.* Augustine speaks of the picture of Truth, given in iv. 38–40, as a possible prediction of Christ; but Jerome, whom Pohlmann well styles "der gründlichste Kenner der alttestamentlichen Literatur," denounced the work as "apocryphal," and prepared the way for its rejection by the entire Western church. His language

[1] Kirchen-Lexikon, I. 335. [2] Theol. Quartalschrift, 1859, p. 259.
[3] L. c. p. 182.

is: *nec quemquam moveat, quod unus a nobis editus liber est nec apocryphorum tertii et quarti libri somniis delectetur, quia et apud Hebraeos Esdrae Nehemiaeque sermones in unum volumen coarctantur*, etc.[1] Moreover, we find on examination, that three fourths of all the citations from the Fathers made by Pohlmann, refer to the one circumstance of the literary contest before Darius, and most of them to the striking expression which it contains respecting the power of the truth. This attractive story, taken in connection with a loose way of making quotations at this time, naturally became a kind of stock reference in the early church, and once started, readily passed from hand to hand with little or no thought of its origin. The most that can be said, therefore, is that the book was used with respect by a number of the Greek and Latin Fathers.

But the probable reason why it was not accepted as canonical by the Tridentine Council in 1546, which elevated to this rank other works having apparently less claim, was, that in addition to the pronounced opposition of Jerome, it was not then known to exist in Greek. Luther, speaking of first and second Esdras says: "These books we would not translate, because they have nothing in them which you might not better find in Aesop." Oecolampadius and Calvin speak with more care, but refuse the book a place in the canon. The same is true of the English church from its earliest history, as is shown in its various translations of the Bible.[2] The more recent criticism, as we have said, is characterized by a too extreme reaction in favor of the historical and critical worth of the book. Its value is chiefly lexical. The translation, which Trendelenburg compares for smoothness and elegance with that of Symmachus, can, no doubt, be made useful in the study of the remaining apocryphal books of the Old Testament as well as of the New Testament Greek. And there are, undoubtedly, a few instances where its aid may properly be invoked in the interpretation of those parts of the canonical books which it includes.

[1] Praef. in libr. Esdr. Opp. T. ix. col. 1472 (ed. Migne).

[2] Westcott, The Bible in the Church, 281 ff.

VI. *Is it a Fragment?* — Opinions on the question whether the book in its present form is complete in itself will naturally be much modified by the view that is adopted respecting its aim. Those who hold that the compiler meant to arrange his material simply with reference to a history of the restoration of the temple, find the work, as it is, pretty nearly complete. But it undoubtedly breaks off in the midst of a sentence, and one cannot say with certainty whether the last part has been lost, or that the author failed to carry out his original design. At least, there would be nothing against the current opinion of the purpose of the author — and it seems to be required by the abrupt conclusion — to suppose that Neh. viii. 13–18 originally formed a part of the work. The theory of Trendelenburg that the first part of the book is also wanting, which he bases on the fact that the history begins with the eighteenth instead of the first year of Josiah's reign, harmonizes with no tenable theory of its object.

VII. *Manuscripts and Versions.* — The critical edition of the LXX undertaken in England by Holmes and completed by Parsons (Oxford, 1798–1827), in which the readings of twenty-four different MSS. of our book are given, still furnishes scholars with their principal resource for the criticism of its text. According to Fritzsche,[1] these twenty-four MSS. may be divided with respect to worth into four classes, the best text being found in II. (Codex Vaticanus) 52 (Codex Liguriensis, Florentiae, saeculi fere x), and 55 (Codex Vaticanus, saeculi fere x). This text, however, is not free from mistakes of copyists in addition to arbitrary attempts at improvement. It is especially to be suspected, Fritzsche thinks, when agreeing with 19, (bibl. Chigianae Romae, saeculi x), and 108 (Vaticanus, n. 330, saeculi fere xiv). The latter MSS. represent in general the text of the Complutensian Polyglott (1514–1517). The remaining codices are (1) III. (Alexandrinus), XI. (Basiliano-Vaticanus, 2106, saeculi ix),

[1] Libri Apocryphi Vet. Test., Praef. viii.–x. Cf. Tischendorf's Vetus Testament. Graece juxta LXX. interpretes. Lips. 1869. Prolegom.

58, 64, 119, 243, 245, 248, and the Aldine; (2) 44, 71, 74, 106, 107, 120, 121, 134, 236. These last two recensions, as they are named, present a text more or less emended — the former with reference to Codex Alexandrinus — and, at the same time, do not always retain their distinctive features, being more or less influenced by each other.

ARTICLE II.

ARISTOTLE.

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I. — HIS THEOLOGY.

"It is natural that he who first discovers any art whatsoever, beyond the ordinary perceptions of the senses, is admired by men, not only because he has discovered something useful, but as wise and different from the rest of mankind."[1] This remark of Aristotle's is peculiarly appropriate to himself. All men seem to be possessed with a desire to trace an art or an idea to its originator. Countless pages have been written to prove that this or that man first invented printing. Immense labor has been expended by the learned in their attempts to discover the discoverer of gunpowder. Fierce contests have raged over the question to whom the glory of applying steam as a motive power was due. Between the followers of Newton and those of Leibnitz a most envenomed controversy arose as to which was first in the application of fluxions. In more recent times we have seen the magnificent honors heaped upon Morse, because he first reduced electricity to the service of man. All early nations must have their eponymous heroes; when they cannot find them they invent them. The early writings of the Hebrews give us the names of the inventors of the arts; the modern Arabs even point out the tomb of the first of the human race. This desire may be explained in the words of Aristotle him-

[1] Arist. Met., i. 1. extr.

self, as a desire to know things in their causes; we do not feel that we thoroughly know a subject until we learn what others have known about it, and our satisfaction is never complete until we go back to the very earliest sources. Of course, we can never say that any man has not received the idea that has made him famous from some forerunner; yet, in the case of Aristotle, we may affirm with a tolerable degree of certainty, that to him belongs the glory of the first systematic treatment of the reasoning faculty. Before him all men had reasoned; some few had observed that they reasoned; he first clearly showed *how* they reasoned, and how all men must reason. The great principles that he was the first,[1] so far as we know, to discern and clearly lay down, have been the guides of all following ages; the canons that he established remained until within the present century, with little change, the rules to which all valid reasoning must conform. Isidore St. Hilaire has remarked: "It is the destiny and glory of the anatomist of Stagira, to have had before him simply precursors, and after him only disciples." In a similar way the great Cuvier has expressed the most unbounded admiration, not only of the genius but of the results achieved by Aristotle in his physical investigations.[2] Although Lewes has severely criticized these unqualified laudations, he himself admits the wonderful results that Aristotle, in spite of the lack of suitable appliances, was able to obtain. We may, perhaps, no longer say that an acquaintance with his works on natural science is essential, or even desirable; but his metaphysics, ethics, and politics, his rhetoric and poetics are,

[1] Maurice asserts that Zeno deserves the credit of being the inventor of Logic, but gives no satisfactory reasons. — Hist. Anc. Philos. in Encyc. Met., vi.

[2] Lewes, Aristotle, xv. Lewes also quotes the opinions of Hamilton,— "His seal is upon all the sciences and his speculations have, mediately or immediately, determined those of all subsequent thinkers"; and Hegel: "He penetrated into the whole universe of things, and subjected its scattered wealth to intelligence; and to him the greater number of philosophical sciences owe their origin and distinction." St. George Mivart, in "Contemporary Evolution," remarks: "There is not and never was nor will be more than one philosophy which, properly understood, unites all speculative truth and eliminates all errors; *the* philosophy of *the* philosopher Aristotle."

and will ever remain, among the great works of the human mind.

Certainly the name of Aristotle is seldom mentioned without respect, but probably the number of persons in this country who have a familiar acquaintance with his writings is extremely small, while those who have any acquaintance at all, except at second hand, would, perhaps, not be very much more numerous. He is often referred to, but it is as a kind of mysterious *deus ex machina* — a name to conjure with, like that of Solomon to the Magicians of the East. It is eminently respectable to adorn a philosophical dissertation, or even a sermon, with a quotation from the Stagirite; but it may be doubted whether such quotations are always obtained from a perusal of his writings.

The causes of this neglect are numerous. There is, in the first place, no very satisfactory English translation of most of his works; and the translations that are best are generally fatiguing from too great fidelity to the original. There is great need of an elegant paraphrase, such as Jowett has given of Plato, in order to clearly bring forth those merits that are hidden under an unattractive style. The lack of translations would not be so serious an obstacle, were it not for the failure of our system of education to give the ordinary college graduate such a knowledge of Greek as will enable him a year after leaving college to read even a simple author without painful labor. To the vast majority of what we call our "cultured" classes the Greek and Roman classics are closed books. The study of Latin is usually so conducted that most scholars relinquish it with no feeling except weariness or disgust; while the writers that are usually studied, as they were but imitators of the Greeks, with scarcely a trace of originality, prejudice the mind of the scholar against all classical literature. And as the language is studied practically for the sake of the grammar, the very name of Latin suggests thoughts of etymology and syntax rather than literary enjoyment. The study of Greek, following that of Latin, is approached with a mind prejudiced

unfavorably, and labors under the additional disadvantage of requiring a familiarity with a most copious system of inflections, that is equally delightful to the philologist and burdensome to every one else. The amount of time spent in acquiring a painful and imperfect acquaintance with the accents alone, a knowledge that is in most cases almost useless, would, if properly applied, go far to enable the young student to read, at least the New Testament, with ease and real enjoyment. It is hardly necessary to remind any one who has attended a theological school of the dismal ignorance of Greek that is there displayed in the shortest lesson in the Gospels. And certainly if Greek is not understood by theologians, we may look in vain for any other class (except professional philologists) that has a very profound acquaintance with the language. If we add to this the common impression that the style of Aristotle is dry and difficult, while the subjects of which he treats are, in great part, highly abstract, it is, perhaps, not very remarkable that the father of systematic knowledge should be so much neglected.

We should also consider that modern civilization has not only made our material life much easier; it has encouraged intellectual indulgence. Books are plenty and cheap; magazines and newspapers bring such stores of interesting matter to our hands, that it requires a severe effort to deny oneself the luxury of these daintily prepared morsels, and turn back to the works of the mighty dead. Especially at the present time, when natural science has usurped the dominion of philosophy, when "Science Primers" have taken the place of the Westminister Catechism, and the operations of bugs and plants receive more attention than the working of the human mind; at such a time the claims of Aristotle might well be disregarded.

And yet the times are not altogether hopeless. The darkest hour is just before dawn. Things run in cycles; and though natural science now stalks almost unchallenged in the lists, the rhythm of progress will again elevate philosophy. The three questions of Kant: "Who am I? What can I do?

What may I hope for?" can never permanently lose their interest for mortal men. The profound remarks of this writer in the Prolegomena to his *Kritik*, may be again true, a century after they were first spoken. He says: "All false art, all vain wisdom, endures its time; for at last it destroys itself, and its highest cultivation is at the same time the period of its ruin. That in reference to metaphysics this time is at hand, is indicated by the state into which it has fallen among all the learned, compared with the earnestness with which all other sciences are pursued. . . . . Metaphysics is no more numbered among the thorough sciences; and we may judge for ourselves how an intelligent man, if any one should be disposed to call him a great metaphysician, would probably regard this well-meant, but scarcely coveted, compliment." [1]

It may seem tedious and unnecessary to allude to the controversy between religion and science, after they have been so often and so elaborately reconciled; but as it is, after all, apparent to any but the most superficial observer that they are not reconciled, and the conflict in this country is even now impending, it is becoming for all religious men to fit themselves to engage in the conflict. All the facts of science may be accepted by the theologian, but its spirit and principles, being essentially analytical, are necessarily unfavorable to received faith. Were there no warfare to be waged, or "reconciliation" to be effected, it would yet be of advantage to the theologian to study the great philosopher from whom both his own theology and the science of his opponents are to a great extent derived. Nothing could be more interesting to the critical observer than now, when "synthetic" and "cosmic" philosophies are presented us by parturient mountains, to read the philosophy of Aristotle, and to recognize in his account of the philosophers that preceded him the principles or speculations that are exhibited in modern times with the brand-new stamp of modern science. One recalls the doctrine of metempsychosis as he

[1] Proleg. Met., Rosenkranz, p. 144.

discovers the long-since departed souls of forgotten philosophies, clothed and vivified, and stalking abroad with more than their former pride. Had Aristotle been endowed with prophetic insight, he might have exclaimed, as he described an overthrown speculation:

> "And thou wilt walk about — how strange a story —
> In other streets, two thousand years from now!"

Forgetting time, one might fancy himself with Aeneas, visiting the nether world, and beholding departed warriors still going through their wonted exercises on the dusky plains.

Thought has no age. As the shower of to-day is composed of the same particles of water that have fallen thousands of times on the earth, and will flow down to the ocean only to return again to the clouds, so the opinions of men are perennial. They arise, flourish, and decay; but even when we seem to see them vanish from the earth we may know that sometime they will reappear.

> "Alter erit tum Tiphys, et altera quae vehat Argo
> Delectos heroas; erunt quoque altera bella,
> Atque iterum ad Trojam magnus mittetur Achilles."

The principle that has given to natural science its success since the time of Bacon is that hypotheses must be tested. No discovery is possible without hypothesis; but no hypothesis is valid that cannot be tested. We find now, however, that this conservative principle is often disregarded. Physical investigators look above their simple compounds, and propound formulae for the construction of the universe. The whole theory of atoms was not long since pure speculation, rank metaphysics. It has often been maintained against the argument from design, that it is invalid, because we have no experience in the creation of worlds. The same reasoning may now be retorted on its originators. No theory of creation can be tested by experience; as modern scientists have chosen to suggest such theories, they have cut loose from their sheet-anchor, and have either stultified themselves or else must admit the possibility of metaphysics — perhaps an equal stultification. In the Atlantic Monthly for 1876

we find a *resumé* of current speculations as to the ether that physicists now require as a substitute for the substance of metaphysicians. Magnificent as these theories are, they are yet pure speculations; for our modern philosophers find themselves at once confronted with the old question whether the ether, and consequently the universe, is infinite, or not. When physicists have to deal with infinities, then farewell science. Indeed, Mr. John Fiske, the author of the papers spoken of, declares that he is not unwilling to admit that the grand assumption on which all science rests — "the principle of continuity," "the uniformity of nature," the "persistence of force," or the "law of causation" — is a supreme act of faith, the definite expression of a trust that the Infinite Sustainer of the universe will not put us to permanent intellectual confusion. May we not regard this as a sign that there is room for a revival of theology?

But if this revival is to come, as it is most desirable it should, from the church, and not, as it now promises to, from the ranks of the scientists, there must be a change in the reading of the clergy. It is an obvious fact that they have lost much of their influence with the more thoughtful portion of the community; and this is possibly in great part so because they do not, in too many cases, keep company with the great minds of the world, nor employ their thoughts on the greatest of subjects, but subsist mentally, for the most part, on ephemeral literature and commentaries; in short, on easy reading. But "hard is the good," as Socrates used to say; and their influence can best be regained by the patient study of the great minds of the past. They will find that their utterances command more respect when they are not derived from those sources that are equally available to their hearers and themselves. No thoughtful man is impressed by a sermon that he is able to find substantially in the commentary that adorns his library, as well as his pastor's.

That such study should begin with Aristotle seems altogether fitting; for, with the exception of some slight additions and modifications, the system of natural theology adopted

by the church is found, at least by implication, in his writings. The sentences that students of theology copy into their note-books are often the very same that were jotted down by the hearers of Aristotle. He laid his foundations broad and deep, and on them the church has built its structure. The fact that the schoolmen elaborated his doctrines has, perhaps, given them a bad name; but the ignorant abuse of the schoolmen should be corrected. The subjects of their disputes may seem trivial; but they took no thought of the subjects; it was the principle involved that they sought, and a principle is often more apparent in a familiar example than in the universe at large. Intellectual ability always commands respect; and no one can read the works of Thomas Aquinas without feeling that he is in the presence of a master. Men talk of the dispute of the realists and nominalists as if it were a thing of the past; but all men, now just as much as then, are realists or nominalists, little as they may be aware of it. Our data are more certain and numerous; but we do not often observe greater ability in handling them than the schoolmen exhibited with their imperfect materials.

The style of Aristotle is not beyond the reach of any one who can read the Greek of the New Testament with ease. Its difficulties have been exaggerated. It is probable, from internal evidence, that his writings have reached us in the form of lecture-notes; and it is plain from this that they are not to be rapidly read, but studied. They are like mathematical formulas; if read hastily nothing can be more unintelligible, but if studied and understood they are full of meanings of the widest application. Their condensation is marvellous. Herbert Spencer devotes one of his fine essays to the definition of science and philosophy. Aristotle, in a few lines at the beginning of his metaphysics, expresses substantially all that is important in the essay of Spencer. One must often pause, after reading a sentence, to take in the wide meaning suggested by the words. Yet the severity of the style is occasionally redeemed by illustrations that are though condensed yet clear, and anecdotes that are none the

less apt because they have a spice of humor that even now provokes a smile. Aristotle is said to have made a collection of proverbs and stories; and one is tempted to wonder whether Bacon gathered his book of apothegms in conscious imitation of Aristotle, or simply from similarity in mental constitution. Certainly, no other writer resembles Aristotle so much, and those that have patience to digest his sententious essays can form a comparatively just estimate of the merits of Aristotle as a suggestive writer. We must never lose sight of the fact that his writings, as we possess them, are deplorably mutilated, and may probably, as above remarked, be no more than the notes of his lectures, taken by some devoted pupil; and yet, like the ruins of the Parthenon, they are almost more impressive. We venture to translate a passage from the Ethics as a specimen of his style.

"Great-souledness seems to be, from the meaning of the word, something that pertains to great things; and to what kind of great things we will first consider. It makes no difference whether we consider the state of mind, or the man that has the state of mind. The great-souled man is one who at the same time thinks himself worthy of great things and is worthy. For he who thinks himself worthy and is not, is a fool; but no virtuous man is a fool, or without reason. So that the great-souled man is such as we have described him. For he who thinks himself worthy of little, and is worthy of little, is a sensible man, but not a great-souled man. For great-souledness consists in greatness, as beauty belongs to a large body; little people are elegant and symmetrical, but not beautiful. He that thinks himself worthy of great things, but is unworthy, is conceited. He that thinks himself worthy of greater things than he is worthy of is vain, but not altogether. He that thinks himself worthy of less than he deserves is small-souled, whether the things be great or moderate; or if he is worthy of small things and thinks himself worthy of smaller. Especially if he that is worthy of great things thinks himself unworthy; for what is he to do if he is not worthy of great things? So then the great-souled man is the highest in respect to greatness; but moderate in that he judges as is fit concerning his own merits, for he thinks himself worthy of those things that correspond to his worth. Others err on one side or the other. If then he thinks himself worthy of the greatest things and is worthy, and especially if this is so of the greatest things, it would be especially true of one. For worth is predicated of external goods. But we ought to consider as the greatest of these what we assign to the gods, and what those held in esteem especially aim at, the reward of the

noblest deeds. Such a thing is honor; for this is the greatest of external goods. About honor, therefore, and dishonor he will behave himself in a becoming way. It is clear enough that great-souled men are especially concerned with honor, for they think themselves worthy of honor, and deservedly. The mean-spirited man is deficient both as regards his own honor and that of the great-souled man. But the conceited man goes beyond bounds in his own case; but it is not so in the case of the great-souled man. Now if the great-souled man is worthy of the greatest things he is the best man; for the better is worthy of the better things, and the best of the best. Hence the great-souled man must be a good man. And that which is great in every virtue would seem to pertain to the great-souled man. For it is no wise congruous for him to flee in terror, nor to act unjustly; for why should he do base things to whom nothing is great? And it is absurd to say that the great-souled man is not good; for if he were bad he would not be worthy of honor. For honor is the reward of virtue, and belongs to good men. So that great-souledness seems to be a kind of ornament to the virtues; for it makes them greater, and does not arise without them. Hence it is hard to be truly great-souled; for it is not possible without the highest excellence. Accordingly the great-souled man is such in reference to honor and dishonor. And in regard to great honors and those of good men, he will feel with moderation, as getting what belongs to him or is less than his deserts; for honor suitable to perfect virtue might not exist. But he will receive what is offered, because there is nothing greater; what is offered by every one and on account of little things he will utterly reject; for these are not what he deserves. So in regard to dishonor; for this cannot justly exist in regard to him. We see again, therefore, that great-souledness is concerning honor; but in regard to riches and power, in good or ill fortune, he acts moderately whatever occurs, neither being elated by good fortune, nor cast down by ill fortune; for he is not thus affected even by honor, which is the most important thing. Power and wealth are desirable because they are honored; for those who possess them wish to be honored on their account. He, therefore, to whom honor is a small thing will not think other things great. On this account great-souled men seem to be haughty. Prosperity seems to favor great-souledness; for those of high birth, and those exercising power, or the rich, are esteemed, for they excel others; but to excel in what is good is most honored. Such things then make men greater-souled, for they are honored by others. In truth, however, the good man alone is honorable; but he who possesses both is thought more worthy of honor. Those who possess such advantages without virtue, — these neither justly think themselves worthy of great things, nor are rightly called great-souled; for these things do not exist without perfect virtue. Also, those having these good things become haughty and contemptuous; for it is hard to bear prosperity wisely without virtue. But not being

able to bear, and thinking they excel others, they despise them; but they themselves do whatever may present itself, for they mimic the great-souled man, not being like him, and they do this in what things they can. So they do not act according to virtue, and yet despise others. But the great-souled man justly despises others, for he judges rightly; but most do so by chance. He does not expose himself to little danger, nor is he fond of danger, as he thinks highly of few things; but he meets great dangers and when in peril does not spare his life, as he does not think it worth while to rate life too highly. He is disposed to benefit others, but blushes to receive a benefit; for the one is the part of a superior the other of an inferior. And he pays back a kindness in greater measure; for in this way he makes the man to whom he was indebted, indebted to him. These great-souled men seem to remember those whom they have benefited. but not those who have benefited them; for he that is benefited is the inferior, but he wishes to be superior. And the former things he will willingly listen to, but the latter unwillingly. Therefore, Thetis does not state her benefits to Zeus, nor the Lakonians to the Athenians, but the benefits received. The great-souled man also asks favors of no one, or scarcely any one, but he willingly obliges; and to those in honor and prosperity he is lofty, but to those in moderate circumstances he is gracious; for to excel the former is hard and honorable, the latter easy. To be honored by the former is a fine thing, but by the latter is petty — like showing off one's strength before the weak. He will not follow kings in honor or where others have the first place. He will be indifferent and procrastinating except in matters of great honor and great labor; a doer of few things, but those great and famous. It is necessary that he should be an open enemy and an open friend; for to conceal is the part of the timid. He will take more pains about truth than appearances, and will speak and act openly; for as he despises others he is indifferent to their opinion. But he cares not for others, because he is entirely truthful, except when he speaks in irony — but to most he does speak in this manner. And he cannot live with another in any other relation than that of friend; for it is servile; all flatterers are mercenary, and all low persons are flatterers. Nor is his admiration easily excited; for there is nothing great to him. Nor does he remember injuries; for a great-souled man does not cherish recollections especially of bad things, but rather overlooks them. Neither is his conversation about persons, for he will not speak of himself nor about another; for he is not anxious to be praised, nor that others should be blamed; nor, again, is he given to praising others. Hence he is not a speaker of evil, not even of his enemies, except in haughtiness and defiance. And in regard to the ordinary necessaries and trifles of life he is not given to complaining nor entreating, for this is characteristic of a man that devotes too much attention to these things. And he is disposed to acquire things that are beautiful but not profitable, rather than

productive and useful things, for he is self-sufficient, and not dependent. His movements are slow, his voice grave, his speech steadfast; for he that is agitated by few things is calm, nor does he struggle much who thinks nothing is great; but sharp voices and hasty movements arise from these causes. Such then, is the great-souled man; but he that falls below this mark is small-souled, he that exceeds is self-conceited and arrogant. Such are not to be regarded as evil, for they are not evil-doers; but they are in error."[1]

This is not the character that the American people delights to honor with public office; but it is a character that deserves to be studied. It is not, however, our purpose to comment on this passage; it is simply presented as a fair example of the peculiar style of the author.

In this rendering elegance has been sacrificed to literalness, and even the obscurities of the passage have been retained, in order that as fair a judgment of the style as possible may be formed. The most important characteristic of Aristotle's method, no more apparent here than everywhere, is his determination of the "end." In all investigation, he lays it down as a fundamental principle, the end in view must first be clearly determined; otherwise, the investigation, having nothing to guide it, will wander aside, and, after a confused course, will come to nothing. Trite enough, this may sound, but it cannot be too often insisted on. Most disputes arise from the use of words in different senses by the disputants; the remainder are caused by a difference as to the end in view. Take the interminable contest between the free-traders and the protectionists in this country. One party maintains and clearly proves that production and distribution are favored by freedom; that free-trade is economically wise. The other party maintains that national independence requires that all things, so far as possible, shall be produced within the territory of the nation itself, although some extremists go so far as to pretend that economic prosperity is increased by tariffs and bounties. It is plain that the end in view is different to each party, and they may sail away on their parallel or diverging lines to

[1] Eth. Nik. iv. 7, 8.

infinity, firing across at each other most furiously without ever doing or suffering any damage. Examples from the history of theological controversy will easily suggest themselves.

In immediate connection with this peculiarity we may notice the extreme carefulness of definition with which Aristotle systematically proceeds. This is especially noticeable in his treatise on metaphysics, where he has continually before his eyes the great confusion into which previous philosophers had fallen from their neglect of this caution. This explains what may seem a defect in his style — the iteration of the same thought. But it is probable that this is intentional, being designed to clearly impress on the mind of the hearer the results of one step in the investigation before another step that depends on the former shall be taken. It is not often that one feels, after patiently going through such an analysis as that given above, that the author has wasted words. The work is not polished like our modern writing; there is no attempt to conceal the framework with all its articulations; they are rather laid bare, and like one of our skeleton iron bridges every truss and bolt in its endless repetition is visible. There is little beauty in either case; but the logical connection is as strong as the iron, and he that enters on an investigation with Aristotle is little less certain to come out with him than the train that starts to cross the bridge is to reach the further end. But the merits of iron bridges do not reveal themselves to those that hurry over them at railroad speed.

The works on Aristotle are numerous, and his system is detailed in the histories of philosophy. Yet, in certain respects, there is an advantage in going back to his own writings for his opinions; otherwise, our knowledge, in the course of time, comes to be little more than the opinion of the latest critics as to the opinions that earlier critics have regarded as the opinions entertained by Aristotle. In certain passages Aristotle expresses himself so plainly and tersely that much comment tends to becloud his meaning. It is

true that, owing to the deplorable disarrangement into which his treatises fell, we often find passages bearing on a subject that is elsewhere systematically treated,— passages that seem sometimes almost contradictory. The method followed below is to take the opinion expressed on a subject when that particular subject is under discussion; giving less weight, for the most part, to remarks that are elsewhere casually thrown out.

The views of such a mind as Aristotle's are of interest on almost every subject; through his penetrating vision, as by the aid of a microscope, much is revealed, even in common objects, that would otherwise escape notice. But, in the most important of all investigations, that into the nature of Deity, we feel an especial desire to learn what results this wonderful intellect, unaided by the light of revelation, could attain. The difficulties in the way of finding out his real views are, however, almost insuperable. Nothing is more contradictory than the testimonies of both ancient and modern philosophers on this point, and the writings of Aristotle himself, as they have reached us, contain statements that are hard to reconcile. In Cicero's dialogue (*De Natura Deorum*) we find a railing accusation brought against the Stagirite for his crimes and omissions in this respect. It is there said that Aristotle often is confused; that he sometimes assigns all divinity to mind; calls the world God; says that God puts some one else over the world, and gives to him these parts "that by winding it up again" he may rule the motion of the world and preserve it; he calls God the heat (*ardorem*) of the heaven — not thinking that the heaven is a part of the world which he elsewhere has called God. Cicero further asks, How could that divine sense of the heaven be preserved in so great celerity of revolution? Where those so many gods, if we reckon even heaven God? When he wishes God to be without body he deprives him of all sense, even prudence; how can the mover of the world be without body; or, how, always moving, himself be quiet and happy?[1] In another passage of this dialogue Aristotle

[1] Cicero, de Nat. Deorum, i. 13.

is quoted approvingly as saying, that since the origin of some living beings is in the earth, others in the air, others in water, it is absurd to think no animal is produced in that part which is most fit for generating animals. The stars are generated in the ether, therefore they have sense and intelligence, their motion is voluntary, and they are to be reckoned among the number of gods.[1]

Aristotle was handled more severely by the Christian Fathers. Clement of Alexandria says: "The father of the Peripatetics being ignorant of the Father of all things, thinks him who is called supreme to be the soul of the world; and so, making God the soul of this world he confounds himself. For he is convicted of manifest error who, banishing providence as far as the moon, nevertheless, determines God to be the world, making that without God to be God."[2] Athenagoras giving the views of Aristotle says, that he, "while recognizing one God, made him a composite animal of body and soul, regarding as his body the ether and planets, and the sphere of the fixed stars that revolve in a circle; his soul being the reason which directs the motion of the body, not itself moved, but the cause of the motion of this. Things below heaven are not ruled by the providence of God."[3] Statements so similar to these as not to be worth quoting may be found in Eusebius,[4] Cyril,[5] Justin Martyr,[6] Tatian,[7] Theodoret,[8] and doubtless many other patristic writers. Plutarch makes the God of Aristotle a dweller on the external sphere of the heavens;[9] Diogenes Laertius said, that Aristotle defined God as incorporeal, his providence extending as far as the heavens, himself being unmoved; "all earthly things he disposes according to the harmony and order of the celestial things."[10] Stobaeus says, that Aristotle taught that divine beings animate the spheres, the greatest is the one embracing all, a reasoning animal, blessed, pre-

[1] Cic. de Nat. Deorum, ii. 15.
[2] Cohort. ad Gentes, 5.
[3] Legat., p. 28.
[4] Prep. Evang. xv. 798, 799 sq.
[5] Contra Jul., ii. 47, 48.
[6] Cohort. ad Gentes, 10, 11, 12.
[7] Orat. adv. Graecos, 244, 303.
[8] Graec. Aff. Curat., 833.
[9] De Plac. Phil., i. 7.
[10] Vita Arist., v.

serving and providing for the heavens.[1] Sextus Empiricus charged that the first God of Aristotle was the extremity of the heaven, and that it was absurd to call this heaven one and two — body and bodiless.[2] More recent historians of philosophy[3] have represented the tendency of Aristotle's views as atheistic, and it is well known that during the Middle Ages his writings suffered, at one time, the partial condemnation of the church; but, perhaps, Martin Luther deserves the credit of pouring forth the most lavish abuse, that the study of Aristotle has received. He thunders against him in the following style:

"What are the universities, unless they are differently ordered from what they have hitherto been, than, as the book of Maccabees (iv. 12) says: *Gymnasia Epheborum et Graecae gloriae*, where there is free living, little teaching of the Holy Scriptures and Christian faith, and only the blind, heathenish master Aristotle rules even more than Christ? My counsel would be that the books of Aristotle, *Physicorum*, *Metaphysicae*, *de Anima*, *Ethicorum*, which have hitherto been held the best, should be entirely done away with, as well as all others that boast themselves of natural things, in which, however, nothing is taught either of natural or spiritual things; besides, no one has hitherto understood his meaning, and so much valuable time and so many noble souls have been loaded down with unnecessary labor, study, and expense. I venture to say, that a potter has more knowledge of natural things than stands written in those books. It makes my heart ache, that the cursed (*verdampter*), haughty, rascally (*schalkhalftiger*) heathen, with his false words, has led astray and befooled so many of the best Christians. God has afflicted us with him on account of our sins.

"Though the wretched man teaches in his best book, *de Anima*, that the soul is perishable with the body, no matter how many with vain words have tried to defend him, as though we had not the Holy Scriptures wherein we are infallibly taught of all things of which Aristotle never discovered the slightest scent; yet this dead heathen has overcome and hindered and almost suppressed the books of the living God; so that when I think of such deplorable doings I cannot but feel that the evil spirit introduced the study.

"In like manner the book *Ethicorum*, the very worst of books, is directly opposed to the grace of God and Christian virtues, although it is also reckoned one of the best. Oh, away with such books from all Chris-

[1] Ec. Phys., 1. 23. [2] Pyr. Hyp., iii. 24. Adv. Math. x. 33.
[3] Meiners, Fülleborn.

tians! Let no one object that I say too much, or disparage what I am ignorant of. Dear friend, I know well what I say; Aristotle is as well known to me as to thee and thy like; I have read and heard him, with more understanding than St. Thomas or Scotus, of which I boast without pride, and, if necessary, can plainly establish." [1]

We may remark, in general, on the above passages, that the representations of Aristotle's views given by the heathen authors, as they write without controversial ends, are more correct than those of the early Fathers. The latter seem to have copied from one another, or from some common source, and to have taken especial pleasure in asserting that Aristotle held things below the moon to be without the providence of God. They were not philosophers, it is no disrespect to say; and their statements are only of worth as showing what was, at least, a common opinion in ancient times. But yet they cannot be said to be altogether unjustified in making these assertions; for there are certainly passages in the extant writings of Aristotle that, taken by themselves, would indicate no proper conception of the Deity.

We find in the treatise "De Coelo" [2] certain remarks that are probably the ground of these statements, although it seems likely that the limitation of the providence of God by the moon is rather an inference from Aristotle's doctrine than an assertion of his. It would be absurd to infer the theology of Isaiah from his speaking of God as, "He that sitteth on the circle of the earth"; and it is equally absurd to judge Aristotle from the remark, "We are accustomed to call what is remotest and loftiest, heaven; in which we say all the divine is situated." [3] Now here Aristotle does not give his own theory, nor does he say that God is the extremity of the heaven, while elsewhere, in hosts of passages, he speaks of the human reason as divine; and yet, this passage is probably the main foundation for the reproaches of the Fathers.

In order to understand the true position of Aristotle, and the cause of his being misunderstood, it will be necessary to

[1] Deutsche Werke, xxi. 344, 345. [2] De Coelo, i. 9. [3] Ibid., med.

briefly allude to his theory of the universe. It is a deeply suggestive fact, that what has long been recognized as the first law of motion, — that all motion is uniform and in right lines unless interfered with — to the mind of Aristotle involved the absurdity of an infinite procession. To him the first law was that the most perfect motion is circular.[1] (We cannot forbear suggesting that the latest theory of modern physicists is the "vortex theory," the circular motion of ultimate atoms.) This, therefore, is the motion of the world, the earth being the centre and at rest. The world is not infinite,[2] but there is an ultimate sphere embracing the interior ones and revolving around them; while beyond this there is nothing, not even void space, nor time;[3] for body can be where place is; vacuum is that where body can be, but is not. But since heaven is the whole and contains all matter, and there can be no body beyond it, there is no space beyond it. In like manner as time is the number of motion,[4] and motion is of body, there can be no time beyond the bounds of the ultimate sphere of the universe. (We must mention, by the way, that the hostility of Aristotle to an infinite series is the basis of much of his reasoning; yet, that he is not positive, but introduces such a train of thought as this by saying: "Unless there be an infinite series, we may say that heaven is one, and there can be no more," etc.) Nevertheless there follows this significant passage; "what things there are, then, beyond heaven are not of a nature to be in space; nor does time make them grow old; nor is there any change. But with no change, subject to no affections, they have the best and most sufficient life for eternity."[5] Further, to the same effect, things are moved either by their own nature or by impulse; simple bodies having the principle of motion in themselves, as the heaven, can be neither heavy nor light; hence heaven is a fifth essence superior to earth, water, air, and fire.[6] This heaven is unchangeable and incorruptible, that is, divine; hence heaven and God are akin.[7]

[1] De Coelo, i. 2. [2] Ibid., i. 5. [3] Ibid., i. 9, 6. [4] Aus. Phys., viii. 1. fin.
[5] De Coelo, ii. 1. [6] Ibid., i. 3. [7] Ibid., ii. 4; i. 3; ii. 3.

So much as to the divine nature of the heaven; let us next consider its relation to God. In spite of opinions such as we have quoted, Aristotle by no means makes God the soul of the world. It is true that we find remarks to the effect that in the seed of all things there is a kind of warmth which makes them fruitful; not fire, nor any such faculty, but spirit.[1] Also, that warmth is in the whole, so that all things are full of soul.[2] But these words mean simply, that in all living things there is a principle of life, which may be called spirit or soul, but is no more to be identified with God than is the human reason because it is called divine. Aristotle was so far from being a pantheist that it is much more doubtful whether he did, in fact, feel that the providence of God extended this side the moon. What the relations of heaven and God really are, the following passage luminously shows: "Heaven, which is moved, we have shown to be first and simple and ingenerable and incorruptible and entirely immutable; much more is that which moves, it is reasonable to believe. For the first is the mover of the first, the simple of the simple, the incorruptible and ingenerable of the incorruptible and ingenerable. Since then that which is moved, though body, is not changed; much less would that which moves, which is without body, be changed."[3] Now nothing can be called the first cause of motion unless it is itself unmoved; otherwise there would be an infinite series. Hence we have the *eternal, independent, unmoved cause* of motion,[4] elsewhere in Aristotle's writings spoken of as God: "God himself completed the whole, making a continuous development."[5] Further, since motion is eternal it is continuous, and therefore one; hence its cause is one.[6]

We may therefore conclude that Aristotle did not confound God and heaven; that God is incorporeal is stated above and confirmed elsewhere from the fact that, as God is

[1] De Gen. An., ii. 3, med.
[2] Ibid., iii. 11. med.
[3] De Coelo, ii. 6, med.
[4] Aus. Phys., viii. 6; Met. xii. 7
[5] De Gen. et Cor., ii. 10, med.
[6] Aus. Phys., viii. 6.

unmoved he is not composed of parts, which is the condition of motion, but is one and indivisible. We may add, as showing the distinctness with which Aristotle separated God from the heaven, this remark: "It is not reasonable to suppose that the heaven remains eternal, being compelled by a soul, for this would be a burden on the soul and interfere with its happy life — like the labor of Ixion."[1] Yet we cannot infer from this that the heaven is absolutely independent of God; for, as we have just seen, he is the cause of its motion. We must rather say, that God, having once caused the motion of the heaven, rested, and the motion continues; very much as the believers in secondary causes would now maintain.

The statements of Aristotle as to the eternity of the world caused some of his writings to be condemned by the church; although this restriction was soon removed. It is undeniable that he distinctly asserts the eternity of the world; but his use of the word eternal, and his grounds for this belief, are peculiar. In his physical writings, where, it must be observed, he himself states that his reasoning is by the nature of the case probable, not demonstrative, he maintains that the heaven is eternal, because no change has ever been known in it, and its motion is perfect. But that it is eternal in the sense of being self-caused he distinctly denies, and thereby frees the doctrine from any dangerous tendency. In the Metaphysics it becomes clear that the eternity of the world is temporal, not logical. The world is created by God; but this creation is not within time, but is co-eternal with God. Motion in itself is eternal, but logically God precedes it, for he is its cause.[2] The question at issue is really the same that is involved in the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son, or, perhaps better, the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit; when this doctrine is proved unorthodox then Aristotle may be condemned.

Closely connected with this theory is, of course, the doctrine of the eternity of matter, which Aristotle seems to

[1] De Coelo, ii. 11. [2] Vid., infra.

imply repeatedly, and so distinctly that one unacquainted with the peculiar force of some of his words would maintain without hesitation, that his theory of the universe is dualistic. In opposition to this view we may remark, in the first place, that Aristotle does not, like Plato, make matter the ground of evil, but rather of both good and evil; that is, it has in itself the possibilities of both good and evil. There is in his view a kind of incompatibility between form and matter, so that the form is often defectively expressed in the sensible object, and this result is evil.[1] But evil as a principle is not admitted in his philosophy.[2]

In the second place we must carefully examine the meaning of the word "exists"; for without a clear notion of the mode in which Aristotle uses this and kindred terms it is impossible to understand his metaphysics. We have already, in speaking of his physical theories unavoidably anticipated, to a certain extent, the explanation of the obscurer portions of his philosophy; but to thoroughly penetrate into its spirit, we shall find it indispensable to define the uses of the words: "cause," "principle," "substance or existence or essence," "matter," "form," "capacity or potentiality," "motion," and "energy or actuality." We shall then be prepared to form a juster conception of his theology.

Causes are fourfold: first, the substance or essence of a thing — the what it is in itself; second, the matter; third, the cause of motion or change — efficient cause; fourth, the final cause, or end of a thing.[3] Thus, to take one of his familiar illustrations, a statue has its substance or formal cause in being a statue, its material cause in the bronze,

[1] "The energy is that which makes things be evil which have only the possibility or potentiality of evil in them. Secondly, in those things which are primary and eternal, there is no evil, no fault, no decay; the capacity for evil lies in nature." — Maurice, op. cit. vi. iii. 5.

[2] "Evil is not anything independent — it is subsequent to capacity. In those things that subsist from a first principle and those that are eternal substances there is nothing evil or imperfect or tending to decay, for such a tendency belongs to what is evil." — Aus. Phys., i. 9; Met., ix. 9.

[3] Met., i. 2, iii. 2; An. Post., ii. 11; Aus. Phys., ii. 3, 7; De Gen. An., i. 1.

its efficient cause in the motion that fashions it proceeding from the mind of the artificer, and its final cause in the purpose for which it is made. In one sense they all answer the question why anything is, or is in a certain way, rather than another. These causes, however, are often reduced to three in number[1] — generally by identifying the end and form,[2] and sometimes by including with these the efficient cause the number is reduced to two.[3] The primary cause is the end, which is even called the cause of the material cause;[4] although the end and substance being identified, substance is called the highest and first.[5]

The first principles are causes in the most general sense.[6] Thus, to keep the same illustration, the brass is the material cause, and the principle is matter. Principle, therefore, stands to cause very nearly in the relation of genus to species; indeed, the question whether genera are principles, is discussed by Aristotle; and it is decided that they are such in analogy at least. But this is so closely connected with the discussion of the Platonic theory of ideas, that we must postpone it till we come to the special treatment of that subject.

The definition of substance, as it is of the utmost importance, is also of the greatest difficulty. On this question Aristotle himself is far from clear; he remarks that the term has many meanings, and that he will use it in different senses — a liberty of which he certainly avails himself. Yet his definition is a clear one, and often repeated: Substance is whatever is not predicated of a subject, while other things are predicated of it.[7] Sometimes Aristotle is careful to insist on this definition; but often, indeed, if not as a rule,

[1] Met., xii. 4.
[2] De Gen. et Cor., i. 1; Met., xii. 2.
[3] Aus. Phys., ii 7.
[4] Aus. Phys., ii. 9; Met., ix. 8.
[5] Cat., 5; Met., v. 8; vii. 1, 12; An. Post., ii. 11; Met., i. 2; iii. 2.
[6] "All causes are first principles," iv. 1. fin. "Common to all first principles is the being the origin from which a thing is, or is produced, or is known."— Ibid., cf. Met., xii. 2; Aus. Phys., i. 6, 7, 9. Three principles are here asserted to exist.
[7] Met., iv. 9; vii. 17.

he uses the word in a popular sense. Thus he often speaks of matter as substance; sometimes remarking that it is not strictly so, but more often, perhaps, not qualifying his statement. This is the more unfortunate, because it is entirely inconsistent with the spirit of his philosophy to regard matter as substance, and when there is real danger of confusion he is apt to distinguish, but a casual reader might easily be misled. Species, too, he calls substances, but in a secondary sense.[1] Substance is used in four senses: the formal cause, the universal, the genus, and the subject, properly the primary subject;[2] but this does not mean that Aristotle regards all these uses as correct, as he in the same passage declares that matter is used to mean substance, but not properly. Again, form is often called substance; but here, again, we find qualifications — it is not the form, but the union of form and matter; form is prior to matter, but the compound is prior to both.[3] Substance is what is first in reason, knowledge, time, nature, and definition. No one of the rest of the categories is capable of a separate subsistence.[4] The definition, essence or formal cause of a thing, may also be called its substance.[5] But the complete definition of substance must be postponed until we have the additional idea of energy.

Aristotle's use of the term "form" is so important that it will require a special essay to do it justice; but we may provisionally remark that he allows no independent existence to forms, apart from the singulars that exhibit them. We have seen that the end is sometimes called the form, and the same is true of the substance and the definition; yet Aristotle is satisfied with none of these. He wishes to give distinctness to the idea of form, but is perpetually hampered with a fear that he may make the form too real, and thus expose himself to the objections he brings against Plato. He partly succeeds in his attempt by contrasting form and privation,

[1] Met., v. 7, 8; vii. 1, 12; Cat., 5.
[2] Met., vii. 3. Universals are not substances, viii. 1.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Met., vii. 1.
[5] Met., v. 8 fin.; vii. 5 fin.

which may be defined as absence of predicates.[1] In this way we might call form the presence of qualities, and thus again we come back to the definition of a thing — the "what" it is. At any rate, form, as well as privation, is a cause or first principle; and if matter is added as a third principle, we can account for change, because change is from opposite to opposite. We find, then, that Aristotle finally settles on these three principles:[2] form, privation, and matter. Yet the importance of privation is not great; it seems to be rather a negative aspect of form than anything necessary as a principle.

Here, now, we might suppose, Aristotle has quite committed himself to the admission of matter as an independent principle, and thus to dualism, if not, indeed, to materialism. It is just here, however, that his genius manifests itself in what is decidedly the grand characteristic of his philosophy, the notion of the "energy," or "entelechy," as distinguished from capacity or mere potentiality. Energy is actuality; it is force; it is life; it is especially mind, and still more especially the divine mind. In his view, the existence of matter is potential merely; it is a kind of condition of the energy, and has no independent actual existence of its own.[3]

In illustration of this important idea, we subjoin a number of passages from the historians of philosophy. As to form, Maurice remarks:

"That which is generated is the whole substance, consisting of matter and form. But the form, properly speaking, is not generated. It is reproduced in each particular subject in combination with a certain matter, and it becomes a new and peculiar form in virtue of that combination."[4]

"The εἶδος, then, which forms the essential in each thing which makes it be that which it is, must be looked upon as individualized by the ὕλη with which it is connected. Apart from the modification which it thus undergoes, it is only a logical existence, the highest genus to which it is ultimately referred being pre-eminently that which can only be contem-

[1] The absence of a quality, where there is capacity for its existence. — Met., v. 22.

[2] Met., xii. 2.

[3] Met., xii. 5.

[4] Maurice, Hist. Anc. Philos., in the Encyc. Metr., VI. iii. 5.

plated by and in the mind. The εἶδος or μορφή is an energy; the ὕλη is a δύναμις or capacity, implying and requiring the action or co-operation of the energy to produce the result. Οὐσια, as we said before, is the synthesis of these; omitting the ἐνέργεια, you come merely to certain material elements and combinations which do not in any way give you the actual things you are examining."[1]

As to the significance of matter, we have very much the same testimony:

"In the mind of Aristotle the notion of matter is invariably combined with that of *becoming*. Now, out of nothing comes nothing. There must therefore antecedently be something out of which that which becomes may become. But now every becoming is a passage from opposite into opposite, as Plato had already shown. As, then, an opposite cannot become its opposite, therefore the substratum of all becoming must be a something which passes from opposite to opposite, and in this passage remains itself. This permanent substratum is what Aristotle calls matter."[2]

"What is substance? Is it the form, or the matter, or the union of both? We can regard matter as substance in so far as it is the subject of different kinds of change, as that of becoming and decaying, form and privation; yet only as the capacity for changes, not as the reality of them, can it be substance; so that the reality of substance rests in the form, so that it is to be sought in the differences of form. And yet the forms are not substances, but an *analogon* of substances; the substance is the energy expressing itself in them, which is different for different matter; this must be eternal, the most real substance; this first substance, of course, cannot be defined."[3]

We have still to consider what motion is. It is plain, from what we have already seen, that it is closely connected with energy; and sometimes Aristotle seems to identify them. Yet he is careful, at times, to distinguish the ideas, which he does by calling motion an imperfect energy, as not containing its end in itself.[4] It is a change from opposite to

[1] Maurice, Hist. Anc. Philos., in the Encyc. Metr., vi. iii. 5.

[2] Ritter, Hist. Anc. Philos., iii. 112; Met., xii. 2; ix. 7; xii. 10; vii. 7; viii. 1; Aus. Phys., i. 9.

[3] Brandis, Gesch. d. Entwickelung d. Gr. Phil., i. 471; Met., viii. 1, *passim*.

[4] Aus. Phys., iii. 2; Met., ix. 6; ix. 9. In De An., ii. 5 the question is discussed as follows: Motion is a kind of energy but imperfect. For everything suffers and is moved by what is creative and exist in energy. To distinguish between potentiality and energy — we may call a man intelligent because that is the nature of man; or we call him intelligent who possesses the science of grammar. One is so by genus and substance, the other because when he wishes to

opposite.[1] It may be regarded as a manifestation of energy, just as in modern scientific language it would be called a manifestation of force.

We have, then, matter subsisting as a mere potentiality, a capacity of suffering change into the opposites, form and privation, and motion,—which is the change or manifestation of energy. Now, as all motion implies a moving cause, we have to inquire whether matter and motion are eternal — whether the process of change involves an infinite progression or evolution. On this point Aristotle is clear enough. He invariably objects to an infinite series of causes, generally on the ground that all scientific knowledge would thus be impossible.[2] There must be, therefore, a prime moving cause, itself unmoved, and this must be eternal and necessary. The great importance of this point requires us to quote freely his own language:

"There is a perpetual, unmoved mover. There is something by necessity both absolutely and accidentally without change. This will be one, rather than many. It is necessary always, and therefore continually."[3]

"The first moving cause moves with eternal motion and infinite time. It must, therefore, be indivisible and without parts and without (bodily) size."[4]

"If, therefore, everything which is moved is necessarily moved by something else, and either by that which is moved by something else, or

contemplate he can do it. But besides these is the one who already contemplates and is properly in energy intelligent. Both the first are intelligent potentially. It is not right to say that he who knows, by knowing is changed. Also, De Gen. et Cor., ii. 9. For to suffer and be moved is the part of matter, but to act and move of another power. Cf. Maurice: "It is then possible for a thing to have the capacity of being and not to be, and to have the capacity of not being and to be; that of which it is the capacity takes place when something is superadded to it which is energy. Energy is analogous to motion. The difference is in this, that every motion is incomplete, tending towards an end, but not including the end in itself; that energy has an end in itself, and that it does not involve a pause or a termination. Learning, building, walking, all imply a termination. Seeing, thinking, being happy, imply no termination; these are energies. — Hist. Anc. Philos., in Encyc Metr., vi. iii. 5; cf. Met., ix. 3.

[1] Aus. Phys., iii. 1.

[2] Met., ii. 2.

[3] Aus. Phys., viii. 6; Met., xii. 6.

[4] Aus. Phys., viii. fin.

by that which is not moved by something else; and if it is moved by that which is moved by another motion, there must be some primary moving thing which is not moved by anything else; and if this is first there is no need of another. For it is impossible that that should continue into infinity which moves and is moved by something else, since in infinity there is nothing first. Hence that which first moves is moved, but not by anything else, but is itself necessarily first moved by itself. Since, therefore, there is something ultimate which can be excited by motion, but does not have the principle of motion, and that also which is moved not by itself but by another, it is consistent with reason, not to say necessary, there is a third thing that moves, being itself unmoved."[1]

"Everything that is moved is divisible, and is necessarily moved by something. Motion may be infinite in one sense, in finite time."[2]

In the seventh chapter of the twelfth book of the Metaphysics, this idea is most clearly and connectedly brought out. There, too, the final step in the argument is taken — the identifying of the first unmoved, moving cause with mind; that is, the necessity of the existence of an infinite mind possessing all perfections; a mind omnipotent, eternal, and unchangeable, holy, and happy; a being free from all matter or possibility of corruption — infinite power and eternal life. The grandeur of this chapter, when it is once understood, almost equals that of the sublimest passages in the Old Testament. Nowhere else in the writings of Aristotle do we find such decisive expressions as these; and we could hardly expect that we should. Aristotle writes as a philosopher, and we seldom find a trace of personality in any of his works. He himself excites our admiration as an intellect, not as a man; and it is in this clear, dry light of abstract existence that his God is presented to us.[3]

[1] Aus. Phys., viii. 5.

[2] Ibid., vii. 1.

[3] We connect the scattered passages bearing on the argument. The efficient cause molds matter into form; form is thus generated *per accidens*, and has no generating power itself. — Met., vii. 8; De Gen. et Cor. ii. 9. If anything is produced, there is a from which and a by which. — Met., i. 3. What is in capacity and in energy are somehow one, so that the cause is, as it were, that moving from capacity to energy. — Met., viii. 6. To be is better than not to be. — De Gen. et Cor., ii. 10. All order is reason. — Aus. Phys., viii. 1. Hence, Anaxagorus was right in saying that mind was without passion and unmixed, since he made it the principle of motion. — Aus. Phys., viii. 5; Met., xii. 6. That which

The chapter is, in substance, as follows: There is an eternal, immovable substance, subsisting in energy without matter, which is subsequent to it. This is the first cause of motion, as that which is desirable and of the nature of mind causes motion. God excites love; he is the consummation of desire and thought. Desire and thought and will are, in the highest sense, what is desired and thought and willed; so that God is the ideal of all aspiration and choice. Hence he is the Final Cause of all things; subsisting by necessity, not external, but that of his own nature, in the most excellent way. The best and highest life, that is ours only in the short moments of pure intellection, is the eternal life of God. Such a life is pure happiness. If God continually enjoys the blessed state that we sometimes enjoy, it is admirable; if a more blessed state, it is more admirable. But such a state is his. He is life, the best and the eternal life. The most real and purest existence is thought, and this is absolutely "the best" in itself. Hence the highest thought, the divine intelligence, thinks the highest "best," that is, itself. The thought of this divine intelligence is the thought of thought. Such a being is not in this or that portion of time, but in the whole eternally.

We see plainly from this, that matter, in Aristotle's doctrine, is nothing more than the possibility of existence; it has none of the properties of matter, as we understand it; it does not occupy space, nor can it be felt. Its actual existence is determined by God, who gives it all its properties. This is really nothing more than the orthodox doctrine of creation.

always exists, as always existing, is not in time; for it is not embraced by time nor measured in its existence by time, nor suffers anything from time. — Aus. Phys., iv. 12. The energy of God is immortal; for this is eternal life. — De Coelo, ii. 3, 6. God is in the universe; and again, all things are in him, for all are moved by the divinity existing in us. — Eth. Eud., vii. 14. Cf. Ritter on Phys., ii. 2; Met., v. 16: "The perfect essence of a thing which is one with its perfect activity, appears to be also its proper end; this is the best that it can accomplish; this is the good after which as its end everything strives in order to be in the full activity of its being; man himself, even, is in a certain manner an end, inasmuch as his essence dwells within him in full activity." — Hist. Anc. Philos., iii. 143.

If God created the heavens and the earth, they must have previously potentially existed. Indeed, so far as the account in Genesis goes, matter may have been actually existing. But Aristotle distinctly maintains that energy is prior to capacity, in definition and in substance, because the first capacity is that of energizing, and things eternal are in substance before things perishable, and nothing potential is eternal, — because it is not necessary. In familiar theological language, whatever is subject to change must have a cause of its changes, and not exist necessarily. In one sense, energy is prior in time; for always an entity in energy arises from an entity in capacity by means of an entity in energy. One who learns to play on the harp learns by playing on the harp. The learner must already possess an energy.[1] The Socratic difficulty about the impossibility of learning, which is kindred with Zeno's paradox about motion, and compelled Plato to invent the *anamnesis*, or pre-existence of the soul, is thus more simply solved by Aristotle. The contrast between this view and Darwinism should also be noted. Aristotle maintains that everything that is being produced advances toward a first principle and an end; for the final cause is a first principle, and the production is on account of the end. Energy is an end, and on account of it potentiality is assumed. Animals do not see in order that they may have the power of seeing, but they have the power of seeing in order that they may see. And so it is with the seed and the plant, and with free-will in the rational subject.[2]

Aristotle is said to have written a treatise about the good, which has not come down to us. Doubtless we should find there a more complete presentation of the moral attributes of God. As it is, we can only infer from the general spirit of his philosophy, and from scattered passages, principally in his Ethics, what his views of the relations of God to man really were. In general, we may say that the life of man, in so far as it is noble and virtuous, resembles the divine

[1] Met., ix. 8, 9.

[2] Ibid., ix. 5, 6, 8.

life.[1] The noblest thing is mind, and the noblest life is the exercise of mind. God is happy,[2] Aristotle often says; but we do not find the Christian idea that he is interested in man with a fatherly love.[3] Certainly no evil quality can be predicated of God;[4] but we do wrong to apply the ordinary human terms to divine virtues. We may say, then, with justice, that the God of Aristotle is a being whom men may worship and be drawn toward, perfect in what theologians call the natural attributes; but that he is not a being that looks with a loving and pitying eye on men. Yet we cannot regard it as an imputation on the great philosopher that he did not discern what only revelation has disclosed. It is judging by a severe standard, indeed, if men are to be blamed for not discovering what God has chosen to lay open only through his dearly-beloved Son.

Numerous passages in the writings of Aristotle speak of the gods as if they were many. Indeed, in the chapter following his establishment of the existence of one God, we

[1] Happiness is connected with virtue, and especially the highest virtue, which will be what is best in man, whether this is mind or something else higher than mind. But mind is the highest. — Nik. Eth., x. 7, 8.

[2] After speaking of the perfect happiness of the virtuous life, Aristotle remarks that such a life is better than the nature of man affords; for it is not in that he is a man that any one enjoys this life, but in so far as there is anything divine in him. If, then, mind compared with man is something divine, the life belonging to mind compared with human life will be the divine. We must do everything to live in accordance with that part which is the best in us — which, though little in size, in power and honor far excels all the rest. We hold the gods most blessed and happy; but we cannot apply to them our titles of the virtues — we cannot call them just, brave, liberal, temperate, etc., for this would be absurd; yet no one thinks they do not live, nor do we suppose them to sleep like Endymion. There is nothing left but contemplation, which is, therefore, the best and happiest life. All the life of the immortal gods is happy; that of men, so far as it resembles theirs. — Nik. Eth., x. 7, 8; vii. 1; cf. Met., xii. 9. Every one is happy in proportion as he is virtuous and wise; since for this we have the example of God himself, who is entirely happy, not from any external good, but in himself and because he is such by nature. — Pol., vii. 1; Nik. Eth., vii. 15.

[3] Yet God rules providently and not imperiously. — Nik. Eth., vii. 15. But the order in the universe is compared to that of an army, where the general is the cause of the good order. — Met., xii. 10. This seems to be τὸ ἀγαθόν, which is especially a first principle.

[4] God cannot envy. — Met., i. 2.

find him speaking of many divine beings as if they were independent; a fact that causes Vater, in his able "Vindiciae Theologiae Aristotelis," to reject the whole twelfth book, and depend mainly on the reasoning in the physical treatises. But it is plain that Aristotle regards the beings that animate the celestial spheres as dependent on the first God. The existence of such spirits, it is well known, was maintained by Kepler, and is no more derogatory to the power of God than is the existence of angels. Indeed, there is a story (quoted by Lewes) that there was a church at Rome, in the Middle Ages, dedicated to these seven spirits.

We cannot take leave of this subject without once more calling attention to the striking resemblances of modern scientific thought to the great truths of Aristotle's philosophy. Especially in the discussion of force (or energy, as it is now in certain senses called — the very word chosen by Aristotle) do we find that the ancient philosopher was not far behind the modern. As Aristotle, after his prolonged studies in the world of nature, turned his mind with a reverent spirit toward the mysteries of the universe, so the modern investigator grows more religious as he approaches the impassable limits of sense, and looks forth into the infinite. Both alike are blind to the love that the Christian knows is there; but as they feel their own weakness, and find the trusty instruments that have served them so faithfully vanish from their hands, both alike are compelled to acknowledge with humility and awe the existence of an inscrutable power that molds all things in accordance with the laws of its own transcendent nature.

ARTICLE III.

REVELATION AND SCIENCE.

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THE present schism between religion and science is acknowledged on all hands to be productive of very deplorable consequences. In fact, the scepticism and infidelity of modern times seem to find in it their strongest defences and support. Hence it is a matter of the greatest importance that it should be healed; and that whatever may contribute in the least to this result should be clearly exhibited and universally recognized. For science and religion cannot remain forever at feud with each other. There must be some common ground where they can meet as twin sisters, and where reasonable people can stand without prejudice against either, but with their minds equally open to both of these two grand sources of truth and human well-being. For it seems plain, from the past history and from the present state of this controversy, that it could never have arisen unless either scientists or theologians had transcended their own legitimate department of knowledge, and invaded the province or domain of the other. As a matter of fact, this error seems justly chargeable upon both parties, inasmuch as science is constantly presuming to question, and even to deny, the truths of religion, and religion the truths of science. A thousand examples on either side might easily be given, such as the assumption — for it is no more — by many scientists, of absolute uniformity in all the operations of divine power, such that miracles and answers to prayer become impossible; and, on the part of many theologians, such interpretations of scripture as are opposed to the most certain truths of science. Hence it is evident that this baleful schism can never be healed until religion and science

shall come to recognize each other as original and independent sources of truth, and as ultimate authorities, each within its own sphere. But this of itself would not be a final solution of the problem, for the results accepted as truths might still be inconsistent with each other. It is necessary, therefore, that a principle of interpretation be established which, consistently applied to the whole Scripture, would leave no ground for science to stand upon for denying the truths of revelation, nor for religion to call in question the truths of science. It is the object of the following discussion, then, to establish such a principle, which — not as anything new, but only as requiring a more rigorous verification and a more extended application than it has hitherto received — may be stated as follows:

The Holy Scriptures were given to reveal moral and spiritual truth, and it was no part of their object to teach the truths of science, upon which, consequently, they are no authority.

A very slight acquaintance with the origin, style, and contents of the Christian records is enough to satisfy any one that it was no part of their object to reveal the truths of science. For they originated, and were communicated to the world, through the seed of Abraham, than whom no people of their time were more destitute of scientific culture. If their object had included precise or infallible statements on matters of science, probably the Greeks would have been chosen for this purpose; for scientific tendencies and adaptations were as characteristic of the Greek mind as they were foreign to the Jew. Their style, moreover, which will require to be more fully exhibited hereafter, is never scientific, but always and eminently popular. And their contents are chiefly great moral and spiritual truths, such as the being and personality of God; that his moral laws are of eternal and immutable obligation; that he created the universe, and man in his own image; that man has fallen from the estate wherein he was created; and that God has redeemed the world from sin and misery by the sacrifice of his only-begot-

ten Son. These truths are the great burden of the Christian Scriptures, the great object of Christian faith; and whatever there may be in the Bible which does not bear upon them must be regarded as of secondary importance.

Yet the failure to recognize this — or the notion that the Scripture must be taken as an infallible authority, not only upon moral and spiritual, but also upon scientific questions; or, at least, that its allusions and statements with respect to physical phenomena, must somehow be harmonized with the results of science — extensively prevails, and is productive of the most disastrous consequences. Not only does it put into the hands of sceptical science its most dangerous weapons, but also it vitiates and poisons theology itself. For, standing on this ground, the theologian is under a necessity to defend all scriptural allusions to physical phenomena as scientifically accurate, and his own interpretation of them as essential to a true faith in the word of God. Hence, whenever science establishes any new truth which bears upon them, so that it can no longer be doubted by reasonable people, he is sorely tempted to foist into the words of Scripture a sense in harmony with it which they were never intended to bear. In this way, all true principles of exegesis are confounded, in order to make God's revelation teach whatever human science, in its progressive development and unceasing changes, may, at any time, be thought to require. But where this expedient would seem to lead too far, theologians have often brought themselves to deny the most certain results of science, in order to maintain their faith in the revelation. They have even been heard to say to the scientist, "If you prove your point, we must give up our Bible." But after the point has been proved, and universally accepted, the scientist replies, "Why do you not give up your Bible, as you said you would?" Thus faith in the Scriptures becomes an object of mockery.

As an example of this last case, we may be allowed to recall here the well known story of Galileo, the significance of which, as it would seem, has never yet been fully ap-

preciated. For surely it is a most instructive fact, that in former times the Scriptures were universally understood to teach the geocentric system of the physical universe; namely, that the earth was the immovable centre of motion to the sun, moon, and stars. But when Galileo had come to see that this construction of cosmical bodies was no longer tenable, and substituted in its place the solicentric system, that the earth and other planets revolved around the sun, it is hardly possible for us at this day to conceive of the alarm which was awakened in the minds of theologians by this revolution in astronomical science. Consequently they resisted it with all their immense influence; and having "the powers that be" on their side at the time, they compelled this foremost advocate of the new theory to repudiate his heresy, in order to save his life. Now who can estimate the enormity of this scandal? Yet the lesson which it ought to have inculcated has been very imperfectly learned. For similar, though not such extreme, results have been witnessed in our day; we have had the most embittered discussions of the age of the earth, the length of time during which it has been inhabited by man, and other matters of science, which theologians long ago had determined by the authority of Scripture.

In allusion to these scandals, the venerable Archibald Alexander, Professor of Theology in the Seminary at Princeton, was accustomed to say to his classes: "Young gentlemen, you should never say to the men of science, 'If you prove this, or that, we must give up our Bible.' On the contrary, you ought to say, 'Go on, gentlemen; make all the discoveries you can; for we are not afraid of the truth. But you will please to remember that whilst you are disputing among yourselves we are not obliged to accept the views of any party. It is our place to wait until you have come to an agreement; and when you have established any new truth, so that you yourselves no longer dispute about it, we will accept it without fear lest it should have a bad effect upon our faith. For if, as we hold, the Author of nature and of

revelation be one and the same infinitely wise and good Being, true science and true religion can never have any quarrel with each other.' "

Now this beautiful rule of practical wisdom, if it were consistently followed, would leave no ground of controversy between science and the word of God. The most perfect harmony would be manifested in the future history of these two great and co-ordinate factors of Christian civilization, between which there never was any opposition except that which arose either from " science falsely so called " or from unsound interpretations of Scripture.

The principle of interpretation which has been thus enunciated and developed we shall find abundantly confirmed, and its applications illustrated, if we consider more particularly the scriptural style of allusion and statement with respect to physical phenomena. For there was a necessity that such allusions should occur on almost every page, in connection with every physical object which required to be mentioned. These objects had to be spoken of by name long before scientific nomenclatures had been formed, before there was any such thing as science in the world. In what forms of expression, then, ought we to expect that these unavoidable allusions and statements with respect to legitimate subjects of future scientific investigation would be made — whether in language scientifically correct and adequate, such that no subsequent progress should ever be able to criticize it; or in popular language, such as prevailed at the time the revelations were given, and such as the most illiterate and ignorant people could understand? It will be easy to demonstrate, which we now undertake to do, that the former method or procedure was impracticable, and that the latter was the only one that could be followed.

In the first place, then, if the scriptural allusions to physical phenomena had been made in forms of expression scientifically correct and adequate, the Bible would have been unintelligible to all the generations of mankind who lived and died before the birth of science, and still such to the

great masses who are destitute of scientific culture. In proof of this, we need only consider that such an expression for the phenomena of the sun's rising and setting would be something like this: The earth, revolving on its own axis, reveals and hides the sun. But no one at the time the Scriptures were given could have understood what was meant by these words; and the expression is so clumsy that we ourselves cannot use it; we continue to say, "The sun rises and sets," knowing that it is as far as possible from being scientifically correct. Hence we cannot infer from their use of such popular expressions that the sacred writers were ignorant of the Newtonian or Copernican theory of the universe, although it would be absurd, no doubt, to suppose them acquainted with it. Since, then, these physical phenomena had to be mentioned or referred to on every page, and almost in every sentence, if scientific language had been employed, the Scriptures would have been unintelligible at the time they were written, and would, no doubt, have been rejected as the ravings of insanity. If they could have been preserved, which is hardly supposable, no one could have understood them until they should have come to be interpreted by modern science.

Nor would they have been any more intelligible to us, at this day, than to those of former ages. For science is not yet perfect, nor ever indeed can be. It is constantly making progress, and changing its nomenclature, its modes of conceiving and expressing physical objects; and doubtless it will always continue to do so. Thus, what lately it called by the name of caloric, it now calls a mode or form of motion; and light, which was formerly a fluid, is now the result of vibrations. Consequently the time may come, nay, is sure to come, when many of our now current forms of expression in science will be found to be incorrect, or inadequate, involving more or less of erroneous conception and theory, and will be superseded by others, in accordance with more advanced knowledge. Thus we see that these allusions in the Scriptures to physical phenomena, in order that they

should be absolutely correct and unchangeable, must have been made in forms of expression corresponding not to the present, but to the still future and last developments of science; in which case they would have been unintelligible to us, and to how many of the coming generations of mankind we cannot tell.

Since, then, it is obviously impossible to understand a scientific expression of any great physical phenomenon, such as that the rotating earth reveals and hides the sun, without the knowledge of the cosmical theory to which it belongs, it would have been necessary, in order to meet this difficulty, that the Scriptures should have revealed, not only the truths of religion, but also a perfect system of science. But, evidently, this was not the object for which they were given; and the attempt would have introduced inconceivably greater difficulties than it could have removed. For, in the first place, it would have made the Bible of such enormous bulk that, it is safe to say, no one person could ever have read it through. In the second place, such a revelation of science would itself have been unintelligible. For that vast and complex system of knowledge which is only symbolized, not expressed, by the word science, however clearly it might have been revealed, could no more have been understood in the early stages of human development than it can be now by little children. If, for example, all that is signified to our minds by modern naval architecture, steam navigation, the mariner's compass, and other similar forms of expression, had been revealed from heaven with the utmost possible fulness and clearness to Cimon, or Themistocles, or some other old Greek admiral, whose most daring voyages hugged the shores of the Mediterranean, and who had hardly ever been out of sight of land in his life, is it conceivable that he could have comprehended it? For the human mind is the subject of development. It has had to grow up through a long course of ages in order to become capable of mastering that vast system of ideas which modern science includes. It is impossible, even by the aid of any conceivable revelation,

that it should bridge the great ocean of thought which lies between its knowledge at any given period, and that to which it arrives, step by step, in the progress of thousands of years. But, in the third place, if we suppose that such a revelation of science could have been understood, it would have superseded that laborious exercise of the human faculties in experiment, research, and reasoning, which, according to all experience, is indispensable to their development and growth. For the search after truth has been held by some of the greatest minds the world has ever seen, to be more conducive to mental power than the truth itself. In the words of Lessing, "If you place the truth before me, on the one hand, and on the other the search for truth, I take the search." This may be an overstatement, but there lies in it this much of truth at least, that, as man is constituted, his intellectual faculties could not have been developed so as to comprehend science otherwise than by means of that strenuous exertion and exercise of them through which all his discoveries have been made, and all his progress achieved.

Hence it appears that there were the best of reasons why the revelation did not, and could not, make the necessary allusions and statements with respect to physical phenomena in scientific language. There was an absolute necessity that they should be managed in some other way. We pass on now to the consideration of this other method, which was actually adopted, and which, it is here claimed, is followed out with perfect consistency from the first chapter of Genesis to the last of the New Testament.

Here, then, recurring to the typical expression, the sun rises and sets, we see that it is derived from the impression which the phenomena make upon the sense of sight — from that which appears, and not at all from the scientific truth which underlies the appearance. This impression, let it be observed, is necessarily the same for all persons at all times and places on the earth. Consequently the expression which is derived from it must always have been, and must forever continue to be, universally intelligible. In whatever lan-

guage it may be said, the sun rises and sets, the most ignorant and stupid people will always understand what is meant. Hence we may safely predict that this expression will continue to maintain its ground through all possible changes in the scientific exploration or comprehension of the phenomena which it represents. For human language itself originated in, and draws its perennial nourishment from, the impressions which the phenomena of the world make upon the senses. In the original Hebrew of the Old Testament, however, the corresponding expression is slightly different, being in this form, "The sun goes forth and enters in." In this case, the impression made upon the senses is somewhat modified by a philosophical conception in explanation of the phenomena, which seems to have prevailed at the time, and which is more fully expressed in the words of the Psalmist: "The sun, which is as a bridegroom coming out of his chamber, and rejoiceth as a strong man to run a race." For the Hebrews, as other ancient peoples, seem to have conceived of the sun as having his sleeping chamber under the earth, from which, at one door, he came forth in the morning, and into which, at the opposite door, he re-entered in the evening. Closely analyzed this expression is found to be in part sensuous, and in part philosophical; which, no doubt, is the reason why it has not been able to maintain its ground, but has given place to the purely sensuous expression which we employ. If, now, we could examine all the allusions and statements with respect to physical phenomena, which occur in the Scriptures, we should find that they are made in forms of expression similar to this by which the sun's apparent motion was represented; that is to say, in forms originally derived from the impressions which the phenomena make upon the senses, but often modified by philosophical conceptions in explanation of these phenomena, which prevailed among the people to whom the revelation was immediately communicated. It remains now to furnish the proof of this statement, which will consist of a few examples, taken almost at random from literally thousands precisely similar.

First, then, the inspired writers, whether of the Old Testament or the New, certainly had no knowledge of the true relations of the sun to the planetary system, nor of those which the heavenly bodies in general bear to each other. For it did not enter into the purely moral and spiritual object of the revelation that this knowledge should be communicated to them; and the attempt to reveal a complete science would, as we have seen, have met with insuperable difficulties. Consequently they, like other people of their time, conceived of the earth as the greatest and most important of all the cosmical bodies, and of the sun, moon, and stars as dependent upon it, and as created for the benefit of its inhabitants. In strict accordance with this conception, they never allude to the sun as the centre of attraction or motion to the planetary worlds; but everywhere they speak of the heavenly bodies as created and placed in the firmament "to give light upon the earth," and to "be for signs and for seasons and for days and years."

In the second place, the sacred writers evidently conceived of the earth as a solid, immovable body, with a plane, or perhaps a slightly convex surface. This, indeed, was the conception of it which universally prevailed in ancient times; and, as was inevitable, speculation abounded as to what it rested on, or by what its weight was supported. Some imagined one thing, and some another, but no satisfactory account of the matter could be given, for obviously, in accordance with this conception, the difficulty did not admit of a final solution. In order to illustrate this point, which has important relations to others which are to follow, we subjoin a description of an old Hindoo scheme of the universe.[1]

In this we have, first of all, a triangle, from which a glory is streaming in all directions, and which among the Hindoos was an ever-recurring symbol of the *Trimurti*, or three-form, ineffable nature of the Deity. For, after all that has been written in explanation of this mysterious symbol, it is more

[1] See diagram in Religions De L'Antiquité, par J. D. Guignaut, Vol. vi. pl. 115.

than probable that a dim shadow of the Triune Jehovah had fallen upon the mind of this wonderful heathen people. Immediately below this triangle we have seven heavens, — each of the superior ones resting on the next under it, — which were believed to be the abodes of their inferior divinities, and of those *rishis*, or sages, who, by their knowledge and austerities rather than by their virtues, had raised themselves to an equality with the gods. The lowest heaven rests upon celestial clouds; the clouds upon a supernal ocean; this ocean upon a solid sky, or firmament; the firmament upon the backs of a troop of elephants, which stand with their feet upon the earth; the earth, which is convex above, but flat beneath, rests upon four other mighty elephants — one at each of the four cardinal points of the compass — the space between them under the earth being *patala*, or the hells; these elephants stand on the back of a tortoise, which, finally, rests upon the folds of a serpent, which, after furnishing this support, forms a circle around the whole vast scheme, with its extremities meeting above the triangle, on which it seems to hang, and by which the weight of the universe is supported. In this way these old thinkers, grappling with this difficulty, represented all the spiritual and material worlds as depending ultimately upon one triune, ineffable, divine being. The whole scheme, as we see, combines the puerile with the sublime in a truly wonderful manner.

Now, it is very remarkable that the Christian Scriptures are free from all such puerilities. They leave the whole matter in that insoluble mystery which is inseparable from this conception of the earth as an immovable body. In many passages of great sublimity they represent the question of its foundations as among the mysteries of God. In one of these God is introduced rebuking the rebellious spirit of Job in the following words: "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? Declare, if thou hast understanding, who hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest. Or who hath stretched the line upon it? Whereupon are

the foundations thereof fastened? Or who hath laid the corner-stone thereof?" Surely, the attempt to explain such expressions as mere figures of speech, or in any way consistent with the knowledge that the earth has no foundations, is worse than idle. It is a perversion of the most certain laws of language, such that, if similar methods be applied to the revelations of moral and spiritual truth, the result must be that we shall get out of the word of God just what we please. Nor are the representations which occur elsewhere, such as "He hangeth the earth upon nothing," to be interpreted in opposition to the plain sense of the preceding quotation, and to innumerable other passages of similar import, as if they were intended to harmonize with our knowledge that the earth is a globe suspended in space by gravitation; but they are to be understood as simply expressive of the mystery of the thing, as it lay before the minds of the sacred writers.

A third conception to explain physical phenomena, which prevailed among the early Hebrews, was, that a great body of water existed under the earth. It was by this supposition that they accounted for the phenomena of springs and wells. For this rising of water out of the earth, even in the tops of hills and summits of high mountains, was a great mystery to the ancient world, and is frequently alluded to in the Scriptures as a wonderful manifestation of the power of God. Thus, in the following words: "He sendeth the springs into the valleys, which run [literally, which break, or rise] among the hills." Now, the sacred writers make no attempt to correct this erroneous notion in science, because that was not included in the object for which they were inspired. On the contrary, they express themselves in accordance with it in a great multitude of places and variety of connections, as in the following instances: "The earth above the waters" .... "The deep that lieth under" .... "The waters under the earth" .... "The fountains of the great deep."

A fourth conception was that of the sky as a solid substance, or firmament; and this seems to have prevailed universally

in ancient times, as it still does wherever science has made little or no progress. Children always have this notion before they are otherwise instructed, and savages cannot be convinced to the contrary. The reason is, that the deep blue color of the sky makes this impression upon the sense of sight. For how can mere void space have any color? We know that this is due to the atmosphere which surrounds the earth; for the writer has seen and handled a transparent gas, similar to the atmospheric air, condensed and frozen solid by an experiment in the laboratory, and its color was precisely the deep blue of the sky on a clear day. Hence it is that its oldest names in many languages, and probably in all, either signify or imply solidity. Our word "heaven" means primarily that which has been heaved up by the exertion of force, and which, therefore, has solidity and weight. The word firmament, in the Mosaic cosmogony and elsewhere, is the exact equivalent of the Greek στερέωμα, and of the Hebrew רָקִיעַ, which it is used to translate. Each of these words signifies that which is solid, compact, firm. They cannot be soundly interpreted in the sense of a void expanse, as some scholars, in their excess of zeal to harmonize the scriptural allusions to physical phenomena with science, have maintained. This interpretation is inconsistent not only with the proper meaning of the words, but also, as we shall see hereafter, with the connections in which they stand. For the Hebrew word, of which the Greek and English are, of course, mere translations, is derived from a root which signifies to expand by hammering out, as iron or gold or other metal is expanded into thin sheets. Hence it is translated in the Greek version of the Scriptures by the word στερέωμα, and in the English Bible, by firmament, neither of which has any meaning apart from the idea of solidity. Accordingly, we find allusions or statements expressing or implying this conception on almost every page of the Scriptures, such as the following: "Hast thou with him spread out the sky, which is strong, and as a molten looking-glass?" For this molten mirror here, as elsewhere, must of course

be understood as being of polished metal; and we shall see directly why this quality of strength is attributed to the sky. Again: "They saw the God of Israel, and there was under his feet, as it were, a paved work of a sapphire stone, and, as it were, the body [literally, the bone] of heaven." The manner in which the firmament is spoken of in the Mosaic cosmogony will require to be examined hereafter, and need not be further referred to here, except to state that the words which represent the birds as flying "in the open firmament" are now recognized by all Hebrew scholars as a mistranslation; "the open firmament" should have been rendered "in the face of the firmament," that is, under it.

Still another conception which prevailed among the Hebrews and other ancient peoples was, that above the firmament, in which it is expressly stated that the stars were set or fixed — and this, by the way, is the origin of the expression "the fixed stars," which we still retain, though in a different sense — that above the sky there was another great body of water, corresponding to "the waters under the earth," and identical with the supernal ocean of the Hindoos. This seems to have been their explanation of the phenomena of rain. As the water in springs and wells was supposed to come from "the deep that lieth under," so the rain fell from "the waters which were above the firmament." The relation which the clouds bore to the rain in this conception does not fully appear. Perhaps they were regarded as a kind of sieve, by which the water, as it fell from the firmament, was separated into drops, and sprinkled over the earth, in order to its more effectual fertilization. There may be a reference to this idea in the words: "He maketh small the drops of water ..... which the clouds drop and distil."

The allusions and statements in the Hebrew Scriptures which either express or imply this conception are almost innumerable. The following are examples: "Praise him, ye heaven of heavens, and ye waters that be above the heavens" .... "And God said, Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it divide the waters from the

waters. And God made the firmament, and divided the waters which were under the firmament from the waters which were above the firmament." Here, now, is one of those cases previously alluded to, in which, if it be possible to determine the sense of a word from the connection in which it stands, this word firmament cannot have the meaning of a void expanse. For it is here represented as that which divides the waters below from those above it, which gives us the reason why the quality of strength is attributed to it, as in a previous quotation, namely, because it was supposed to sustain the weight of a superincumbent ocean. But there are no waters above the void expanse which it can be supposed to divide from those below it. Besides this, God is represented as being occupied the whole of the second day in creating the firmament; but how can a void expanse be spoken of as a work of creation? And this difficulty is greatly enhanced by taking these six days in the sense of geologic periods of immense duration.

But some of the most striking and significant allusions to these waters, both above the firmament and under the earth, occur in the account of the deluge, where it is declared that "all the fountains of the great deep were broken up," so that the waters under the earth burst up in great floods; and that "the windows of heaven [literally, the flood-gates] were opened," so that the waters which were above the firmament came down in mighty torrents. In this way the deluge is accounted for; and if we fail to recognize the conception of the physical universe to which these expressions refer, the sublimity of this whole picture is well nigh lost.

Besides such allusions and statements as these, with respect to great cosmical phenomena, we find similar references to minor particulars, of which it must suffice to reproduce here one or two examples. Thus, in the Book of Job, we have the following allusion to "the ostrich, which leaveth her eggs in the earth, and warmeth them in the dust; and forgetteth that the foot may crush them, or that the wild beast may break them. She is hardened

against her young ones, as though they were not hers. Her labor is vain, because God hath deprived her of wisdom, neither hath he imparted to her understanding." Now, it is quite true that the ostrich sometimes leaves her nest in the heat of the tropical day, as do other birds; but this passage does not exhibit her true character and habits, such as we know them to be from a great number of perfectly trustworthy eye-witnesses. For the ostrich, in fact, is a most affectionate and prudent mother. She broods on her eggs, like other birds, with the utmost assiduity. When she leaves them to procure food or water the male bird commonly takes her place on the nest until she returns. They both fight desperately, even to the loss of their own lives, in defence of their young; and they resort to the most cunning strategems to deceive the hunter. Like the lapwing and some other birds, they pretend to be wounded or crippled, and go fluttering and floundering along upon the ground in order to draw the hunter away from their young ones after themselves. In all this we do not see a creature whom "God has deprived of wisdom and understanding," nor "hardened against her young ones, as though they were not hers."

Again, we find that animals of the pachyderm and rodent classes are prohibited as unclean by Moses on the ground that, though ruminants, they are not cloven-footed: "The coney, because he cheweth the cud, but divideth not the hoof — he is unclean unto you; and the hare, because he cheweth the cud, but divideth not the hoof — he is unclean to you." Now the word שָׁפָן, which is here erroneously translated coney, designates, as is generally agreed, a little pachyderm animal resembling the coney, which last, as also the hare, are rodents. Both the *shaphan* and the hare are still believed by the Arabs to be ruminants, though neither of them has the fourfold stomach, or other traits of physical organization, which are characteristic of all animals that chew the cud. This popular error originated, no doubt, from the fact that the rodents have a peculiar motion of the mouth and cheeks, which is produced by rubbing the edges of their cutting-teeth

upon each other, and which gives them a striking appearance of chewing the cud. But Moses speaks of them, as in all similar cases, according to this appearance, as if they were ruminants, and not according to the scientific truth which underlies it. For the distinction between clean and unclean animals was one which all classes of the people had constantly to make, judging from outward signs; and if they had been allowed to disregard these signs here, it would have been well-nigh impossible to have kept up the distinction in other cases.

To these may be added the case where the doing of certain things is claimed as the exclusive prerogative of God, but which science has since brought within the reach of human power. Thus the question is addressed to Job: "Canst thou send lightnings, that they may go, and say unto thee, Here we are?" But it seems impossible to choose words which should more exactly describe what we are now doing every day by means of the electric telegraph. The lightnings now say to us, with the utmost docility, Here we are, send us; and we send them with our messages from continent to continent, and from pole to pole.

These few examples are all that we have room for, to illustrate and verify our main proposition, that the Scriptures always speak of natural phenomena in forms of expression originally derived from the impressions which they make upon the senses, but often modified by philosophical conceptions in explanation of them, such as prevailed at the time among the people to whom the revelation was communicated. For certainly it was no part of their object to correct these impressions or conceptions however erroneous they might be. The limitations imposed upon them by their great moral and spiritual object made it absolutely indispensable that they should never concern themselves with the scientific truths which underlie the phenomena of the physical universe, but should leave all these to be discovered and expounded by science. For if they had spoken of natural objects otherwise than in free and popular language; if they

had undertaken to correct all the errors in science which prevailed, there would have been no end of the Bible, neither could it have been understood; but, as we have seen, it would have been a sealed book to those who first received it from God, also to us at the present time, and to how many of the future generations of mankind no one can tell.

We do not claim, however, that the view for which we here contend is free from difficulties. For it may be objected against it that, in the attempt to distinguish between what is of moral and spiritual import in the Scriptures and that which is not, we must be liable to very deleterious errors; that the two spheres of faith and science are not absolutely exclusive of, but, to some extent at least, do interpenetrate and overlap each other; that our principle implies a low view of inspiration; and that it cannot be applied to the Mosaic cosmogony without impairing its claims upon our faith as a divine revelation. It must be conceded that these are grave objections, and require to be fairly appreciated.

First, then, we frankly admit that some matters of faith do come within the purview of science; but this is a difficulty which cannot be wholly avoided whatever view be taken of this subject. For, in any case, science within her own legitimate sphere, which is that of determining the laws of nature, may have something to say upon the question of miracles, and in sifting the evidence upon which they rest, as also upon superstition, and other similar matters. But the principle which we advocate has this great advantage over all others, that it greatly reduces the number of these questions in which it may be claimed that faith and science are equally concerned. In fact, it leaves very few, and these such as are most easily defended, wherever the most sceptical science can have any temptation to deny what a true faith in the word of God must ever maintain.

Secondly, our liability to error in distinguishing between that in the word which is moral and spiritual and that which is not does not seem to be any greater than it is in the distinction, which we have constantly to make, between

fundamentals or essentials to salvation and matters of secondary importance. For some things "the Scriptures principally teach"; other things are not principal, but subordinate. But, whatever be our liability to error in either case, the sole question for us here is, whether God has not laid upon us the responsibility of making this distinction. In proof that he has, we have the whole preceding argument, the force of which, however, we cannot fairly appreciate without putting ourselves on our guard against that universal temptation which arises from our natural dread of responsibility. For we have the most sorrowful evidence that there is a deep longing in the human heart for a more comprehensively infallible revelation than that which God has seen fit to give us. Great moral and spiritual truths do not satisfy this depraved longing. We want a Bible alike infallible in matters of science as in matters of faith. We want an infallible church to determine for us what the Bible teaches, and to decide all our perplexing cases of conscience. This is human nature; and it is the claim to such infallibility by the Romish church which, as much, perhaps, as anything else, attracts the ignorant multitudes who submit themselves to her authority, and follow her banner. For she releases them from the painful responsibility of thought in deciding for themselves, from the teaching of the word, what they are to believe concerning God, and what duty he requires of them. We shall err if we think ourselves exempt from this temptation; and it is indispensable that we guard ourselves against it, if we would appreciate at its true value the evidence that God has laid upon us the solemn responsibility of distinguishing between that in his word which is moral and spiritual and that which is, so to speak, the material framework in which his saving truth is exhibited to our minds.

In the third place, all that has just been said is of equal force against the objection that our principle of interpretation implies low views of inspiration. For the question for us, surely, is not one of high or low, but simply, what is the

true view. Yet neither the highest nor the lowest is probably the truest. The former, indeed, would relieve us of the greatest amount of responsibility, but the latter would go far to rob us of the word of God. The antecedent probability would seem to be in favor of a middle ground, which proverbially is the safest:

"In mediis tutissimus ibis;"

in which, as we think, the most thoughtful and judicious have ever been found. But, however this may be, it seems both unphilosophical and unfair to hold the Scriptures responsible for infallible accuracy of statement and allusion in matters which they were not given to teach. The consistent application of the principle here advocated to all similar cases, cannot affect our views of inspiration in any other way than as they are necessarily affected by the interpretation which is always given to the phrase, "The sun rises and sets," or "goes forth and enters in." And upon what rational grounds can we expect the word of God to harmonize with the results of modern science in other similar allusions with more precision than we find in this typical expression?

Finally, the difficulties we meet in applying this principle to the cosmogony, which has been so often assailed and defended by arguments alike unsound, are, no doubt, the greatest of all. Yet it seems most unreasonable to require that the Bible, in this first chapter, should speak of physical phenomena in language scientifically correct and adequate, when it does this nowhere else. Nor is it possible so to interpret its words without imposing upon them a sense which they were not intended to bear, nor without peril to important moral and spiritual interests; that is to say, this method of procedure cannot fail to introduce far greater difficulties than those which it claims to remove.

For the interpretation which is now commonly adopted, and which is the most ably defended, for the purpose of reconciling the cosmogony with science, includes the following particulars: Moses exhibits the creation, not as it actually

took place, but as it appeared, or would have appeared, to an observer stationed upon the earth; what he calls the six days of creation were, in fact, geologic eras of immense duration; by the word firmament we are to understand the void expanse; the words create and make are to be distinguished from each other, the former as signifying creation, properly so-called, and the latter, formation out of pre-existing material, or simply, causing to appear. In support of this view, much stress is laid upon the order of creation, which, it is claimed, agrees with the results of modern science.

Now, against all this, we urge the following counter objections: first, the harshness and incongruity of the supposition that the creation is here represented not as it actually took place, but as it would have appeared to an observer upon the earth; inasmuch as when it commenced there was no earth; and if there had been, there was no observer to occupy it as a point of observation. Next, the order of creation here given does not agree with that which science requires, in that it represents the sun as having been created on the fourth day, and the plants on the third; whereas we know that the plants depend for their existence upon the light and heat of the sun, and could not have lived and flourished through a whole geologic age before the sun was created. Besides this, we have the cosmical dependence of the revolving planets upon the sun as their centre of attraction and motion, which renders it impossible to conceive of the earth as having been created three or four geologic ages before the sun. It was chiefly for the purpose of meeting this difficulty the supposition was devised, that the sun was not actually created, but only made its first appearance through the clouds during the fourth period; and this supposition its advocates would confirm by the fact that the word make, to which they give the sense of causing to appear, and not the word create, is here applied to the heavenly bodies. But this distinction cannot be maintained — it is perfectly arbitrary — for the two words with all their derivatives are used as equivalent, both in this account and throughout the

Hebrew Scriptures. Of this innumerable examples might be given, such as the following: "God created the heaven and the earth" .... "The Lord God made the earth and the heavens" .... "Remember thy Creator" .... "Let us kneel before the Lord our Maker." Also, on the fifth day, God created the living creatures, where, according to this distinction the word made ought to have been used, as it is in the case of vegetable life. Since, then, these words are used as equivalents, if one of them be thus limited to the sense of forming or causing to appear, the other may be also; in which case, for aught that appears in this account, there may never have been any true or proper creation, but matter may be eternal. The objections to understanding the word firmament, in the sense of a void expanse, have been already given. It remains only to point out that the word day is here clearly defined in its common meaning by the explicit statement, that each of the six days had its morning and evening; and with still greater precision by the consecration of the Sabbath on the ground that God himself, after the six days of creation, "rested on the seventh, and was refreshed." For if this seventh day be understood as of a different kind from the preceding six, the most fundamental law of logical analysis — that all the parts into which any given theme is analyzed must be obtained by one and the same principle — is violated. For if the first six days be taken as geologic eras, and the seventh as a period of twenty-four hours, we have seven parts which cannot be obtained from the theme by the application of any one principle of analysis. The force of this objection cannot fail to be appreciated by all students of logic and rhetoric, especially when their attention is called to this Mosaic account of the creation as, beyond comparison, the most perfect and beautiful specimen of analysis to be found within the whole compass of literature. In fine, that this word should have a different meaning, in other connections, where it occurs without any such definition, as "In the day that the Lord God made the earth and the heavens," is in strict accordance

with all the laws and usages of language. But to impose such a meaning upon it, in disregard of its connection, and in the face of this definition, is a violation not only of the nature of language, but also of the necessary laws of analytic thinking, such as tends to unsettle and confound all received principles of interpretation, and of thought itself.

These are some of the objections which lie against this method of harmonizing the Mosaic cosmogony with the results of modern science. Is it not evident that it imposes upon the words a sense which they were never intended to bear, imperils some of the most important of revealed truths, and thus introduces far greater difficulties than those which it claims to remove? But this is not all; for who can foresee where this procedure, applied to other parts of Scripture, may ultimately lead us? For it is not physical science alone with which we have to do. Anthropology, also, and psychology and biology, to say nothing of the science of historical criticism, are now putting in their claims to govern our interpretations of the word of God — sciences which have a direct bearing upon its moral and spiritual import. And when we come, for precisely similar reasons, to impose upon it every meaning which the sceptical tendencies of these sciences may seem to require, what is likely to become of the fall of man, of human depravity, of the incarnation, and the atonement?

These difficulties seem to us immeasurably greater than any which can arise from the principle of interpretation for which we here contend. For by it nothing in this cosmogony, or in any other part of the Bible, which can possibly be claimed as of any moral or spiritual import, is in the least affected. No such claim can be made for the length of time during which the work of creation was going on, nor for the order in which it took place, nor for any other forms or details of the picture, provided that God be understood to have created all things which are included in the universe. For evidently it was the object of the particularization given by Moses to cover this ground. But in these specifications

he speaks of the physical world, as it is spoken of everywhere else in the Scriptures, in free and popular language, in accordance with the impressions which it makes upon the senses, and with the conceptions of it which prevailed when he lived, and which he, no doubt, shared with all others of his time. All this, therefore, is to be taken as the material framework, so to speak, of this sublime picture of the creation of the world, in which it is revealed to our faith that there is but one only living and true God; that he is a free, personal Being, of infinite wisdom, power, and goodness; that he created all things that exist by the word of his power, especially man in his own image, and male and female; that he consecrated one day in seven as holy unto himself; and whatever else there may be in this account which is of any moral or spiritual significance. It would seem that these revealed truths are enough for one short chapter in the Bible; for they lie at the foundation of all true religion, in direct contradiction to atheism, materialism, pantheism, dualism, polytheism, idolatry, and fetichism — those great and deadly errors which have always dominated over the human mind wherever they have not been driven out by the revelation of himself which God has given us in the Holy Scriptures.

In conclusion, by the adoption and consistent application of this principle of interpretation, the malignant enemies of true religion — that seed of the serpent who are permitted to bruise the heel of the seed of the woman whilst he crushes their heads — would be deprived of their deadliest fangs. For, although they should find innumerable allusions and statements with respect to natural objects which are not in accordance with the scientific truths underlying the phenomena, what would it all amount to, more than is contained in the expression, "The sun rises and sets"? Science, moreover, would be left free to do her own great and blessed work, unimpeded by fear or misgiving lest her ever-multiplying discoveries might come into conflict with revealed truth. And as many of her votaries as are at all sensible of their

spiritual wants — who, no doubt, are as numerous as they are among any other people — would be relieved from their peculiar difficulties and temptations to unbelief, and would find that peace and joy which the gospel brings to the heart of every true believer. The aid which they would then bring to the defence of the Scriptures, and of our holy religion — who can estimate how great and effectual it would be? Also, the readers and interpreters of the word of God would be delivered from that sore temptation, with which they are now beset, to impose upon it meanings which it was never intended to bear, and which, without abuse, it cannot be made to bear — a procedure which must greatly injure the conscience, and mightily confound the science of hermeneutics. But that which is, perhaps, of greater importance than all other advantages is, that these "oppositions of science" would no longer dwarf and well-nigh paralyze the faith nor mar the peace of God's dear children, as in a multitude of cases they now do. Delivered from this incubus, the faith of the church might be expected to grow up to "the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ," and go forth to conquer the world.

ARTICLE IV.

IRENAEUS OF LYONS.

BY C. J. H. ROPES, RES. LIC., UNION SEM.

THE history of the second Christian century has always been the arena of theological controversy, never more than to-day. Critics and apologists of all opinions still find their views represented in this formative period. The present problem of church history is the rise of the old Catholic church. And in the last few years a party has arisen, calling itself by this time-honored name, and claiming to re-establish the old Catholic faith.

This, therefore, is a peculiarly appropriate time to invite attention to the most influential churchman of the second century, to the best representative of its doctrine and polity, to the champion of the old Catholic church in the hour of its greatest peril, to the first uninspired theologian who "on all the most important points conforms to the standard which has satisfied the Christian church ever since"[1] — to Irenaeus of Lyons. And yet, when we seek the foundation for these statements in the character of Irenaeus, in his life, in his book which describes the home of the church as a fortress against the gnostics, we may meet with disappointment; for in him we find no trace of the rugged individuality of Ignatius, of the brilliant rhetoric of Tertullian, of the wide range of Origen's speculation, of the creative intellect of Augustine. The individuality of Irenaeus seems almost lost in his catholicity; his rhetorical armory is the Bible, his speculation moves in the plane of the Scriptures, and his creations in theology are almost unnoticed, because so familiar. In fact, the great difficulty in characterizing

[1] Dr. Lightfoot, in Contemp. Rev., May 1875, p. 827, cf. Harvey's Irenaeus, i. p. clxxiii.

Irenaeus springs from the naturalness of his expressions, which relaxes the critical attention.

The worth of Irenaeus lies in his peculiar position, and in the fact that he was the right man to fill it. Many lines meet in him. Two long lives, overlapping by nearly thirty years, link Irenaeus with the Founder of Christianity. Polycarp was a faithful disciple of John, but a zealous student of Paul; and in Irenaeus we find united the anthropological, practical tenets of Paul and the sublime theology of John.[1]

Again, the youth of Irenaeus was spent in Asia Minor, the cradle of theology; but his life-work was done in Gaul, under the practical influences of the Western church. So we find in him head, heart, and hand joined together in many-sided work. Lipsius has ably described the change which turned the attention of Christians in the second century from the heavenly to the earthly kingdom.[2] They were no longer to "stand gazing up into heaven," but to extend and defend the faith. Here, again, Irenaeus unites both motives. He holds to the strong chiliastic hopes, and even to the gross realistic conceptions of the future; but he puts his hand vigorously to the work. We think of him as the great antagonist of gnosticism; and this he was. But while his book against the gnostics occupied a few of his later years, all his manhood's strength was given to his missionary work in Gaul. Trained in the school of John, and having all the advantages of a liberal education, growing up in the affluence of all Christian and intellectual privileges, he went in his prime as a missionary to the Celts of Lyons and Vienne. Before many years came the terrible persecution of A.D. 177. He escaped; but the bishop was martyred, and Irenaeus took the dangerous position. The work went on uninterruptedly until the dawn of the third century. Then another persecution; and, if a late tradition does not speak

[1] Such thoughts as these may be found more fully in the introductions to Duncker's Christologie des Irenaeus and Graul's Christliche Kirche an der Schwelle des Irenaeischen Zeitalters.

[2] Von Sybel's Historische Zeitschrift, 1872. p. 241 sqq.

falsely,[1] Irenaeus fell at his post, as Pothinus had done before him. Without touching on the wider personal influence of Irenaeus, let us notice some of the lines of doctrine which begin with this Father.

First, of the Bible. He first recognizes a definite canon, nearly co-extensive with ours, and rejects uncanonical writings. He first puts the same estimate that we put on the books of the New Testament. He first states, and in the main observes, a number of rules for exegesis. He even gives the first hint of text criticism, by deciding for the reading of "all the good and old copies."[2] Irenaeus is a most important witness to the use and authority of the whole Bible. He makes a truly Protestant use of the Scriptures, though of course he falls into many mistakes from which we ought to be preserved.

Secondly, of theology. We find for the first time a biblical theology, every doctrine moving along a road on which texts of Scripture are the milestones. Irenaeus starts with the foundation thought that God and man are not naturally wide apart nor uncongenial; but "the glory of God is a living man, and the life of man is to see God."[3] He can from this meeting-point follow theology to the sublimity of John's conception, and anthropology to the depths of Pauline doctrine. Irenaeus has the first Christology, as distinct from a Logos theology, and the first clear signs of a doctrine of the person of Christ, derived from his fundamental principle. In him we first find any fulness of expression about the Holy Spirit.

Even more prominent is Irenaeus as having the first scheme of anthropology. Irenaeus grasps firmly the organic unity of the race, the fall of Adam and its consequences to all, the redemption in Christ and its efficacy for all. These doctrines he elaborates with great minuteness, basing his teachings on the Pauline Epistles. His doctrinal influence

[1] Cf. Harvey's Irenaeus, i. p. clxii sq. Jerome and the Quaestiones ad Orthodoxos are the earliest witnesses for this tradition.

[2] Massuet's ed., v. 30, § 1. Oxford Trans., p. 519.

[3] Ibid., iv. 20. § 7. Oxford Trans., p. 369.

on later times may be illustrated from the fact that he first distinguishes between the image and the similitude of God in man, — a distinction which lies at the root of the Roman Catholic doctrine of man's constitution, — and that Luther quotes him in support of his own view of the sacrament.[1]

So much, in general,[2] to hint at the claims of Irenaeus for attention and interest. We shall return to these topics in the examination of the theology of Irenaeus, which is the main object of our study.

It is usual to preface such an examination with a detailed account of the man himself. This, however, must be given either with new materials, or at least from a new point of of view. The latest editor of Irenaeus,[3] Mr. Harvey, has supplied both, in that he defends with great plausibility the hypothesis that Irenaeus was a Syrian. Mr. Harvey argues that, while the name of Irenaeus does not at all necessarily show him to be a Greek, its rarity suggests the contrary. He further finds, in the Preface to the Adversus Haereses, a confession that Irenaeus is not at all at home with the Greek language. He discovers that Irenaeus was well versed in Hebrew; and, to crown all, he exhibits most extensive evidence that Irenaeus very frequently quotes from the Peschito. It must be confessed that this theory puts all the facts previously ascertained about Irenaeus in a new and, if it be true, a most perplexing light. Candid dealing compels us to consider it, before we can have any certain basis for the further examination of Irenaeus; and the discussion of it will give an incidental opportunity for noticing some interesting facts respecting the date and education of Irenaeus and the Bible he used, which have never hitherto been brought

[1] In the Erlangen ed. (in 67 vols. 1826–1857), Vol. xxx. pp. 144, 166 sqq.

[2] These *first* doctrines must be taken for what they are worth; although founded on a survey of the previous literature, and in most cases on other authority besides, yet some previous signs of these doctrines may have been overlooked.

[3] Sancti Irenaci Episcopi Lugdunensis libros quinque Adversus Haereses edidit W. Wigan Harvey. Cantabrigiae, MDCCCLVII. 2 vols. 8vo. (References to this work being numerous, will be made only by numbers indicating volume, page, and note).

together under his name. As we have hinted, it would be unjust to pass Mr. Harvey's theory by as if it were to be classed with the opinion expressed by Oecumenius that Irenaeus was a Gaul,[1] or with the assumption of Erasmus that he wrote in Latin.[2] The learning and authority of Mr. Harvey, his other publications in the department of patristic study,[3] the selection of him by the syndics of the Cambridge University Press to edit the works of Irenaeus, the amount of labor he expended on the preparation of the edition,[4] the high commendation accorded to it,[5] the countenance[6] and even partial assent[7] given to this very theory, last, and principally, the arguments already mentioned[8] in support of the theory — all combine to show that a candid examination of the question is necessary — all demand proof from us, if we are to hold that Irenaeus was not a Syrian.

In opposition to Mr. Harvey's theory it will be my purpose to prove that we need not abandon the opinion that Irenaeus was a Greek. This purpose will be best accomplished by establishing the antecedent probability that Irenaeus was a Greek, and by showing that the arguments adduced on the other side do not destroy that probability.

In support of the antecedent probability that Irenaeus was a Greek, it is to be noticed that:

I. The facts and dates of the early life of Irenaeus, so far

[1] Stieren, Hallische Encyklopaedie d. W. u. K., s. v. Irenaeus, note 2.

[2] Ibid., n. 71. Massuet Diss. ii. § 51. Erasmi Epist. nuncupatoria.

[3] Ecclesiae Anglicanae Vindex Catholicus, 1841. History and Theology of the Three Creeds, 1854. He has also published Prolusio Academica on Prov. viii. 22, and University Sermons.

[4] Athenaeum, 1858, Vol. i. p. 117. Mr. Harvey speaks of the preparation of one of the appendices to the work as "having kept him at work for several weeks during the summer months from five, and even four, o'clock in the morning till eleven at night."

[5] Bib. Sac. Vol. xvi. p. 250; Journal of Sac. Lit., Vol. xxi. p. 208; M'Clintock and Strong's Cyclopaedia, s. v. Irenaeus.

[6] Journal of Sac. Lit., l.c.; M'Clintock, etc., l.c.; Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Irenaeus, Vol. i. p. xviii.

[7] Ante-Nic. Lib. l. c. p. 14, n. 8.

[8] These arguments will be quoted in full when we come to examine them, they may be found, i. p. cliii sq.; cf. i. Preface, p. v.

as they can be ascertained, leave no room for the hypothesis that he was a Syrian.

Our knowledge of Irenaeus begins with the undisputed fact that he was the pupil of Polycarp. Let us look at the oft-quoted passage in the letter of Irenaeus to Florinus, which describes this connection:

"For I saw thee when I was still a boy (παῖς ὢν ἔτι) in Lower Asia, in company with Polycarp, while thou wast faring prosperously in the royal court, and endeavoring to stand well with him. For I distinctly remember (διαμνημονεύω) the incidents of that time better than events of recent occurrence; for the lessons received in childhood (ἐκ παίδων), growing with the growth of the soul, become identified with it; so that I can describe the very place in which the blessed Polycarp used to sit when he discoursed, and his goings out and his comings in, and his manner of life, and his personal appearance, and the discourses which he held before the people, and how he would describe his intercourse with John, and with the rest who had seen the Lord, and how he would relate their words. And whatsoever things he had heard from them about the Lord, and about his miracles, and about his teaching, Polycarp, as having received them from eye-witnesses of the life of the Word, would relate altogether in accordance with the Scriptures. To these (discourses) I used to listen at the time with attention, by God's mercy which was bestowed upon me, noting them down, not on paper, but in my heart; and by the grace of God I constantly ruminate upon them faithfully (γνησίως). And I can testify in the sight of God, that if the blessed and apostolic elder had heard anything of this kind [referring to the doctrines of Florinus], he would have cried out and stopped his ears, and said, after his wont, 'O good God, for what times hast thou kept me, that I should endure such things?' and would even have fled from the place where he was sitting or standing when he heard such words."[1]

1. We notice here, that Irenaeus was very young when he first saw Polycarp. "Still a boy," "in childhood," with a similar expression in the Adversus Haereses: "(Polycarp) whom we also saw in the first age of our life,"[2]

[1] ii. p. 471 sqq. Translation by Dr. Lightfoot, Contemp. Rev., May 1875, p. 833.

[2] ii. p. 12; ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμῶν ἡλικίᾳ. Oxford Trans., p. 208.

together with the style and details of his recollections,[1] and his description of the youthful memory which retained them,[2] all point to a period of life which begins, perhaps, about the eighth year. And the date is fixed by the reference to the royal court, according to an ingenious and appropriate suggestion of Dr. Lightfoot.

"About the year 136, T. Aurelius Fulvus was proconsul of Asia (Waddington, Fastes des provinces Asiatiques, p. 724). Within two or three years from his proconsulate he was raised to the imperial throne, and is known as Antoninus Pius. Florinus may have belonged to his suite, and Irenaeus in after years might well call the proconsul's retinue, in a loose way, the 'royal court' by anticipation. This explanation gives a visit of sufficient length, and otherwise fits in with the circumstances."[3]

This conjecture, combined with the preceding inferences, seems to show that Irenaeus was at least eight years old in A.D. 136. And this accords with the approximate date which Irenaeus gives for his own birth. Speaking of the Apocalyptic vision, he tells us, "at no long time ago was it seen, but almost in our generation, in the end of Domitian's reign."[4] The end of Domitian's reign is A.D. 96, and if we take a generation[5] roughly, as twenty-five to thirty years, and allow

[1] Cf. A. Reville in Rev. d. Deux Mondes, Feb. 1865, p. 1003; Beavan, Account of S. Irenaeus, p. 2 sq.

[2] Cf. Dr. Lightfoot, Contemp. Rev., May 1875, p. 834.

[3] Contemp. Rev., May 1875, p. 833 sq., note. The rest of the note shows that no other reference has so much in its favor as this to A.D. 136. Dr. Lightfoot's suggestion, may, perhaps, have been anticipated by Tillemont, who, however, did not elaborate it. Cf. his Hist. Eccles., Vol. ii. p. 362, and note. "A la cour de l'empereur." "D'Adrien, qui fut souvent en Orient jusqu'en 134, *ou plutot d'Antonin puisque S. Irenée ne naquit apparemment que vers l'an* 120." A.D. 120 is exactly the date Dr. Lightfoot (Contemp. Rev., Aug. 1876, p. 415) assigns for the birth of Irenaeus on the basis of his note, which we have quoted in the text. Still it must be doubted whether Tillemont (who put Polycarp's martyrdom as late as about 167) does not mean the Emperor's journey in the East, A.D. 154–157 (cf. Lipsius Zeitschr. für wissensch. theol. 1874, p. 190) rather than his proconsular stay there in 136.

[4] ii. p. 410; Οὐδὲ γὰρ πρὸ πολλοῦ χρόνον ἑωράθη, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας γενεᾶς, πρὸς τῷ τέλει τῆς Δομιτιανοῦ ἀρχῆς. Oxford Trans., p. 521.

[5] Cf. Leimbach. Zeitschr. für Luther. theol. 1874, p. 472 sq., ibid. 1873, p. 626 sq.; Dr. Lightfoot, Contemp. Rev., Aug. 1876, p. 415 note.

a little margin for the *almost*, we reach the conclusion that the birth of Irenaeus is to be placed A.D. 125–130. If the date A.D. 136 is to be accepted, then Irenaeus could hardly have been born later than A.D. 128, and it was possibly several years earlier; Dr. Lightfoot suggests A.D. 120. Leimbach and, following him, Hilgenfeld[1] have decided for about A.D. 126. I am inclined to think that the expressions used in the letter to Florinus point to an earlier age than sixteen, and the more probable inference from the date of the Apocalypse is in favor of a later date than A.D. 120. In this connection the opinions of earlier authorities deserve notice.

"Those who have placed it (the birth of Irenaeus) as late as A.D. 140, have chosen this date on the ground of the relation of Irenaeus to Polycarp in his old age,[2] and on the supposition that Polycarp was martyred A.D. 167. Since, however, it has recently been shown that Polycarp suffered A.D. 155 or 156, it may be presumed that these critics would now throw the date of his pupil's birth some ten or twelve years farther back, i.e. to about A.D. 128 or 130."[3]

Thus the testimony here cited would be in favor of A.D. 128 rather than 120. Therefore, while all is guesswork, perhaps about A.D. 126 is the most probable date. All, however, that we need to establish here is, that Irenaeus first listened to Polycarp in early boyhood, and this, while implied in his language to Florinus, is confirmed by all the data.

[1] Leimbach. l. c. Hilgenfeld, Zeitschr. für wissensch. theol. 1874, p. 319.

[2] It should be mentioned, as Dr. Lightfoot notes, (as also Leimbach, l.c. 1873, p. 620) that these authorities had an unsound reason for their late date of Irenaeus, since they connected *πάνυ γηραλέος* (ii. p. 12) with the time when Irenaeus saw Polycarp, not, as the order plainly indicates, with the time of his martyrdom, — *ὃν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἑωράκαμεν ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμῶν ἡλικίᾳ ἐπὶ πολὺ γὰρ παρέμεινε, καὶ πάνυ γηραλέος, ἐνδόξων καὶ ἐπιφανέστατα μαρτυρήσας, ἐξῆλθε τοῦ βίου.*

[3] Quoted from Dr. Lightfoot, Contemp. Rev., Aug. 1876, p. 415. For the new date of Polycarp's martyrdom, cf. Waddington, Memoires de l'Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, Tom. xxvi. Pars. i. 1867, p. 203 sqq. Lipsius, Zeitschr. für wissensch. theol. 1874, p. 188 sqq. Hilgenfeld, ibid., pp. 120, note, 325 sq. Gebhardt, Zeitschr. für hist. theol., 1875, p. 377 sqq. Dr. Lightfoot, Contemp. Rev., May 1875, p. 838.

2. It is to be noticed, secondly, that Irenaeus remained some time as a pupil of Polycarp. The style of the references to the venerable elder point to this. The minute acquaintance with his ways and habits, the constant reference to certain actions as customary with him, even to the prediction of what he would do and say under certain circumstances, — the fact, in short, that Irenaeus had learned Polycarp by heart, — indicates a prolonged intercourse. The expression, "in the first age of our life," would sanction a similar inference. There are hints, moreover, that Irenaeus was with Polycarp *at*, and therefore probably *up to*, a very late period in the life of the latter. In his letter to Victor, Irenaeus speaks of Polycarp's visit to Rome, and gives details of his discussions with Anicetus and their agreeing to differ on the subject of the Eucharist.[1] In another place, speaking of the same visit to Rome, he asserts that Polycarp "converted to God's church many of the forementioned heretics," and describes minutely his meeting with Marcion, which was probably, at the same time and place.[2] When, therefore, we find that Polycarp was in Rome only a year or two before his martydom, and that Irenaeus was probably in Rome at the time his teacher was martyred,[3] we reach the presumption (against which, so far as I know, nothing can be alleged) that Irenaeus was the companion of the aged Polycarp on his journey to Rome, and was left there, when the latter returned to meet his end in Smyrna. The probability, then, — for it is, of course, no more, — seems to be, that Irenaeus was a pupil of Polycarp from early boyhood to developed manhood. Hence, if he ever learned Syriac, it must have

[1] ii. p. 476. Oxford Trans., p. 541 sq.

[2] ii. p. 12 sqq. Oxford Trans., p. 208. Zahn (Ignatius von Antiochien, p. 476) thinks that the meeting with Marcion did not occur in Rome; but cf. Hilgenfeld, Zeitschr. für wissensch. theol., 1874, p. 323, and note, Lipsius, ibid., p. 206 and note.

[3] This information is contained in a note at the end of the Moscow MS. of the Martyrium Polycarpi, and may be found in Pat. Apost. Opp., edd. Gebhardt, Harnack, Zahn. Pars. i. Fasc. ii. (1876), p. 167 sq. Gebhardt (Zeitschr. für hist. theol., 1875, p. 368). A. Harnack (Zeitschr. für Kirchengesch., 1876, p. 121). Dr. Lightfoot (Contemp. Rev., Aug. 1876, p. 417 note), all agree with Zahn, in thinking it probable that Irenaeus was then in Rome.

been (as Mr. Harvey assumes) before he first saw Polycarp. Let us try to unite hypothetically the two theories.

On Mr. Harvey's supposition Irenaeus was born in Syria, and early instructed in the Syriac Scriptures. So intense was his application and so earnest his study, that a great part of the New Testament was, word for word, impressed on his memory. This will be conceded by any one who will carefully examine the numerous (over one hundred) texts in which Irenaeus deviates (according to the theory) from his Greek text to follow the Syriac. They occur in every book from Matthew to 1st Timothy. They are often concerned with changes so slight as to be retained only by a very accurate verbal memory, which Irenaeus does not seem to have possessed.[1] These changes appear, many of them, in passages that would, among us at least, scarcely interest, or be retained by, the youthful mind. And often they are suddenly discovered in a passage of such length that it must have been copied bodily from the writer's Greek Bible manuscript, proving that the influence of memory was, in these places, strong enough directly to induce a change of reading. To crown all, this marvellous memory was exercised in the "Adversus Haereses" fifty years, if not more, after the writer said farewell to the Syriac Scriptures. For he was removed to Smyrna, learned Greek, and, in early boyhood, he was listening easily and attentively to Polycarp, in the newly adopted language. Such a mental history is extraordinary to the point of incredibility when no hint of it appears; and, no doubt, it is Mr. Harvey's consciousness of this which leads him to extend the term "the first age of our life" to the thirtieth year.[2] But the facts and dates

[1] For, he writes it *Siloa* for *Bethesda*, ii. p. 166; *High-priest's daughter*, for *daughter of ruler of synagogue*, ii. p. 355; *three* spies for *two*, ii. p. 224; omits all mention of John, Luke vii. 51, i. p. 339; quotes a verse from Mark, which is not found in that Gospel, ii. p. 158; after quoting 1 John ii. 18 cites 2 John 7 as from the *aforementioned* epistle, ii. pp. 86, 89; refers one passage to Isaiah and Jeremiah — it is found in neither, ii. pp. 108, 228; cf. Justin, Dial. c. Tryph. c. 72.

[2] i. p. clv.; cf. p. 331, n. 1; ii. p. 12, n. i.

of the early life of Irenaeus (though probabilities are all we have to show for them) destroy the chronological basis of Mr. Harvey's theory.

II. The education of Irenaeus is strong evidence of his Greek nationality, and its wide range makes an additional Syriac education very improbable — there is not room for both. Let us notice the names of some of the authors cited by Irenaeus, as evidence of his education.[1] Homer's Odyssey and Iliad were so well known to him that he even makes a cento of lines from all parts of them, to illustrate the absurd combinations of the gnostics.[2] Four other references to Homer may be noticed.[3] Hesiod, Empedocles, Stesichorus, Aesop, Pindar, Sophocles, Antiphanes, Menander, Anaxilaus,[4] all come in for a familiar allusion. A few names of Greek philosophers may also be mentioned — those being selected to whose opinions reference is made. Thales, Anaximander, Anaxagoras, Pythagoras, Democritus, Epicurus, and especially Plato,[5] are thus cited. Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Cynics are noticed.[6] Such a list of allusions in a work which has no immediate and special reference to philosophy, argues a wide acquaintance with Greek literature.

At least equal to his classical learning was the familiarity of Irenaeus with early Christian literature. There is scarcely a work that has been preserved to our time from which he does not borrow, and there are some of which we know only what Irenaeus tells us.[7] Clement of Rome,[8] Hermas,[9] Ignatius,[10]

[1] Cf. Stieren, De fontibus Irenaei, § 19 sq.; Ziegler, Irenaeus, p. 17 sq.

[2] i. p. 87. It may be objected that Irenaeus perhaps only quoted the cento, but in any case he assigns the different lines to their respective places and speakers with an ease which shows he *could* have constructed the cento.

[3] i. pp. 110, 289, 322; ii. p. 258.

[4] i. pp. 296, 226, 294, 192, 275, 326; ii. p. 356; i. pp. 287, 315, 115.

[5] i. pp. 289, 290, 299, 291; Plato, i. pp. 292, 293, 294, 378; ii. pp. 135, 136.

[6] i. pp. 295, 296, 373.

[7] E.g. the writings, or lectures, of the elders, and the treatise of Justin against Marcion; cf. Euseb. H. E. iv. 11; Phot. cod., 125 (Semisch, Justin der Märtyrer, i. p. 57).

[8] ii. p. 10.

[9] ii. p. 213.

[10] ii. p. 403. Cf. Pat. Apost. Opp., edd. Gebhardt, Harnack, Zahn. Pars. i. Fasc. 2 (1876), p. 331, and the references there given.

Polycarp,[1] and Tatian[2] are quoted and referred to by name. There is at least one exact verbal parallel in Irenaeus to the epistle to Diognetus.[3] Several echoes of the Epistle of Barnabas must be noticed, and they are too numerous and too exact to be indirect.[4] Irenaeus probably borrowed largely, especially in the exegesis of certain passages, from elders[5] of whom we know definitely nothing further. So extensive and detailed are these references to "the elders," that Dr. Lightfoot supposes notes of lectures heard by Irenaeus to be their source.[6] Papias of Hierapolis is responsible for "considerable parts of the fifth book of Irenaeus."[7] But greater than to any other writer are the obligations of Irenaeus to Justin Martyr. Twice Irenaeus cites him by name.[8] Further, Semisch has collected from Irenaeus eight quotations taken from the First Apology, the Trypho, and the Fragment on the Resurrection.[9] I am

[1] ii. pp. 12, 14.

[2] i. p. 220; ii. p. 130. There is, however, here no quotation of the works of Tatian, but only of his doctrine. The works of the other Greek apologists, Athenagoras and Theophilus, could hardly be accessible to Irenaeus when he wrote.

[3] Ep. ad Diognetum, c. vii. (p. 310 ed. Hefele) *βιὰ γὰρ οὐ πρόσεστι θεῷ*. Cf. Irenaeus, ii. p. 238.

[4] Christ laid aside his glory because man could not have endured the sight of it. Ep. Barnab. c. iv.; Iren. ii. p. 293; Isa. l. 8, 9, quoted in a peculiar reading Ep. Barnab. c. vi., Iren. ii. p. 268, very different from the same quotation Justin i. Apol. c. 38 or the LXX. Milk (or butter) and honey as the first food of an infant, used to explain Ex. xxxiii. 3, Ep. Barnab. c. vi.; Isa. vii. 15, Iren. ii. p. 116. This parallel, however, cannot be insisted on, for the idea is a common one, cf. Cotel. ad loc. (Ep. Barnab. c. vi). Allegorical interpretation of "chewing the cud," Ep. Barnab. c. x.; Iren. ii. p. 340 sq. "The day of the Lord is as a thousand years" (Ps. xc. 4; 2 Pet. iii. 8?), used to prove the end of the world in 6000 years from its creation, Ep. Barnab. c. xv.; Iren. ii. p. 403.

[5] E.g. *ὁ κρείσσων ἡμῶν*, i. pp. 3, 119; ii. p. 95; *πρεσβύτης*, i. p. 155 sq.; ii. pp. 238, 248, 251, 254, 331, 372, 428 *bis*. Cf. Dr. Lightfoot, Contemp. Rev., Oct. 1875, p. 840 sqq.; Hilgenfeld, Zeitschr. für wissensch. theol., 1874, p. 343 sq.

[6] Contemp. Rev., Oct. 1875, p. 841, note.

[7] Ibid., p. 845.

[8] ii. pp. 158, 396; cf. i. p. 220.

[9] Semisch (Justin der Märtyrer, Breslau, 1840; i. pp. 59, 83, 148), gives 1 Apol. 15, Iren. i. p. 372; c. 22, i. p. 364; c. 12, ii. p. 8; c. 43, ii. 290; Dial c. Tryph. c. 6, Iren. i. p. 383; c. 84, ii. p. 118; c. 110, ii. p. 272; de Resurr. c. 8, Iren. ii. 335.

able to add to these a number of instances in which the similarity of thought is too great to be accidental.[1] No doubt a systematic comparison would greatly enlarge this list of parallels from Justin; but these are enough, with those which precede them, to suggest the extent and accuracy of the acquaintance of Irenaeus with Christian literature. Let it be remembered that we possess only a part of the works of Irenaeus, and but a small fraction of that early literature which he quotes.[2] As the treatises quoted were all written in Greek, acquaintance with them creates, so far forth, a presumption of Greek nationality.

It would seem probable that the studies which supplied these references were prosecuted mainly before the departure of Irenaeus from Asia Minor. Some of the books would hardly be accessible in Gaul, and we know that the missionary zeal of Irenaeus led him to make so constant a use of the language of that country that he felt it to be destructive of the elegance and polish of his vernacular style.[3] We may, perhaps, infer that during the period when he wrote

[1] Apparent contradictions of Scripture, Tryph. c. 65; Iren. i. p. 351. *παρθένος*, Isa. vii. 14; Tryph. c. 67; Iren. ii. p. 110 sqq. Authority of the LXX, Tryph. c. 68; Iren. ii. p. 111 sqq. Symbolism of the Cross, 1 Apol. c. 54; Tryph. c. 91; Iren. i. p. 339; ii. p. 272. Amalek destroyed by the cross, Tryph. cc. 91, 131; Ep. Barnab. c. xii.; Iren. ii. pp. 232, 256. Christ in the burning bush, 1 Apol. cc. 62, 63; Tryph. 60, 127; Iren. ii. p. 172. Prophecy unfulfilled because to be realized in Christ, 1 Apol. c. 35; Iren. ii. pp. 270 sq. Christ's descent into hell foretold by Jeremiah, Tryph. c. 72; Iren. ii. p. 228. Argument for resurrection of the body, 1 Apol. c. 19; Iren. ii. p. 326. Eve and the Virgin Mary, Tryph. c. 100; Ep. ad Diognet. c. xii. (p. 320 ed. Hefele); Iren. ii. p. 376. Simon and Helena, 1 Apol. c. 26; Iren. i. p. 190 sqq. How Adam died on the day of the fall (Ps. xc. 4; 2 Pet. iii. 8?), Tryph. c. 81; Iren. ii. p. 387. Moral freedom and responsibility, 1 Apol. c. 43; Iren. ii. p. 286 sqq. Etymology of the word *Satan*, Tryph. c. 103; Iren. ii. p. 383. The Eucharist, 1 Apol. cc. 13, 66; Tryph. cc. 41, 70, 117; Iren. ii. pp. 197 sq., 318 sq., etc.

[2] To take a single example which will illustrate the probability that Irenaeus's obligations to Christian literature were far beyond what we can now detect; we know Justin wrote a work against all heresies (cf. 1 Apol. c. 26), as well as his treatise against Marcion. Irenaeus quotes the latter at least once, how much more we can only guess. But the former would probably yield him a far greater store of knowledge, if we may judge by the quotations of Hippolytus and Epiphanius from Irenaeus.

[3] i. p. 6 (praefatio).

the Adversus Haereses his Greek studies would be principally confined to those heretical treatises which he undertook to refute.[1] The Greek education of Irenaeus makes it probable that he was a Greek; since it is too thorough to be a secondary layer on previous Oriental learning, and too broad to have left opportunity for the anterior acquisition of Syriac.

III. Silence furnishes us with an argument against the supposition that Irenaeus was a Syrian. Why does Irenaeus nowhere speak of the Syriac language or literature, even when he is dealing with gnostic teachers, many of whom "learned their craft in Syria"?[2] Why did Irenaeus seek to hide his Syrian origin? And how did he succeed in concealing it not only from open mention, but even from the slightest incidental allusion by himself or any of his contemporaries and near successors?[3] Why, in short, did no one ever suspect that Irenaeus was a Syrian, till the year 1857, when a scholar, whose specialty is confessedly Syriac,[4] discovers some Syriac analogies in the biblical quotations of this Father, and infers his Syrian nationality?

IV. We have already prepared the way to our last argument here — the consensus of authorities that Irenaeus was a Greek. If we value, in such questions as this, the opinion expressed by intimate friends, then should the conviction of those who have long and laboriously made the acquaintance of Irenaeus in his writings here carry weight as an argument from the general impression received by them. That Ireneaus was a Greek is the almost unanimous opinion of those who have made this Father a study.[5] Oecumenius is an

[1] Cf. Stieren, de fontibus Irenaei, Harvey's Irenaeus, i. pp. 4, 242.

[2] i. p. lxv.

[3] Those adduced by Mr. Harvey being omitted till their value is ascertained.

[4] Mr. Harvey's edition of Irenaeus shows this; cf. also Athenaeum, 1858, Vol. i. p. 117.

[5] E.g. Dodwell, Grabe, Tillemont, Massuet, Stieren, Ziegler, Kling (in Herzog's Encyclopaedie), Reville, l.c. p. 1003 s. etc. Those who express no decided opinion are, of course, not reckoned, e.g. Ante-Nic. Lib. Iren., i. p. xviii., McClintock and Strong's Cyclopaedia, s.v. Irenaeus.

exception; but even with him the epithet "Gallic" may be intended rather for the bishop than for the man.[1]

Mr. Harvey's theory has, therefore, against it the weight of authority. We must conclude that — from the dates and events of the life of Irenaeus, from his education as shown in his writings, from his otherwise unnatural silence respecting Syriac and kindred subjects, and from the consensus of those (Mr. Harvey, of course, excepted) who are best qualified to judge — there exists a strong antecedent probability that Irenaeus was a Greek, and not a Syrian.

With this probability to aid us, let us proceed to examine the arguments of Mr. Harvey.

I. "The name Εἰρηναῖος, of no common occurrence in Greek nomenclature, may have been the substitute for some Syrian equivalent, as Saul became Paul, and as the Orientally descended philosopher Malcho became known by the adopted name of Porphyry; the more obvious equivalent, Basileides, having been already appropriated by a predecessor from the East."[2]

It is true, Irenaeus is not a common name; but it is not very rare. Besides appearing at least six times in Attic monumental inscriptions, it was borne by an epigrammatic poet of the anthology, by an Alexandrian grammarian (Pacatus), and, later, by a bishop of Tyre.[3] The analogy of Saul and Paul is of no weight here; for it is a change from Hebrew to Latin for a person who spent most of his subsequent life among Greeks, and we do not know either the motive or the nature of the change. Paul is not a translation of Saul. Perhaps the best conjecture is that it was Saul's Roman name as a citizen of Tarsus, and therefore naturally used by his Gentile friends.[4] On the other hand, Irenaeus is (by the supposition) a translation from Syriac to Greek. There is no assignable motive for the change;

[1] Stieren, Hallische Encyklop. p. 358. Feuardent, de vita Irenaei.

[2] This argument would seem to be borrowed from Dodwell (Diss. in Iren. (Oxon. 1689), Diss. v. § 1), who attaches no weight to it.

[3] Stephani Thesaur. s. v. Εἰρηναῖος; cf. also Pape, Wörterbuch der Griech. Eigennamen, p. 336. An Irenaeus, bishop of Ululi, attended the Council of Carthage, A.D. 256.

[4] Smith's Bible Dict., s.v. Saul, No. 3.

since, if it had been made in order to be understood, we should expect that later, in Gaul, he would alter his name (like his namesake, the grammarian) to Pacatus. The change from Malcho to Porphyry is appropriate, so far that it is a translation, though a loose one; but it is obvious that many motives might lead a Neo-platonist philosopher to translate his name, particularly when that name meant "king," and could be rendered (as we should say) "born in the purple." But no such motives would apply in the case of this modest Christian Father; no advantage would accrue from translating a name meaning peaceable. Of course, the most natural supposition is that Irenaeus was the only name this Father ever bore; since there is no trace whatever of any other, and since it is probable, on other grounds, that he was a Greek.

II. "Irenaeus apologizes for his roughness of style, as betraying the conscious imperfection of a writer who is not handling his own vernacular language, and hardly feels at home with the idioms that force of circumstances has compelled him to use. If Greek had been his native tongue, there would have been little danger that his style should be debased through barbarian contact."

The apology referred to runs thus:

"But thou wilt not require of us, who dwell among Celts, and converse for the most part in a foreign language, skill in discourse which we have not learned, nor power of composition which we have not practised, nor eloquence of phrase, nor persuasiveness, of which we know nothing. Rather in simplicity and truth and plainness the things which are written to thee lovingly, thou wilt lovingly accept, and what is more, wilt cherish them within thyself, as being more competent than we are, receiving them from us as a kind of seeds and principles. That which we have briefly expressed, thou wilt cause to bear much fruit in the wide field of thine understanding, and wilt forcibly represent to them that are with thee what we have but faintly detailed."[1]

The general tenor and tone of this preface, laudatory of the reader, deprecatory of the writer, is perfectly natural and usual in an ancient work, without any suspicion of the

[1] Oxford Trans. pp. 2 sq.

use by the author of a language not his own.[1] There is here no apology for "roughness of style," but only for plainness and simplicity; and the reason given for it is not the general "barbarian contact;" but the specific "converse for the most part in a foreign language." It is difficult to see why Mr. Harvey should assume that, if Irenaeus were a native Greek, his style would not thus suffer in point of rhetorical elegance. It is an experience familiar to any one who has resided for some years in a foreign land, and used its language almost exclusively, that his command over the literary resources of his vernacular becomes very much weakened, even while his power of conducting an ordinary conversation with a fellow-countryman remains comparatively unimpaired. Most foreign missionaries can bear testimony to the truth of this; and Irenaeus was a Greek missionary sent to the Gauls of the Rhone valley. It appears, then, that this apology, in all its details, is perfectly natural from a Greek who was compelled to be constantly using the Celtic or the Latin language. The very expression *βάρβαρον διάλεκτον* for a foreign language marks the writer as a Greek.[2] Further, this apology would be unnatural, almost disingenuous, in one who was really writing in a foreign language, since it fails to mention that fact here, where, if anywhere, it would be expected.

Another fact should be noticed in this connection. It would certainly be a strange thing for Irenaeus, if a Syrian, to discuss the style of an author who used the Greek language. Yet we know, from his own words, that he wrote a treatise on the "transpositions" so common in the Pauline Epistles.[3]

But the style of Irenaeus does not need the apology, for it is neither "rough" nor "debased." We have seen that the terms of the apology could not be used to prove that Irenaeus wrote in a foreign language. Now we may advance a step, and assert that the apology proves nothing but the

[1] If an instance be needed, cf. Cyprian, Epist. ad Donatum.
[2] Cf. Ziegler, Irenaeus, p. 14.
[3] ii. p. 25.

modesty of Irenaeus and his devotion to the missionary work. For the style of his book nowhere betrays the defects he mentions. On the contrary, the style of the Adversus Haereses, which even Mr. Harvey does not impeach, is a strong argument for the Greek nationality of its author.[1] It will be enough, in this connection, to illustrate the fact, that from Jerome to Ziegler there has been a great unanimity of opinion on this subject.

Jerome bears witness "that the books of Irenaeus against heresies are written in a most learned and eloquent style." And Massuet adds: "The Greek text, so far as preserved, is elegant, polished, and dignified, and couched in terms appropriate, expressive, and befitting both the subjects treated and the thought and purpose of Irenaeus."[2]

Even more to our present point, Ziegler: "His management of the Greek, in spite of all his modest words, displays, even in his first book, — alone preserved to us entire in the original, — a command over the language and a facility in its use which would be very surprising in one who was not a Greek."[3] And even Erasmus, who supposed the miserable Latin translation to be the original, testifies that "the flow of his discourse on subjects so difficult and obscure is yet elegant, clear, methodical, and connected."[4] It is true some

[1] Cf. Ziegler, Irenaeus, p. 14.

[2] Massuet, Diss. ii. § 51. "Hieronymus optimus styli aestimator, testatur in sua ad Theodoram viduam epistola, Irenaei libros Adversus Haereses *doctissimo et eloquentissimo sermone compositos esse* ..... Graecus textus, qui superest, elegans est, nitidus et gravis, verbisque constat propriis significantibus, ac tum ad res ipsas, tum ad Irenaei mentem et scopum accommodatissimis."—Cf. §§ 4, 44. Also Tert. in Val. c. 5; Hier. in Ezech. c. 36; Tillemont, Hist. Eccles. Vol. iii. p. 80.

[3] Ziegler, Irenaeus, p. 14. "Seine Handhabung des Griechischen lässt, trotz aller bescheidenen Worte, auch schon in dem ersten, uns allein vollständig Griechisch erhaltenen, Buche seines Werkes, eine Herrschaft über die Sprache und eine Leichtigkeit in ihrem Gebrauche erkennen, die bei einem Nichtgriechen sehr in Verwunderung setzen müsste."

[4] Erasmi Epist. nuncupatoria: "Sermonis cursus in rebus tam spinosis ac perplexis, immo fastidii plenis, dilucidus, digestus, ac sibi cohaerens." — Cf. Dr. Lightfoot, Contemp. Rev., Aug. 1876, p. 418. "His (Irenaeus's) work is systematic and occasionally shows great acuteness."

minor criticisms have been made, not wholly without justice, on the style of Irenaeus; but none of these are such as to affect his nationality.[1]

We conclude, then, the style of Irenaeus gives no ground for the supposition that he was a Syrian, but, on the contrary, strongly supports his Greek origin. Any lingering doubt on this subject may be dispelled by a comparison of the style of Epiphanius the Syrian with the Greek of Irenaeus.

III. "A respectable knowledge of the Hebrew tongue. It is hoped, also, that the Hebrew attainments (see General Index, Irenaeus — knowledge of Hebrew) of Irenaeus will no longer be denied."[2]

This is all that Mr. Harvey says, in general; so we pass to the particular instances adduced. A few words, however, are necessary to show where the argument hinges. Mr. Harvey ascribes every mistake to the ignorance of the transcribers; so that we shall have to distinguish between probable and improbable errors of transcription. I accept most of Mr. Harvey's explanations of the truth at bottom, and heartily believe *him* to be a learned and acute Oriental scholar; but I cannot beg the question, and refer all mistakes to transcribers or (*really* Syrian) heretics, "because the errors are unworthy of the venerable Father."[3] The fact that Origen alone of the Ante-Nicene Fathers knew Hebrew,

[1] E.g. Brit. and For. Evang. Rev., Jan. 1869, pp. 3 sq.; Ante-Nic. Lib., Iren. Vol. i. p. xvii.; Reville, in Rev. d. Deux Mondes, Feb. 1865, p. 1007. So far as these criticisms do not apply to the Latin translation only, they seem to be founded on an unhistorical undervaluation of the importance, in the second century, of fully exposing the absurdities of the gnostics and of reiterating the arguments against them. As an extreme instance of this, cf. Theol. of Early Chr. Church, by Dr. J. Bennett (Lond. 1855), p. 21. "We cannot wonder that the well-intentioned Father (Irenaeus) was blamed by his contemporaries (?) for so deeply exploring and publishing to the world the ravings of madmen, of which a full length report forms his first book. The second is a repetition of what did not deserve to be told once, and an attempt to reason with men who set reason at defiance." What would those German critics who affirm that *Irenaeus* did not sufficiently realize the importance of gnosticism, say to this?

[2] i. Preface, p. v.

[3] Cf. notes; i. pp. 334, 386.

and even he imperfectly,[1] joined to the probability, previously set forth, that Irenaeus was a Greek, makes a more critical estimate necessary.

The first instances adduced by Mr. Harvey to prove the reality and extent of the Hebrew attainments of Irenaeus are the two Marcosian formulae.[2]

We cite the Greek as more secure from error than the Latin. Here is the first: Ἄλλοι δὲ Ἑβραϊκά τινα ὀνόματα ἐπιλέγουσι, πρὸς τὸ μᾶλλον καταπλήξασθαι τοὺς τελειουμένους, οὕτως· βασεμὰ χαμοσσὴ βααιανορὰ μισταδία ῥοναδὰ, κουστὰ βαβοφὸρ καλαχθεῖ. Τούτων δ' ἡ ἑρμηνεία ἐστὶ τοιαύτη· Ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν δύναμιν τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπικαλοῦμαι φῶς ὀνομαζόμενον, καὶ πνεῦμα ἀγαθὸν, καὶ ζωή· ὅτι ἐν σώματι ἐβασίλευσας. Mr. Harvey restores the text of the formula thus: βασεμὰ Ἀχαμῶθ Ἄβα οὐὰ νοῦρα μιστάμια Ροῦα δακούδσα βαφούρκαν μελάχθει. These words [he adds] are Syriac, and mean: In nomine sophiae Patris, et Lucis, quae vocata est spiritus Sanctitatis, in Redemptionem angelicam. Now, I accept Mr. Harvey's explanation, and am willing to concede that ignorant transcribers might have made the formula of the text out of Mr. Harvey's; though I think it probable Irenaeus did not write it faultlessly. For — and this is noteworthy — Irenaeus says it was Hebrew, Mr. Harvey shows it to be Syriac,[3] Irenaeus says it means one thing, Mr. Harvey something differing from that *toto coelo*. Mr. Harvey knows much Hebrew and Syriac, and is probably right. The inference is irresistible that Irenaeus knows little Hebrew, less Syriac, and is inextricably wrong. It is inconceivable that Ἑβραϊκά is a transcriber's error for Συριακά, or the translation in the Greek a simple distortion of that which Mr. Harvey gives; especially as the Latin text, which has an entirely independent history, gives the whole in an exactly similar rendering.[4]

[1] Blunt, Early Fathers, p. 158 (but Hegesippus perhaps knew Hebrew (cf. Euseb. H. E. iv. 22), and Melito of Sardis was certainly acquainted with both Hebrew and Syriac, cf. Otto, Corp. Apol. Vol. ix. pp. 374 sq., 418; Euseb. H. E. iv. 22; Etheridge, Horae Aramaicae, p. 46, note 2; Dr. Lightfoot, Contemp. Rev., Feb. 1876, p. 479).

[2] i. pp. 183, 184; cf. Hitzig, Gebet der Marcosier erklärt., Zeitschr. für wissensch. theol. 1858, p. 313 sqq.

[3] If Irenaeus did not distinguish Hebrew and Aramaic (cf. note 4, p. 306), we can lay no stress on the difference of "Hebrew" and "Syriac" here.

[4] Except that ἀγαθόν is untranslated in the Latin, as in the second formula *Christi* is unrepresented in the Greek.

If these simple words are not copied with approximate correctness, then no part of our text is to be trusted. The second formula, being exactly like the first in the knowledge (or ignorance) of Hebrew displayed, may be omitted. We come next to some Hebrew etymologies.[1] "Jesus autem nomen secundum propriam Hebraeorum linguam, literarum est duarum et dimidiae, sicut periti eorum dicunt, significans Dominum qui continet coelum et terram, quia Jesus secundum antiquam Hebraicam linguam coelum est, terra autem iterum sura usser dicitur. Verbum ergo quod coelum et terra habet, ipse est Jesus." The truth at the bottom of this seems to be that יְשׁוּ, the abbreviation of the Hebrew for Jesus (יְהוֹשׁוּעַ), may possibly be counted as two and a half letters; though this is a matter of conjecture, no instances of such counting being adduced from rabbinical writings by any editor. יְשׁוּ contains the initials of יְהוָֹה, שָׁמַיִם, וָאָרֶץ (though of course in the last word the initial is *and* (ו), the first letter of *earth* being א), Jehovah, heaven, and earth; and "sura usser" is gibberish pure and simple, in spite of Mr. Harvey's efforts to interpret it essentially thus: sura = s'ma = שָׁמַיִם. usser = user = uers = וָאָרֶץ (!)

It is easy to see that making Jesus *signify* "Dominum eum qui continet coelum et terram" on the true basis referred to, is a mistake of ignorance, not of transcription; and the exposition is in other ways too distorted to be, in its errors, solely the work of copyists. Not to be tedious by noting all the details, let us merely remark, that Irenaeus makes the whole statement not on his own authority (as one with a knowledge of Hebrew would, cf. Epiphanius), but introduces it with "sicut eorum periti dicunt," which is conclusive as to this Father's well-founded modesty on the subject of Hebrew.

The next instance in order is in the text a hopeless tangle on the subject of the Hebrew alphabet.[2] Mr. Harvey has certainly done more than any previous authority to show that it is possible some truth may have originally given rise to a statement now so obscure; but to father the simple assertion of that truth on Irenaeus, in the face of the present text, is impossible. It would take so long and be so fruitless to go into this thoroughly, that we can only recommend those who suspect we are shirking a strong argument to read Mr. Harvey's notes, and judge for themselves how much of the Hebrew belongs to Irenaeus, how much to his learned editor. And

[1] i. p. 334.

[2] i. p. 335 sq.

here it is appropriate to add that Mr. Harvey's notes[1] show either an entire ignorance or a profound knowledge of Hebrew in Irenaeus — a knowledge superior to that displayed by Epiphanius, the Syrian. The words Baruch,[2] Eloae and Elocuth, Adonai, Sabaoth, Jaōth and Jaŏth[3] are all discussed; but I will not weary the reader with a succession of mistakes like those we have reviewed.

It is worth while to compare with these evidences of the Hebrew attainments of Irenaeus the manner and matter of the references to that language in the Panarion of Epiphanius. Here we have a real Syrian, who possessed a respectable knowledge of Hebrew, and whose text cannot have suffered more from the copyists than the Greek text of Irenaeus; for it is the source from which most of the latter is obtained.

The difference between Epiphanius and Irenaeus in point of Hebrew is salient; but we have space only for a few references:[4] Scytharum, Phares, names of sun and planets, Osseni, Iel Xai, and especially Ps. cix. 3.[5] Of course, Epiphanius makes mistakes, as e.g. Sadducees, Jer. xvii. 9, adonai canani[6]; but they are very different from the errors of Irenaeus, except where Epiphanius copies Irenaeus without examination.[7]

By Epiphanius the Hebrew is clearly distinguished from the LXX version,[8] and this brings us to Mr. Harvey's last argument in favor of the Hebrew attainments of Irenaeus. He cites two texts, which are quoted in the fourth book of Adversus Haereses in conformity with the Hebrew and different from the LXX.

The first is Ps. cii. 26, "mutabis eos, et mutabuntur,"[9] where the LXX (Ps. ci. 26) has ἑλίξεις, not ἀλλάξεις. But among the var.

[1] Cf. i. pp. 335, n. 4; 385, n. 1; 386, n. 2; ii. p. 70, n. 8.

[2] i. p. 336.

[3] i. pp. 384–387; cf. also Satan, ii. p. 383, another etymological error.

[4] Oehler's edition of the Panarion; cf. also the notes of Petavius, on the passages referred to.

[5] i. pp. 37, 85, 87, 95, 97; ii. p. 387.

[6] i. p. 81 (cf. Bib. Dict. s. v. Sadducee), i. p. 275; ii. pp. 125, 545.

[7] E.g. i. p. 475.

[8] E.g. Ps. cix. 3, Vol. ii. p. 387; Isa. xxviii. 12, Vol. ii. p. 545.

[9] ii. p. 151, n. 2.

lect. of the LXX[1] we have these authorities given for ἀλλάξεις, 142. (mutabis), Vet. Lat., Vulg., and others. The reading ἀλλάξεις therefore may have been in the LXX of Irenaeus,[2] or altered by some Latin scribe to conform to the Vetus Latinum or to the Vulgate. The second text is Mal. iv. 1, "et erunt stipula omnes peccatores, qui faciunt injusta."[3] The LXX has ἀλλογενεῖς (זָרִים) in place of peccatores (זֵדִים); while Aquila and the Vulgate are close to the Hebrew with ὑπερηφανοῦς, superbi. But peccatores is not near enough to the Hebrew for any argument to be founded upon it, especially as it stands alone. I have found no nearer parallel than the Vulgate, but the LXX of Irenaeus may have escaped the mistake of the version we have. The Hebrew word used in this passage (זֵד) is translated in the LXX ἄνομος (Isa. xiii. 11) and παράνομος (Ps. cxviii. 85), either of which might be rendered by peccator, while the direct translation from the Hebrew to the Latin presents too wide a gap to be probable.

Not only does Irenaeus not distinguish the Hebrew readings from the LXX version,[4] but he praises and uses the LXX to the exclusion of the Hebrew.

To prove that *virgo*, not *adolescentula*, is the correct term, Isa. vii. 14, he affirms the miraculous origin and inspired correctness of the LXX which has παρθένος, against the νεᾶνις of Theodotion and Aquila.[5] It might be expected that a Hebrew scholar would go back to הָעַלְמָה for his proof; or, at least, that one able to read the original would not insist on the miraculous correctness of the LXX, without ever mentioning the frequent disagreement of the two.

And the actions of Irenaeus are consistent with his words. Without having made any exhaustive examination of his Old Testament quotations, about sixty places may be noted where he has left the Hebrew to follow the LXX.[6] Even if it

[1] Edd. Holmes et Parsons, Oxon. 1873.

[2] As Mr. Harvey admits, cf. Heb. i. 12, ἀλλάξεις ℵD 43. d e f vg. am demid tol etc. (Tdf.).

[3] ii. p. 153, n. 2.

[4] Gellasius and Feuardent (on lib. ii. c. xxx. § 5), maintain that Irenaeus did not distinguish the Aramaic dialect of Palestine from Old Testament Hebrew.

[5] ii. pp. 110–115.

[6] Vol. i. p. 94, Ex. xvi. 18; p. 163, Isa. xlviii. 22; p. 169, Gen. i. 2; p. 188, Ps. xxxiii. (xxxii.) 6; Vol. ii. pp. 23, 375, Ps. l.(xlix.) 3; p. 23, Isa. xliv. 10; xliii. 10; 1(3)Kings xviii. 21; p. 25, Deut. iv. 19; p. 32, Isa. xi. 3; p. 36, Sam. iv. 20; p. 37, Ps. xcv. (xciv.) 6; p. 45, Isa. xlii. 4; p 64, Deut. xxxii. 8; p.

should be deemed barely possible to collect as many quotations in which Irenaeus has followed the Hebrew where our present LXX differs from it, it may be said that the LXX was probably less faulty in the second century,[1] that such verses may have been corrected by the influence of Latin versions, and that we need a particular cause to account for a mistake, but what is correct goes with the whole tide of probability.

Mr. Harvey is the first and only writer, so far as I can discover, who has claimed for Irenaeus a knowledge of Hebrew, and his proofs are precisely those given by Blunt and Daillé[2] to prove the contrary. Stieren,[3] Reville,[4] and the Ante-Nicene Library translator[5] all echo the words of Massuet: "Some sciolist seems to have palmed off this stuff on our Irenaeus, who was but little versed in Hebrew."[6] From the weakness of Mr. Harvey's arguments,

84, Isa. ix. 6; p. 85, Isa. viii. 3; p. 86, Ex. xvii. 16; p. 88, Hab. iii. 2; p. 92, Ps. li. (l.) 12 (13); p. 93, Ps. lxviii. 9 (lxvii. 10); pp. 96, 266, Jer. xvii. 9; p. 102, Deut. xxxii. 4; p. 108, Isa. lxiii. 9; pp. 109, 266, Hab. iii. 3, 5; p. 118, Isa. xxviii. 16; p. 120, Gen. ii. 5; p. 122, Ps. lxix. 26 (lxviii. 27); pp. 120, 202, Gen. iv. 7; p. 147, Isa. xlii. 5; p. 150, Jer. iv. 22; p. 151, Isa. li. 6; p. 154, Ps. xlix. 20 (xlviii. 21); p. 155, Dan. xiv. 3; p. 169, Isa. xlii. 10, 12; p. 172, Ex. xx. 12; p. 173, Gen. xlix. 10, 12; pp. 174, 253, Deut. xxxii. 6; pp. 174, 375, Deut. xxviii. 66; p. 187, Ezek. xx. 24; p. 189, Deut. x. 16; p. 194, Ps. l. (xlix.) 9; p. 195, Jer. vii. 3, 4; p. 196, Jer. vii. 21, Isa. lviii. 6; p. 220, Num. xii. 8, 1 (3)Kings xix. 12; p. 226, Dan. xiii. 42; p. 234, Jer. ix. 2; p. 235, Dan. xii. 3; p. 238, Isa. ix. 17; p. 240, 1(3)Kings iv. 32; p. 265, Ps. xlv. 4 (xliv. 3, 4); p. 267, Jer. xv. 9; p. 268, Ps. xcix.(xcviii.) 1; p. 278, Jer. vii. 29; vi. 18; pp. 279, 405, Gen. vi. 2; p. 304, Gen. iii. 15; p. 305, Ps. lviii. (lvii.) 4; p. 337, Ps. xxii. 30 (xxi. 31); p. 350, Isa. lvii. 16, xxv. 8; p. 360, Gen. ix. 5; p. 379. Gen. ii. 16.

[1] Cf. Semisch, Justin der Märtyrer, i. p. 219. The case of Justin Martyr (ibid. pp. 211–223), affords an instructive parallel to that of Irenaeus, for while the arguments in favor of his having known Hebrew are many times stronger than for the same in Irenaeus, yet Semisch concludes justly that a review of all the evidence is decidedly against Justin's having known Hebrew, and this mainly from his exclusive use of the LXX, in which Irenaeus follows him step by step.

[2] Blunt, Early Fathers, p. 167. Daillé, on the right use of the Fathers, p. 215.

[3] Ed. of Irenaeus, Vol. i. p. 419, n. 2.

[4] Rev. d. Deux Mondes, Feb. 1865, p. 1007.

[5] Trans. of Irenaeus, Vol. i. p. 255, n. 3.

[6] Sciolus quispiam, Irenaeo nostro in Hebraicis haud satis perito, hic fucum fecisse videtur. Massuet (Paris, 1710), p. 170, n. 1.

from the instructive parallels with Epiphanius and Justin Martyr, from the undue value attached by Irenaeus to the LXX, from the opinions of authorities, we conclude that the mediocrity of the Hebrew attainments of Irenaeus favors the belief that he was a Greek.

IV. "A very perceptible familiarity with the Scriptures of the New Testament in Syriac." "The probability that he was born in Syria, and having been instructed as a child in some Syriac version of Scripture, was removed during the years of boyhood to Smyrna." "A point of some interest will be found of frequent recurrence in the notes; which is, the repeated instances that scriptural quotations afford of having been made by one who was as familiar with some Syriac version of the New Testament as with the Greek originals. Strange variae lectiones occur, which can only be explained by referring to the Syriac version (see General Index, Syriac Analogies). It will not be forgotten that S. Irenaeus resided in early life at Smyrna; and it is by no means improbable that he may have been of Syrian extraction, and instructed from his youth in some Syriac version of Scripture.[1]

The argument thus rests upon one hundred and five[2] instances of Syriac analogy scattered through the libri quinque Adversus Haereses. The other arguments advanced having been disposed of, the question of the nationality of Irenaeus turns on the strength of this proof, we have a right to demand — as Mr. Harvey admits — that these variae lectiones "can *only* be explained by referring to the Syriac version," and also that these variae lectiones shall bear evidence by number, force, and probability of origin to Irenaeus as their author.

The points which I shall endeavor to make against the theory of Mr. Harvey are two.

1. The Syriac parallels do not necessarily[3] argue more

[1] i. Preface, p. v.

[2] There are many more allusions to Syriac in the notes, but Mr. Harvey does not adduce them in support of his theory, and wisely; for e.g. among those thus omitted are twelve instances where Irenaeus and the Peschito confessedly differ (ii. pp. 41, n. 2; 53, n. 3; 55, n. 2; 56, nn. 4, 5, 8; 63, n. 2; 65, n. 3; 69, n. 1; 91, n. 5; 362, n. 3; 363, n. 2).

[3] *Necessarily*, because if it can be proved that the so-called Syriac analogies

than a small amount of Syriac influence, and this is easily explained.

2. From the New Testament citations of Irenaeus a much stronger argument may be deduced for the use by him of Codex Bezae, than that advanced by Mr. Harvey for his familiarity with the readings of the Peschito. We proceed to the examination of

1. The Syriac parallels do not necessarily argue more than a small amount of Syriac influence, and this is easily explained. On the supposition that Irenaeus was a Greek to what codex is it most natural to refer his biblical citations? There can be but one answer — to that older manuscript from which, according to Scrivener, our present Codex Bezae was copied, and of which he says "it may well have been brought into Gaul by Irenaeus and his Asiatic companions."[1]

But we have a more complex problem here. Irenaeus was probably translated into Latin about A.D. 200; since the translation seems to have been used by Tertullian about A.D. 208.[2] From that time to the tenth century (the date of the earliest existing Latin MS. of Irenaeus, the Clermont) the Latin text is entirely lost to view, and it is natural to suppose that it underwent many changes from various Latin transcribers. These scribes would naturally alter the biblical citations of the text to the form of the version current with them,[3] both as a needed emendation in their view, and to save the trouble of translation. This practice probably began with the first translator who seems to have had so small a knowledge of Greek, and even Latin, that he would be very glad to let a Latin version of the Scriptures save him the labor of translating some of the nine hundred texts cited by Irenaeus. So extensive has been this substitution

may be referred to another source, consistent with the Greek nationality of Irenaeus, the antecedent probability turns the *may* into *must*.

[1] Scrivener, Codex Bezae, Introd. p. xlv.

[2] Cf. Massuet, Diss. ii. § 53; Harvey's Irenaeus, i. p. clxiv.

[3] For testimony on this point, cf. "Itala-Fragmenta der Paulinischen Briefe, by L. Ziegler (Marburg, 1876), Proleg. §§ 5, 21, 22.

that Mill[1] takes it for granted that the ground text of the Latin translation in the Scripture citations made by Irenaeus is the old Latin, [disfigured, however, by interpolations from later versions]. Sabatier also has a note on this subject.[2] It will not be thought strange that the Latin scribe differed so much from the Greek in translating mere proof texts, when we remember that the translator of Codex Bezae, avowedly rendering that particular New Testament Codex into Latin (a very different position from that of the interpreter of Irenaeus), swerves from the Greek in nineteen hundred and nineteen instances,[3] though in this case the MS. is of the sixth century, and that of Irenaeus four centuries later. In view of these facts it will not be thought unfair that we aim to account for the readings ascribed by Mr. Harvey to the Peschito, by reference to the Codex Bezae and the old Latin versions, especially those classed by Tischendorf as Italae Codices.[4]

The Syriac analogies adduced by Mr. Harvey divide themselves at the first glance into two classes: genuine parallels with the Syriac Scriptures, and conjectural variae lectiones from it. To this latter class we first turn our attention.

1. The authority of a conjecture is very small at the best. A slight improbability is sufficient to put it on one side.

[1] Proleg. in Nov. Test. § 608; pro saeculo isto haud facile credibilis apparet Italici textus interpolatio.

[2] On the reading of Irenaeus, 1 Tim. i. 4, Sabatier, Biblia Sacra Latina, Vol. iii. p. 866 (Paris ed.), "Ex quo vel uno constat quod et ex aliis locis confirmari potest, hunc interpretem Latinae linguae rudem, in interpretandis variis scripturae testimoniis versionem Latinam vulgatam seu Italicam usurpasse." — Cf. also Westcott, On the Canon (ed. iv. 1875), p. 253 and note, though he scarcely appears to appreciate the complexity of the problem.

[3] Scrivener, Codex Bezae, p. xxxix.

[4] The New Testament text (N.T.) taken as a standard is that of Tischendorf's eighth ed. crit. maj. "Tdf." refers to the notes of the same. The abbreviations used in that edition are employed here, followed by the authority (Sab. Gb. Ln. etc.), from whom the references are taken. When no authority is given, the references have been taken directly from editions of the different MSS. Of course the word Itala is used here only as a convenient term, not a correct one. L. Ziegler, Itala-Fragmenta der Paulinischen Briefe (Marburg, 1876), together with Rönsch's well-known investigations, has shown that the word Itala has properly only a very limited application.

Much more the improbability now accumulated against a Syrian Irenaeus.

2. These conjectures are none of the best. With a few exceptions they consist of conjectural alterations of the Syriac text to something usually not slightly different in sound and sense.[1]

3. Even if these conjectures were of salient likelihood and authority, they would not apply here, for this is a case of pure memory. On the supposition, Irenaeus, with no Syriac MS. before him, remembered certain peculiarities of reading, and wrote them from memory into Greek. Now all these conjectures rest either on a change of the text to something which is supposed to sound like it, or from one to the other of two different meanings of a Syriac word. But the memory works by neither of these channels. We remember quotations first, by their sense; second, possibly, by the exact words as connected with the sense, and in accordance with this, errors of memory in the transmission of MSS. are changes of order, of synonym, of pronouns and of logical connectives.[2] But Mr. Harvey claims for Irenaeus a memory occupied with similar or exactly reproduced sounds apart from their sense. No argument can be drawn from these conjectures in this case; for they are, if anything, possible errors of transcribers or translators.[3]

It may be well to attempt a brief explanation of the various readings in Irenaeus which have given rise to these conjectures.

We begin with eight instances in which the conjecture hinges on the different meanings of some one Syriac word.

Suam legem e contrario statuerunt (ii. p. 177, n. 5) "νόμος, scarcely has the extended meaning of the same word in Syriac, which might express αἵρεσις."[4] There is no reference to Scripture here, but Mr. Harvey's meaning seems to be that Irenaeus meant something which

[1] E.g. i. p. 1, n. 4; ii. pp. 63, n. 1; 70, n. 8; 386, n. 1.

[2] Smith's Bible Dict. (Am. ed.), Vol. iii. p. 2127.

[3] Ibid. p. 2126.

[4] Mr. Harvey's arguments may be examined in full by the references. Here they are abridged as much as possible, and omitted where not needed.

would be expressed by αἵρεσις, but the Syriac word led him to write νόμος, from similarity, and this the translator rendered *lex*. But there is no possible reference to αἵρεσις, for here *suam legem* is set over against *lex data per moysem*.

Matt. i. 23: *ecce virgo in utero accipiet* (ii. p. 31, n. 2); N. T. ἰδοὺ ἡ παρθένος ἐν γαστρὶ ἕξει. "Here the Syriac word expresses either ἐν γαστρὶ ἕξει or λήψεται of the LXX." Irenaeus quotes this text four times,[1] thrice with the LXX as above, once with N. T., i.e. *concipiet*, so no certain conclusion can be drawn as to his original reading, though if it was λήψεται, the LXX explains it.

Luke ii. 22: *imposuerunt* (ii. p. 38, n. 2); N. T. ἀνήγαγον, but: e *imposuerunt*.

Acts xv. 14: *quemadmodum deus excogitavit* (ii. p. 69, n. 3); N. T. καθὼς πρῶτον ὁ θεὸς ἐπεσκέψατο. Here Irenaeus omits πρῶτον, with Sah (Scholz), but the Syriac does exactly the opposite; for, by emphasizing πρῶτον at the expense of ἐπεσκέψατο, it reads *coepit*.[2] Mr. Harvey asserts that the Syriac embodies both πρῶτον and ἐπεσκέψατο in one word which means *to begin* and *to purpose*. But this is impossible, for, in any one place, the word can have only one of the two meanings. To make a combination of the two is as mistaken as to translate כַּפֹּרֶת *Suehndeckel*,[3] when it may mean either *Suehne* or *Deckel*. If, however, this Syriac word does mean *to purpose*, it is certainly nearer to the reading of Irenaeus than the N. T. is.

Per occasionem immortalitatis (ii. p. 125, n. 2), "cf. Rom. vii. 11, 13. There the Syriac word would correspond either with ἀφορμήν, as used by the apostle, or προφάσει as expressed by the context in this place and also in the opening of c. xxxv." If we are to connect the words of Irenaeus here with ἀφορμήν, Rom. vii. 11, it may be said that *occasio* is a common translation of that word;[4] if, however, (as Grabe suggests) *occasio* renders πρόφασις, it is only what we find twice before in Irenaeus.[5] In either case the Syriac is superfluous.

Rom. x. 7: *liberare*; N. T. ἀναγαγεῖν (ii. p. 96, n. 1). Slav. 5. 8. have ἐξαγαγεῖν (Gb.), which might explain *liberare*, but their

[1] ii. pp. 31, 83, 216, 230.

[2] Schaaf. Nov. Test. Syr. ad loc.; Michaelis, Curae Syriacae, p. 74. Tdf. ad loc.

[3] As in Exodus, in Lange's Bibelwerk, *passim*.

[4] E.g. Irenaeus, i. pp. 5, 214, also f vg.

[5] i. pp. 2, 14.

authority is insufficient; g translates *reducere* vg. *revocare*. *Liberare* may be regarded as a free translation.

1 Cor. xi. 10: Δεῖ τὴν γυναῖκα κάλυμμα ἔχειν. *Opportere mulierem velamen habere* (i. p. 69, n. 3); N. T., ὀφείλει ἡ γυνὴ ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν. "Here the Syriac word is the exact equivalent for ἐξουσία, but it also means anything worn on the head, i.e. the turban or other ornament, serving to distinguish the satrap's rank. As referring to female costume, this could only be the veil." But the context gives a sufficient cause for the interpretation of ἐξουσία as referring to a veil. If Mr. Harvey's note be correct, it is strange that no commentator in the abundant literature of this verse has hit on an explanation that lay so near at hand. But Mr. Harvey's explanation does not apply here. We can understand that this Syriac word (from the same root as *sultan*) may mean the turban as a sign of the satrap's rank, but from this to "anything worn on the head" is a long step. Even if we concede that it may be applied to anything worn on the head as a sign of rank, this is very different from the veil worn as a sign of subjection — of power, indeed, but of power exercised *over*, not *by*, the wearer.[1] Thus, Chardin says of the veil worn by Persian ladies; "only married women wear it, and it is the mark by which it is known that they are under subjection."[2] Meyer cites from Diodorus Siculus ἔχουσαν τρεῖς βασιλείας ἐπὶ τῆς κεφάλης; and this use of βασιλείας is analogous to Mr. Harvey's alleged meaning for the Syriac word. But it is hard to believe that Irenaeus took his idea (if it was his) of translating ἐξουσία, *a veil*, the sign of subjection, from a Syriac word which signifies *a turban*, the sign of power. As authorities for the gloss καλύμμα may be cited Schol. Hier., Beda (Sab.), harl. Aug. Or. cf. Lc. Brug. pro *potestatem* non scribas *velamen* (Tdf.)

1 Cor. xv. 50: *non apprehendunt* (i. p. 239, n. 6); N. T. κληρονομῆσαι οὐ δύναται. We find this text cited in different ways nearly twenty times. The rendering which occurs most frequently in the translation will, perhaps, best represent Irenaeus himself. *Possidere non possunt* appears twelve times, *haereditare non possunt* twice,[3] *apprehendunt* only once. Both the former readings represent

[1] Cf. Meyer's Commentary, ad loc.

[2] Lange's Bibelwerk, ad loc. So Theophylact. τὸ τοῦ ἐξουσιάζεσθαι σύμβολον τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ κάλυμμα (Massuet, ad loc., Stieren's Irenaeus, ii. p. 602).

[3] ii. pp. 343 *bis*, 345 *bis*, 346 *bis*, 348 *bis*, 356, 359, 360, 362; haereditare, pp. 341, 344; possident, p. 345; possidebunt, p. 348.

κληρονομῆσαι οὐ δύναται, as is easily seen by a comparison of other Latin versions.

We now come to two texts cited from heretics, for the readings of which Irenaeus is not answerable.

Matt. xi. 25; Luke x. 21: *οὐά, ita*; N. T. *ναί* (i. p. 180, n. 1) οὐά is a Syrian exclamation of joy, but is not found here, nor, it would seem, elsewhere in the Syriac New Testament. It is, however, also a Greek word, and occurs in Mark xv. 29, so that the probability is in favor of its Greek origin here.

Luke xii. 50: καὶ πάνυ ἐπείγομαι εἰς αυτό, *et valde propero ad illud* (i. p. 182, n. 2); N. T. καὶ πῶς συνέχομαι ἕως ὅτου τελεσθῇ. Epiphanius cites a somewhat similar verse ποτήριον ἔχω πίειν καὶ τί σπεύδω ἕως οὗ πίω αὐτό· κ. τ. λ. (Tdf.) and Philastr. Brix. de haeres; *baptisma habeo baptisari et quam festino si scietis* (Sab.). These show that this quotation in Irenaeus is not without a parallel. Grotius remarks: Veteres scriptores saepe utuntur testimoniis ex Scriptura, sed, ita ut appareat, codicem ab illis non inspectum, cum tamen sententiam satis recte ex memoria reddant. Tale est quod hunc locum ita citat Irenaeus.[1] So Mr. Harvey's explanation, which supposes Irenaeus confused the Syriac word for συνέχομαι with a similar Hebrew word meaning ἐπείγομαι, seems unnecessary as well as improbable.

Two instances occur in which a varia lectio of the MSS. of Irenaeus is adduced as a parallel to a varia lectio contrived from the Syriac.

Eph. iv. 6: Clerm. MS. reads *et ipse per omnia* (i. p. 256, n. 4). N. T. καὶ διὰ πάντων. This text is cited four times by Irenaeus,[2] and *ipse* (on which the supposed parallel is based) is supported by only one MS. in this one place.

John iv. 36: *gaudeant;* N.T. χαίρῃ (ii. p. 230, n. 1). Here "*gaudeant*, sic Feuard. in marg. Arund. Merc. ii. Voss. et Mass., in ceteris, *gaudeat*."[3] So the Clerm., the oldest and best MS., has *gaudeat*. The transition from *gaudeat* to *gaudeant* would be easy in copying MSS.; for not only does either make good sense, but also a heavy line crossing the *t* might be mistaken for the line over letters in MSS. which marks the omission of an *n*.

[1] Critici Sacri, Vol. vi. p. 553. [2] i. p. 256, n. 4; ii. pp. 214, 255, 374.
[3] Stieren's Irenaeus, i. p. 638, n. 3.

The rest of the conjectures are readings of Irenaeus, for which Mr. Harvey has constructed a corresponding set in the Syriac.

Matt. xxvi. 38: *quam tristis est anima mea* (i. p. 70, n. 4). Irenaeus (Gk.) with N. T. περίλυπός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή μου. The text is cited again, ii. p. 122, and there we have the Greek εἰρήκει ὅτι περίλυπός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή μου, while the Latin is *dixisset quod*, etc. This makes it probable that *quam* (a mistake in copying, according to Grabe and Stieren, from *qm*, i.e. *quoniam* in the MSS.) and *quod* are both translations of the ὅτι. The concurrence of the Latin versions in both places makes the Greek of the second citation more probably original than that of the first. Yet cf. plerique MSS. *valde tristis*. Tert. *quid anxia* (Sab.).

Luke xvi. 9: *fugati fueritis* (ii. p. 251, n. 1); N. T. ἐκλίπῃ, but Irenaeus probably read ἐκλίπητε with 𝔖. Tdf. accepts *fugati fueritis* as a translation of ἐκλίπητε, and Grotius notes: Irenaei interpres ita citat hunc locum: *fugati fueritis* et sane solet ἐκλείπειν etiam hunc sensum habere.[1]

Luke xviii. 8: *Putas cum filius hominis eenerit* (ii. p. 265, n. 3); N. T. πλὴν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐλθών. Putas with a c f ff^2 vg. (Tdf.).

John i. 10: *in hoc mundo* (ii. p. 41, n. 4); N. T. ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ; hoc with Cyp. Amb. Aug. Gaud. Brix. in serm. vg. (Sab.) e fu.

John i. 13: ... *sed ex voluntate dei verbum caro factum est* (ii. p. 83, n. 5); N.T. ἀλλ' ἐκ θεοῦ ἐγεννήθησαν. καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο. Cf. b (John i. 12–14) *credentibus in nomine ejus qui non ex ... sed ex deo natus est. Et verbum caro factum est.* The text is cited by Irenaeus three times more,[2] but nowhere with any attempt at exact conformity to Scripture. Amb. Aug. (Tdf.) and Tert. (Grabe) have similar misquotations.

John viii. 44: *quoniam mendax est ab initio et in veritate non stetit* (ii. p. 386, n. 1); N. T. ἐκεῖνος ἀνθρωποκτόνος ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ οὐκ ἔστηκεν. The mistake in memory is evident. Irenaeus puts together the ὅτι ψεύστης ἐστίν near the end of the verse in the N. T., and the ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς κ.τ.λ. as above; cf. Epiphanius ἐπειδὴ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ψεύστης ἐστίν (Tdf.).

Acts vii. 38: *praecepta dei vivi* (ii. p. 187, n. 4); N. T. λόγια ζῶντα. The peculiarities of the reading of Irenaeus are, the genitive, cf. d *eloquia viventium*, vg. *verba vitae* (Tdf.), and *dei* interpolated, cf. 104. 106.

[1] Critici Sacri, Vol. vi. p. 617.

[2] ii. pp. 103, 117, 118.

λόγια θεοῦ ζῶντα (Tdf.). I have found no parallel[1] for the combination of these two readings, but deus vivus is a favorite term with Irenaeus.[2]

Acts xvii. 25: *tractatur* (ii. p. 63, n. 1.); N. T. θεραπεύεται. This, it should be noticed, is regarded by Mr. Harvey as "an undoubted proof." Even Grabe calls *tractatur* mira sane versio verbi θεραπεύεται, but without sufficient reason, for Erasmus comments: θεραπεύεται pro quo Irenaeus legit *tractatur* nam et famuli et medici graecis dicuntur θεραπεύειν[3]; and Vatablus[4] explains *colitur* (the usual translation of θεραπεύεται in the Latin versions) by the one word *tractatur*. We must not then regard this as an unnaturally bad translation from such a poor scholar as the interpreter of Irenaeus.

Gal. iii. 19: *legem factorum positam* (i. p. 381, n. 4); N. T. τί οὖν ὁ νόμος; τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν προσετέθε; d e g m[1] (Tdf.) support the reading of Irenaeus.

Gal. iv. 8: *si enim* (ii. p. 24, n. 6); N. T. ἀλλὰ τότε μέν. Grabe supposes *si* written for *sed* by mistake; still Tert. has *si ergo* (Sab.); and in view of the variation of the Latin versions (e.g. Amb. *quia tunc* (Sab.) g and most *sed tunc*, Beza *immo tum*, etc.) it does not seem that *si enim* is a strange translation, the context and construction not being forgotten.

2 Thess. ii. 9: *portentis mendaciorum* (ii. p. 392, n. 6); N. T. τέρασιν ψεύδους. I have found nothing nearer than *mendacii* in d Aug. Ambrst. Tert. (Sab.).

1 Tim. i. 4: ματαίας (i. p. 1, n. 4); N. T. ἀπεράντοις. The transition from ἀπεράντοις to ματαίας is not difficult.[5] Gb. and Alford[6] give "ἀπείροις const." But the reference seems to be a mistake. Still we may conjecture (since we are refuting a conjecture) that ἀπείροις was used in some MS. as the synonyme of ἀπεράντοις. But ἀπείροις, meaning both *endless* and *foolish*, was naturally rendered

[1] Lest it should seem that a parallel has been neglected, it may be mentioned that Tischendorf's note on this passage,—"teste Grabio codex actorum Collegii Novi Oxon. consentit, c. Ir."—is a mistake. Grabe's note refers only to ὑμῖν which is cited by Tischendorf in its place from the MS. to which Grabe refers (cat.[119]). Cf. Dr. Abbot's note in Bib. Sac. April 1876, p. 314.

[2] E.g. ii. pp. 44, 98, 103, 119, 155, 253.

[3] Critici Sacri, Vol. vii. p. 2334.

[4] Ibid. p. 2336.

[5] Chrysostom, quoted by Alford (Greek Test.), ad loc.

[6] Greek Test. (ed. of 1856, omitted in later editions).

ματαίοις. If this conjecture be not regarded as "an undoubted proof" that Irenaeus was a Greek, it must at least rank as an unusually good example of the style of argument here employed by Mr. Harvey. The Latin in this place (*infinitas*) makes it possible that we owe ματαίας to Epiphanius.

The list of conjectures is closed by six which the Codex Bezae explains.

Matt. xxii. 13: *tollite* (ii. p. 281, n. 1); N. T. δήσαντες; D ἄρατε.

Matt. xxv. 41: *quem preparavit* (i. p. 268, n. 2); N. T. τὸ ἡτοιμασμένον; D ὃ ἡτοίμασεν.

Mark i. 3: *semitas ante Deum nostrum* (ii. p. 39, n. 3). N. T. τὰς τρίβους αὐτοῦ; D τὰς τριβους τοῦ θεοῦ ὑμῶν (the last word an evident error for ἡμῶν, for d has *nostri*).

Acts iii. 14: *aggravistis* (ii. p. 55, n. 3); N. T. ἠρνήσασθε; D ἐβαρύνατε.

Acts iii. 17: *nequam* (ii. p. 55, n. 4); N. T. om.; D πονηρόν.

Acts xv. 29: *ambulantes in spiritu sancto* (ii. p. 70, n. 8); N. T. om.; D φερόμενοι ἐν τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι.

It has been shown that most of the conjectures are susceptible of natural explanations. Had more sources of information been accessible, the two or three left unaccounted for might perhaps have been elucidated. Mr. Harvey's conjectures, however, are of so little value that, had none of the readings been susceptible of other solutions, his discoveries would, as already shown, have been no proof that Irenaeus was a Syrian.

We now come to parallels with the Syriac Scriptures; and here the question of the nationality of Irenaeus must be finally decided. It will be noticed that in many cases the so-called variae lectiones of Irenaeus do not differ from the critical text of the N. T. But Mr. Harvey uses the Textus Receptus as the standard, and therefore these readings are justified on that basis wherever they appear. First, let us notice some alleged parallels which need only explanation in order to be set aside.

Fructus autem operis spiritus est carnis salus (ii. p. 353, n. 1). This is not a direct quotation of Scripture; but Mr. Harvey affirms

it is inexplicable except from the Syriac version of Phil. i. 22. If this be true, it is strange that Irenaeus here twice quotes the text in general conformity to the Greek, and very differently from the Syriac. Further, the passage is clear enough as a case of mistaken exegesis. Irenaeus is arguing for the *resurrectio carnis*, and of course many Pauline texts require elucidation. In trying to show that it was *sin*, and not *flesh*, which was to be cast off, Irenaeus uses the text, exspoliantes vos veterem hominem cum operibus ejus (Col. iii. 9). This, however, needs explanation; so he adds: Hoc autem dicebat (apostolus) non veterem amovens plasmationem: alioquin opportet nosmet ipsos interficientes separari ab ea quae est istic conversatione. He goes on to add another proof, by citing a text from Paul which could not be harmonized with Col. iii. 9, if that were interpreted as veterem amovens plasmationem: Sed et ipse apostolus, ille existens qui in vulva plasmatus erat, et de utero exierat, scribebat nobis, et *vivere in carne fructus operis* epistola confessus est, in ea quae est ad Philippenses, dicens. This text probably comes from memory; and Irenaeus, missing the force of its context,[1] proceeds to apply it here in the above misunderstood and abbreviated form. Life, the fruit of labor, — this can be only eternal life — salvation; so vivere in carne = carnis salus. But then the *operis* cannot be referred to the apostle, — no amount of man's work brings salvation, — it must be the work of the Spirit. So from *vivere in carne fructus operis*, Irenaeus deduces *fructus autem spiritus est carnis salus*, which contains the truth of the salvation (resurrection) of the body, though it is not proved by Phil. i. 22. Then he goes on to defend this exegesis: quis enim alius apparens fructus ejus est qui non apparet Spiritus, quam maturam efficere carnem et capacem incorruptelae. And now he applies the hard-won argument, Si igitur vivere in carne, hic mihi fructus operis est (N. T. εἰδὲ τὸ ζῆν ἐν σαρκί, τουτό μοι καρπὸς ἔργου) non utique substantiam contemnebat carnis, in eo quod diceret, Spoliantes," etc. We have followed it far enough to show the train of thought, and to give a more probable explanation than Mr. Harvey's, who makes the Syriac of Phil. i. 22 refer to Phil. i. 11, and thus say that "the fruits of righteousness (Phil. i. 11) are the life of the flesh" (Phil. i. 22).

1 Cor. xiii. 13: *Sicut et apostolus dixit, reliquis partibus destructis haec tunc preseverare, quae sunt fides, spes, et caritas* (i. p. 351, n. 4).

[1] Cf. Lightfoot, Commentary on Philippians, ad loc.

Irenaeus then adds that these three will endure forever. Mr. Harvey claims that Irenaeus mistook the apostle's meaning; "for the Greek has νυνὶ δὲ μένει πίστις, ἐλπὶς, ἀγάπη; the particle νυνί, 'for the present,' marks the transitory nature of the two first, ... but love abideth forever. Now this is lost sight of in the Syriac, which ignores the νυνί. It simply says, 'for these are the three that abide'; and Irenaeus follows the statement."

It is not worth while to go into the exegesis of the passage. "Haec *tunc* perseverare" shows conclusively that Irenaeus does *not* ignore the νυνί, and consequently differs from the Syriac. Νυνί is logical (as Irenaeus understands it[1]), and Mr. Harvey separates ἀγάπη from πίστις and ἐλπίς, with which it is shut in betweeen νυνὶ δὲ μένει and τά τρία ταῦτα by a *tour de force* which can hardly be called exegesis.

Three more cases of difference between Irenaeus and the Syriac are adduced by Mr. Harvey as arguments.

Matt. xii. 20: *in contentionem* (ii. p. 45, n. 2); N. T. εἰς νῖκος "the reading νεῖκος being followed instead of νῖκος, victoria. The Syriac has *victory* in a forensic sense, acquittal, innocence." Auct. l. cont. Jud. ap. Cyp. p. 501 has *in contentione* (Sab.); but probably the translator of Irenaeus is here at fault.

1 Cor. vi. 11: *Et haec quidam fuistis* (ii. p. 288, n. 5); N. T. καὶ ταῦτά τινες ἦτε; "the Syriac has *every man of you.*"

John i. 18: *Unigenitus deus*, Υἱὸν μονογενῆ καὶ θεόν, *unigenitum* domini (ii. p. 221, n. 4; i. p. 76, n. 4); N. T. ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός. Mr. Harvey tries to support both these readings from the Syriac, saying, with truth, that it has μονογενὴς θεός, but making a mistake in the quotation of the same text as μονογενὴς θεοῦ. The citation of this text in Irenaeus is so fluctuating that it is impossible to fix on any reading as the original one. We have Vol. i. p. 76, Greek, υἱὸν μονογενῆ καὶ θεόν; Latin, *unigenitum domini;* Vol. ii. pp. 44, 399, *unigenitus filius dei* (with q); p. 218, *unigenitus filius* (with AC^{3}XΓΔΠ, abcefff^2, etc.); p. 221, *unigenitus deus* (with ℵBC*L 33. etc.). *Unigenitus filius* occurs four times (once in Greek), and is perhaps the most probable. From its combinations with *unigenitus deus*, a reading strongly supported by New Testament MSS., all these combinations might arise. So, though nothing is decisive, the argument is rather against the Syriac.

[1] Here and ii. p. 178; cf. Meyer's Commentary, ad loc., Ante-Nic. Lib., Iren. Vol. i. p. 221, n. 3.

We now come to those readings of Irenaeus which are explained by the concurrence of Latin versions.

Matt. iii. 9: *potens est* (ii. p. 163, n. 6) with am a b c (Ln.); N. T. δύναται.

Matt. iii. 17: (*bene*) *complacui* (ii. p. 32, n. 3); N. T. ηὐδόκησα *bene* is omitted in Clerm. and Voss. MSS. and the Syriac, also by ff² am Amb. Aug. (Sab.). *Bene* is retained in Arundel MS. and in a b f.

Matt. v. 45: *bonos et malos* (i. p. 327, n. 2) with a c f ff¹ h (Tdf.); N. T., πονηροὺς καὶ ἀγαθούς.

Matt. xii. 18 (cf. iii. 9): *Ecce filius meus dilectissimus in quo bene sensi: ponam spiritum meum*, etc. (ii. p. 45, n. 1); N. T. ἰδοὺ ὁ παῖς μου ὃν ᾑρέτισα, ὁ ἀγαπητός μου εἰς ὃν ηὐδόκησεν ἡ ψυχή μου· θήσω τὸ πνεῦμά μου κ.τ.λ. Tertullian cites this text just as Irenaeus does (Sab.). The Syriac is not to be thought of as a parallel, for it has *Ecce servus meus* (though, of course, *servus* is a possible translation of παῖς) *in quo mihi complacitum est; dilectus meus in quo delectatur anima mea, spiritum meum ponam*, etc. The Syriac is close to the Greek. But from the way in which Irenaeus introduces this quotation: "et Petrus (cf. John i. 49) cognovit Christum Filium dei vivi, dicentis: *Ecce*," etc., shows that he meant to quote from Matt. iii. 19 what was said by the voice from heaven at Christ's baptism; but the similarity of this to Matt. xii. 18 makes him go on with the quotation as there found. This piecing of texts may be the result of a mistake of memory,[1] or because Irenaeus took the citation of the first verse (Matt. iii. 9 and parallels) as standing for the quotation of the whole prophecy.[2]

Matt. xxi. 37: *forte* (ii. p. 276, n. 8) with b c e ff² h (Tdf.); N. T. om.

Matt. xxiii. 4: *sarcinas graves* (ii. p. 179, n. 1), ς adds δυσβάστακτα; N. T., φορτία βαρέα, also a b e ff² h (Tdf.).

Matt. xxiii. 38: *relinquetur* (ii. p. 284, n. 5); N. T., ἀφίεται. Mr. Harvey adopts *relinquetur* on the authority of Grabe, the Syriac, and a similar quotation (ii. p. 289), but Arund. Voss. and Clerm. (correction a prima manu) have *remittitur*. *Remittitur* has no resemblance to the Syriac. But as *relinquetur* occurs (ii. p.

[1] For examples of this confusion, cf. ii. p. 338 (1 Cor. xiii. 9, 12); p. 170, n. 2; (Phil. iii. 2; 1 Cor. iv. 4; xiii. 9, 10).

[2] Isa. xlii. 1 sq.; Matt. xii. 18 sq.

289) we may give as parallels f ff^2 vg. *Remittetur* is found in Zeno Veron.; d Aug. have *dimittetur* (Sab.).

Luke i. 17: *plebem perfectam* (ii. p. 34, n. 1), with a b f; N. T., λαὸν κατεσκευασμένον.

Luke i. 35: *quod nascetur ex te* (ii. p. 116, n. 1), with a vg.; N.T. τὸ γεννώμενον; Syr. ex te natum.

Luke ix. 61: *ire et* (i. p. 71. n. 2), with a g^1 (g^1 om. *et*) (Tdf.); N. T. om.

Luke xvi. 31: *credent ei* (ii. p. 148, n. 2), with c i l m (Tdf.); N. T. πεισθήσονται.

John i. 30: *quoniam prior me* (ii. p. 36, n. 1); N. T. ὅτι πρῶτός μου. The reading of Irenaeus has nothing against it but the A. V.! we may cite a ff ff^2 vg. (*quia*) b (*ante me*) as parallels.

John ii. 25: *ei* (ii. p. 33, n. 2), with c l vg. (Tdf.); N. T. om.

John v. 39: *in quibus* (ii. p. 172, n. 5), with a ff^2; N. T. ὅτι ἐν αὐταῖς.

John xx. 31: *Jesus est Christus filius dei* (ii. p. 86, n. 5), with g q vg. (Tdf.); N. T. Ἰησοῦς ἐστιν ὁ Χριστὸς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ. The reading of Irenaeus has the weight of authority, and as Mr. Harvey's note turns on the insertion of Christus, we may add D b c e f (Tdf.) to g q vg.

Acts ii. 30: ventris (ii. p. 53, n. 6), with am Victorin. (Tdf.); N. T. ὀσφύος.

Acts ii. 30: Irenaeus omits τὸ κατὰ σάρκα ἀναστήσειν τὸν Χριστὸν (ii. p. 53, n. 6), with N. T. D^2 h am (Tdf.).

Acts ii. 33: *donationem hanc* (ii. p. 54, n. 3), with e demid tol (Tdf.); N. T. τοῦτο.

Rom. iii. 23: *egent* (ii. p. 241, n. 6), with am f vg.; N. T. ὑστεροῦνται.

Rom. v. 6: *ut quid enim* (ii. p. 91, n. 2) with d e f g vg. (Tdf.); N. T. ἔτι γάρ; Syr. *si autem*.

Rom. viii. 11: *corpora vestra* (ii. p. 337, n. 7), with f g vg. (Ln.); N. T. σώματα ὑμῶν.

Rom. viii. 34: *immo (qui) et resurrexit* (ii. p. 91, n. 4); N. T. μᾶλλον δὲ ἐγερθείς; *qui* is not found in any MS. of Irenaeus; Syr. omits *qui*, and has simply *et resurrexit*; f g have *immo autem et resurrexit*.

Rom. xi. 32: *omnia* (i. p. 96, n. 1; ii. p. 106, n. 8), with d e f g vg. (Tdf.); N. T. τοὺς πάντας; Syr. *unumquemque*.

Rom. xii. 3 : *prudentiam* (ii. p. 380, n. 2), with gue (Tdf.) g ; Syr., *pudicitiam ;* N. T., τὸ σωφρονεῖν.

Rom. xiv. 9 : (vol. ii. p. 96, n. 2, probably a misprint for n. 3) *et vixit et mortuus est et resurrexit* with d e ; N. T., ἀπέθανεν καὶ ἔζησεν, but Syr., *mortuus est, et vixit, et resurrexit.*

1 Cor. vi. 11 : *Domini nostri* (ii. p. 288, n. 5), with c f vg. (Tdf.) ; N. T. τοῦ κυρίου.

1 Cor. vi. 14 : *nos* (ii. p. 336, n. 1), with d c f vg. (Tdf.) ; N. T. ἡμᾶς, 𝔖^{e} has ὑμᾶς, which seems to be the point of Mr. Harvey's note.

1 Cor. xiii. 12 : *faciem ad faciem* (ii. p. 338, n. 7, cf. p. 339) ; N. T. πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον. "Clerm. MS., cum Vulg. It. *faciem ad faciem*"[1] ; also Syr. Other MSS. of Irenaeus read *facie ad faciem ;* we may read *faciem* with d g vers. antiq. apud Sab., etc., or *facie* with Tert. Cyp. Aug. (five times) Hil. Amb. (three times) Ambst. Gaud. Brix. (twice) (Sab.) f am fu.

1 Cor. xv. 15 : (vol. ii. p. 359, n. 5, misprint for n. 6) ; Irenaeus omits ; N.T. εἴπερ ἄρα νεκροὶ οὐκ ἐγείρονται, with Syr. d e harl * (Tdf.).

1 Cor. xv. 42 : *surgit* (ii. p. 338, n. 1) ; N. T. ἐγείρεται. Mr. Harvey asserts Syr. (*resurgunt*) is nearer the reading of Irenaeus than ἐγείρεται, but *surgit* is found in vers. ant. (Sab.) Go. fu. g ; *surgit* is in Clerm. and Voss. MSS. Arund. has *surget* with am vg. etc.

2 Cor. iv. 10 : *Jesu* (omitting *Domini*) ; v. 11, si (ii. p. 358, n. 1) ; N. T. Ἰησοῦ . . . ἀεί. Irenaeus omits *Domini* with d e f g r vg. and almost all except 𝔖 (Tdf.). *Si* (probably a mistake of the translator reading εἰ for ἀεί, according to his Latin Bible) is found in k^{scr} f g Tert. Ambrst. etc. (Tdf.).

Eph. ii. 7 : *saeculis supervenientibus* (ii. p. 154, n. 3) ; N. T. ἐν τοῖς αἰῶσιν τοῖς ἐπερχομένοις. Mr. Harvey says the Syriac (*saeculis venturis* is indicated rather than the recepta lectio ἐν τοῖς αἰῶσι τοῖς ἐρχομένοις. I have failed to discover any where this reading ἐρχομένοις, but if it does exist it is certainly a nearer parallel to the Syriac than the reading of Irenaeus or N. T. ; d f g fu am have *in saeculis supervenientibus.*

Phil. iii. 11 : *quae est a mortuis* (ii. p. 359, n. 2) ; N. T., τὴν ἐκ νέκρων. Mr. Harvey adduces the 𝔖 ἐκ νέκρων to show that Syr., which has the relative, is the source of the reading of Irenaeus. But d e f g vg. (Tdf.) have *quae est.*

1 Thess. v. 3 : *munitio* (ii. p. 418, n. 3), with d g ; N. T. ἀσφάλεια.

[1] Massuet, in Stieren's Irenaeus, i. p. 734, n. 2.

2 Thess. ii. 4: *super omne quod* (ii. p. 391, n. 2), with f g vg. (Ln.); N. T., ἐπὶ πάντα (f g vg. read ἐπὶ πᾶν τό; cf. ii. p. 24, n. 7).

2 Thess. ii. 11: *mittet* (ii. p. 392, n. 7), with d e f g vg. demid tol (Tdf.); N. T., πέμπει. Tdf. decides for πέμπει, but adds that Irenaeus has present and future each three times; so no conclusion can be drawn.

Other readings may be classed as explained by Codex Bezae.

Matt. i. 22: *Hoc autem totum factum est* (ii. p. 280, n. 5); D and N. T. τοῦτο δὲ ὅλον γέγονεν.

Matt. x. 10: *esca* (ii. p. 168, n. 2); D and N. T. τῆς τρόφης.

Matt. xxii. 32: *Deus* once (ii. p. 155, n. 1); D and N. T θεός once.

Mark i. 2: ἐν Ἡσαΐᾳ τῷ προφήτῃ — *in Esaia propheta* (ii. p. 49, n. 2); N. T. ἐν τῷ Ἡσαΐᾳ τῷ προφήτῃ; D ἐν Ἡσαΐᾳ τῷ προφήτῃ. (Irenaeus twice (ii. pp. 39, 84) cites this text *in prophetis* with ϛ. etc.)

Luke i. 75: *dies nostros* (ii. p. 35, n. 2); D and N. T. τὰς ἡμέρας ἡμῶν.

Luke xiv. 27: ὃς οὐ βαστάζει τὸν σταυρὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ μοι μαθήτης ἐμὸς οὐ δύναται γενέσθαι — *qui non tollit crucem suam et sequitur me discipulus meus esse non potest* (i. p. 29, n. 3); N. T. ὅστις οὐ βαστάζει τὸν σταυρὸν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἔρχεται ὀπίσω μου οὐ δύναται εἶναί μου μαθητής; D ὃς οὐ βαστάζει τὸν σταυρὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔρχεται ὀπίσω μου οὐ δύναταί μου μαθητὴς εἶναι; Syr. *is qui non tollet crucem suam et venit post me discipulus non potest esse mihi.* It will be noticed that the reading of Irenaeus coincides with none of the adduced parallels, but that it is a little nearer to D (ὅς, αὐτοῦ and the order of the last clause) than to the other two. The Syriac also shares with D and N. T. the differences from Irenaeus in ἀκολουθεῖ, ἐμός, γενέσθαι. So that Syr. is no better parallel to Irenaeus than N. T., and not so good as D. ΚΠ etc. have ἀκολουθεῖ ὀπίσω (Tdf.).

Luke xxiv. 46, 47: All MSS. of Irenaeus omit *sic oportebat* (vs. 46) and *poenitentiam in* (vs. 47) (ii. p. 86, n. 4). The first omission is in N. T., and may be ascribed to D; for the second I have found only the authority of two versions — a Syriac (not Mr. Harvey's, which is the Peschito) and a Persian (Mill). As the Peschito has filled up both these lacunae, no parallel can be alleged.

John xii. 32: *omnia* (ii. p. 150, n. 4); D πάντα; N. T. πάντας; Syr. *unumquemque.*

John xx. 31: *vitam aeternam* (ii. p. 86, n. 6); D ζωὴν αἰώνιον; N. T. ζωήν.

Acts ii. 24: *inferorum* (ii. p. 53, n. 4); D τοῦ ᾅδου; N. T. τοῦ θανάτου; Syr. *vincula sepulchri* (Tdf. and Michaelis Cur. Syr. p. 2)

Acts ii. 31: D, N. T., and Irenaeus (ii. p. 54, n. 1) all omit ἡ ψυχή μου, which ς adds.

Acts iii. 18: *ore omnium prophetarum pati Christum suum* (ii p. 56, n. 1); D and N. T. διὰ στόματος πάντων τῶν προφητῶν, πάθειν τὸν Χριστὸν αὐτοῦ; but ς adds αὐτοῦ after προφητῶν.

Acts iv. 25: *per Spiritum Sanctum ore David patris nostri pueri tui dixisti* (ii. p. 58, n. 1); Syr. has all except *patris nostri*; so D διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου διὰ τοῦ στόματος λαλήσας Δανεὶδ παιδός σου, and N. T. adds τοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν, but before διὰ πνεύματος; vg may be given as perhaps the best parallel to Irenaeus: *qui spiritu sancto per os patris nostri David, pueri tui, dixisti.*

Acts iv. 27: *in hac civitate* (ii. p. 58, n. 2); D and N. T. ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ; ς om.

Acts vii. 43: *stellam dei Rempham* (ii. p. 188, n. 1); D τὸ ἄστρον τοῦ θεοῦ Ῥεμφάμ; N. T. τὸ ἄστρον τοῦ θεοῦ Ῥομφάν; ς adds ὑμῶν; Syr. *stellam dei Rephon* or *Radphon* (Schaaf Nov. Test. Syr. *Rephon;* Michaelis Cur. Syr. p. 57, *Radphon*).

Acts xvii. 27: *illud quod est divinum* (ii. p. 64, n. 2); D τὸ θεῖόν ἐστιν; N. T. τὸν θεόν; Syr. *deum.*

Three readings may now be noticed which find their explanation outside of the circle of MSS. to which we have hitherto limited ourselves.

Mark x. 21: ἄρας τὸν σταυρὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ μοι, *tollens crucem sequere me* (i. p. 29 n. 2); N. T. καὶ δεῦρο ἀκολουθεῖ μοι; Syr. *accipe crucem tuam et veni post me.* Nearer than Syr. to the Latin of Irenaeus is a, *sublata cruce veni, sequere me.* The Greek reading of Irenaeus is found in ΑΝΧΓΠς q etc. (Tdf.); but the order of the clauses is transposed. The order and reading of Irenaeus are found in G 1. 13. 28. 69. al[5] Arm. Aeth. (Tdf.) Therefore this reading need not come from the Syriac, which is different from it.

Acts xv. 11: *Domini nostri* (ii. p. 69, n. 2); N. T. τὸν κυρίον. The reading of Irenaeus is found in 13. Hier. (Gb. Wetst.) "one MS." (Sab.) Cop. Sahid. Aeth. (Scholz).

Col. i. 22: *per mortem ejus* (ii. p. 362, n. 4); N. T. διὰ τοῦ θανάτου; Syr. *et per mortem suam* — so Syr. adds *et.* For the reading of Irenaeus we have ℵAP al[25] m[87] etc. (Tdf.)

There are a good many texts which seem to be sufficiently natural as translations from the Greek.

Luke i. 2: *speculatores* (ii. p. 145, n. 2); N. T. ἀντόπται. *Speculatores* needs no justification, for it and *contemplatores* (ii. p. 76 and e) are nearer than the translation of almost all the Latin versions: *qui ipsi viderunt* (d vg etc.).

Luke ii. 31: *in facie* (ii. p. 163, n. 1); N.T. κατὰ πρόσωπον; Syr. *ante faciem*; d f have *in conspectu*; b vg. *ante faciem*. Irenaeus cites the text twice *ante faciem* (ii. pp. 38, 85); Hil. has *in facie* (Ln.).

Acts ii. 33: *qui dextera* (ii. p. 54, n. 2); N. T. τῇ δεξίᾳ οὖν; but the Syr. has *et ipse est qui per dexteram*. The only exact parallel seems to be Cop. But it is common enough to find the relative and finite verb in Latin for the participle in Greek.

Acts iii. 19: *et veniant* (ii. p. 56, n. 2, misprint for n. 3); N. T. ὅπως ἂν ἔλθωσιν. Syr. has literally *et evenient;* but, as in Hebrew, here *et* has the consecutive force, and so *et evenient* is equivalent to *ut eveniant*. But in Irenaeus *et* connects *veniant* with *ut* in the previous clause; otherwise of course we should have *et venient*.[1]

Acts v. 42: *in domo* (ii. p. 59, n. 4); N. T. κατ' οἶκον; d Lucif. Cal. (Ln.) have *domi*, from which this *in domo* cannot be sharply distinguished in such a translator as the interpreter of Irenaeus, especially as he had just written *in templo*. The Syriac has *domi*, that is, strictly, a preposition and a noun (the Hebrew בְּבַיִת), but to be translated *domi* in Latin (e.g. Schaaf, N. T. Syr. ad loc.).

Acts vii. 43; *accepistis* (ii. p. 187, n. 4); N. T. ἀνελάβετε; Syr. *bajulastis* sive *accepistis*; vg. *suscepistis*; d *adsumpsistis*. The Vulgate has the best translation; but the translator of Irenaeus is as near the Greek as d is.

1 Cor. xv. 49: *qui de terra (limo) est* (ii. pp. 343, n. 2, 348, n. 6); N. T. τοῦ χοϊκοῦ. The relative construction is too common to need justification, and Syr. has *qui erat ex pulvere*. Irenaeus probably wrote τοῦ χοϊκοῦ, for the translation varying (*terra, limo*) indicates some word which could be thus differently rendered.[2] So Tertullian (de resurr. carnis, cap. 49) *primus homo de terra choicus, id est limaceus*.[3] Ambrst. has *qui de terra est;* Cyprian, Zeno Veronensis, *qui de limo est* (Sab.).

Col. ii. 19: *compaginatum* (ii. p. 363, n. 4); N. T. ἐπιχορηγού-

[1] Cf. Erasmus, ad loc., Critici Sacri, Vol. vii. p. 2156.

[2] ii. p. 220 we find χοῦν θανάτου (Ps. xxii. (xxi.)15) translated *limum mortis*.

[3] Quoted by Drusius, Critici Sacri, Vol. vii. p. 3926.

μενον. Mr. Harvey pronounces the reading of Irenaeus to be closer to Syr. (which has *compositum*) than the Greek ἐπιχορήγων. This is true; but where does Mr. Harvey find ἐπιχορήγων? *Compaginatum* is about as near to ἐπιχορηγούμενον as the Syr. *compositum*. Ambrst. has *compaginatum* (Sab.).

Two texts follow which are quoted from heretics, and for which Irenaeus is not responsible.

Rom. xi. 36: πάντα εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὰ πάντα; *omnia in ipsum et ex ipso omnia* (i. p. 28, n. 5.); N. T. ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα: Syr. *omnia ab eo et omnia in eo, et omnia per eum*. This quotation of the Valentinians is careless or intentionally defective in omitting καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ. Being used as a proof text in showing Σωτήρ to be πάντα what would be more natural than to repeat the πάντα?[1] Further, the Valentinians may have quoted with the Syriac in mind.

Col. iii. 11: καὶ αὐτός ἐστι τὰ πάντα, *et ipse est omnia* (i. p. 28, n. 5); N. T. ἀλλὰ πάντα καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν Χριστός; Syr. *sed omnia et in omnibus* (*est*) *Christus*. The same remarks apply to this quotation as to the last, except that the Syriac parallel is evidently much weaker than before, in fact, no closer than the N. T.

The rest of the texts must be left to the Syriac explanation; for I have not been able to discover adequate parallels.

1 Cor. i. 26: *non multi sapientes apud vos nec nobiles neque fortes* (i. p. 320, n. 5); N. T. οὐ πολλοὶ σοφοὶ κατὰ σάρκα, οὐ πολλοὶ δυνατοί, οὐ πολλοὶ εὐγενεῖς; Syr. *non multi inter vos* (*sunt*) *sapientes secundum carnem, neque multi inter vos potentes, neque multi inter vos genere illustri*. The parallel between Irenaeus and the Syriac is only in the first *apud* (*inter*) *vos*. Irenaeus omits *secundum carnem* and the second and third *inter vos* and Irenaeus reads *nobiles*, not *genere illustri*.

Acts vii. 41: *sacrificia* (ii. p. 187, n. 4); N. T. θυσίαν; Syr. *victimas*; the plural I have found only in Go. (Bianchini) and 46. (Scholz).

Acts vii. 42: *exercitibus* (ii. p. 187, n. 4); N. T. τῇ στρατιᾷ Syr. (*ut colerent*) *exercitus*.

Acts ix. 15: *in gentibus* (ii. p. 79, n. 3); N. T. ἐνώπιον ἐθνῶν; Syr. *in gentibus*.

Acts xvii. 26: *super faciem totius terrae* (ii. p. 63, n. 4), with Syr. Cop.; N. T. ἐπὶ πάντος προσώπου τῆς γῆς.

[1] Valla (Critici Sacri, Vol. vii. p. 828) paraphrases the verse thus: unde *omnia*, et per quem *omnia*, et in quem *omnia*.

To sum up, — we have reviewed thirty conjectures, five cases where Irenaeus and the Syriac evidently differ, thirty-six explained by the Latin versions, sixteen by D, three by other MSS., eight by inaccurate translation into Latin, two quotations by heretics, and five instances for which we are unable to give a better reason than the Syriac; in all one hundred and five readings. There are, then, just five instances in which the influence of the Syriac cannot be disproved from the accessible materials. It is possible, if not probable, from the large number of readings explained, that had we been able to refer to a larger number of MSS., these five also might have been traced. But five parallels will be deemed wholly insufficient ground on which to rest the nationality of Irenaeus, especially, since all but one occur in Acts, of which book, as we shall see, it is probable that Irenaeus used a different version. But, in case it should still appear to some that real, though slight, traces of Syriac influence can be detected in the writings of Irenaeus, these traces may be easily accounted for.

The striking agreement of the Peschito — Mr. Harvey's "Syriac Version" — with Codex Bezae [1] and the old Latin versions,[2] makes it probable that they coincided in other readings now lost (except in the Peschito and Irenaeus) from the mutilations and changes which the Greek [3] and the Latin have undergone. Again, the present condition of the Peschito indicates a probable revision in the fourth century by collation with Greek MSS.,[4] and thus readings may have come into the Peschito and Irenaeus from some common source. When we remember that the Peschito is cited by many

[1] Marsh's Michaelis, Vol. ii. pp. 25, 231; Cureton, Syriac Gospels, Introd. p. lxviii and note; Scrivener, Codex Bezae, Introd. pp. lvi, lviii, lix, lxiv; Michaelis, Curae Syriacae, p. 82.

[2] Marsh's Michaelis, Vol. ii. pp. 24, 112, 116; Horne's Introd. Vol. iv. (1863), pp. 235, 265; Cureton, l. c. p lxvii.; Scrivener, l. c. p. lvi; Etheridge, Horae Aramaicae, p. 68; Michaelis, Curae Syriacae, p. 163 s.

[3] Cf. Horne's Introd. Vol. iv. pp. 170, 172.

[4] Tregelles, in Smith's Bible Dict. (s.v. Version, Syriac), and Horne's Introd Vol. iv. p. 265 s.; Marsh's Michaelis, Vol. ii. p. 46 s.

of the Fathers,[1] that it was possibly used in Alcuin's revision of the Vulgate,[2] and, especially, that there was from an early date a Syriac translation of Irenaeus,[3] we see that the avenues were not few at which Syriac influence could enter. Proof, to be sure, is wanting, and must be; but, at all events, if Syriac influence is insisted on, it is more probable that it was felt in any or all of these ways than through the Syriac nationality of Irenaeus.

2. From the New Testament citations of Irenaeus a much stronger argument may be deduced for the use by him of Codex Bezae, than that advanced by Mr. Harvey for his familiarity with the Peschito. It is beyond the scope of this discussion, and impossible in the mutilated state of some MSS., to prove this exhaustively from the examination of every New Testament text cited by Irenaeus; but it may be briefly illustrated in so striking a manner as to carry almost equal weight. For the purpose of comparison with Irenaeus we select a Codex whose history associates it with that Father; one, too, not like the Peschito, the result of a much later recension by comparison with other MSS., but which has probably kept, to a great extent, its own readings from an early date. Codex Bezae is, moreover, a manuscript whose readings are individual and peculiar, so that wherever found they leave little doubt as to their source. The most peculiar book of this most peculiar Codex is Acts; let us then compare some readings of Irenaeus in the book of Acts with Acts in Codex Bezae. Fortunately Irenaeus quotes almost all the passages he adduces from Acts within a very short space;[4] and these often in long citations, where a writer cannot trust to his memory, and where, therefore, traces of the MS. he used will probably appear.

[1] Origen, Basil, Ambrose, Procopius, Theodoret, Chrysostom, Augustine, Ephrem the Syrian (and perhaps Melito); Etheridge, l. c. p. 23; Epiphanius also, cf. Mill, Proleg., in Nov. Test., § 790.

[2] Theganus is the authority; but cf. Lee, Proleg. in Bib. Polyglot, p. 63, notes; Marsh's Michaelis, Vol. ii. p. 125, iii. p. 630; Etheridge, l. c. pp. 36, 37.

[3] i. p. clxiv s.; Massuet, Diss. ii. § 55.

[4] ii. pp. 52–76.

As to the form of coincidences to be noticed, they must be limited to words and order of words (since this last is used by Mr. Harvey). Conjectures, however simple, are not admissable. Nor would it be fair to cite all variations from the Textus Receptus, but only the differences from the critical text which has hitherto been our standard. Such a test is just to Irenaeus, and not unjust to Mr. Harvey; for, in the twenty-five pages of Irenaeus now to be examined, Mr. Harvey has collected eighteen Syriac analogies; more than in any other twenty-five pages of either volume. But these eighteen are reduced to nine by the rules laid down, for we find four conjectures,[1] four variations from only the Textus Receptus,[2] and one case where the Syriac and N. T. exactly agree, but Irenaeus differs from both.[3] Let us now compare Codex Bezae and Irenaeus with the critical text.

Acts i. 16 (p. 52): D Ir. add *ταύτην*, hanc.

Acts ii. 24: N. T. *τοῦ θανάτου*; D *τοῦ ᾅδου*; Ir. inferorum.

Acts ii. 37: D Ir. add *οὖν*, ergo.

Acts ii. 38: D Ir. om. *ὑμῶν*.

Acts iii. 7: N. T. *παραχρῆμα δέ*; D *καὶ παραχρῆμα*; Ir. et statim.

Acts iii. 12: N. T. *πρὸς τὸν λαόν*; D *πρὸς αὐτούς*; Ir. (dixit) eis.

Acts iii. 12: D Ir. add *ἡμῶν*, nostrâ.

Acts iii. 13: D Ir. add *εἰς κρίσιν*, in judicium.

Acts iii. 13: N. T. *ἀπολύειν*; D *ἀπολύειν αὐτὸν θέλοντος*; Ir. cum remittere eum vellet.

Acts iii. 14: N. T. *ἠρνήσασθε*; D *ἐβαρύνατε*; Ir. aggravistis.

Acts iii. 17: D Ir. add *πονηρόν*, nequam.

Acts iii. 21: D Ir. om. *ἀπ' αἰῶνος*.

Acts iii. 22: D Ir. add *πρὸς τοὺς πατέρας ὑμῶν*, ad patres nostros.

Acts iii. 22: N. T. *ὡς ἐμέ· αὐτοῦ ἀκούσεσθε;* D *ὡς ἐμοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀκούσεσθε*; Ir. quemadmodum me ipsum audietis.

Acts iii. 23: N. T. *ψυχὴ ἥτις ἐάν*; D *ψυχὴ ἥτις ἄν*; Ir. omnis anima quaecunque.

Acts iii. 24: D Ir. om. *δέ*.

Acts iii. 26: D Ir. om. *αὐτόν*.

Acts iv. 8: D Ir. add *τοῦ Ἰσραήλ*, Israelitae.

[1] ii. pp. 55, n. 3, 4; 63, n. 1; 70, n. 8. [2] ii. pp. 54, n. 1; 56, n. 1; 58, n. 1, 2. [3] ii. p. 64, n. 2.

Acts iv. 9: D Ir. add ἀφ' ὑμῶν, a vobis.

Acts iv. 12: D Ir. om. ἡ σωτηρία.

Acts iv. 20: N. T. ἐν ἀνθρώποις; D ἀνθρώποις; Ir. hominibus.

Acts iv. 22: D Ir. om. τοῦτο.

Acts iv. 24: D Ir. add ὁ θεός, deus.

Acts v. 31: N. T. τοῦ δοῦναι (vg. ad dandum); D δοῦναι; Irv. dare.

Acts x. 5: d Ir. om. τινα (wanting in D).

Acts x. 37: D Ir. add γάρ.

Acts x. 41: D Ir. om. αὐτόν.

Acts xiv. 15: D Ir. om. καί.

Acts xiv. 15: D Ir. add τὸν θεόν, deum.

Acts xiv. 15: D Ir. add ὅπως, uti.

Acts xiv. 17: N. T. αὐτόν; D ἑαυτόν; Ir. semetipsum.

Acts xv. 8: D Ir. add ἐπ' αὐτούς, eis.

Acts xv. 10: D Ir. add Χριστοῦ, Christi.

Acts xv. 13: N. T. Ἰάκωβος λέγων; D Ἰάκωβος εἶπεν; Ir. Jacobus dixit.

Acts xv. 15: N. T. τούτῳ; D οὕτως; Ir. sic.

Acts xv. 18: D Ir. add ἔστιν (τῷ κυρίῳ) τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ, est (deo) opus ejus.

Acts xv. 20: D Ir. om. καὶ τοῦ πνικτοῦ.

Acts xv. 20: D Ir. add καὶ ὅσα μὴ θέλουσιν ἑαυτοῖς γίνεσθαι ἑτέροις μὴ ποιεῖτε, et quaecunque nolunt sibi fieri aliis ne faciant.

Acts xv. 26: N. T. τὰς ψυχάς; D τὴν ψυχήν; Ir. animam.

Acts xv. 29: D Ir. om. καὶ πνικτῶν.

Acts xv. 29: D Ir. add καὶ ὅσα μὴ θέλετε ἑαυτοῖς γίνεσθαι ἑτέρῳ μὴ ποιεῖν, et quaecunque nolunt sibi fieri aliis ne faciant.

Acts xv. 29: N. T. ἐξ ὧν; D ἀφ' ὧν; Ir. a quibus.

Acts xv. 29: D Ir. add φερόμενοι ἐν τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι, ambulantes in spiritu sancto.

Acts xvi. 10: N.T. συμβιβάζοντες; D ἐνοήσαμεν; Ir. intelligentes.

Acts xvi. 10: N. T. ὁ θεός; D ὁ κύριος; Ir. dominus.

Acts xvii. 25: N. T. αὐτὸς διδούς; D ὅτι οὗτος ὁ δούς (where οὗτος is probably an error for αὐτός, cf. d ipse); Ir. cum ipse dederit.

Acts xvii. 26: N. T. καὶ τὰ πάντα· ἐποίησέν τε; D καὶ τὰ πάντα ἐποίησεν; Ir. et omnia qui fecit.

Acts xvii. 26: N. T. καὶ τὰς ὁροθεσίας; D κατὰ ὁροθεσίαν; Ir. secundum determinationes.

Acts xvii. 27 : N. T. τὸν θεόν ; D τὸ θεῖόν ἐστιν ; Ir. illud quod est divinum.

Acts xvii. 27 : N. T. αὐτόν ; D αὐτό ; Ir. illud.

Acts xvii. 27 : N. T. καί ; D ἤ ; Ir. aut.

Acts xvii. 27 : N. T. ὑπάρχοντα ; D ὄν ; Ir. sit (cf. v. 24, Ir. renders, ὑπάρχων, existens).

Acts xvii. 28 : D Ir. om. ποιητῶν.

Acts xvii. 28 : N. T. τοῦ ; D τούτου ; Ir. hujus.

Acts xvii. 29 : N. T. καί ; D ἤ ; Ir. aut.

Acts xvii. 31 : N. T. ἐν ᾗ μέλλει κρίνειν ; D κρῖναι ; Ir. judicari.

Acts xvii. 31 : D Ir. add Ἰησῷ, Jesu.

Acts xx. 28 : D Ir. add ἑαυτῷ.

Acts xx. 30 : N. T. ἀποσπᾶν ; D ἀποστρέφειν ; Ir. convertant.

Acts xx. 30 : N. T. ἑαυτῶν ; D αὐτῶν ; Ir. se.

We have here sixty instances of variae lectiones common to D and Irenaeus. It may be worth while to call particular attention to some of these instances of the remarkable agreement of Codex Bezae and Irenaeus, over against the critical text — in peculiar changes of words, Acts ii. 24 ; iii. 14 ; xvii. 26, 27 ; xx. 30 ; in marked omissions, iv. 12 ; xv. 20, 29 ; xvii. 28, and in curious interpolations — the chief characteristic of Codex Bezae — iii. 13, 17, 22 ; xv. 18, 20, 29.

These parallels are of such strength as to prove a common source, and the weakness of the Syriac analogies we have considered is salient in contrast with them. Let us notice, further, a few cases of similarity in the order of words.

Acts ii. 26 : N. T. μου ἡ καρδία ; D ἡ καρδία μου ; Ir. cor meum.

Acts ii. 33 : N. T. τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου ; D τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ; Ir. sancti spiritus.

Acts ii. 36 : N. T. ἐποίησεν ὁ θεός ; D ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησεν ; Ir. deus fecit.

Acts ii. 38 : N. T. μετανοήσατέ φησιν ; D φησίν μετανοήσατε ; Ir. ait poenitentiam agite.

Acts iii. 7 : N. T. αἱ βάσεις αὐτοῦ ; D αὐτοῦ αἱ βάσεις ; Ir. ejus ... gressus.

Acts iii. 19 : N. T. ὑμῶν τὰς ἁμαρτίας ; D τὰς ἁμαρτίας ὑμῶν ; Ir peccata vestra.

Acts iii. 25 : N. T. διέθετο ὁ θεός ; D ὁ θεὸς διέθετο ; Ir. deus disposuit.

Acts iii. 26: ἀναστήσας ὁ θεός; D ὁ θεὸς ἀναστήσας; Ir. deus excitans.

Acts iv. 33: N. T. Ἰησοῦ ... τοῦ κυρίου; D τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ; Ir. domini Jesu.

Acts vii. 60: N. T. τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ταύτην; D ταύτην τὴν ἁμαρτίαν; Ir. hoc peccatum.

Acts x. 28: N. T. ἔδειξεν ὁ θεός; D ὁ θεὸς ἔδειξεν; Ir. deus ostendit.

Acts x. 47: N. T. δύναται κωλῦσαί τις; D κολῦσαί τις δύναται; Ir. quis ... vetare potest.

Acts xv. 7: N. T. ἐξελέξατο ὁ θεός; D ὁ θεὸς ἐξελέξατο; Ir. deus elegit.

Acts xv. 28: N. T. τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ; D τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι; Ir. sancto spiritu.

Acts xvii. 24: N. T. ὑπάρχων κύριος; D κύριος ὑπάρχων; Ir. dominus existens.

Acts xvii. 27: N. T. μακρὰν ἀπὸ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου ἡμῶν ὑπάρχονται; D μακρὰν ὂν κ. τ. λ.; Ir. non longe sit, etc.

These sixteen parallels of order would not otherwise merit so much attention as they now deserve, being supported by sixty verbal parallels and a strong historical probability. Of course the argument from Codex Bezae does not exactly overthrow Mr. Harvey's supposition of Syriac readings retained in the memory. Yet, in conjunction with the foregoing examination of those Syriac readings, it shows that the traces of the Peschito in Irenaeus are infinitesimal compared with those of Codex Bezae, and so, that the argument from the Scripture citations in the Adversus Haereses, is in favor of that manuscript of the New Testament which was procured by Beza from the monastery of S. Irenaeus.

But the case for Codex Bezae may be made still stronger. It will have been observed that almost all of Mr. Harvey's Syriac analogies were from the Latin text, so that they (if from Irenaeus) had survived embodiment in Greek and translation into Latin, while there is really no evidence that they might not have emanated from the last transcriber, or any other, as probably as from Irenaeus or his immediate translator. But with these seventy-six parallels the case is different;

they are taken directly from the Greek of Codex Bezae, and, from their style, seem to have been translated from it by the translator of the whole of Irenaeus. It is evident at a single glance that they have nothing to do with the Latin of Codex Bezae. Not only do they differ from d wherever synonymes will permit,[1] but the translator of Irenaeus often remains faithful to the Greek when d varies from it, and follows some Latin version.[2] Their habits of translation are entirely different, and the interpreter of Irenaeus is generally the better scholar.[3]

The translator of Irenaeus was probably almost (if not quite[4]) contemporaneous with that Father, so that few, if any, Greek scribes intervened. Hence it seems most natural that the quotations evidently made directly from the Greek of Codex Bezae were cited by Irenaeus himself, and as incorporated with the context were translated by his interpreter. Thus we reach the probability that the older form of Codex Bezae, including the Epistles,[5] was the New Testament of Irenaeus.[6]

This foundation-text was probably far more visible even in the first translator than now, because of the mutilation of Codex Bezae and the loss of its Epistles. Add to these causes the alterations of the Latin scribes, who from different Latin versions remodelled the ancient readings, and we reach the present state of the Bible text in Irenaeus. But while this theory for the formation of our Latin text of this Father is suggested, not proved,[7] yet we trust it will hardly be dis-

[1] E.g. Acts i. 20, d accipiet alter, Ir. sumat alius; ii. 24, d suscitavit, Ir. excitavit; d amitibus, Ir. doloribus; d deteneri, Ir. teneri; ii. 26, d inhabitabit in spem, Ir. requiescat in spe; ii. 30, d collocare super thronum, Ir. sedere in throno — and so on, ad lib.

[2] E.g. Acts iv. 22, d hoc signum, Ir. om. hoc; xvii. 26, d et, Ir. secundum; xvii. 28, d et, Ir. aut; xvii. 30, d abstrahant, Ir. convertant, d se ipsos, Ir. se.

[3] E.g. always d quia (or quod), Ir. quoniam (Gr. ὅτι); often d suscito, Ir. excito; d puts enim and autem in the third place, e.g. Acts vii. 37, ii. 38; x. 28, d's use of aliquis; ii. 30, d inhabitabit in spem; xv. 8, d super eos (Ir. eis); xv. 16, ipsius (Ir. ejus); x. 29, d ferentes, Ir. ambulantes.

[4] Horne's Introd. Vol. iv. p. 333.

[5] Ibid. p. 170.

[6] Cf. Scrivener, Codex Bezae, Introd. p. xlv.

[7] If Dodwell was right in supposing (Diss. in Iren. (Oxon. 1689) Diss. v. §§ vi. vii. x.), that Tertullian did not have the Latin translation of Irenaeus before

puted by one who has followed the course of this essay that Irenaeus was an Asiatic Greek by birth, by name, by education, in style, in the absence of Hebrew and Syriac attainments, and in the New Testament he read from his childhood.

ARTICLE V.

STRICTURES ON REVIVALS OF RELIGION.

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One of the prominent evangelical agencies of our time for the promotion of vital piety and the salvation of men is best defined by the current phrase which the agency has coined as descriptive of itself, "revival effort." Such effort is now nearly universally accepted as indispensable to the growth of existing churches and the planting of new ones. So general is this recognition that to submit any criticisms on the theory or method of such efforts is to invoke on ourselves the severe censure of those who set themselves up as the special champions and promoters of religious awakenings. To do so often incurs the charge of frigid conservatism, or a want of zeal for the Lord, or a want of interest in the salvation of sinners. If pastors or churches raise any question as to the scripturalness, or even the expediency, of measures employed, they are assumed to have no sympathy with the thing itself. If they institute an earnest, scriptural inquiry into the theory and objects proposed by the special advocates of revivals and revival measures, they are assumed to be influenced more by excessive caution than by love for souls; more by indifference to the end sought than by sincere rev-

him, and that we have no trace of it before Augustine (§ viii), this lessens the improbability of alterations in the *Greek* text of biblical passages made *subsequent* to Irenaeus and incorporating readings of the Codex Bezae. Even then, the boldness of such interpolations, unless from the hand of Irenaeus himself, is only surpassed by that exhibited in Codex Bezae itself. So if Dodwell be right, our theory is weakened, but not rendered improbable. Cf. Massuet, Diss. ii. § 53, Harvey's Irenaeus, i. p. clxiv, Sanday, Gospels in 2d. Cent. pp. 320, 332.

erence for the biblical and evangelical character of the means employed. It seems never to be surmised by those who assert themselves the special advocates and promoters of revivals, that they are fallible; may possibly have more zeal than knowledge; or, that in the eagerness with which they press their "one idea" they become reckless respecting the means they employ, or virtually adopt the Jesuitical maxim, that "the end sanctifies the means." Evangelists must not be criticized. Measures proposed must be neither questioned nor sifted. We must accept with subservient meekness, and without any doubt, as an ordained agency of God whatever labels itself evangelical effort, and avows as its object the promotion of revivals of religion, however sentimental or sensational it may be. It is necessarily wise, expedient and scriptural, because the end it proposes is in itself good. To examine into its nature or its essential tendencies or probable results is an impertinence; to object is a proof of want of sympathy with the thing itself; and to withhold co-operation is disobedience to the plain indications of Divine Providence.

But notwithstanding all this, there is a conviction, widespread and growing, among our wisest and most devoted pastors and our best churches, some of whom have reached their conclusions by the way of bitter experience in spurious revivals and reckless measures for their promotion, that there is something radically wrong in our theory of revivals and methods of promoting them, or else we should not witness such lamentable results as often follow them. For it is a fact, that with the converts thus added to the church the desire for novelty and excitement is far stronger than the desire for the sincere milk of the word. A church trained to rely on such effort is in a state of chronic dissatisfaction, or of death-like inactivity, until by some sort of revival measure it is again galvanized into spasmodic vivification, while pastors are cheerless and discouraged if they are not having a "revival season"; just as though the whole of religion consisted in feeling very happy; or the noise of

battle and the shout of victory were to be always heard in the church; or the pastor were accomplishing nothing unless he had many inquirers and nightly meetings; as though his office had only one function and object — baptizing men and women, and thus increasing the numerical strength of the church. This state of things does exist. The instances are not exceptional or occasional; they are frequent. They are found in every city, and may be cited in every association. Indeed, it has come to pass that — unless we know the pastor to be judicious, or the church to be under the leadership of wise deacons; unless we know the work has been preceded by patient and well-directed labor; by healthful, formative discipline, and careful development of the energies of the membership; by the faithful preaching of the word and constant waiting upon God for his blessing — the reports of revivals contained in our newspapers are, must be, received at least *cum grano salis*. We do have fearful reactions, unhappy church quarrels, and many things besides, often following those revivals heralded most loudly, which make us blush for the honor of religion and tremble for the ark of God. As Dr. H. C. Fish has well said: "These spurious movements haved one much to harm the cause of true revivals. Artifices to catch attention; devices to entrap the careless; representations to create impressions; an exaggerated style of preaching to produce alarm and shake suspicious hopes, and to raise a *furore*, no matter of what kind — these have been sometimes put into requisition, over which truth and reverence and humility must weep, and which have done more to injure revivals than all opposition and unbelief on the part of those who make no profession of piety."[1] This opinion of Dr. Fish we are glad to quote in confirmation of what we have just asserted, because he has had large personal experience on this subject, and has added to personal experience extensive observation and inquiry. He is an enthusiastic advocate of revivals, and while many may not endorse some measures he lays so great stress upon, yet he concedes what

[1] Handbook of Revivals, p. 14.

many of our pastors and churches, not so enthusiastic as himself, claim to be true.

Now we do not believe we can have revivals without the natural tendencies and results of the presence of the human element in their promotion. In the working out of his purposes of grace God employs human agencies; men, not angels. We must, therefore, expect unwise methods, and the extravagances of well-meant, but uninstructed zeal. We must not be surprised by occasional excesses of passion and consequent absence of calm, deliberate judgment. Man being imperfect, the evidences of imperfection are traceable in all he does. He works in revivals, as in all things else, not as passive, but as active; not as a machine, but as a moral agent; working, it is true, in obedience to impulses awakened by the Divine Spirit, but manifesting themselves none the less through his own powers, and in accordance with the laws of his own mental, moral, and physical constitution and condition. He does not cease to be man, though actively engaged in promoting a work the efficient cause of which is supernatural, and the final cause God's glory in the salvation of men. President Edwards, in writing of Christian experience, makes an observation pertinent also to the agency of Christians in promoting revivals. He says: "It is not to be supposed that Christians ever have any experiences in this world that are wholly pure; entirely spiritual, without any mixture of what is natural and carnal. The beam of light as it comes from the fountain of light upon our hearts is pure, but as it is reflected thence it is mixed; the seed as it is sent from heaven and planted in the heart is pure, but as it springs up out of the heart is impure; yea, there is commonly a much greater mixture than persons for the most part seem to have any imagination of."[1] Hence the reason for closely discriminating between the many things entering into Christian experience; carefully distinguishing the spiritual from the carnal; the love of God from mere passion; the suggestions of selfishness from that disinterested

[1] Works, Vol. iii. p. 382.

benevolence awakened in the soul by the grace of God in Christ, and the wishes of selfishness or of prejudice from the convictions wrought in our moral self-consciousness by the Divine Spirit and the inspired word. We fail to discriminate in these things as we ought, and hence so much of religious experience is superficial, unreliable, and unscriptural. It soon becomes entirely unsatisfactory to the convert, or he accepts a false notion of religion as a life in the soul, and as a service to be cheerfully and obediently rendered to God. Hence religion is misconceived both subjectively and objectively. It is either forgotten or held with the looseness of indefinite conception and shallow conviction, that while the efficient cause of all true piety is divine, that Divine Cause is working out its effects, not independent of, but through and by a human subject. Nor is this all. The effect is to be manifest by the change of character *in* the human subject. And this, too, not in contravention of the laws and functions of man's mental and moral self-consciousness, but in harmony with them, though the secret of that harmony be so profound and so subtile as to elude all our attempts to analyse and define it. And as all the laws and functions belonging to man's self-consciousness are included in the work of the Divine Spirit, so all that belongs to man's present condition, whether essential or incidental, is also recognized, and becomes apparent, in all his attempts to work out what God thus is working, or has wrought, in him. By essential things in man's present condition, we mean the present constitution and arrangement in the midst of which man is placed and of which he is a part. These are not ignored by the Spirit and word of God, but are too often disregarded by men, who vainly attempt impossibilities, and assume the exercise of prerogatives beyond the sphere within which God has limited human judgment, conscience, and activity. By things *incidental* we mean the degree of mental culture, breadth of intellectual grasp, the circumstances of early education, and the formative influence entering into the foundation and structure of character. None of these

things are ignored by the Spirit in quickening the hearts of men and fitting them for eternal glory. They all appear in connection with revivals of religion as well as in the various departments of Christian work. They are apparent in revivals, in the definition of their object, in the method of their promotion, and in their results. We may expect all the evidences of the employment of a human agency, though working out the gracious impulses God may awaken within. We accept, therefore, as unavoidable, though undesirable, the imperfections inseparable from the employment of human agents in promoting revivals of religion.

But here, after all, has been, and is now, the cause of mistake and source of disaster in connection with revivals of religion. We do not discriminate between the Divine and the human. We know this cannot be done with strict accuracy of judgment. Our imperfect knowledge of the method by which the Divine Spirit works, and our fragmentary understanding of the laws of man's mental and moral self-consciousness render infallibility of judgment impossible. We do not, therefore, mean that we can trace the precise boundary between human passion and that love to God and all things pure begotten in us by the Holy Spirit, or infallibly define this as unwarrantable assumption and that as the assurance of faith, or trace with unerring precision the distinction between the sorrow of the world which worketh death, and godly sorrow which worketh repentance unto salvation. These and many other things are distinct from each other in origin, nature, and effects; and yet there is a shading of one into the other, an interblending of outward indications by which we are perplexed when we attempt to analyze and define them. But, granting this, there is much we might know, of which we are wilfully and culpably ignorant. The existing indifference to such questions is not a healthful indication, but is rather an evidence of the inconclusiveness of our theological thinking and the superficiality of our religious experience. If physicians became indifferent to the study of the diagnoses of disease, and gave no thought

to the indications of convalescence, their knowledge of the science of medicine would be of little value, and their practice of it an imposition on the credulity of their patients. The knowledge of symptoms and of the effects of their medicines in changing for the better the condition of the system is essential. What we want, is a scriptural knowledge of the diagnosis of sin, and a better acquaintance with the scriptural evidences of recovery from its power through the grace that is in Christ Jesus our Lord. In times of special religious interest this is all important. It is vital. The inquirer should have correct instruction. He should know himself, and know God through the atonement, life, and teachings of our Redeemer. Personal piety is comprehended in just two things — a true knowledge of ourselves, and a right understanding of the way of salvation from the sin by which we are depraved and condemned. These are the first lessons to be learned by the inquirer, and all his subsequent attainments are but the expansion of these two fundamentals. Yet these are not the things carefully explained or understood. Often during such seasons the utterances to which we listen, whether intercessory, hortatory, or explanatory, are indefinite in statement and positively false in the theory of salvation they define, when they define anything. Starting converts on the narrow way with such confused conceptions and vague impressions of what religion is and what Jesus requires of them, it ought to occasion no surprise that so many cannot endure the heat and burden of the day, and that so many among us have need that some one teach them "the way of the Lord more perfectly."

The truth in reference to the present aspect of revival efforts is, that we are giving undue prominence to the human side. It is natural this should be so; for the Divine is secret. Its operations are not immediately traceable; we only know them by the effects we witness. Indeed, the Divine side of the work is largely a thing accomplished before we are aware of anything having been done. The Spirit has wrought conviction in the sinner's heart before

we are informed of the fact. His mind is brought into an attitude of inquiry before he makes known his anxiety to us. Men are constrained to seek before they announce themselves seekers; and so it is in every part of a true religious awakening. In the spring-time we see in bud and blossom, in the new leaf, the springing grass, and the fragrant flower the evidence of the revivification of all nature; but that which vivifies we do not see. It is there, nevertheless. To doubt its presence is impossible; but to uncover it, to know its secret, to trace all its subtile and intricate workings is beyond our power. There are points of resemblance between this illustration and all true revivals. The power of which they are the effect we do not see; we only know its presence by its effects, even as the wind bloweth where it listeth, and we hear the sound thereof, but cannot tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth. But there is this difference: In revivals we see the effect of Divine power manifested through, by, and upon man, who is thus at once subject, medium, and agent. Hence we must of necessity judge of the work largely by what we know of man, his passions, prejudices, mental idiosyncrasies, his strong emotions, his prior conceptions of religion, and his liability to subject his mental to his emotional nature when his attention is once wholly directed to his soul's present and future welfare. These are facts we must take into consideration, and no prejudice in favor of any theory of revivals or of revival work should make us indifferent to them. It is just here the danger exists, and for this reason the most judicious discrimination is necessary; for the greatest extravagances have been accepted as special operations of the Holy Spirit; excesses have been approved by which the cause of true religion has been disgraced; while the ecstasy produced by mere animal emotion and the illusions of an excited imagination have been accepted as undoubted evidence of regeneration and the special blessing of God. Urging most earnestly to effort, and putting disproportionate stress on the emotional nature, the special advocates of revival effort have given

little attention to the possible perils inseparable from the undue exaltation of human agency in promoting the interests of true religion; while it is not improbable that excesses and abuses arising from this cause have made others so suspicious of the spurious that they are not laboring assiduously, and as God directs, for the promotion of the true. Having made these general observations on revivals, we proceed to point out the fundamental errors respecting them into which we have imperceptibly drifted, and from which our churches have greatly suffered.

The first is Undervaluing all Kinds of Christian Work not immediately related to Revivals of Religion.

Where this is the fact a continuous state of feeling in church and congregation just like that enjoyed in seasons of special interest is demanded. If this be not maintained it is assumed that nothing is being effected. For this reason we have many members in our churches, and in some instances we have entire churches, exhibiting no interest in anything not directly contributing to the development of immediate results. Working only for these, they can be relied on only while such interest continues; when it subsides their zeal effervesces; a few are left to endure the burden, and nothing more is heard of those who a short time before were a consuming fire of zeal, until by some novel arrangement the process of regalvanization is again commenced. Consequently we have an element in our churches, and a class among our pastors, to say nothing of evangelists, who make what they call religious awakenings the chief end of their desire, prayer, and labor. They can see nothing important but this, and in their intense and narrow zeal cannot imagine anything is being accomplished if such awakenings are not constantly occuring. They measure the efficiency of churches by this rule, and determine the worth of a pastor by his ability to dexterously manipulate church and congregation so as to maintain what they regard as a good state of things.

Now whether it is possible or not to maintain in a congregation a perpetual revival state is not the question, and

hence it is not necessary here to note the distinctions between such a state and spasmodic zeal. What we insist upon is this, that there is a state of things in some of our churches — there is a policy adopted by some evangelists, and having the sympathy of some of our pastors — precisely like that I have just described. Assuming, as they do, that the promotion of religious awakenings and the conversion of sinners is the end of all Christian work, they soon disparage and afterwards neglect other and relatively as important matters. The weekly expository lecture, prayer and conference meetings as means of mutual edification, the cultivation of Christian forbearance, the duty to abound in love and good works, interest in missions, the raising up and proper training of such a ministry as the times demand, the culture of Christian character, and the edification of the whole body of Christ, these and many other things indispensable to religious progress, to the development of the resources of the church, to the organization of all her forces for work, and the consequent strengthening of her hold on those moral agencies by which society is moulded and controlled, are in part or altogether ignored. Hence we have churches whose reputation for activity in times of special religious interest is widely known, but whose contributions to missions, attendance on prayer-meetings, influence in their localities, constancy in devotion, and faithful co-operation with their pastors and the general benevolent work of their denomination, are all in sad contrast with their periodic zeal for the salvation of men. For the cultivation of these things they have no desire. Time and thought bestowed on them is not judged wisely expended. But what would be thought of a military commander who should say: "To push my foes to the wall and win splendid victories is the great object of my campaign, and therefore I will neglect discipline; I will rely on the enthusiam and bravery of my men." He might at first by boldness and dash achieve some brilliant successes, but surely in the end he would be disastrously and ignominously defeated. His army would be demoralized,

disheartened, and routed. As a commander he would be chagrined, disgraced, and cashiered. Confidence in his ability would be hopelessly lost. So in a church where training is undervalued — the culture of those gifts and graces essential to the perfect symmetry of Christian character neglected. The prosperity of such a church will be precarious; its zeal like the meteor's flash; and after exhausting itself by convulsive efforts will be destitute of moral power in society — "twice dead, plucked up by the roots." The minister accepting this policy, and therefore neglecting to feed and train his people, will certainly fail and be discouraged as a pastor. In that office his record will probably be, startling awakenings under his ministry, followed by sad decline because of his lack of qualification to lay those deep foundations so indispensable to strong Christian character and vigorous Christian labor. Then, despondent in heart and, it may be, soured in spirit toward his brethren, he will resign, to seek another field, there to repeat the same thing. We have churches and ministers of this sort, and both undervalue the importance of those things always requisite to their preparation for work and their success in working. Other causes doubtless have contributed to this state of things, but none so much as the theory that the promotion of revivals is the chief end of all Christian labor.

The second, intimately allied to what has just been advanced, *is a Radical Misconception of the Place assigned by Divine Providence to Revivals of Religion in the Extension of Christ's Kingdom.*

What we mean is this: they are not regarded as results of careful, well-directed, and often of long-continued labor, but rather of transient endeavor and of periodic enthusiasm. It is supposed a church may be as inactive as an oyster-bed, as lifeless as a graveyard, as cold as an iceberg, and as penurious as a miser; doing nothing for the cause of Christ for months or for years; neglecting prayer-meetings, indifferent to discipline, and making no effort for the salvation of men. And yet, such a church, stirred by a sudden im-

pulse born of some exciting event in the religious world, may come together, perhaps invite an evangelist, sing and pray, make vows, assert the best intentions for the future, and pledge themselves to excellent resolutions; have a large number profess conversion — from what or to what nobody knows, and hence the converts are not instructed — and so report a glorious revival of religion. This is not an over drawn picture. The thing itself is too common, and altogether too sad for caricature. The theory of revivals it assumes is accepted, and the practical phase it presents is often repeated. That under such circumstances there can never be a genuine revival of religion is not asserted. It is possible God may suddenly rouse his people in this way when they have become wholly indifferent. But if so it is exceptional. It is not in harmony with his normal method of working. And when a work having satisfactory evidence of being a true work of grace occurs under such apparent conditions, the roots, from which the work grew, may be deeper and much farther back than we are able to discover. We have no doubt this is so. For if there are not some remote and hidden causes — we mean secondary causes — by which God has been working, it may be for years, there is, judging by God's ordinary method of working through human agency, scarcely a possibility of it being genuine either in character or results.

For it is true that God does work by human agencies. And it is just as evident that in manifesting his gracious purposes by such agencies it is his sovereign pleasure to employ a series of intermediate causes before the final result is apparent. In fact, so much is this an integral part of God's arrangements that we see no final results in this life or in a single generation. All things are working — working together — working together for good. All Christian efforts originating in the impulses of the Holy Spirit and guided by Divine Wisdom, are but part of one all comprehensive plan, the wisdom of which we cannot understand, and of which we see only the partial and relative results. Consequently

the prayer of Habakkuk, "Oh Lord, revive thy work," was in its spirit far more comprehensive than he knew. Like every true petition for the establishment of Christ's kingdom, it embraced everything by which that glorious consummation is to be finally attained. For God has so constituted man that by intellect, conscience, emotion, faith, prayer, and activity he influences those about him and the generations succeeding him. We cannot change this. God employs it. We are privileged to know the evidence to an extent sufficient to satisfy us that the law exists, but we have not sufficient knowledge of the law, and may never have, to trace all its intricate and subtile workings. But if not discernible by us, God, in his all-comprehensive economy of moral and spiritual causes and effects, has given us demonstration of the thing itself, clear and strong enough to constitute a reason why we should employ in faith the means adapted to the end we desire, assuring us that whatsoever we sow the same also shall we reap. And this is true of all genuine revivals. They do not come up in a night like Jonah's gourd. If such movements, like the seed on stony places, spring up quickly because they have no depth of earth, for the same reason their boasted fruits soon wither away. If they are genuine they must grow like the oak, strike their roots deep like the Cedars in Lebanon. They are the harvests gathered after sowing good seed, carefully cultivating the field, and so fostering and maturing the grain. This is, therefore, where the radical, and sometimes fatal, mistake is made in promoting revivals of religion. Past labor is treated as if worthless, or assumed to have been misdirected. And just here is our chief criticism on the course pursued by some evangelists, and by not a few of their enthusiastic devotees. They ignore patient continuance in well doing. Years of faithful service by a judicious and faithful pastor, and instructive biblical preacher, are disparaged, while the "measures" of the evangelists are praised as the magical instrumentalities by which such wonderful effects were wrought. The impression is made, and often the evangelist and his followers are not

anxious to have it corrected, that, if such means had been employed instead of the stereotyped agencies used, many such glorious ingatherings would have been enjoyed. In this way the harmony of churches has been marred, pastors have been unsettled, and thus — because justly suspicious of them — evangelists have become unacceptable to the best class of our pastors and churches.

Now, contrary to this flippant, superficial, and pharisaical disparagement of such labor, we believe that tireless devotion, biblical preaching, judicious pastoral oversight and counsel, are sacred offerings to the cause of God which he will in no wise dishonor or forget. They are incorporated into his all-wise, all-inclusive plan, in harmony with which he is making certain the triumph of the cross, and preparing the way for the enthronement of his Son as the "Prince of the kings of the earth." If, therefore, such labor be neglected or disparaged we may not reasonably or scripturally hope for his blessing; for we are not complying with the conditions on which he has authorized us to expect it. And this being evident, we cannot contemplate the extent to which such labor, spiritual power, and moral worth is being ignored as a contribution toward the promotion of revivals acceptable to God, without a feeling of sadness for the want of faith in God and appreciation of the devotion of good men it exhibits, and hence a painful suspicion of the genuineness of the work wrought under such circumstances.

For we know God has made no change in the method by which he carries forward his cause through human agency. He works first on man, and then by man on his fellow men. If he move masses — as he does in great awakenings — he does it by means of a man. A Luther, a Bunyan, a Whitefield, a Wesley, a Spurgeon is raised up as his chosen instrument. But these more conspicuous examples are only representative. That is, what by them we see God effecting in the larger sphere he is constantly doing in innumerable smaller ones; and combining these lesser influences he makes all things ready for those greater and more glorious exhibitions of his

grace and mercy. The great outpouring on the day of Pentecost is in its essential features the type and forerunner of all true revivals of religion. Leaving out the miracle-working gift bestowed at that time, a thing not designed to be permanent — and as a fact it ceased with the apostolate — Pentecost is deserving of closer study and imitation than it has yet received as to the place revivals occupy in the divine economy for the establishment of Christ's kingdom. We can only indicate the particular point relating to our position. It is simply this, the minds of the people and of the disciples were prepared for what occurred on the day of Pentecost. We do not mean that they were prepared by the promise assuring them that something remarkable would occur, and for which they were to "tarry at Jerusalem"; but there was also a previous mental, moral, and spiritual preparation for Pentecost of which they may not have been fully conscious as to its intention, but which was, nevertheless, as real in fact and design. For three years Jesus had been preaching and teaching; for almost as long, the seventy and the twelve. Hence the popular mind had been greatly moved; the spirit of inquiry had been aroused; men were musing in their hearts whether Jesus of Nazareth were the Christ or not. There was a combination of labor and of providences that preceded Pentecost and that immediately culminated in Pentecost. In saying this we do not mean that Pentecost and that all revivals are results of natural causes only. What we mean is this: there was a Divine Providence in planning and timing, as well as a divine power in producing the impressions preceding Pentecost; and hence, when — all things being guided by divine wisdom — the fulness of time came, that same gracious and divine power descended more fully on the assembled people, and astounded the multitude by combining in one grand result all that had been done up to that time. In this way the work of God is carried forward, and revivals of religion have a determined place and a necessary relation both to the results and enlargements of all Christian work. Pentecost made it

possible for the disciples to do what could not have been done before Pentecost, and Pentecost was possible because of what had been done before it arrived. If, then, we would have general and glorious revivals, we must honor the place assigned to them among the results of all labor, prayer, and sacrifice. Then the harvest gathered will be abundant and valuable. The effect will be the unfolding of a divine power in and through our churches. Zion will lengthen her cords and strengthen her stakes.

A third error is Indifference to the Scriptural Character of the Means employed for promoting Revivals of Religion, especially as seen in the Tendency to Sensationalism.

Agencies and results in the moral and spiritual realm are even more intimately related than cause and effect in the physical. The relation is more complex, more comprehensive, and exists in obedience to a higher law — a moral law, involving moral consequences abiding and far-reaching. The character of the latter is therefore determined by the nature of the former. If we would see a certain result, we must employ just the agency for the production of that result, and no other. The relation is like that of the tree and the fruit. "A corrupt tree will not bring forth good fruit." We cannot "gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles." A poisoned fountain cannot send forth a healthful stream. A bad life cannot exert a good influence; and, for the same reason, unsound teaching and illegitimate agencies cannot produce perfect character. Hence the agencies by which we build up the character and enlarge the sphere of the influence of our churches cannot be an exception to this principle. If we desire a healthful condition we must use, as far as possible, only the means for the production of such a condition. Experiments are dangerous. Innovations are perilous. Departures from the teachings of Jesus, from the example of the apostles, and the principles underlying the methods of activity in the apostolic churches are liable to be productive of pernicious results, and for this reason should be carefully scrutinized before endorsing them. It is not

affirmed that we should do nothing for which there is neither apostolic precept nor precedent; as, for example, the apostles made no use of that potent instrumentality, the printing press, as it was not then in existence; to infer, therefore, that we should not would be to discard an agency raised up by Divine Providence, susceptible of being made most effective in the work Christ has delegated to us. But even the press, essentially considered, is not a departure from the practice of the apostles, for they did use the written page; we employ the printed; that is all the difference. The rule is, that we must not deviate from the spirit of their method of working, and must, in all we do, keep within the principles by which they were guided. Hence we do not include the multiplication of meetings, whether during the day or for a succession of evenings; for all such things, being incidental rather than fundamental, are left to be determined by the existing circumstances, the demands of the hour, and the facilities at our command. Questions, therefore, relative to such things can at best involve only considerations of expediency and practical utility, and may degenerate into mere quibbles dictated by a captious spirit or ignorant zeal. Agencies must be determined by a different principle altogether. It is "the adaptation of means to the end," and in determining this we must keep within the scriptural precept and example. If we set these aside we jeopardize the result we desire. We may produce an effect, but it will not be a revival of God's work; for that can be secured only in the way God has appointed. Change in this is no more desirable or possible or safe than it would be in the way by which we raise a crop of corn or produce a flower in our garden. If we want the crop of corn or the flower we must seek it in conformity with the laws of nature, and not in disregard of them. It is just so in all true revivals. They must be obtained in the way God appoints. In promoting them the scriptural character of the means employed is vitally important.

To define the scriptural means we do not judge within the object and scope of this paper. It is sufficient for our pur-

pose to say that they must be scriptural. The point we insist upon is, that their scripturalness has not received sufficient attention. For this reason, as already shown, we have become indifferent to all means not focalizing in one point—the production of immediate results of the kind we have come to regard as indispensable to a revival of religion. It is thought the end is so desirable that the nature and appropriateness of the means is wholly a secondary consideration. And it has come to pass that we must accept the vagaries and extravagances in manner and method of all who claim to be specially engaged in labor to promote revivals of religion, or submit to the charge of hostility to religious effort and opposition to the "use of means." Expediency and zeal are to be accepted as adequate apologies, if not as reasons. All innovations are to be received without questioning, on the presumption that the men introducing them are good men, or they are pleasing and attractive to the young. Results must be accepted as genuine; and if anyone does not join enthusiastially in their glorification, he is assumed to have no heart in the good cause. And what is the consequence of this disregard of scripturalness in the use of means, which, in not a few instances, is little better than reckless enthusiam, in which all reasons for acting and the selection of methods are drawn from an overwrought imagination or strong feeling, swayed by an unsanctified will, rather than from the study of God's word and sincere reverence for its teachings? The answer to the question is, "By their fruits ye shall know them." The type of piety formed by such means is emotional, rather than rational. Its theological basis is the sensibilities and sympathies, rather than the Bible. It has its source in highly wrought emotions, rather than in gracious experiences; is often impracticable in church relations; is self-opinionated, rather than wise unto salvation; presumptuous, rather than humble; and guided more by impetuous self-will than by the spirit of Christ and the word of God. That we should be pained by none of these things if we conformed to the fullest extent possible

to the word of God is not affirmed. Even then we should encounter them, even as the apostles did. But what we do affirm is that if we gave a more earnest study to the scriptural theory and method of religious revivals we should greatly decrease the sum total of those things by which our hearts are saddened and the interest of evangelical Christianity compromised in the opinion of those who are without.

If any one should think we have made our statement too strong, we are nevertheless persuaded that none will dispute the position that *sensationalism* now enters largely into the means employed, and that it was not used by the apostles. That in all places where they preached there was a curious, gaping multitude, doing nothing except hearing or telling some new thing, and that the agitation of the popular mind by the preaching of the apostles furnished a sensational stimulus and gratification to those gossipping loungers and idle talkers was doubtless the fact. But the apostles did not pander to this class. They did not covet their approbation. They made no attempt to produce an excitement by catering to their prurient curiosity. We know that a "time of refreshing from the presence of the Lord" will occasion more or less excitement, according to the sentiments, culture, and habits of the society in which it occurs. But that is not the question. What we say the apostles did not do, and we should avoid, is the deliberate creation of excitement in order to turn the thoughts of men to personal religion. Yet often the first thing done is to produce some excitement, and if this is not brought about in some way nothing is effected. Arguments addressed to the understanding and designed to reach the conscience by convincing the judgment, thus rousing men to a sense of sin, of alienation from God, and of personal reconciliation to him through faith in our Lord Jesus Christ are not relied upon. Reason and conscience are not the objects of appeal. The effort is not to awaken man's indurated moral self-consciousness through them. They are not made the means of reaching, awakening, and

renovating the affections and sensibilities. On the contrary, as every man must admit who has carefully and dispassionately studied the methods and measures of some evangelists, the emotions and the imagination have been conspicuously appealed to, while the demonstrations of clear reasoning and the pungency of appeals to the conscience based upon God's word and man's moral constitution have been as conspicuously absent. The theory on which these measures are defended is preposterous. What, excites men before you reason with them? Excite men before you reach their consciences, and in order to reach their consciences? Excite men first, so that you may lead to Christ afterward? Very well, suppose you do. When the exciting conditions are withdrawn, what remains to hold either reason or conscience loyal to Jesus? Nothing. It happens to them, "according to the true proverb, the dog returns to his vomit, and the sow that was washed to her wallowing in the mire." Yet churches are looking for excitement as indispensable to the progress of Christ's kingdom. There must be some clap-trap to catch the people. Resort is had to some kind of pious fraud. A sort of side-show must accompany the exhibition of the cross. It may be a tirade against Universalism, or an unprovoked assault on other heretical bodies, whom we should rather try to win that we may convince and save, than repel by insulting allusions or declamatory denunciations; or it may be the dreamy mysticism and lofty pretensions of the higher life, or great personal magnetism, or remarkable ability in working upon and managing the emotions. No cause for surprise, therefore, that we have so much that is both superficial and sentimental in the typical piety of our day, when we make so little account of straightforward earnestness, of clear perception of the truths of the gospel, of deep conviction of man's moral ruin, and that his recovery is possible only through the saving knowledge of Christ. Therefore it behooves us to "inquire for the old paths, and walk in them"; so shall we see a better day in Zion. We shall rejoice in true revivals

that will lift the people out of sin and bring them into joyful communion with God.

In submitting these reflections and criticisms, it is not meant to disparage revival effort. Having the fullest faith in both its necessity and efficacy, to all that is scriptural and in harmony with the fitness of things we say heartily "Amen and amen." The day in which we live calls for the employment of all our forces. The fields are white already to the harvest. Enthusiasm must not, therefore, be chilled by cold, searching criticism; nor honest endeavor intimidated by sarcasm or ridicule. But, notwithstanding, we need to be careful, though not abating earnestness one jot or one tittle; wise, though just as persistent; more biblical, but just as unremitting in our activity. That untempered zeal should lead to extravagances, the results of which we deplore is to be anticipated; that earnestness in so great a work should sometimes degenerate into rashness ought not to surprise us. Rather these possibilities and tendencies should incite us to a healthful caution, so that we may not suffer the consequences of undue zeal, thus preventing rashness and avoiding extravagances. To do this, how imperative that wisdom and grace which cometh from above! May it be sought in all our churches and by all our pastors; and in seeking it may the prayer of all Christians be, "O Lord, so revive thy work that we may see most of thy glory and least of human imperfection."

ARTICLE VI.

RECENT WORKS BEARING ON THE RELATION OF SCIENCE TO RELIGION.[1]

BY REV. GEORGE F. WRIGHT, ANDOVER, MASS.

No. IV. — CONCERNING THE TRUE DOCTRINE OF FINAL CAUSE OR DESIGN IN NATURE.

Birks (Thomas R.). Modern Physical Fatalism and the Doctrine of Evolution. 12mo. Macmillan.

Cocker (Prof. B. F., D.D., LL.D.). Theistic Conception of the World. An Essay in Opposition to certain Tendencies of Modern Thought. pp. 426. New York. 1875.

Bowen (Professor Francis). Lowell Lectures on the Application of Metaphysical and Ethical Science to the Evidences of Religion. pp. 465. Boston. 1849. In Lectures viii. and ix. of the First Course, pp. 155–198, the "Argument from Design" is judiciously and powerfully presented, though of course without special reference to the peculiar problems of the present time.

Cook (Rev. Joseph). Monday Lectures delivered in Boston in the Fall and Winter of 1876 and 1877. Published with the author's revision in the Daily Advertisers of the Tuesdays or Wednesdays following. Especially the Lectures on the Concessions of Evolutionists. Oct. 9, 16, 23, 30, 1876.

Dawson (J. W., LL.D.). An Address before the American Association for the Advancement of Science at Detroit, Michigan. August, 1875. pp. 26. Montreal. 1875.

Article in International Review for Jan. 1877, in Review of Huxley's New York Lectures. pp. 17.

Elam (Charles, M.D.). Winds of Doctrine: being an Examination of the Modern Theories of Atomatism and Evolution. Reprinted from Contemporary Review for Sept., Oct., and Dec., 1876. pp. 163. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1877.

Fiske (Prof. John). Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, based on the Doctrine of Evolution. 2 vols. pp. 465, 523. Boston. 1875.

Article in North American Review for Jan. 1877. pp. 90–106.

[1] The list of books and articles given here is supplementary to that given in the two previous papers. See Bibliotheca Sacra for July and October, 1876. We regret that through oversight Mesozoic was incorrectly spelled in the October Article. It was correctly spelled in the manuscript.

Hickok (Laurens P., D.D., LL.D.). The Logic of Reason, Universal and Eternal. pp. 192. Boston: Lee and Shepard. 1875.

Hill (Thomas, D.D., LL.D.). A Statement of the Natural Sources of Theology; with a Discussion of their Validity and of Modern Sceptical Objections; to which is added an Article on the First Chapter of Genesis. Reprinted from the Bibliotheca Sacra. pp. 139. Andover: W. F. Draper. 1877.

Huxley (Thomas H., F.R.S., F.L.S.). Lectures on the Theory of Evolution, delivered in New York. Published in Tribune Extra. No. 36, also, with the author's revision, in the Popular Science Monthly for Nov. and Dec. 1876, Jan. 1877.

2. Article on Biology in the ninth edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Jackson (Rev. William, M.A., F.S.A.). The Philosophy of Natural Theology. An Essay in Confutation of the Scepticism of the Present Day, which obtained a prize at Oxford, Nov. 26, 1872. pp. xviii. and 398. New York: A. D. F. Randolph and Co. 1875.

LeConte (Dr. John L.) Address before the American Association for the Advancement of Science at Detroit, Michigan, August, 1875. pp. 18. Salem. 1875.

Martineau (James, D.D., LL.D.). Modern Materialism in its Relations to Theology and Religion. With an Introduction by Henry W. Bellows, D.D. 18mo. pp. 211. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1877.

Maxwell (Prof. Clerk). In Article on "Atoms" in the ninth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. He argues the absurdity of "pangenesis," from mathematical calculations regarding the size of atoms.

Morse (Professor Edward S.). Paper read before the American Association for the advancement of Science at Buffalo, N. Y. Aug. 1876. Published in Popular Science Review for Nov. and Dec. 1876. pp. 1–16, 181–198.

McCosh (James, D.D., LL.D., President of Princeton College). The Development Hypothesis: Is it Sufficient? 12mo. pp. 104. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1876.

The earlier works of the same author should by no means be neglected. The more important are:

The Method of the Divine Government, Physical and Moral. pp. 547. Especially Book II. pp. 75–257. Edinburgh. 1855.

Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation. pp. 556. Edinburgh. 1857.

The Intuitions of the Mind Inductively Investigated. Revised edition. pp. 448. London. 1865.

Porter (President Noah, D.D., of Yale College). The Human Intellect, etc. pp. 693. Especially Chapter v. of the Fourth Part, on "Design, or Final Cause." New York. 1869.

Smith (Prof. Goldwin). "The Ascent of Man." Article in Macmillan's Magazine for Jan. 1877. pp. 10. Republished in Eclectic Magazine for March.

Socrates. Reported in Xenophon's Memorabilia. Book I. chap. 4 and Book IV. chap. 3. This author is not very recent, neither are the Bridgewater Treatises, to which the reader should be referred, fully up to date, but there is as much meaning in them now as ever, and, as modern science is trying to show, a little more.

Wallace (Alfred Russell). The Geographical Distribution of Animals, with a Study of the Relations of Living and Extinct Forms as Elucidating the Past Changes of the Earth's Surface. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 503, 607. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1876.

Address at the Glasgow Meeting of the British Association. Published in the American Journal of Science and Arts for Nov. 1876. pp. 354–85.

Weismann (Prof. August). Studien zur Descendenz-Theorie. II. Uber die letzten Ursachen der Transmutationen, Mit fünf Farbendrucktafeln. 8vo. pp. 336. Leipzig. 1876.

Wilder (Rev. M. A.) Natural Law and Spiritual Agency. Article in New Englander, Vol. xxxiii. (Oct. 1874). pp. 674–702. This is a very satisfactory vindication of the general doctrine of Mind in Nature.

I. *Is there Design in Nature?*

If on shaking a quantity of type in a basket it should appear that some of the pieces stuck together, when they fell, in such order as to compose the story of Moses in the bulrushes, could we resist the conclusion that these particular types were loaded with the design of composing that story, on condition that they were well shaken? Indeed, should we not see more design in type thus endowed than in ordinary "pie," from which an intelligible sentence can be formed only by the direct efforts of a highly skilled workman?

We read the design in the complicated and intelligible adaptation of the final result. It is no prejudice to our conclusion to show that the forces producing this delicate adaptation have passed through a variety of transformations, and that their origin is out of sight. Whatever that might prove, it would in no manner disprove origination in an intelligent designer. The atmosphere of modern speculation is not inimical to the Paleyan argument when properly understood, but is rather a positive supporter of it.

We hear much about the conservation of force. Energy may be cast down from one seat and another, but it cannot be destroyed. It is protean in its forms. There is a principle of continuity in nature. Lines of force which we see in operation in present phenomena may be traced backward into more indefinite, because less known, forms; but they cannot be run so far back as to project behind adequate causation. It is precisely so with the evidence of design in complicated adaptations of nature. Chance produces nothing *definite* and *orderly*.[1] Nature "conserves" design as much as it does force, and in much the same manner.

"One day at Naples," says a French writer, "a certain person in our presence put six dice into a dice-box, and offered a wager that he would throw *sixes* with the whole set. I said that the chance was possible. He threw the dice in this way twice in succession; and I still observed, that possibly he had succeeded by chance. He put back the dice into the box for the third, fourth, and fifth time, and invariably threw *sixes* with the whole set. 'By the blood of Bacchus,' I exclaimed, '*the dice are loaded*'; and so they were.

"Philosophers, when I look at the order of nature that is constantly reproduced, its fixed laws, its successive changes, invariably producing the same effect, — when I consider that there is but one chance which can preserve the universe in the state in which we now see it, and that this always happens, in spite of a hundred millions of other possible chances of perturbation and destruction,—I cry out, '*Surely, Nature's dice are also loaded.*"[2]

The adaptations which we behold in such profusion in nature, may each of them, with respect both to their secon dary causes and their final causes, be compared to a river like the Mississippi, flowing past our doors. We shall not be able to dispense with the idea of design in the location of the river by showing that the channel was not dug by the

[1] How little sense there is in attributing orderly manifestations to *chance*, especially such adaptations as those by which we live and move and have our being, we have shown in previous Articles. See Bib. Sac., Vol. xxxii. pp. 544–547; also Vol. xxxiii. pp. 669, 674, 676, and 687; see also, Hill's Natural Sources of Theology, p. 77 f.; J. S. Mill's Inductive Logic, Book iii., chapters 17 and 18; Bowen, on Metaphysical and Ethical Science, pp. 165–171; Jevons's Principles of Science, Vol. i. p. 225 ff.

[2] The Abbé Galiani in discussion with Diderot, translated and quoted by Bowen from Dugald Stewart's notes.

use of spades, and the material removed on wheelbarrows; for that is only one way, and is not God's way, of forming a canal. The nature of the instrument used in accomplishing an object has nothing whatever to do with the fact of *a* design. We may, if we please, trace the Mississippi back through all its numerous tributaries to the raindrops and the skies, but we are still in a charmed and closed circle of "principles of order," combining for definite results. We never in our investigations get within sight of chaos. What is science but a study of orderly operations? Where order seems to cease, the scientific investigator pauses in bewilderment. "Principles of order" compass his "path and his lying down," they beset him "behind and before." If he "ascend up into heaven they are there; if he take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall they lead him."

In any case of secondary causation we do not care, so far as the argument for the existence of an intelligent designer is concerned, at how many, or at what points, the various elements of design entered. The inference of design in nature is drawn from complexity and niceness of adaptation. This inference need not be affected by any new view of the mode of origination, and cannot be rebutted, except by assigning a sufficient physical cause, irrespective of intelligence. If any one asserts that these adaptations arise from necessity, he is bound to show by what necessity. Until that is shown, the inference of an intelligent cause is as good as it ever was, however much our conception of nature's intricate machinery may be enlarged. Man is himself a designer. The hypothesis that the adaptations of nature had their origin in design is, to say the least, more intelligible than that which ascribes them to necessity. Certainly it devolves upon those who deny or refuse to recognize design in organic complexity, to do more than push back one step, or one hundred steps, the point at which the designing impulse may have been given. They must draw lines of circumvallation around the whole field, and cut off every avenue of approach, or the argument

for design will enter with all its force in spite of them. Sober-minded naturalists do not undertake this task. We do not envy the success of those philososphers who have undertaken it. For, it is as hard to banish the idea of final cause as of efficient causation, and for precisely the same reason.

In the case referred to, of type arranging itself to compose the story of Moses, there is an accumulation of particular designs. In type set up by a printer, a very large part of the particular design enters through his work. But he did not design the type, nor did the type-founder design the story. In this case the skill of the type-setter is called into requisition because the type-maker had not the power or the inclination to go farther in his design than to get the material in readiness for the more specific designs of the printer. But if this type, when shaken sufficiently by horse power in the cellar, would in a square box become Milton's "Sonnet on his Blindness," in a round one the "Lord's Prayer," in a tin pan the "Sayings of Poor Richard," and in a rush basket the story of Moses, we have not lost the design because an animal furnished the power which did the shaking. We grant that the animal did not of his own will add anything to the evidence of the design,— perhaps he was only trying to get at an ear of corn on a stick before him. But design entered in adjusting the forces to make the mill go. We grant, also, that a person of less skill than a printer could set the mill in operation. But so far as the argument for design is concerned, you have, in bringing forward these considerations, only transferred more of the designing activity to this extraordinary type-founder. The evidence of design is not obscured.

II. *Paley did not Reason in a Circle.*

Paley, in the second chapter of his Natural Theology, considers the case of one watch being produced from another in a regular series; and shows that such a discovery would only increase our "admiration of the contrivance," and our "conviction of the consummate skill of the contriver."

Paley, in company with all the scientific investigators of his day, was ignorant of the considerations which are now forcing upon the world the question of the derivative origin of species as well as that of individuals. But he was not so short-sighted as to base his argument on the mode of origination. When one individual gives birth to another, it is only "in some sense the maker" of it.

He is "asking for the cause of that subserviency to a use, that relation to an end, which we have remarked in the watch before us. No answer is given to this question by telling us that a preceding watch produced it."[1]

Still farther on in the chapter Paley contends that supposing one watch to have been produced from another watch, and "that from a former, and so on indefinitely," "does not, even though we go ever so far," "bring us any nearer to the least degree of satisfaction on the subject." The difficulty is not diminished by removing it farther back.

"A chain composed of an infinite number of links can no more support itself than a chain composed of a finite number of links. And of this we are assured, though we never *can* have tried the experiment, because, by increasing the number of links, from ten, for instance, to a hundred, from a hundred to a thousand, etc., we make not the slightest approach, we observe not the smallest tendency, towards self-support."[2]

In the case of one watch being produced by another, Paley denies that "we have [in that fact] any cause whatever ..... for the design, the contrivance, the suitableness of means to an end."[3] The real effect of discovering such an origin would be to "increase beyond measure our admiration of the skill which had been employed in the formation of such a machine."[4] But, while Paley satisfactorily disposed of the objections to his argument on the ground that individuals are propagated from each other, it could not be expected that he should altogether anticipate a somewhat different line of objection, subsequently arising out of a belief that living *species* have a genetic connection with one another. If individuals are endowed not merely with the power of producing other individuals exactly after their kind, but of producing them

[1] Paley's Natural Theology, chap. ii., sec. 3.
[2] Ibid., sec. 4.
[3] Ibid., sec. 4.
[4] Ibid., sec. 5.

with variations of such a kind, and so correlated to their environment, that there shall be improvement in the organization, this, as Professor Gray early contended, compels an extension of the Paleyan argument for a designer.

We are fully aware of a remarkable passage, in which Paley is thought by some to assert that he would throw up his whole style of reasoning if such an hypothesis as that of Mr. Darwin should be established. The passage is as follows :

"There is another answer which has the same effect as the resolving of things into chance, which answer would persuade us to believe that the eye, the animal to which it belongs, every other animal, every plant, indeed every organized body which we see, are only so many out of the possible varieties and combinations of being which the lapse of infinite ages has brought into existence; that the present world is the relic of that variety; millions of other bodily forms and other species having perished, being, by the defect of their constitution, incapable of preservation, or of continuance by generation."[1]

If Paley had written in our day, he would no doubt have guarded his phraseology with more care. But even as it is, the section, as a whole, plainly indicates that the Lucretian theory of fortuitous development was in view. For in his more explicit statement, on the following page, we read :

"The hypothesis teaches, that every possible variety of being hath, at one time or other, found its way into existence, — by what cause or in what manner is not said, — and that those which were badly formed perished; but how or why those which survived should be cast, as we see that plants and animals are cast, into regular classes, the hypothesis does not explain; or, rather, the hypothesis is inconsistent with this phenomenon."

Now, Mr. Darwin, in our day, has brought forward an hypothesis which purports to be consistent with this phenomenon. On this hypothesis, — suggested by observation, — of a wide range of variability, correlated to a complicated series of changing conditions which do not neutralize the effect of the tendency to variation, but direct and intensify it, naturalists are attempting to account for the definite direction in which species have progressed, and the "regular classes" in which they are cast. Yet this can be no hap-hazard process,

[1] Natural Theology, chap. v., sec. 4.

however concealed from our plodding intellects. No one can suppose that all possible events have occurred. The farthest one could go in that direction would be to surmise that all events possible under the present system of nature had come to pass; but that would be a very different thing. Like all illustrations, the one we are now going to bring forward is very unsatisfactory in some respects; but it is truthful to the main point. Each single variation in the hypothesis of Mr. Darwin is like an explosion of gunpowder, determinate in its tendency only as there is a gun-barrel to direct its force.

Had the modern speculations concerning the derivative origin of species been promulgated when Paley wrote, there can be little doubt that our American naturalist would have been anticipated in his supposition of the watch whose immemediate descendants produced better watches, and whose remote descendants gave birth to a chronometer and a town clock. The question in natural theology raised by Darwinism does not disturb the argument for an intelligent designer, but pertains only to the times and modes in which the forces of design are introduced. It also modifies in some degree the interpretation of that design. How little the students of natural theology have to fear this theory of the origin of species, will appear when attention is directed to the contrivance and foresight of a higher power demanded by this theory, not so apparently in the construction of each particular part of the organic and balanced whole, when taken singly, as in the construction and preservation of the whole itself, which should *incorporate* and *retain* these contrivances and adaptations among its parts.

If Paley is open to criticism in one point more than in another, it is in this: that he does not make sufficiently prominent the *a fortiori* nature of his argument. To come down from the "Cosmos" to a watch, to find design, seems like labor lost, since the one is so infinitely inferior to the other. Furthermore, the watch reveals two separate things which we are likely to confound, namely, design, and man's

method of executing design. Making such a comparison prominent incurs the danger of encouraging conceptions of God which are too *anthropomorphic*, both as to the narrowness of the design contemplated and as to the means of attaining the end.

III. *Life does not exist or continue by Necessity.*

The profoundly mysterious power of life, somehow introduced into the world, is adjusted on the Darwinian hypothesis to the other forces which have operated co-ordinately with it. We can easily conceive that at any time since its introduction, changes in these co-ordinate powers might have altogether extinguished life itself. The theory of pangenesis, which is derided by some as absurd, has only that degree of absurdity that pertains to any attempt to state in comprehensive, material figures of speech the marvellous facts concerning the manifestations of life.

We are aware that at this point we are likely to be told that there is no more propriety in speaking of the "power of life" and "vitality" than in speaking of the "power of aquosity" in water. For the sake of the argument we are willing to grant it. But certainly the "power of aquosity" is something. Water is not a necessary existence, even when all the elements in its composition abound. Oxygen and hydrogen are not water, till other and a whole congeries of powers have brought them in to a particular relation to each other; and then they are held in that relation only so long as certain conditions are preserved. The word "aquosity" because superfluous, is not senseless. But no one would contend that there is not a far greater manifestation of power, and an inconceivably more delicate adjustment of conditions required in the production and perpetuation of living organisms, especially those of a higher grade, than in the production of water. As water is more than oxygen and hydrogen, so a living organism is more than oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, carbon, and whatever other chemical elements enter into it. If any one says that living organisms exist in nature by virtue

of necessity, we ask by what necessity? Chance knows no necessity. There can be no necessity in the outcome of Nature except such as is put into her operations. The reasoner never can get so far back in the chain of secondary causation that he is not compelled to posit a nature and conditions which involve in their operations all present phenomena. We by no means admit that philosophers have reduced, or ever can reduce, all phenomena to two or three elementary forms of motion. But if they should do so, they will not have reduced the amount of intelligence necessary to work out of these so-called simple motions the present complicated results and adaptations; for since the days of Aristotle we have rather heard that wisdom was most manifest in the power of accomplishing wonderful results by simplest means.

Let us now look more closely at the Darwinian hypothesis, and see if it in any manner excludes design.

Life is not, according to this hypothesis, a product of the present conditions of existence. It comes down from the past through a mysterious power of propagation. Life is a power co-ordinate with the other natural forces, and clothes itself in material forms which accord both with the nature of the inner principles and of the conditions. A living principle, capable, to a limited extent, of transforming other material powers, is set in motion. To maintain its existence this principle has to run the gauntlet of all the changes that take place in such a world as this. This power of life may be compared to a rove of cotton, and the conditions of life to the spinning-jenny and the combined machinery of a cotton-mill. The nature of the product depends on a vast complication of movements and adaptations, from those of the water-wheel to those which secure the proper tension of the thread. All these movements are independently adjusted with reference to the nature of the cotton. Too much tension will break the thread, too little would loop it.

The Darwinian supposition is, that life has been so adjusted to the changing conditions of the material forces of the

world, that for a period of one hundred million years, more or less, it has been continuous. That surely makes a demand for a Contriver who is omniscient as well as omnipotent. For, the conditions through which that plastic principle has passed have been changeable and trying. Time and again, land and water have shifted place, and transferred the scene for organic development from one portion of the globe to another. The alternations of climate have been extreme between distant periods of time. Now an arctic climate has crept slowly down far towards the equator, to give place in due season to ameliorating influences that should dispel even the rigor of the frigid zones. Volcanoes have at times belched forth their fires in almost every portion of the world, and earthquakes have everywhere shaken her solid foundations. Vast regions have sunk beneath the sea; while elsewhere plains as vast, and bearing mountain chains on their summits, were rising towards the sky. Amid all these changes, however slowly they may have occurred, the equation of life has had continually to re-adjust itself not only to forces outside, but to its own inherent tendencies. Race has warred on race, and individual has been brought into sharp competition with his fellow. The mystery is that the higher forms of life have been preserved at all. The hand of Providence certainly is not dispensed with, but rather called for. The Providence of the Darwinian resembles a far-seeing capitalist, who like the ant lays up his store in the summer season; while that of the catastrophist is like the day-laborer, whose family lives from hand to mouth. It is the inability of our imaginations to cross the cycles of time and its secondary causes, which makes it so difficult for us to recognize the similarity of contrivance from eternity with that which is originated to-day. There is convincing force in the remarks of Whewell, when applied to the subject in hand, as well as to that upon which he was writing.

"The adaptation of the bones of the skeleton to the muscles, the provision of the fulcrums, projecting processes, channels, so that the motions and forces shall be such as the needs of life require, cannot possibly become less

striking and convincing from any discovery of general analogies of one animal frame with another, or of laws connecting the development of different parts. Whenever such laws are discovered we can only consider them as the means of producing that adaptation which we so much admire. Our conviction that the artist works intelligently is not destroyed, though it may be modified and transferred, when we obtain a sight of his tools. Our discovery of laws cannot contradict our persuasion of ends; our morphology cannot prejudice our teleology. ..... The assertion appears to be quite unfounded that, as science advances from point to point, final causes recede before it, and disappear one after the other. The principle of design changes its mode of application, indeed, but it loses none of its force. We no longer consider particular facts as produced by special interpositions; but we consider design as exhibited in the establishment and adjustment of the laws by which particular facts are produced. We do not look upon each particular cloud as brought near us that it may drop fatness on our fields; but the general adaptation of the laws of heat and air and moisture to the promotion of vegetation does not become doubtful. We do not consider the sun as less intended to warm and vivify the tribes of plants and animals because we find that, instead of revolving round the earth as an attendant, the earth, along with other planets, revolves round him. We are rather, by the discovery of the general laws of nature, led into a scene of wider design, of deeper contrivance, of more comprehensive adjustments. Final causes, if they appear driven farther from us by such extension of our views, embrace us only with a vaster and more majestic circuit. Instead of a few threads connecting some detached objects, they become a stupendous network, which is wound round and round the universal frame of things."[1]

IV. *Difficulties in the way of an Exhaustive Interpretation of God's Designs in Nature.*

It may be well to recur to our opening illustration of types possessed in some way of the capacity of sticking together according to an intelligible plan. Suppose, now, that after the amount of shaking, more or less, which brought out the story of Moses we should find a large quantity of "types," "leads," "spaces," and "quads" still jumbled together according to no discernible order: would that disprove the positive testimony we already had of intelligent design? We will not insult our readers by answering so plain a question for them, but may bring to their attention a pertinent remark of Paley on the point:

[1] The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Vol. ii. pp. 88–94. London, 1840.

"True fortitude of understanding consists in not suffering what we know to be disturbed by what we do not know. If we perceive a useful end, and means adapted to that end, we perceive enough for our conclusion. If these things be clear, no matter what is obscure. The argument is finished. ..... A just reasoner removes from his consideration not only what he knows, but what he does not know, touching matters not strictly connected with his argument, that is, not forming the very steps of his deduction. Beyond these, his knowledge and his ignorance are alike relative."[1] [That is to say, are *irrelative* to the matter in hand.]

But by the seeming waste and the apparent failures and imperfections of nature, we are brought to face a difficulty regarding the power, wisdom, and goodness of its Designer. We come now to the more important and difficult question of *interpreting* the designs of the Creator. The position which we defend is, that though his ways are as much higher than our ways, and his thoughts than our thoughts, as the heavens are higher than the earth, still, his name is something better than the "Unknowable." We do know something about the heavens. The heavenly bodies are set for the dividing of times and seasons. The fugitive and the sailor know something, though far less than the astronomer, about the north star. "We may find God, though we can never find him out." One may endeavor to point out the means of rescuing the doctrine of final causes from the general disrepute into which it has fallen in some quarters; and from certain objections, supposed to be new, arising in connection with Darwinism.

There are, indeed, few subjects upon which there has been so much loose speculation as upon that of the interpretation of the reasons which have actuated the Divine Mind in the creation of particular things. The arrogance of our short-sighted wisdom in pronouncing upon the ultimate reason why certain things are brought into existence has often been so manifest and so offensive, that it is not surprising that some philosophers have gone to the other extreme, and pronounced the ways of God absolutely unknowable. But it is surprising and somewhat discouraging that authors of the

[1] Natural Theology, chap. v., sec. 7.

calibre and breadth of Hamilton and Mansel should have landed in such a suicidal and self-stultifying position. The error has been in failing to consider the universe as a whole. We have cut nature up into parts, and discussed the meaning of these in their isolation. We have brought an atom within the field of the microscope, and reasoned about it as though it were the centre of the universe, as it is of our vision. Whatever thing was useful it has been assumed was made for that special purpose, with no farther thought of its relation to other objects. The bill of a mosquito is doubtless useful to its possessor, but it is a torment to the rest of the animal creation. The tail of the cow is of advantage to the cow chiefly as it is a terror to the mosquito.

There is no disguising the fact that a constant state of warfare exists between the members of the animal kingdom, in which the weakest go to the wall. Carnivorous animals live by depredations upon the herbivorous, and the more favored of the herbivorous live by snatching the food from the mouths of their less favored brethren, and subjecting them to slow starvation. The carnivora, too, struggle between themselves as well as with their more peaceable neighbors. The very need of many of the contrivances necessary for the preservation of the lives of plants and animals is created by the existence of antagonistic elements in surrounding nature. For example, some individual fishes produce millions of young every year; but the adverse conditions are so numerous and destructive that, on the average, not over one or two survive to maturity. It has been adduced as evidence of the care of the Deity for the welfare of these fishes that since the elements are so adverse to the survival of their young they are compensated by the power of producing so great a number, so that the species may not be lost. But then the rocks are full of evidences that numberless species have at last succumbed and become extinct.

> "From scarped cliff and quarried stone
> She cries 'A thousand types are gone.'"

Where is the benevolent wisdom in these facts, when con

sidered in themselves, apart from the general system in which they are introduced? The truth is, that the rose-colored views of many of the evolutionists, and of still more of the pietistic interpreters of natural theology, are built upon a very narrow basis of facts, to the exclusion of another class of facts which abound in startling number. Much of what is ascribed to God as benevolence, displays as much confusion of mind on the part of those who adduce it, as did certain laws of Massachusetts for the protection of fish. Among other statutes on the subject, there was one making the lives of *pickerel* sacred at certain times of the year. The legislators did not consider that the lives of the more valuable fishes were in greater danger from the voracity of one hungry pickerel than from the depredations of half a score of fishermen.

V. *The Doctrine of Second Causes involves Difficulties analogous to those in the Doctrine of Final Causes.*

In stating the doctrine of secondary causation, logicians have found it necessary to disencumber themselves of many old-time distinctions between causes and conditions. In the realm of secondary causes nothing is the product of a single cause. As Hamilton remarks:

"Of second causes, there must almost always be at least a concurrence of two to constitute an effect. Take the example of vapor. Here, to say that heat is the cause of evaporation is a very inaccurate, at least a very inadequate, expression. Water is as much the cause of evaporation as heat. But heat and water together are the causes of the phenomenon. Nay, there is a third concause which we have forgot — the atmosphere. Now, a cloud is the result of these three concurrent causes or constituents; and, knowing this, we find no difficulty in carrying back the complement of existence, which it contains prior to its appearance. But on the hypothesis that we are not aware what are the real constituents or causes of the cloud, the human mind must still perforce suppose some unknown, some hypothetical, antecedents, into which it mentally refunds all the existence which the cloud is thought to contain."[1]

According to Stuart Mill:

"The statement of the cause is incomplete, unless in some shape or

[1] Lectures on Metaphysics, chap. xl., pp. 554, 555. Boston, 1859.

other, we introduce all the conditions. A man takes mercury, goes out of doors, and catches cold. We say, perhaps, that the cause of his taking cold was exposure to the air. It is clear, however, that his having taken mercury may have been a necessary condition of his catching cold; and, though it might consist with usage to say that the cause of his attack was exposure to the air, to be accurate we ought to say that the cause was exposure to the air while under the effect of mercury. ..... Every condition of the phenomenon may be taken in its turn, and with equal propriety in common parlance, but with equal impropriety in scientific discourse, may be spoken of as if it were the entire cause. And in practice that particular condition is usually styled the cause whose share in the matter is superficially the most conspicuous, or whose requisiteness to the production of the effect we happen to be insisting upon at the moment. So great is the force of this last consideration that it often induces us to give the name of cause even to one of the negative conditions. We say, for example, 'the cause of the army's being surprised was the sentinel's being off his post.' ..... Since, then, mankind are accustomed, with acknowledged propriety, so far as the ordinances of language are concerned, to give the name of cause to almost any one of the conditions of a phenomenon, or any portion of the whole number, arbitrarily selected, without excepting even those conditions which are purely negative and in themselves incapable of causing anything; it will probably be admitted, without longer discussion, that no one of the conditions has more claim to that title than another, and that the real cause of the phenomenon is the assemblage of all its conditions. ..... The cause, philosophically speaking, is the sum total of the conditions, positive and negative, taken together."[1]

We would not care to be held by all the phraseology of Mill, nor would we speak disrespectfully of those logicians and philosophers who, for special purposes, have endeavored to make accurate and intelligible distinctions between causes of various kinds and conditions. It is sufficient for our purpose that there is a word "concause": and its idea in a very comprehensive sense is indispensable to any proper understanding of the true doctrine of secondary or efficient causation. A difficulty which is always encountered by the men of science is to keep hold of all the threads of physical causation which centre in a given phenomenon. Some are invariably lost, and there is necessarily an apparent dissipation of

[1] Logic, p. 198 ff. See also President Edwards' definition of cause, in "Freedom of the Will," Part ii., sec. 3.

energy. The doctrine of the conservation of energy is not one of perfect experiment, but is one of thought; it is a belief which goes beyond experiment.[1] The students of natural theology, or of design in nature, encounter in their field difficulties altogether analogous to, but we apprehend no greater than, those just referred to as experienced by scientific men. The students of natural theology are endeavoring to harmonize in one principle the imperfect evidences of apparently conflicting designs which appear in nature. The universe is a compromise, in which subordinate ends are but imperfectly realized. Justice and mercy are not the only principles which coalesce with difficulty. There are paradoxes other than those presented by the co-existence in the human will of freedom and certainty. There is a nature of things which presents obstacles even to Omnipotence; for Omnipotence has relation only to such things as are the proper objects of power. Two hills cannot exist without a valley between. It is easy to conceive that two or more ends, desirable in themselves, may be so related as to require an indirect process for their accomplishment. For example, the perfection of the whole and the perfection of the part, are in a manner exclusive of each other, except as the mutual adaptation is an element of the perfection. It may not be derogatory to the divine wisdom to affirm that the eye is an imperfect optical instrument, because the securing of the power of sight is only one of the many ends to be accomplished in such an organism. Vision as an end is correlated with other objects of design. As each writer has his style, so God has his chosen mode of operations. The style of God's workmanship may be as essential in its correlation to the intellect of his creatures, as light is to the eye. If God has infinite ends in view, it is fitting, that in accomplishing these ends, he move along the curve of an infinite circle. The manner in which a thing is done, is a part of the thing itself. If it be impossible to penetrate far into the designs of the Creator,

[1] See an instructive paper, by Prof. Leebody in British and Foreign Evangelical Review, for Oct. 1876.

it is equally impossible to comprehend to any great extent, the method of his operations.

In the comprehensive theory of virtue elaborated by President Edwards and his successors, the "good of being" is made the ground of obligation. "The creation, taken not distributively, but collectively, as a system raised to a high degree of happiness," constitutes "the declarative glory of God."[1] God, in his infinite benevolence, must have sought, in the creation as a whole, the "good of being," in the most comprehensive sense of that phrase, including himself. Here comes the practical difficulty of interpretation; when we attempt to follow out the lines of this design as they radiate from the divine activity; or (to speak more properly) when we pick up a few loose strands of this infinite web, we soon plunge into mysteries and encounter paradoxes. But it ill becomes scientific men to magnify those difficulties in comparison with their own. The scientific fraternity had trouble, not long since, with a guild popularly styled "positivists," who well nigh classified science to death, and insisted that philosophers were to take no step beyond actual observation and experiment. From that folly Darwin has happily delivered them. So have we had, in the ethical field, those called "utilitarians," who insisted that there was no virtue except in such acts as have a tendency to promote happiness, — the *promotion* of happiness being the foundation of obligation. But that is too narrow a view of virtue, since man cannot tell absolutely what actions will, on the whole, promote happiness; he must accept the testimony of God as seen in the construction of human nature and in providence and in revelation. To the question what is Virtue; the Edwardean answers, Virtue consists in choosing the "good of being"; and that involves, on the part of a finite creature only such conformity of executive action in attaining the general object as corresponds to the light he has regarding the correlation of means to the end. Where there is a willing mind, God takes care of the results. But when we rise above the region of

[1] See Edwards' Works [The Younger], Vol. i. p. 481. Boston, 1854.

human infirmity, and speculate concerning the designs of infinite wisdom, we see that with God the choice and the action must coalesce. The general becomes particular, and the individual choice becomes universal. Doubtless, the universe is "all of a piece" both as to second causes and as to final causes. No part of the creation can be fully interpreted, either as to efficient cause or as to final cause, without regard to every other part. We may say, then, of any object in nature, that in the divine idea the final cause of its creation is the sum of all the uses to which it is ever to be put. This should introduce us to a very broad view of design, comprehending the principle of correlation, which has regard to negative use as well as positive, and bringing to view the whole question regarding the dignity of human nature, and the requisites for its mental and moral development. Even then there is an unknown range of possible intelligence, different from our own and perhaps above it, which will make us cautious about expressing negative conclusions regarding the wisdom of any work of God. With some of these questions, as they have been met both in the field of science and in that of theology, we shall deal in a future paper; so we will touch lightly upon them here. Doubtless there is in the mind of God a "sufficient reason" for the existence of each particular thing in the creation. But the full interpretation of this sufficient reason, like the complete comprehension of the doctrine of the "continuity of nature," lies beyond our capacity. Still, we are not in either department complete "agnostics"; we do know something. Let us see what, and about how much, it is.

VI. *How fully can the Human Mind interpret the Design in Nature?*

To get a proper understanding of the true doctrine of final causes, we must endeavor to shift the point of view from that in which we see things singly and disconnected to a position from which they shall be seen as parts of an organic whole. The reason for the existence of any part of the

creation cannot be fully understood except in its relations to all the other parts. The final cause of the least part of the universe can be interpreted only from a proper understanding of the final cause of the whole. The part must be merged in the whole before it can be exhaustively interpreted. As each particle of matter feels the attraction of every other particle, so all lines of design are deflected by the requirements of each subordinate element. We have not insisted enough upon the distinction between the chief end of creation and what is subsidiary or incidental to it. Each incidental good, however, comes in as a part of that whole which constitutes the chief end. The comprehensive end of the creation is, as we have said, the "highest good of being in general." We can conceive that this is secured in a variety of co-ordinate lines centering in that one generalization. The sensational happiness of all organic creatures, from the lowest animalcule to that of the most highly organized animal form, is an element to be considered in that general good of being. The pleasurable sensations of the intellect, investigating and interpreting the ways of God as displayed in the creation, is likewise a part of that good included in the end for which all things were made. The interchange of sympathy and love and admiration and gratitude which accompanies the development of moral character amid the trials of life, forms also a part of that object for which all things exist. But, aside from the satisfaction which we may suppose God to have himself in his own work and its results, we must, perhaps, in estimating the material creation's "value in use," give the foremost place to the probability that intelligent beings throughout all future time and in all space will need a clew by which to unravel and rightly interpret the scheme of God. The intellectual and moral emotions dependent upon the adaptability of the works of God to being understood may form the chief part of finite good. In other words, it may reasonably be supposed that it is of more account to God's creatures as a whole that the universe be capable of interpretation, and that the method of God in his works

be manifested, than that any amount of temporary good should occur during the earlier stages of the process of development. The happiness occurring now may be only such as can be worked in incidentally to the greater good that is to supervene in the consummation of all things. And even now it may be of more account to us to be assured that we have some conception of God's general plan of operations with reference to us, than it would be to know the full meaning and object of any part of his creation ; just as it is of more importance that a child should be certain that the command is from his parent than that he should understand the reason of the command.

The use to which we may put a thing is never more than a fragment of the final cause of its existence.

We may illustrate this by the reasons that prevail in the establishment of a manufactory at a particular place. We will suppose it is a saw-mill, the main object of whose construction is the production of lumber. A combination of reasons, no single one of which may have been sufficient alone, accounts for the existence of each particular saw-mill. The price of labor, the facility to a market for the principal production, the obstacles to be overcome in getting the raw materials to the mill, and, finally, the use that can be made of the refuse, or incidental production of the establishment, may, any one of them, come in as the determining reason. All the profits of the mill may be in the sale of the slabs and scantling, or in economizing these as fuel. The uses the miller's children may make of the refuse for play-houses, and the miller's wife for kindling, are none of them so insignificant as not to be taken into account. The children very naturally, might at a certain age, fix upon their incidental advantage as the main object, or final cause, for which the mill existed. And their error may not be half so ludicrous as that we make in assigning the temporary advantages we derive from them as the exhaustive reason for the existence of the several parts of the universe that come within the range of our limited observation. Indeed we may well

suppose that the highest conception we can compass with our imagination of the perfection and design of the divine workmanship, is but a partial appreciation of the utility of the chips that have fallen off incidentally in the process of rearing the walls of the city of God. We are living in the quarry, and are concerned with the fragmentary pieces of emerald and sardonyx and topaz that are scattered thickly about the region where God's hand is at work. This view is suggested by the last three pages in the work of Darwin on "Animals and Plants under Domestication"; which are worthy of the most careful study of the theologian.

"In accordance with the views maintained by me in this work and elsewhere, not only the various domestic races, but the most distinct genera and orders within the same great class; for instance, whales, mice, birds, and fishes, are all the descendants of one common progenitor, and we must admit that the whole vast amount of difference between these forms of life has primarily arisen from simple variability. To consider the subject under this point of view is enough to strike one dumb with amazement. But our amazement ought to be lessened when we reflect that beings, almost infinite in number, during an almost infinite lapse of time, have often had their whole organism rendered in some degree plastic, and that each slight modification of structure which was in any way beneficial under excessively complex conditions of life, will have been preserved, whilst each which was in any way injurious will have been rigorously destroyed. And the long continued accumulation of beneficial variations will infallibly lead to structures as diversified, as beautifully adapted for various purposes, and as excellently co-ordinated, as we see in the animals and plants all around us. Hence I have spoken of selection as the paramount power, whether applied by man to the formation of domestic breeds, or by Nature to the production of species. I may recur to the metaphor given in a former chapter; if an architect were to rear a noble and commodious edifice, without the use of cut stone, by selecting from the fragments at the base of a precipice wedge-formed stones for his arches, elongated stones for his lintels, and flat stones for his roof, we should admire his skill and regard him as the paramount power. Now, the fragments of stone, though indispensable to the architect, bear to the edifice built by him the same relation which the fluctuating variations of each organic being bear to the varied and admirable structures ultimately acquired by its modified descendants.

Some authors have declared that natural selection explains nothing, unless the precise cause of each slight individual difference be made clear. Now, if it were explained to a savage utterly ignorant of the art of build-

ing, how the edifice had been raised stone upon stone, and why wedge-formed fragments were used for the arches, flat stones for the roof, etc.; and if the use of each part and of the whole building were pointed out, it would be unreasonable if he declared that nothing had been made clear to him, because the precise cause of the shape of each fragment could not be given. But this is a nearly parallel case with the objection that selection explains nothing, because we know not the cause of each individual difference in the structure of each being.

The shape of the fragments of stone at the base of our precipice may be called accidental, but this is not strictly correct; for the shape of each depends on a long sequence of events, all obeying natural laws; on the nature of the rock, on the lines of deposition or cleavage, on the form of the mountain, which depends on its upheaval and subsequent denudation, and, lastly, on the storm or earthquake which threw down the fragments. But in regard to the use to which the fragments may be put, their shape may be strictly said to be accidental. And here we are led to face a great difficulty, in alluding to which I am aware that I am travelling beyond my proper province. An omniscient Creator must have foreseen every consequence which results from the laws imposed by Him. But can it be reasonably maintained that the Creator intentionally ordered, if we use the words in any ordinary sense, that certain fragments of rock should assume certain shapes, so that the builder might erect his edifice? If the various laws which have determined the shape of each fragment were not predetermined for the builder's sake, can it with any greater probability be maintained that He specially ordained for the sake of the breeder each of the innumerable variations of our domestic animals and plants, — many of these variations being of no service to man, and not beneficial, far more often injurious to the creatures themselves? Did He ordain that the crop and tail-feathers of the pigeon should vary in order that the fancier might make his grotesque pouter and fantail breeds? Did He cause the frame and mental qualities of the dog to vary in order that a breed might be formed of indomitable ferocity, with jaws fitted to pin down the bull for man's brutal sport? But if we give up the principle in one case, if we do not admit that the variations of the primeval dog were intentionally guided in order that the greyhound, for instance, that perfect image of symmetry and vigor, might be formed, no shadow of reason can be assigned for the belief that variations, alike in nature and the result of the same general laws, which have been the ground-work through natural selection of the formation of the most perfectly adapted animals in the world, man included, were intentionally and specially guided. However much we may wish it, we can hardly follow Professor Asa Gray in his belief 'that variation has been led along certain beneficial lines, like a stream, along definite and useful lines of irrigation.' If we assume that each particular variation was from the beginning of all time pre-ordained, the plasticity of

organization, which leads to many injurious deviations of structure, as well as that redundant power of reproduction which inevitably leads to a struggle for existence, and, as a consequence, to the natural selection or survival of the fittest, must appear to us superfluous laws of nature. On the other hand, an omnipotent and omniscient Creator ordains everything and foresees everything. Thus we are brought face to face with a difficulty as insoluble as is that of free-will and predestination."

This remarkable passage really raises, as Mr. Darwin evidently perceives, no new questions regarding final causes, but such as have already been raised by Copernicus and the geologists, and indeed by theologians in their discussions of the doctrine of general providence. That structure of rock to which he refers, as rendering it fit for building purposes, whether quarried by human tools, or by the powers of nature, is certainly adapted to meet the wants of man: and its general diffusion presents a remarkable correlation to the infirmities of man's bodily condition and to the range of his mental powers. Likewise the capacity for variation in animals, offering such a wide range of uses subservient to the purposes which men may cherish, whether benevolent or otherwise, is adapted to the capacity which man really possesses: and affords material, upon which man's character may impress itself in tangible shape. We may not fully comprehend the extent of the necessary limitations of any particular plan of creation. Into that question theologians have ventured, and have to venture, much farther than any other class of reasoners. But any one can see that this adaptation of nature to the use of man, does not exist from any necessity other than is involved in the conditions which we are compelled to postulate before we reason at all upon the matter. Nature is made for a long time; what is not of present use, perhaps has been of use, or will be. To have things lying around loose, so that a being with man's freedom of choice and abundant infirmities, will run upon them is an element of value in them. To have them preserve marks such that the geologist, or the naturalist, can interpret their scientific meaning, is, perhaps, the highest of all the uses to which they are ever put.

Dr. Asa Gray's pertinent suggestions[1] concerning the purpose which is served by much of the seeming waste in nature, lay open a very wide subject. Some make the apparrent waste in nature an argument against the wisdom of the Creator. But, as Professor Gray remarks, if there seems to be a superabundance, for example, of pine pollen, we must remember that "wind carriage is cheap"; and there is no wasteful excess when both the end — cross-fertilization — and the means of transportation are taken into account. So we can say of all mere material mechanism and of the lower forms of life, as of dirt, that they are exceedingly cheap. Our chief arguments in natural theology are drawn from the intellectual and moral constitution of man, as he is related to the complex system of nature. We might easily premise with regard to the adaptations suitable to man, that it would usually be much easier, and far better, to make Mohammed go to the mountain than to bring the mountain to Mohammed. What else should we expect of such a far-seeing capitalist as Nature, but that she should have laid by in store the tools and materials and means of intellectual and moral advancement which man, her crowning work, would need? The man of science does well in exalting to the highest degree of importance man's capacity for discerning truth. It is an inspiring and ennobling thought that man can

> "Find tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
> Sermons in stones, and good in everything."

In his search for truth in nature the man of science is not discarding final causes. He is but reading the hand-writing of God, and, consciously or unconsciously, paying deference to the highest end for which nature exists, namely, that of revealing the glory of the Creator's ways. The doctrine of final causes has been too often associated with low forms of utilitarianism. The paleontologist, for example, finds the cast of a trilobite in the bed of what was an old Silurian sea. The purpose of that low organism is by no means exhaustively explained when we have taken a measure of

[1] See Darwiniana, pp. 375–378.

the sensational happiness he derived from his monotonous existence. The light so well adapted to his marvellous eyes, the agreeable temperature of the waters, the slimy food on which he lived, all this, and more, brought him some degree of pleasure; and that is to be considered a part of the final cause of his existence. But a far higher purpose is served in the adaptation of his complicated organism, and the position of his tomb in a sedimentary deposit, to arrest the attention and direct the reasoning of a scientific observer. The pleasure of one lofty thought is worth more, and so more fitted to be with the Creator an object of design, than a whole herd of sensational pleasures. A page of Darwin has, to a single reader, more "value in use" than all the elements had, to the whole race of the trilobites in Silurian seas. Yet the latter, with their marks in the rocks,—what are present as well as what are absent,—when correlated with general laws of production and preservation, may have been necessary before ever the thought which illuminates the page of the naturalist could have been engendered. This leads us to the real question of the doctrine of final causes, a question that also lies at the foundation of the authority of conscience. And here the modern bent of the scientific mind allies itself with Theism as opposed to Deism, and with the intuitional theory of morals as opposed to the utilitarian.

VII. *The Revelation of God is the Highest End of Nature.*

With those modern men of science who give attention to the philosophy which really underlies their processes of thought, the combination of marks in the organic world pointing to the affinity of all species with each other, is held to be of the very highest value as God's hand-writing. The men of science would live "not by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God." The temporal uses to which the various incidents of the development were put, are of infinitely less account than the purpose they serve in revealing the eternal glory of the Creator.

The very doctrine of final causes which leads us, as theolo-

gians, to look for occasional miracles in the administration of God's moral system, would, perhaps, persuade us not to look for them previous to the establishment of that system. In the true doctrine of final causes the wants of rational creatures must be supposed to be the principal object kept in view by the Creator. "How much better is a man than a sheep"? "Are ye not of more worth than many sparrows"? And of the wants of such beings the most imperious is that of a means of communication with each other and with the Creator. Thus the persistent adherence of the Creator to a definite plan of operations, and the trustworthiness of the marks revealing the style of his workmanship and hand-writing, become essential elements in the well-being of a progressive and immortal race. It is confidence in this uniformity of manifestation as involving the veracity of supreme goodness, that renders it possible to have communion and fellowship either with our fellow creatures or with our Creator. It is this intuition of the value to us of uniformity in the ordinary operation of divine power, which makes a miracle miraculous, and therefore an instructive attestation; i.e. which makes a break in the appareut uniformity for moral ends conceivable and cognizable.

The theistic hypothesis which acknowledges the need of the revelation of the Bible has this special merit, that it brings into prominence the inscrutability of the ways of God. A prominent assumption at the bottom of the reasoning of theists regarding the revelation given in the Bible, is that we have less power to interpret, in the narrow sense, the final causes of existing things, than we have to discern the marks of God's veracity in revealing a law of conduct for us. Indeed, this revelation of a law of duty to us, is a large part of the final cause of all things. Our faith in Scripture rests on the intuition that, with the conscious limitations of power and experience belonging to human reason, it is easier for us to recognize the authenticity of the hand-writing of God, than it is to interpret the ultimate end which a particular part of the creation is designed to serve. The veracity of God in his dealings with

us flows more directly from his goodness than any other of his moral qualities. Confidence in the marks of his veracity as guides of our conduct is what constitutes faith. In these marks of God's veracity in revealing himself to us, we have a provisional guide in practical morality. The instincts of our nature have thus a certain amount of authority from God. And with reference to the Bible, though its revelations are beyond the reach of reason, and are many of them profoundly mysterious, yet the veracity of God is so bound up in the evidence of its genuineness, and of its authority on moral subjects, that we accept it as a rule of action, with all there is in it to stagger the reason.

It is upon the same department of our reasoning powers that the present scientific habit of thought makes its demands. It denies our power exhaustively to interpret the final cause of the narrow fields of nature which we explore. It says, in the true spirit of theism, the full meaning of this is above our sight, and we do not attempt to comprehend it. We will acknowledge to the fullest extent the uses to which all these contrivances are and may be put. But we still hold that there are irrefragable evidences that these uses are but incidental in working out a master scheme, whose law of development we dimly discern. We transfer you from the narrow and delusive study of the final cause of the things as isolated and in themselves, to contemplate the final cause of the whole scheme of nature. In that infinite scheme, — so the thoughtful man of science must say — we believe that the good which may come from being able to discover the truth in the works of God and to enlarge our conceptions of his plans, may be far greater than that possible to arise in connection with the transient sensational uses which a contrivance is allowed to serve. That is, God has taken more pains to reveal to us his methods and laws, than to reveal his particular ends. It is the supremest mark of design that the method of God should be so admirably correlated to the capacity of our understanding. The revelation of God himself is the larger part of the final cause of creation.

It is in place to remark here that a question altogether similar to the foregoing has to be considered when we seek for the ground of the authority of conscience. Is conscience guided by a direct perception of the utility of its commands, or by an indirect belief that certain impulses and intuitions are infallible guides to utility? The latter is most certainly the case. Man cannot refrain from acting till he has demonstrated the utility of his choice. He obeys certain impulses, and intuitions, and tendencies of mind, as being the voice of God. Within certain limits he does not discern the utility of purity or honesty, but accepts obedience to the voice of God as infallibly leading to the highest utility. General principles have more weight in sanctioning moral action than a narrow circle of visible results. There is the same distinction as this between the prevailing scientific interpretation of final causes and the ordinary method.

To prevent misapprehension it may be well, in conclusion, to state more explicitly our position. The universe is made for happiness of one sort or another. There is no happiness in the universe, not even that of the smallest insect, but such as was designed by the Creator. The system, however, was chosen as a whole. The prospective pleasure of the worm had *some* power as an element determining to the creation as it is, — it was a part of that sufficient reason which moved the divine being to creative activity in the modes which we witness. But there are grades of happiness, and hierarchies of being. The same impulse of the designing mind which leads to a provision for the sensational happiness of the oyster, leads also to the subordination of the oyster to the higher orders of being. The welfare of oysters, of birds, and of men, were elements in the final cause which led to the creation as it is. But for the sake of the oysters, God would have made the world somewhat different from what it is. But for the sake of the birds, he would have made it still more different. Had it not been that man was to be incorporated in the scheme, the plan would have been very different indeed. It is important, for both men of science and

theologians to occupy that median position, where the truth lies; on the one hand avoiding the presumption which aspires by searching to "find out" God, and on the other hand, shunning that false humility which disowns our divine birthright of reason, — a birthright which enables us to penetrate to some extent into the realm of both final and secondary causes, and to partially answer the two inseparable questions, how does God work? and what does he work for?

It may have been observed that the order announced for the treatment of the subjects in this series of papers has been departed from in the present discussion. What was announced as the fifth, is given as the fourth of the series. This was partly due to the desire to present first, the subjects which were least theological; though to some, this paper may seem theological enough. What follows, however, in succeeding Articles must be still more deeply tinctured with theology. But we beg our scientific readers, if we have any, to be patient with us, as we have been with them. Theology, even more than science, suffers from fragmentary treatment. If the men of science object to the petty criticisms, and narrow judgments, of those who have only a superficial acquaintance with the problems presented in nature; so may students of theology complain, if the system of thought to which the great body of Christendom has given its assent is set aside without being adequately understood. "We be brethren," all of us, gathering pebbles along the shore of the same illimitable ocean.

ARTICLE VII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

In the present Number we begin a running sketch of German works on the Darwinian controversy. — In eleven lectures on the Rise of Animals and Plants by Natural Selection, Dr. George Seidlitz, Lecturer on Zoölogy at the University of Dorpat, sought to further *Die Darwinische Theorie.* His position is that Darwin's theory is a real answer to the question how organisms arose, and that now the assumption of supernatural creative causes is totally unnecessary. He blames all who use the word *hypothesis* respecting Darwin's view, and believes it to rest on "facts, and facts alone." He accepts the reality of *generatio aequivoca*, and, in short, swears by Darwin and Häckel; but adduces little or no fresh evidence of the truth of Darwinism. One good feature of this book we must mention; namely, that he gives a list of the literature of Darwinism up to the time of the delivery of his lectures.

Professor Spiller of Berlin has written a work entitled *Populäre Kosmogonie* whose aim is to show "how everything in the universe has become what it is; how everything remains in an eternal becoming (Werden), and how all phenomena are the outflow of an eternally operative, indestructible, and identical natural force." His theory is really based on that of Laplace, which he had expounded in a prior tractate on "the Creation of the World from the Point of View of Modern Science"; and his estimate of its satisfactoriness is not a low one. He expresses the hope that he will be found to have transferred the subject from the domain of fancy and superstition, represented by philosophers and theologians, to that of exact science; and that his production will not prove to be a mere fancy; though he also hints a fear lest he should be deemed "a too bold architect in the world of thought." There is a delightful naiveté in much that Professor Spiller writes; one would sometimes suppose that he had received special information about the pre-historical period of the world's existence. How very bold are his flights may be judged from the following sample: "If an artist, more bent on giving knowledge than on edifying the faithful, were desirous of depicting Adam true to nature, he would represent him with woolly hair, small but narrow head, projecting jaws and teeth, brown skin well covered with hair, flat nose, slim body and short, thin legs, almost without calves." Spiller's boldness in the one direction is equalled by his bitterness as regards Christianity.

No less bitter against Christianity, but more shallow and self-complacent, is the *Geschichte und System der Natur* (History and System of Nature), of Dr. J. H. Thomassen, author of "Bibel und Natur," etc. Published by Ed. H. Mayer in Leipzig.

Similar to the *Homo versus Darwin* of the Rev. W. P. Lyon (translated by the way, into German), that is, humoristically-serious defences of the biblical against the Darwinian view of man, are two smaller books by the pseudonymous Dr. Henrico Starke and Herr Graw. The former has the characteristic title; "Victory of the Infallibility of the Animal Descent of Man; Proclamation and Scientific Exposition of the Animal Origin of Man, and final reply to the reply of Herrn Herrmann Sallmeyer"; the latter is entitled *Moses und die Materialisten.* An appendix to the latter, on "How it came to pass that the silly monkey received a reasonable soul," contains some hard hits at the chief Darwinists of Europe.

More serious in form is the apologetic work of the able Professor Michelis (formerly of the Seminary of Braunsberg, now an old Catholic) *Der Gedanke in der Gestaltung des Thierreichs* (Thought in the Formation of the Animal Kingdom) in which an attempt is made to show the impossibility of the descent of man from the ape, by the principles of scientific morphology. This work is a further development of ideas contained in the same writer's "Formentwickelungsgesetz im Pflanzenreiche" (Law of the Development of Form in the Vegetable Kingdom). So too the *Beiträge zur Kritik der Darwinischen Lehre* of Dr. E. Askenasy, who advances a number of well-grounded objections to Darwinism from the vegetable kingdom. He seems to be a well-informed and scientific botanist. His own position is, that organisms are now constantly being originated from germs so small as to have hitherto escaped observation. — We hope to continue this sketch of German works on Darwinism in a future Number. S.

Student's Hebrew Lexicon. A Compendious and Complete Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon, chiefly founded on the Works of Gesenius and Fürst. Edited by Benjamin Davies, Ph.D. Second edition. London: Albert Cohu (Asher and Company).

So far as we can now judge, this is a very carefully edited lexicon of the Hebrew and Chaldee languages. The editor was for many years Professor of Old Testament Exegesis at the Regent's Park College, and was the translator of Roediger's Gesenius's Hebrew Grammar. He had given ample proof of his fitness for the task he undertook. The book is also very well got up. The Hebrew words, especially, stand boldly out, and thus greatly facilitate reference. An index of the English words whose Hebrew equivalents are explained in the lexicon, extending over more than fifty closely printed pages, adds very much to the utility of the work. Altogether, we can commend it heartily to all who require a cheap, handy, and trustworthy Hebrew lexicon. S.

THE SERVANT OF JEHOVAH; a Commentary, Grammatical and Critical, upon Isaiah lii. 13–liii. 12. By William Urwick, M.A. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1877.

This work embodies the substance, carefully revised, of lectures delivered by the writer as Professor of Old Testament Exegesis at the Congregational New College, London. It consists of two dissertations; one on the Authorship of the Great Prophecy of Isaiah xl.–lxvi., the other on the Signification of the עֶבֶד יְהוָה (servant of Jehovah) in the Prophecy; of the Commentary specified in the title; and of a note or excursus on the distinction between sin and trespass-offerings in Leviticus. At the close there is a list of works directly or indirectly bearing upon the subject. With regard to the authorship of the section above mentioned, Mr. Urwick says that "the external testimony, the *locus standi* of the writer as witnessed by the prophecy itself, the relation of the prophecy to other Old Testament books, and the testimony of the language, all lead to the conclusion that chapters xl.–lxvi. are, as the Jews believed, and as they placed them, part and parcel of the genuine prophecies of the great Isaiah, the son of Amoz." His conclusions in the second dissertation are the following: (1) That the title "Servant of Jehovah" is not used in one and the same sense; (2) that in the later chapters (liii. to lxvi.) it is used in the plural only, and to designate a class of characters; (3) that it occasionally refers to the prophet himself, or to the prophets, as distinct from the people; (4) that it is often expressly given to Jacob and Israel, the chosen people; (5) that in three passages, of which lii. 13–liii. 12 is chief, it refers to a person distinct from himself and fellow-countrymen — a righteous servant who, though holy, suffered sorrow and death — a person to whom alone the Eternal Son corresponded. These two dissertations evince great care, and show very ample learning. The commentary is full and exact. Under the Hebrew the Septuagint and Vulgate translations are always given. The conclusion arrived at in the valuable excursus on sin and trespass-offerings is, that "both the sin-offering and the guilt- (or trespass-) offering had to do with, and were expiatory offerings for, real sins; and that by means of them, by God's appointment, the guilty Israelite obtained the forgiveness of sins."

The outline we have given will show that the method pursued by Mr. Urwick is thoroughly scientific. To examine the reasonings on which he bases his conclusions would require more space than there is at our command. We welcome this first-fruit of the author's labors, and trust he may be encouraged to go on in the same direction. It is refreshing to receive so thorough a monograph on a limited subject from the pen of a Congregationalist; for Congregationalists are most frequently burdened with such a multiplicity of functions that they have no leisure for the scientific study necessary to the production of a work like this. S.

THE BOOK OF PSALMS; a New Translation, with Introductions and Notes Explanatory and Critical. By J. J. Stewart Perowne, D.D., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and Canon of Llandaff. From the Third London Edition. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 534, 477. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1876.

The first edition of these volumes was published in 1864; the second in 1870; the third in 1873. The rapid sale of the volumes is a proof of the estimation in which they are held in Great Britain.

Thirty pages of the first volume are devoted to three distinct Prefaces, and eighty-two pages to an elaborate Introduction. The first chapter of the Introduction treats of David and the lyrical poetry of the Hebrews; the second, of the use of the Psalter in the church and by individuals; the third, of the theology of the Psalms; the fourth, of the position, names, division, and probable origin and formation of the Psalter; the fifth, of the inscriptions of the Psalms. These subjects are treated, if not in an exhaustive, yet in an interesting manner. No faithful pastor can read this Introduction without receiving an impulse to the devout study of the Psalms. Some parts of it breathe the spirit of a genuine poet, and the moral bearing of it is excellent.

In his Commentary Dr. Perowne has made a truly judicious use of the writings of De Wette, Tholuck, Stier, Delitzsch, Ewald, Hupfeld, Bunsen, Hitzig, Bleek, and other German authors; of Horne, Hammond, Horsley, G. Phillips, Thrupp, Alford, and many other English expositors. He has most faithfully studied the writings of Luther and Calvin in relation to the Psalter. He has avoided the pedantry so common among recent commentators on the New Testament, and has expressed his thoughts in a good English diction. The naturalness and heartiness of his style will commend his work to the great majority of our scholarly clergymen. He has not intermingled with his translation the more learned comments upon it, but has relegated these comments to notes which the scholar may examine at his leisure, and thus avoid the mental distraction which is caused by the intermingling of different trains of thought in the same paragraph. His Commentary is not so erudite and exhaustive as that of Hupfeld and some other Germans, but is better adapted to the wants of the mass of educated clergymen in our own land. It is written with care, and thus its statements are safe; with candor, and thus it exerts a healthful influence on the heart; with a comprehensive view of truth, and thus tends to save the reader from the bigoted and one-sided speculations of some German and English exegetes. Dr. Perowne's Commentary will be read by American divines more *generally* than they read Hengstenburg, Delitzsch, or Hupfeld; it is far more *learned* than the Commentaries of Barnes, Alexander, and Tholuck on the Psalms; the last edition of it was written since the Commentary of Dr. Moll in Lange's Bibel-work, and in a style more perspicuous and attractive. Of course there are scholars who will prefer

the more scholastic Commentaries of the more advanced German philologists; but the hard-working pastors, the literary yet practical sermonizers, of our own land, will make a more frequent and a better use of Dr. Perowne's Commentary than they would make of a work more *technically* learned, more exhaustive in the discussion of *minutiae*.

Manual of Universal Church History. By the Rev. Dr. John Alzog, Professor of Theology at the University at Freiburg. Translated with additions from the Ninth and last German Edition, by F. J. Pabisch, Doctor of Theology, of Canon and Civil Law, President of the Provincial Seminary at Mount St. Mary's of the West, Cincinnati, Ohio; and Rev. Thomas S. Byrne, Professor at Mount St. Mary's Seminary. In three volumes, with three Chronological Tables and three Ecclesiastico-Geographical Maps. Vol. II. pp. 1096. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke and Co. 1876.

We have already spoken of the first volume of this history in commendatory terms, such as we see no occasion, on the whole, for modifying in what we have to say of the second volume.

We have looked with much interest to see in what manner this Catholic historian would dispose of certain matters which have always been regarded as quite discreditable to the Romish church. One of these matters is that of the so-called False Decretals of Isidore. In the ninth century it had come to be felt, and, as all candid inquirers are willing to admit, with reason, that as the power of the German emperors waned, and a spirit of insubordination became general, the exertion of a power superior to the civil, was needed in order to place an effectual check upon this spirit. This power was supposed to exist in the Romish church; and it was often exerted, we are not unwilling to allow, to a very salutary purpose. At the same time, such means were resorted to for the purpose of demonstrating the validity of the claims of the Romish church to this great power, as no enlightened conscience can justify. One of these means was the promulgation of the False Decretals of Isidore. They were a recension of a body of canons based ostensibly on what is styled the Isidorean Collection. "A large number of confessedly spurious fragments, borrowed," as Alzog affirms, "from private collections, and bearing on their face incontestable evidence of the ignorance of their authors, had been introduced. It contained also a number of false documents. There were altogether above a hundred spurious decrees of popes. These Decretals are proved, both by intrinsic and extrinsic arguments, to be impudent forgeries" (Vol. ii. p. 269). A Catholic historian could not, we think, be expected to speak of this subject in stronger terms of condemnation than Alzog has here done. In adverting to the moral condition of the monastic orders during the Middle Ages, Alzog candidly admits that "a spirit of laxity soon crept in, and the conspicuous contrast between their vows of poverty and their great wealth and vast possessions foreboded, and, in matter of fact, brought on, their

steady decline. Once introduced, the taste for refined and sensual enjoyments rapidly spread. The monastic state, heretofore so sacred and honored in the eyes of all, was regarded with indifference, or excited contempt; and monks became either secretly vicious or openly scandalous" (p. 682).

We have not space to quote, as we should be glad to do, the passage in which our author adverts in terms of severe, but just, condemnation to the state of morals among the Catholic clergy during the Middle Ages. The passages which we have cited indicate a degree of candor on the part of Alzog which we are afraid is not very common with Romish writers.

Intelligent Protestants should read such works as this. We are confident that to do so will strengthen their attachment to their faith.

LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF THE JEWISH CHURCH. By Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, D.D., Dean of Westminster. Third Series; from the Captivity to the Christian Era. 8vo. pp. 531. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1876. [Published by arrangement with the author.]

In this third volume of his work the author brings the history of the Jewish church from the period of the Babylonian captivity to that of our Saviour's birth. The book opens with a powerful description of the fall of Babylon, which is followed by an account of the Persian dominion. The character and peculiar work of Ezra and Nehemiah are sketched with a master hand. With an account of the life and labors of Malachi the prophetic period is brought to a close. The author now boldly traverses the historical desert which separates the Old Testament from the New. He opens for us the Grecian period with an account of the life and work of Socrates, showing the vast influence exerted by that remarkable man, not only upon Christianity but upon Judaism itself. The invasion of Antiochus Epiphanes and the deliverance of his country by Judas Maccabaeus are described with great power. The closing chapters upon the Roman era, by giving us a minute account of the life and public work of Herod the Great, prepare us for the volume which is yet to come upon the Jewish church in the time of our Saviour.

The style of the present volume is even more graphic and brilliant than that of the two which have preceded it. Every page of the book reveals to us the author's breadth of view and extent of learning. While strictly confining his attention to the comparatively narrow development of Jewish history, he makes it the stand-point from which we may behold the contemporaneous progress of the world. The successive characters mentioned in the book are brought upon the stage with a rapidity which is breathless and an animation which is dramatic; no hero is presented to us alone, but each one in connection with the men of his time and the circumstances in which he moved. Dean Stanley may well be called the Macaulay of church history. He brings to the illumination of scriptural records the same powerful imagination and masterly arrangement of detail which charac-

terize the great historian of England. Yet Macaulay himself admits that "men doubt the solidity of a structure which is covered with flowers," and the distinguishing merit of the present volume is connected with its possible deficiency. The very brilliancy of the work will suggest a doubt as to whether it is invariably accurate; and some men will suspect that the author aims to make his pages fascinating rather than true. It is due, however, to the greatest living master of sacred history to say, that we are not aware of a single important statement in his work which can be disproved.

LETTERS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE, Bishop of Hippo. Translated by Rev. J. G. Cunningham, Lochwinnich. 8vo. pp. 480. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong. 1875.

We need not say that these letters are full of interest. The translation is perspicuous and natural. Mr. Cunningham has rendered an important service to his readers in appending to some noted sentences the original Latin. Thus we have, on page 22, the celebrated words: "Sicut ergo secundum quemdam modum sacramentum corporis Christi corpus Christi est, sacramentum sanguinis Christi sanguis Christi est, ita sacramentum fidei fides est.

Writings of John Wingate Thornton. Two of the volumes published by this author were to have been noticed during our centennial year; but they have a value independent of times and seasons. One of them is entitled:

THE PULPIT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION; or, the Political Sermons of the Period of 1776. With a Historical Introduction, Notes, and Illustrations. Boston: D. Lothrop and Co. 1876.

This is the second edition of the work; the first was published in 1860. The sermons forming the bulk of the volume are serious and deep. They illustrate the character of the American people.

The second volume of Mr. Thornton appeared in 1874, and is entitled:

THE HISTORICAL RELATION OF NEW ENGLAND TO THE ENGLISH COMMONWEALTH. By John Wingate Thornton. 8vo. pp. 105.

This is a compressed recital of facts, accompanied with many terse quotations, regarding the power exerted by the New England Colonies, more especially the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on the Commonwealth of England. Mr. Thornton is eminently successful in hunting up what Mr. Carlyle calls "the interesting reciprocities and mutualities between New England and her old mother, which ought to be disentangled, to be made conspicuous and beautiful" (p. 33). "I propose to show, step by step, by exact historical evidence, that the English Commonwealth was the daughter of New England, the reflex of the New on the Old; for ideas control the world and create institutions, while men are merely players. The political ideas of the Pilgrims have penetrated the thought and life of both lands"

(p. 46). Robert Baillie, in his Dissuasive from the Errors of the Time, 1645, p. 54, says: "Master Robinson did derive his way to his separate congregation at Leyden; a part of them did carry it over to Plymouth in New England; here Master Cotton did take it up and transmit it from thence to Master Goodwin, who did help to propagate it to sundry others in Old England first, and after to more in Holland, till now by many hands it is sown thick in divers parts of this kingdom" (p. 42). The religious influence exerted by the fathers of New England was also political. It must have been so. The science of theology and the science of politics are intimately blended. The religious spirit intertwines itself with the spirit of patriotism. In various particulars it is easy to see the bearing of the New England principles in ecclesiastical and political science upon the opinions and practice of the English divines and statesmen.

Among the prominent men in New England who early exerted an influence upon prominent men in Old England, Mr. Thornton names Cotton, Hooker, Norton, Shepherd, Allen, Mather. The Rev. John Cotton is known to have had a personal influence over Archbishop Usher and Lord Say; upon Thomas Goodwin, John Davenport, Philip Nye, John Owen, and other men who were powers in the mother country. Dr. Goodwin, for example, who was president of Magdalen College, Oxford, was an important adviser of Cromwell, and a leader of the nonconformists. Dr. Owen exerted his great influence not only as an author, but also as the vice-chancellor of Oxford University, and as an intimate friend of Cromwell. One of Owen's pupils was John Locke, whose political power is even yet conspicuous. In the family of Mr. Cotton at Boston, Massachusetts, Sir Henry Vane resided when a young man, and under Cotton's personal influence was educated for his great work in the British House of Commons. The treatises which Cotton, Hooker, Norton, Shepherd, and Mather printed in America were extensively read in Great Britain. "These treatises were often 'published' and circulated in manuscript before being printed. For instance: Mr. Cotton's 'discourse' or 'treatise,' sent to Archbishop Usher in 1626, at his desire to know what Mr. Cotton 'conceived of the way of God's eternal Predestination, and the Execution of it,' seems to have been multiplied in manuscript copies, and was 'in hands of many,' for more than twenty years, and was finally printed, 'together with an examination thereof, written by William Twisse, D.D., pastor of Newbury.' London, 1646, pp. vii. 288.8. See Cotton's letter in Parr's Life of Usher, reprinted in N. E. Hist. Gen. Reg., 1870. Oct. Twisse's Epistle unto the Reader, and marginal note on p. 261. Others of Cotton's books were 'published,' in manuscript, years before they were printed. Dr. Twisse was President of the Westminster Assembly" (p. 53). When we reflect on the learning and the spirit of several New England divines like those above named, and on the character of the above-named scholars and statesmen in Old England, we should be prepared to believe, had we no other proof, that

there went forth from these colonies an important influence on the politics as well as religion of Great Britain.

Among the changes effected in Old England through the agency in part of the men in New England, Mr. Thornton makes general references to the various measures adopted to secure the toleration of different religions and political opinions, and to give more liberty of action, as well as thought, to the common people. He makes particular reference to the reform of the British civil law in relation to the "inconveniences, delays, charges, and irregularities" in legal proceedings. "The late Prescott Hall declared that 'the known defects in the laws and practice of England, pointed out and most strikingly stated by Lord Brougham in his great speech upon Law Reforms, delivered in the House of Commons in 1828, were discovered and banished from the New England States while they were yet colonies under the British crown. But we must leave this attractive inquiry, fitter for a volume than a page, with the emphatic declaration of one whose opinion is authoritative in this department: 'Certainly,' says Dr. George H. Moore, of New York, 'Massachusetts has given the law to the United States more literally than either her friends or enemies have ever cared to claim or acknowledge; and the diligent student of legal antiquities may recognize in her earliest codes the expression of principles of reformation which have since pervaded the whole realm of English law" (pp. 77, 78).

"The system of commercial policy contained in the Navigation Act of Oct. 9, 1651" is also ascribed by Mr. Thornton in part to a New England influence. This system was initiated by Sir George Downing, whose "early youth had been passed on the seaboard of New England, where the spirit of enterprise and trade had from the beginning found its most genial home. His mind was formed and his genius shaped in Salem, where commerce and navigation were then, as they have ever since been, the chief topics of interest among the people. Hugh Peters was his kinsman, pastor, and instructor, at the very time when that enlightened statesman was laying the foundations of American navigation and commerce, and revealing to the colonists the relations, and circulations, and mysteries of the coasting and foreign trade, and pointing out to them the value of the fisheries, as contributing to the mercantile and naval strength of a people" (pp. 78, 79).

Mr. Thornton also refers to Sir George Downing's plan of specific parliamentary appropriations, introduced Oct. 21, 1667; a plan which Sir George had brought from New England (p. 74).

In treating of the Relation of New England to the English Commonwealth, Mr. Thornton naturally and very happily alludes to various sources from which New England derived its power. One of these sources was the *radical* character of the opposition made by our Pilgrim and Puritan fathers to the spirit and forms of Romanism. In this particular the fathers

of New England were in thorough agreement with the Calvinists of the Old World. From this *radical* antipathy to Romanizing tendencies certain *evils have resulted.* Under the impulse of it many precious works of art were mutilated or destroyed. Still, the people of that day needed extreme measures; not all, perhaps, which were actually adopted. Mr. Thornton says: "The reformers and their precursors, Waldo, Wicliffe, and Huss, were like skirmishers on the enemies' frontiers, engaged in light combats, at a distance from each other; but the first to organize hostilities against Rome, the first general in the field to combine the forces in aggressive and systematic war, was John Calvin. Rome never felt a deadlier wound than that inflicted by Calvin's policy of quick and thorough destruction of its ecclesiastical pageantry, imagery, and symbolism.[1] It proposed a revolution sharp and decisive, rather than a halting, lingering, reformation, like that in England. The pulpit and the Bible in the vernacular superseded the altar with its priestly mediation and anathema, oblations, and idols, clouds of incense and glitter of ornament,[2] gorgeous vestments, punctilious ceremonies, and drawling of dead words"[3] (pp. 5, 6).

Another source of the power acquired by New England fathers was their regard for the distinctive *preaching* of the gospel. In this particular they were in hearty sympathy with the reformers. "'The Reformation was,' says Mr. Carlyle, 'a return to truth and reality in opposition to falsehood and semblance.' Lord Bacon, in his Controversies of the Church, 1589, says: "They have made it in a manner of the essence of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper to have a sermon precedent. They have, in a sort, annihilated the use of liturgies and divine service.' The travelled observer, Sir Edwin Sandys, son of the archbishop, a man pleasantly associated with the Pilgrim Fathers, and whose books had the honor to be burned in Paul's churchyard, by order of the High Commission, in 1605, records in his *Europae Speculum*, 1599, p. 76, that 'the first and chiefe meanes, whereby the Reformers of religion did prevaile in all places, was ... preaching, ...

[1] "'Where images were left there was most contest, but most peace where they were all sheer pulled down, as they were in some places.' Strype in Hallam's England, i. 86. 'Ye ceremonies and servis booke and other popish and anti-christian stuff, the plague of England to this day," said our Governor Bradford in 1630. 'Not daring to eke out what was defective in our light, in matters divine, with human prudence, — the fatal error to reformation, — lest by sewing any piece of the 'old garment' into the 'new,' we should make the 'rent' worse.' — An Apologetical Narration to Parliament, by Goodwin, Nye, et al., 1643."

[2] "The vestments 'led to erroneous notions among the people, and kept alive a recollection of former superstitions, which render their return to them more easy in the event of another political revolution.' — Hallam, i. 175."

[3] "'The mysteriousness of an unknown dialect served to impose on the vulgar, and to throw an air of wisdom around the priesthood.' — Hallam's England, 1866, i. 86."

at that time ... out of use, ... the French Protestants making it an essentiall and chiefe part of the service of God; whereas the Romanists make the masse only a work of duty, and the going to a sermon but a matter of convenience.' Hugh Latimer, the martyr, 'continued all King Edward's time, preaching for the most part every Sunday two sermons, to the great shame, confusion, and damnation of a great number of our fat-bellied, unpreaching prelates.' In his 'notable sermon at Paul's church in London,' January 8, 1548, Latimer said, 'The preaching of the word of God unto the people is called meat,— Scripture calleth it meat. Not strawberries, that come but once a year, and tarry not long, but are soon gone, but it is meat. It is no dainties. The people must have meat that must be familiar and continuall, and daily given unto them to feed upon. Many make a strawberry of it, ministering but once a year; but such do not the office of good prelates'" (pp. 6, 7). The early magistrates of Massachusetts, when they encouraged the labor of the pulpit, were also encouraging the establishment of schools, the general diffusion of learning; but Governor Berkeley of the anti-Puritan State of Virginia "passionately wished his clergy would 'pray oftener and preach less;' for, said he, "learning has brought disobedience, heresy, and sects, into the world, and printing has divulged them. Thank God, here are no free schools nor printing, and I hope we shall have none these hundred years'" (p. 28).

Still another source of the power gained by the fathers of New England was the respect which they entertained for labor, manual as well as mental. The love of hard work gives vigor to the workman, and gives him a signal advantage over other men. There was a *rudimental* "difference between Jamestown and Plymouth, which ended in the conflict that so lately convulsed the nation. In one was cherished the feudal sentiment of contempt for labor, and a social degradation of the workingman, ever fruitful of ignorance, indolence, barbarism, woe, and general decay; in the other, labor was honorable and honored, making the North a field of intelligent industry, virtue, temperance, and frugality, where free institutions — the school, meeting-house, and college — were the fruits and the stay of Christian civilization. In England the Pilgrims 'had only been used to a plaine countrie life and y^e^ innocent trade of husbandrie;' and in exile in Holland, 'they fell to such trades and employments as they best could, valuing peace & their spirituall comforte above any other riches whatever. At length,' says Bradford, 'they came to raise a competence & comfortable living, but with hard and continual labor.' Governor Carver died from overwork in the field in seed-time; and Governor Winthrop, the successor of Conant and Endicott, was "in plaine apparel assisting in any ordinary labor'" (p. 27).

It is impossible that men trained under such a regime as is here intimated should not have been powerful. Their history has been too much neglected. Mr. Thornton's volume suggests various trains of thought

which our clergymen ought to pursue further. He closes his volume with the appropriate verses:

"We have need of these
Clear beacon stars, to warn and guide our age;
The great traditions of a nation's life,
Her children's lustrous deeds, with honor rife,
Are her most precious jewels, noblest heritage,
Time-polished jewels in her diadem."

The True Order of Studies. By Thomas Hill. 12mo. pp. 163. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1876.

The practical object of this book is to show what course of education is best suited to interest and develop the mind. For this end there is laid down at the start a table exhibiting "the hierarchy of the sciences." The table makes a five-fold division in what is held to be an ascending scale: 1, mathematics; 2, natural history; 3, history; 4, psychology; and 5, theology. Each of these branches has its more or less simple subdivisions. For instance, the principal subdivisions as you ascend the scale are as follows: geometry, arithmetic, algebra, mechanics, chemistry, biology, trades, art, language, law, mental philosophy, aesthetics, ethics, natural theology, and religion. From these special branches are built up. Thus, connected with chemistry we have electrics and inorganic and organic chemistry. Thus, too, under language we find poetry, rhetoric, and philology. Thus, further, the trades from agriculture to architecture are grouped again under political economy; and biology, in its threefold relations with physiology, botany, and zoölogy, appears again related to geography, and geology. Any critique of the scheme, however, regards only its more simple divisions.

The question at once arises what the central thought is on which this hierarchy is arranged. Various attempts have been made to classify the sciences. Comte, for instance, placing them as more or less general in their scope, puts "mathematics first," — to use Dr. Hill's words, — "because the laws of form and number govern all matter in the solar system; and political economy last, because its laws govern only about one million tons of matter in the form of human brains." Herbert Spencer, again arranges the sciences in three tables. The first containing what he calls "abstract science," as logic and mathematics. The second series is of the "abstract-concrete," or "the laws of force as manifested by matter"; under the head, for instance, of mechanics is magnetism. And the third series he calls "concrete science," which embraces everything between astronomy and sociology.

Now Dr. Hill's arrangement seems to be based on the idea of greater or less dependence. Thus he puts mathematics first, because he holds that that science is less dependent on all the rest than they are upon it. And he sets natural history next, because he considers that though its

branches are based on the mathematical sciences so as not to be able to proceed without them, yet as related to the next higher divisions of history, psychology, and theology, they all depend on natural history more than it depends on them. And he places theology last, because all below form the basis on which this rests. So, too, in the lesser divisions he names geometry first, because it would be more readily learned by itself without arithmetic or algebra than either of these last without geometry; and naturally, he claims, since the conception of forms and space precedes the conceptions of number and time. In the same way chemistry would stand before art, because the former is one of the pillars on which a full knowledge of the other depends. And thus through the list, with the more independent below and the more dependent above.

Dr. Hill's hierarchy does not therefore appear at all inconsistent with Mr. Spencer's arrangement, for the two systems proceed with a different purpose. But while Dr. Hill arranges the sciences according to this idea of dependence on one another, he does not for a moment imply that a full knowledge of any one could be had without the help of all the rest, or that he would have a pupil perfected in mathematics before he let him advance to the study of natural history, or gave him suggestions of psychology and theology; but he constantly emphasizes the idea of mutual interdependence, and likens the scheme to an ever-ascending spiral, where even the undermost round traverses each one of the five great regions of thought.

Before we leave the account of this theoretical part of the system we wish to call attention to the terms which Dr. Hill uses, since they have an important bearing upon our understanding of the more practical side of the plan. Each one of the names which he gives to the five main divisions has the widest possible meaning. Indeed the meanings almost run the risk of vagueness and confusion. Thus mathematics covers "the field of time and space, in which creation has wrought." History investigates "the acts of man, or the creations of the finite will," in such a broad sense as to include poetry, music, and sculpture. And psychology has logic under it, which it will be remembered by a different mode of division Mr. Spencer makes first in the series of abstract science.

It is not a part of our purpose to review Dr. Hill's book, and so to discuss his order of arrangement, — to inquire whether as a science geometry ought to precede arithmetic, or how far political economy or Christian evidences might depend on the study of organic chemistry. In the large sense in which we have seen that our terms must be understood, and with Dr. Hill's qualifications as regards the interdependence of our various branches, such questions might be irrelevant. But we have wished to call special attention to his use of the terms. For such is the dread of the word mathematics, for instance, with many poor souls, and such dismal associations of blackboards and chalk-dust are at once raised by it, that

its use, when it seems to be placed as the bottom round of the ladder of learning, threatens immediate antagonism, even though it seems clear that what Dr. Hill really means by the word is quite innocent. But we have thought that many might be helped more by the scheme when certain expressions were translated into different language, and it were made to read, without any change of the sense, we think, somewhat as follows: Science, with reference to the natural order in which it develops itself to the mind, may be divided into five great divisions. The first regards forms and numbers and those relations of space and time of which our bodily senses remind us. This corresponds to the division of mathematics. The second considers the facts of what we call nature in its manifold manifestations. The third includes man's outward acts, past and present, and is equivalent to history. The fourth discusses the workings of man's mind. The fifth rises to the great Cause of things, or the Infinite Mind. Whatever objections one may make to this order, as thus understood, divested of the impressions which, as first read, its scientific terminology makes, it leaves one best prepared to go on to its practical bearing. On this practical side Dr. Hill's scheme is specially valuable. Indeed, we cannot see how, as he explains it, any one can fail to appreciate its excellence, and particularly as regards the training of young scholars. True, when geometry is recommended as the initial step in education one shrinks with some slight sense of apprehension at the idea of Euclid in the cradle; but when Dr. Hill tells us that he means by geometry for infants only the playing with blocks and learning to distinguish the forms of various flowers, we are ready at once to believe that going to school with such a teacher might be amusement. And when we find that geography and chemistry are to be pursued out of doors in the sunshine, and botany taken by walks in the woods, we wonder whether knowledge is such a difficult hill as we used to be told. And when we learn that the spelling-book is to be thrown away and grammars remanded to the high school, and our whole barbarous method of what, by a euphemism, we call orthography, reformed to phonotype, we fairly want to begin our school days over again.

And yet it, perhaps, needs to be noticed that Dr. Hill's scheme of education is not, as we have somewhere seen suggested, and as a careless reading of the book might possibly lead one to think, at all revolutionary in its character. On the contrary, it is rather in the line of all the best and most approved attempts to better our educational methods. It goes with the kinder-garten system. It emphasizes all that has been said of late on the importance of object teaching. Nor, as will be readily seen, does it very much change the order of studies in our best public schools. It aims rather to introduce common sense and a more practical spirit into teaching. Dr. Hill plainly believes that, with proper means, scholars may be led to take pleasure in study, as well as to win knowledge out of their recreation and holidays.

A page from the last chapter of the book will illustrate both the method and spirit of Dr. Hill's teaching: "The youngest child brings in, for example, a dandelion. Its circular form, its radiant lines, the number of its rays, the bell shape of the involucre, the cylindrical scape and its cylindrical cavity, the close spiral into which the split end of the scape curls itself,—these are mathematical points to which his attention may easily be directed. Its yellow color, slightly bitter taste, the use of its root in medicine, and in the adulteration and imitation of coffee; its relationship to asters, sunflowers, ox-eye daisies, fleabane, tansy, yarrow, ragweed,—these matters belong to the great group of natural history; in some of them the youngest child can be interested, and in all of them the older ones. The derivation of the name, dandelion (dents de lion, dens leonis), from the form of the green leaf; and of the generic name, taraxacum, from its medical effects; the fact of its introduction from Europe; quotations from Lowell and other poets referring to it; these would be historical instructions naturally flowing from the incident of the dandelion being brought into the school-room. If now the child is asked why he likes the flower so much, whether it is because it is prettier than others, or whether because it comes so early in the Spring, or whether because it is so common — the poor man's flower and the children's flower — the questions will stimulate a healthy psychological curiosity, not a morbid introversion, but held still to a healthy attitude by its external hold upon the flower. And, finally, this little flower may give theological lessons of great value, if, without parade or cant, but in a simple and natural manner, you allude, as from your own fulness of heart, to the goodness of the Heavenly Father in spreading beauty with so unsparing a hand; or simply bringing to the child's remembrance, by quotation, or by a childlike paraphrase, the Saviour's appeal to our consciences, drawn from the lily of the field. Now every lesson in this school of life will lead as naturally as this dandelion has done to the five great branches of intellectual studies; and no lesson has done its full work for our minds until it has been thus linked into relation with all the main lines of dependent truth."

Of course there could be few teachers found with such tact and completeness of knowledge as to be able with interest to preach so long a sermon from so simple a text. For four hundred dollars a year we cannot hope to put instructors of Dr. Hill's calibre into our primary schools; and most of our teachers not having a gift for their work, for some generations further, no doubt, will need to have a clearly marked routine laid out for their guidance. In a word, machine work seems to be largely the order of the day, and as really in schools as everywhere else; but all the more for this very reason Dr. Hill's plan commends itself as an effort to give this routine work of ordinary teachers the greatest possible efficiency. D.

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

MISSIONARY CULTURE.[1]

BY REV. JAMES G. VOSE, D.D., PROVIDENCE, R.I.

THE great work of Foreign Missions is now receiving unusual attention from all classes. The progress of the work excites astonishment, and its results can no longer be treated with contempt. In forming an estimate of the value of missions, an important element is to be found in the character of the missionaries themselves. Any great work, for society or for the nation, requires a lofty type of excellence in those who plan and execute it. While it may be true of many of the founders of great systems that "they builded better than they knew," it is no less true that their work was a part of themselves. The ideal is ever in some respects loftier than the achievement. The efforts of philanthropy must lower their expectations in view of the difficulties to be encountered. The aim of the leaders is loftier than can be made to appear from the result. This is true in education. While we boast of the diffusion of knowledge in modern times, the highest interest centres about the great educators, who have inspired others. We see in the men themselves the model of what they would accomplish. So it is in all Christian leaders. We are first

[1] The substance of this Article was delivered as an Address before the Society of Inquiry at Brown University, June 13, 1875.

attracted by their work, but if it be great and genuine we always find something greater in themselves. We form an idea of what can be done for the race by what is seen in the individual. When Christianity was founded our Lord came himself into the world to show what he was in his own person. So when he commissioned his apostles, it was not only that they might bear a message for the rescue of mankind, but that they might attain with every step of their work a loftier manhood. The true Christian missionary in all ages has exemplified more or less in himself the power of the gospel to glorify mankind. It is the purpose of this Article to consider missionary culture in its most important aspects.

I. *Spiritual Culture.* — In those engaged in missions we observe two especial features. These are faith and loyalty to Christ. While faith is always set forth in the Scriptures as the entrance to the spiritual life, the meaning of it is never so distinctly shown as in efforts to advance Christ's kingdom. Whatever dispute there may be as to the amount or quality of faith essential to salvation, there can be no question as to its necessity in all great achievements. Our Saviour himself showed his exalted faith in his methods of conveying truth to all conditions of men. None were too low to be beneath his sympathy or his prayers. And the same is seen, in humbler measure, in the case of Paul. Whoever may think that Paul exaggerates the importance of faith as a principle, cannot deny its immense power in his own life. It carried him through all dangers and conflicts, and made him equally fervent whether he preached on Mars' Hill or to the little company of women by the river side at Philippi.

In our age the missionary work has, in like manner, developed the power of faith. It has brought distant things near, by making men sympathize with the misery and degradation of the remotest tribes. Judson and Newell could not sleep when they thought of the moral condition of those for whom Christ died. Faith also overcame the disparity between means and ends. It overleaped all barriers — want of

money, ignorance of languages, difficulty of treating with hostile governments, opposition alike of friends and foes. No greater derision could have been excited when David chose five smooth stones out of the brook, wherewith to assail the mailed champion of the Philistines, than when our early missionaries sailed for an unknown coast with every earthly probability against them. Truly had they need to remember Christ's saying, "My kingdom is not of this world." Nor did their faith encounter its main obstacles at the beginning. It was developed by trials, that for years seemed to increase at every step. It was developed too by successes. For as steel is tempered by plunging alternately into heated baths of mercury or oil and into cold water, so the early champions of the missionary cause passed, like David, through alternate straits and deliverances that brightened faith on every side. It was developed both by God's answer to prayer and by his delays. The power of prayer was taught them, both by extraordinary escapes wrought by the hand of God, and by the complete sweeping away of their hopes when they were tempted to trust too much to the favor of men. They learned with the Psalmist how "to tarry the Lord's leisure." They learned with Paul, how to be abased and how to abound. Thus has the great principle of faith, the rock on which Christ built his church, been glorified afresh in the advance of Christian missions.

The missionary work has also developed loyalty to Christ. To march under the banners of a victorious prince is easy, but to follow one who is despised, and whose progress is marked by scorn and insult, is a keener test of loyalty. We cannot estimate the pains endured by the missionaries of modern times, men and women alike, in the cause which they held so dear. Suffice it that this experience has brought out their love to the Master. Livingstone, after painting what has been well called a Pauline picture of the sufferings he had endured, says, "I do not mention these privations as if I considered them to be sacrifices, for I think that the

word ought never to be applied to anything we can do for Him who came down from heaven and died for us." And one of the English missionaries [1] to the South Sea Islands, describing the sort of men he would like to have sent out as fellow laborers writes: "A man who takes the sentimental view of cocoanuts and coral islands is, of course, worse than useless; a man possessed of the idea that he is making a sacrifice will never do; a man who thinks any kind of work beneath a gentleman will simply be in the way." Such loyalty has been awakened among missionaries who, like the knights of the Middle Ages, have counted no service degrading that has been required by their liege lord. Thus have they been brought near to Christ. They behold his life, and enter into the compassion with which he looked upon all the wants of humanity.

Here, too, is revealed with intense vividness every man's need of Christ. The ambassador to the heathen goes forth with this absorbing thought, that Christ came as a light to all the nations of the earth, and that without him every man is in darkness. In this manner Paul read his first commission to the Gentiles, "to open their eyes, and to turn them from darkness to light" (Acts xxvi. 18). The whole work of missions is a restatement of every man's dependence on Christ. In his own words, "Without me ye can do nothing." This is the declaration carried equally to the educated Hindoo and the sensual Caffre. This is the truth newly impressed on Christendom as well. Repentance and conviction of sin are the same in every land. Peace is brought to the soul by the application of redeeming blood as truly in the most distant nations as in the soil of New England. And with every man's need of Christ appears also the truth that Christ has a right to every man. Henry Martyn, laboring for years in India and Persia, with no visible results from all his toils, had no less faith in what the future would bring. Under date of April 30, 1806, he writes: "How easy for God to do it; and it shall be done in due time; and even if I never

[1] Life of Bishop Patteson, by Miss Yonge (Eng. ed.), Vol. ii. p. 29.

should see a native converted, God may design by my patience and continuance in the work to encourage future missionaries. But what surprises me is the change of views I have here from what I had in England. There my heart expanded with hope and joy at the prospect of the speedy conversion of the heathen; but here the sight of the apparent impossibility requires a stronger faith to support the spirits."[1] To him the people who rejected his Master none the less belonged to Christ. He felt the claims that Jesus had on them. It was not for their sake only, but for his Master's, that he was willing to live and die to plant the gospel in the East. Those vast countries in which no ray of light appeared were Christ's by right, and should one day own his sway. The crusaders firmly grasped the idea that the holy places must be reclaimed for Christ; but to the missionary all places belong to him, and all hearts must be made holy by his presence and indwelling. Such loyalty to Christ is here learned; and piety has never appeared more genuine or more fitted to inspire confidence since the days of Paul, than that which has been witnessed in the life and death of these faithful disciples.

II. *Moral Culture.* — The moral training of the missionary is no less to be admired. By this is meant that clear perception of the value of the moral law and of its indissoluble connection with the Christian religion which the missionary, beyond all other men, learns and enforces. In all the world's history there is a persistent tendency to dissolve the connection between religion and ethics. Although we cheerfully admit that in all systems of religion there are excellent precepts, such as if faithfully followed would greatly improve the life, yet practically there is a divorce between worship and virtue. The sacred books of the Hindoos and Chinese contain precepts rarely applied to life, and of which the world would know little by the results that are patent to the eye. While the Mohammedan code of morals is very defective, the Mohammedans themselves admit that they do not follow even

[1] Memoir of Henry Martyn (Tract Society edition), p. 161.

their own standard of duty, and that the most zealous religionists are by no means models of virtuous living. It is a saying among them, "If thy neighbor has made one pilgrimage to Mecca, avoid him; if two, do not speak to him; but if three, move out of the same street."

Now, it may be replied that Christianity illustrates the same discrepancy — that the maxims of Christ find but a very partial response in the lives of his professed disciples, and that the greatest abuses have been practised and defended under the name of religion. We cannot deny this; although we may safely claim that under the guidance of Christianity the world has made far greater advances in brotherly love than under any other system. Popular oratory may draw a bold picture of the superior virtues of civilized heathens; but there is undeniable proof that under Christianity a better type of character has been developed, and a higher condition of manhood and womanhood, than elsewhere throughout the world. But it would be strange if the same tendency which exists in the case of other religions should not exist to some extent in Christianity also. The human mind is the same everywhere. Everywhere man desires to make himself accepted of God without a life corresponding to the law of love. Christian morals have never reached, in all respects, the standard of purity exhibited in Christ, and will only approximate to that, until he himself comes to reign triumphant in every heart.

It is the glory of the Missionary work that it develops, by its Christlike character and purposes, a higher union between these two than is elsewhere seen. In a civilized country, where the forms of society are fixed, where public opinion demands a servile deference, and often usurps the throne of conscience; where also the appeal to self-interest is strong among all classes, morals may tarnish and private virtue depreciate The missonary work tends to combine the forces of religion and morality in a united onset upon heathenism. The missionary cannot hold the decalogue in abeyance, until he has made numerous converts. Moral

obligation must be preached, as Christ preached it, side by side with penitence and pardon.

The missionary occupies an independent position. What cares he for public opinion? He has come to overthrow public opinion, and place in its stead the law of Christ. In this country men speak of the bondage of the pulpit and, perhaps not always unjustly, charge ministers with preaching a doctrine palatable to the average sentiment, and not likely to disturb the conscience. The missionary does not preach in that way. He is confronted at once, not only with a false religion, but a false morality. Systems of vice and oppression, like polygamy and caste, are before him; and with the story of the cross he must interweave the plain demands of the law. The words of Christ stand out in their original force: "If thine hand or thy foot offend thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee." Thus the servant of God on foreign shores preaches a gospel like that of his Master, in which love to God and love to man are one.

Dogma and precept are united again, as they were by Christ himself and his apostles. In Christianity there are, and must be, both dogma and precept. In the language of Ullmann, in his "Essence of Christianity," "The moral and the religious are not absolutely identical, but they are so inwrought that in a sound development neither can be conceived without the other. True morality has its ground in piety; living piety its expression in morality; and both give us, in their complete interpenetration, the idea of holiness, so far as it is attainable in a human sphere."[1] But even in Christian lands there is a tendency to separate dogma and precept. One is often exaggerated at the expense of the other. We have seen the time in our own land when the tendency was too strong toward the development of abstract doctrine. We have seen also a reaction to the other extreme of mere outward excellence, as if it were to be assumed that there is nothing in religion but good behavior. The missionary enterprise has taken a larger view of human wants. It has

[1] Das Wesen des Christenthums (4th ed.), p. 94.

taught us that religion is something more than doctrine, and also that it is something more than good behavior. Men cannot be converted from heathenism by a one-sided gospel. They must be told of Christ and his sufferings. The whole story of his life and death and his lofty claims must be set before them, while, at the same time, they hear his uncompromising demand, "If thou wouldest enter into life, keep the commandments." The plain commands of the law are set side by side with the life of the gospel. The doctrine of Paul's Epistles is not dissevered from his appeal to the conscience. Doubtless, Christian congregations might hear more frequently with profit such exhortations as Paul gives without flinching to the Ephesians: "Wherefore putting away lying, speak every man truth with his neighbor. . . . . Let him that stole steal no more; but rather let him labor, working with his hands the thing which is good, that he may have to give to him that needeth."

It has been the high office of the missionary to bring together dogma and precept. It is not possible for him to preach either mere morality or, what is worse, mere religion. He sees all about him the systems of mere religion, whose hollowness he must show in order to crush them. In contrast with these he is to set forth not only the elemental truths of Christianity, but its power to mould and beautify the daily actions of men. The missionary spirit, the same in recent as in earlier times, has brought out the life-giving power of Christianity. Its grand object is, not to enforce a system or a ritual, but to convey new life to human souls. The morals of Christendom have felt the influence.

It is not too much to claim that the system of slavery in England and America was overthrown by the influence of the missionary spirit. Wilberforce, the champion of freedom in England, was the champion also of the cause of missions. And if the slave-trade is ever to be abolished in the heart of Africa it will be through the labors of Christian missionaries, and by the new view of duty inspired by their toils and sacrifices. They are not merely to bear the hope of pardon to

individual men, but to develop a Christ-like life throughout the whole world. Set free from self-interest, trying on lofty heights the moral questions of the world, and taking, as it were, a bird's-eye view of the condition of all countries, they have come to a higher and broader comprehension of ethics than any other class of men. They have a more vivid sense of purity and truth than is elsewhere found. We might well appeal to the records of this century. Although no longer under the restraints of home, and surrounded by strange customs, who has made good any accusation against them? What class of men, not only so lofty in purpose, but so stainless in character, so worthy to be examples to the Christian church? Who has ever fastened upon them the charge of cupidity, of license, of injustice? Who has not seen in them the highest exhibitions of that virtue which appeared in Christ and which won the approval of all sorts of men? The Christian world may point with a just pride to the impartial testimony borne by the Indian government to "the blameless lives and self-denying labors of their six hundred Protestant missionaries."

III. *Intellectual Culture.* — Scarcely was it thought, when the first missionaries went forth in this century, that they and their successors were to stand among the most broadly cultivated men of the age. But the fact is now everywhere admitted. We have sent men to heathendom, amid all privations, restricted in means, and exiled from civilized countries, to attain to a scholarship which they would have sought in vain at home.

Of course, they have had great advantages in respect to language. If there be any truth in that saying of Coleridge, that "he who learns a new language doubles his own range of thought and expression," or in that other saying, that "he who knows no language but his own knows very little of that," what shall we say of men who have learned familiarly several languages, not in a general and superficial way, but to master their every peculiarity, and to use them with power and eloquence? Nor could these men allow

their knowledge of the ancient languages to grow dim. They must study the text of the Bible with careful diligence. Like Judson they pored over the Scriptures with patient industry and freedom of investigation. The discussions of Hebrew grammar found in the correspondence of Bishop Patteson unfold the deepest questions of philology. He had studied Arabic and Hebrew while in Dresden, and read large portions of the Koran.[1] But when he became acquainted with the languages of the Pacific Islands he felt that a flood of light was thrown upon the construction of Hebrew. "It is very hard," he says, "to render Greek into a Melanesian tongue; but the Hebrew runs into it naturally. ..... Unless we learn, by years of experience of uncivilized life among a people without books, to divest ourselves of our artificial modes of thought and speech, we cannot approximate to the mind of the Hebrew of old."[2] His remarks on the Hebrew tense are deeply interesting, and deserve the attention of all students of that language.[3] Our missionaries have studied the literatures of India and China, so as to be able to controvert the learned, and so as to translate hymns into poetry that should not offend fastidious ears. Few have confined themselves to one language, but have become masters of several, in the prosecution of their varied labors.

These statements are not made on partial testimony. "No body of men," says the Indian Government, in a passage quoted in the London Quarterly Review," pays greater attention to the study of the native languages than the missionaries. With several societies it is a rule that the younger missionaries shall pass a series of examinations in the vernacular of the district in which they reside; and the general practice has been that all who have to deal with natives who do not know English shall seek a high proficiency in these vernaculars. The missionaries, as a body, know the natives well; they have prepared hundreds of works suited both for schools and for general circulation in the fifteen most

[1] Life of Bishop Patteson, Vol. i. p. 88. [2] Ibid., Vol. ii. p. 504 sq.
[3] Ibid., Vol. ii. p. 475.

prominent languages of India, and in several other dialects. They are the compilers of dictionaries and grammars; they have written important works on the native classics and the systems of philosophy; and they have largely stimulated the great increase of native literature prepared in recent years."

In frequent instances, missionaries have made themselves familiar with the European languages, that they might the better discourse with fellow-laborers from those countries and that they might exert more influence at courts. An incidental remark of Judson illustrates this, while it shows also the comparative difficulty of Oriental languages: "I have now been engaged two years and a half in the Burman; but if I were to choose between a Burman and a French book to be examined in without previous study, I should, without the least hesitation, choose the French."[1] What was very extravagantly said of Theodore Parker by one of his admirers, that "he made no more of learning a new lan guage than of eating a big apple," may be far more fitly applied to some of our modest missionaries, who have made themselves familiar with many languages and dialects, that they might carry the gospel to the lost. Sir William Martin says of John Coleridge Patteson that "he could speak not less than twenty-three of the languages of the Pacific Islands, and that he had prepared elementary grammars in thirteen of them, besides copious vocabularies of several others."[2] And most beautifully does this missionary illustrate the philosophy of language, when he describes to us the mode of conveying the ideas of repentance and heartfelt confession in dialects in which these ideas do not exist. "By degrees," he says, "the language is made the exponent of such ideas, just as in English all religious ideas are expressed by words now used in their second intention, which once meant very different and less elevated things."[3] He thus enjoins his pupils: "Do not attempt to use words as [assumed] equiva-

[1] History of American Baptist Missions, by Wm. Gammell, LL.D., p. 27.
[2] Life of Bishop Patteson, Appendix ii. [3] Ibid., Vol. ii. p. 145.

lents of abstract ideas, nor devise modes of expression unknown to the language in use. Everywhere our Lord gives the model. When a lawyer asked him for a definition of his neighbor, he gave no definition; only he spoke a simple and touching parable." [1]

The late Dr. Jonas King was Professor of Oriental Languages before offering himself to the American Board. In the course of his long life he became familiarly acquainted not only with the European languages, but with Arabic, Syriac, and Modern Greek. He pursued the study of Arabic in Paris, under the celebrated Orientalist, De Sacy.[2] Pliny Fisk, whose whole missionary life was finished in less than six years, was still more remarkable for his linguistic attainments. "All men who could comprehend French, Italian, or Greek were accessible to his powerful admonitions. In the first mentioned language he conversed with ease, and in the last two performed with perfect fluency the common public services of a preacher of the gospel. Even the Arabic he had so far mastered as to commence in it a regular Sabbath service with a few of the natives." [3] Just before his death he was about completing an English and Arabic dictionary. These examples are but selected from a multitude. This species of culture has extended to women, as well as men; and it may be safely affirmed that the missionary families in Constantinople and in other places have been, in many instances, more accomplished than the best educated families in Christian lands.

Thus has Christianity been able to take into itself the learning of the world, and to lift man to the highest culture. Oriental societies have found some of their most useful and honored members among missionaries, and no class of men have done more to extend the knowledge of comparative philology. The time would fail us to recount all that they have done for the various departments of physical science. Our cabinets are enriched with their collections; and our

[1] Life of Bishop Patteson, Vol. ii. p. 191.

[2] Anderson's Oriental Churches, Vol. i. p. 16.

[3] Ibid., p. 32.

best knowledge of geography and the results of the most valuable and boldest explorations may be traced in large part to them. The following tribute to one of the early missionaries is from the pen of a writer who has long resided in India, and whose testimony is as impartial as it is clear:

"The kirk of Scotland had shortly before [referring to the date of his own arrival, in 1834] sent out a man who will be remembered among the Christian apostles of Western India. Dr. John Wilson possessed in an eminent degree all the typical excellences and powers of a highly educated Scotch clergyman. He neglected no branch of human learning which came in his way. Classical and Oriental scholars, philologists and antiquarians, geologists and politicians all lamented that he did not pay exclusive attention to their own favorite branch of study; but none could complain of him as negligent or indifferent. All his human learning, however, was devoted to the missionary cause, and mainly to education, which he believed was to be the chief handmaid of missionary work in India; and all his proceedings were directed with a prudence, judgment, and consistent perseverance which is rare in any profession." [1]

We are permitted here to allude to a volume, now in course of preparation, on the connection of missions with science, which will detail these facts at large.[2] In the missionary work the gospel has shown itself able to grasp and to assimilate all the knowledge of the world. Here Christianity asserts its right of eminent domain over all that ennobles manhood. There have been times when Christianity has been deemed antagonistic to culture. The history of modern missions disproves it, not merely by the results gained, but by the fact that they have been gained in the direct line of efforts

[1] Indian Missions, by Sir Bartle Frere, reprinted from "Church and Age."

[2] Provision was made for the preparation of this work, by the munificence of Alfred B. Ely, Esq., of Newton, Mass. Its aim is to give a statement of the contributions of the Missionaries of the A. B. C. F. M. to science, especially in the departments of Philology, Geography, Archaeology, Literature, and the Arts, and the value of their influence in controlling or hopefully shaping the "Destinies of States and Communities."

to spread the gospel. Nor have these heralds of the cross turned aside to worldly pursuits; but, like Paul, the great missionary, they have made all human learning subsidiary to their lofty aim, and illustrate his assertion: "All things are yours."

IV. *General Culture.* — There is a species of culture recognized in our day, and much talked of, which cannot be included under either or all of the above heads, and must be described by itself. It belongs not to any one department of our nature, but traverses the entire manhood. No list of qualities can comprehend it. It is elemented of many, and yet exceeds them all. The whole range of active and passive virtues, so wonderfully brought to light by our Saviour, has been illustrated among those sent to distant nations as nowhere else in the church. One might have thought that men exposed to hardship and peril, obliged to associate largely with the ignorant and the repulsive, might themselves become rude and harsh; but instead we find such exhibitions of patience, of hope, of submission to trial, as astonish us. We have learned that work among the lowly does not degrade. Among those who have the advantages of wealth, and are trained in the etiquette of society, will be found far less of deference and sensitiveness to the happiness of others than among men and women who have devoted their lives to the rescue of the lowest of their race. The missionary work has taught us, if I may so say, the beauty of the gospel as manifested in human life. It has freshened the meaning of Paul, when he says to the Philippians: "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest [worthy of honor], whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things."

Among men and women who have exiled themselves for Christ's sake, these graces of character have been exhibited in the most striking degree. For culture does not consist in mere knowledge, nor in facility to acquire languages, nor

in power of generalization, but rather in the beauty of human character, which combines all these with gentleness and grace. Nor will it be possible to find any better illustrations of culture thus viewed than are afforded in the missionary work. Whoever has been acquainted with missionaries has found in them courtesy and refinement, favored, it is true, but not originated, by their extensive knowledge of mankind. Indeed it is not a very bold assertion, that our American manners might be improved by a touch of Oriental deference. And to some of our modern missionary heroes, while much of course, is to be granted to differences of temperament and early training, may be applied *mutatis mutandis*, the words which Dean Stanley applies to the Apostle Paul, that he was a thorough Roman citizen, and a thorough Eastern gentleman.[1] Those who have had the good fortune of familiar intercourse with missionaries, must have observed in them those qualities of ease and deference which at home are not always associated with piety.

One thing may be said of them without fear of contradiction, that their religious earnestness is free from cant. Competent judges will bear witness to the simplicity of their piety. They have exhibited to us the happiness of the Christian life. They have shown that the most earnest work and true self-sacrifice are consistent with child-like joy. They have an open eye to all that this world can afford of knowledge and beauty, and know how to make it do service for Christ. John Foster wrote an Essay many years ago, to show why Christianity was often distasteful to men of letters. In it he suggested the problem of religion and culture, so much talked of in our day. In it also, he showed the repugnance which educated men might be expected to have to set phrases and meaningless repetitions. But in the work of missions there is a grand escape from cant. He who preaches the gospel in many languages will not be likely to fall into stereotyped phrases. He who has heard narrations of religious life from men of other tongues will not be likely

[1] Introduction to Prof. Max Müller's Lecture on Christian Missions.

to view it in any stiff mould. And hence it is that Christian life has gained a vast enlargement in beauty, simplicity, courtesy, and in all that Paul includes in what is "lovely and of good report."

These are men who have stood before kings, who have been preferred on delicate errands of diplomacy, who have been interpreters between governments, and who, like Christ, have explained the greatest truths to ignorant men and women by the wayside. Thus they have passed between the highest and the lowest orders of society, and have derived hence a breadth of manhood beyond that of the most favored lands. And, therefore, it is not strange that they have challenged the admiration of the most eminent men, nor that Professor Max Müller should thus speak of John Coleridge Patteson, of whom, till of late, the world had scarcely heard. "It has been my privilege to have known some of the purest and noblest spirits which England has produced during this century, but there is none to whose memory I look up with greater reverence, none by whose friendship I feel more deeply humbled, than by that of that true saint, that true martyr, that truly parental missionary."[1]

Comment is needless on such testimony as this; but who can fail to be impressed by it, coming, as it does, from that shrine of learning, fragrant with the memory of England's greatest names, where now, too, repose the bones of Livingstone,

"With kings,
The powerful of the earth — the wise, the good,"

and where the highest learning brings its garland to the missionary, and admits that here is found as bright an example of true culture as the world has ever seen? And who that has read the life of Reginald Heber, or seen the glimpses of it that appear in the exquisite memorials of the Hare family; nay, who that has seen face to face the missionaries of our day, will not be ready to admit that examples

[1] Lecture on Christian Missions, delivered in Westminster Abbey.

are not rare among them of the highest culture mingled with the deepest piety?

Nor must we forget the crowning grace of all, the charity which has marked their intercourse. In India have labored together no less than thirty-five distinct missionary societies, and yet the Indian Government attests the fact that "their missionaries, though belonging to various denominations of Christians, have been led to think rather of the questions on which they agree than of those on which they differ, and that they co-operate heartily together." Nor is this a mere outward union. Personal attachment grows strong in kindred service. An honored missionary of the American Board, recently in this country, wrote to a fellow laborer of the Church of England in Constantinople, that an alarming disease had fastened upon him, requiring a difficult operation whose anticipated results awakened more fears than hopes. Weeks after, he learned that in the crisis of danger, since happily passed, special prayers had been offered for him, in the public services of that church, as a brother beloved. Thus does the work of the gospel make men forget minor differences. When they feel the presence and hear the voice of Christ, they cannot quarrel about trifles. And thus charity has been taught us at home. To this point Sir Bartle Frere bears emphatic testimony: "Active mission work, whether in our own or any foreign country, stimulates the inmost life of any missionary church. It can hardly fail, also, to foster the spirit of Christian charity. Many a man whose existence has been embittered by the internal discords of Christendom may learn in mission work how all-important are the points on which all Christians are agreed, how comparatively trifling are the questions which often in this country divide us from each other."[1]

The victories of the cross are our victories, by whomsoever gained. The heroes of Christian labor are all one. Sects are forgotten, and must be forgotten, when men are heartily

[1] Indian Missions, p. 85.

at work for Christ. There is a Turkish proverb, which Archbishop Trench has thus happily translated:

> "Sects seventy-two, they say, the world infest;
> And each and all lie hidden in thy breast."[1]

When men have leisure to please the whims and follow the fancies of their own hearts they may magnify the differences among Christians. But when they stand in serried ranks before the hosts of heathenism they forget all controversy in their love to the one leader. "One is your Master, even Christ, and all ye are brethren." We share together in all the missionary heroes of every land. Heber and Martyn, Judson and Boardman, Winslow and Eli Smith — we claim them all; "All are yours, and ye are Christ's, and Christ is God's."

This theme, while evidently admitting of much larger illustration than the limits of a single Article can fairly contain, will find its truest endorsement in those subtile and personal evidences to which we cannot directly appeal. The claims of missionaries to be considered men of comprehensive culture are not likely to be pressed by themselves, and will be fully accepted only by those who have come into contact with them, and have observed their labors with a sympathizing and appreciative eye.

From reflection on this subject, we are impressed anew with the value of missionary work to the church. Indeed, the missionary spirit is an integral part of Christianity. We might judge so from its origin, and from the early triumphs of the gospel. But the events of the present age have brought it out afresh. Through and through the religion of Christ is a missionary religion. This age may well ponder the words of such a man as Professor Max Müller: "The Christian religion is missionary, progressive, world-embracing. It would cease to exist if it ceased to be missionary."[2] Different sorts of culture are produced in different fields; but here we have a combination of them all. The consecration

[1] Poems, by Richard Chenevix Trench.
[2] Lecture on Christian Missions.

to Christ which produces such a lofty type of character on heathen shores develops the same in those who possess it here; for it contains the germ of all benevolent effort. It is sometimes said that "Charity begins at home"; but that is both false in theory and in fact. True charity does not inquire whether the sufferer be near or far off; it takes no note of distance. Jesus taught this, once for all, in the parable which he uttered to him who, willing to justify himself, asked: "And who is my neighbor?" Every suffering child of man is neighbor of ours, even though he live at the ends of the earth. And hence it is literally true that from the missionary spirit have sprung up all benevolent efforts at home. The care of our own poor, the protection of the orphan, the reclaiming of the vicious have resulted from the labors and example of men whose charity has embraced the world.

This theme suggests to us the value of education for all Christian workers. While it has often pleased God to make use of men for great service whose early advantages were of the humblest sort, yet the worth of culture as an instrument is always recognized in their history. The teacher in any department of knowledge is better fitted for his work by any and every addition to his resources. The day is past when people believed that even a little child can be safely taught by one of narrow mind and small attainments. In every art or science he who can best teach the rudiments is he who can grasp the subject as a whole. Our Lord himself gave evidence not only of his condescension, but of his faith in the powers of the human mind, when he explained the loftiest truths to plain men and women. In Christian work every faculty and resource come into play. While the servant of Christ continually derives new culture from the work assigned him, he finds that nothing can be lost of all that he has previously gathered. Such is the artless testimony of Bishop Patteson, very early in life, which he lived to illustrate in most unexpected ways. "Whatever we have acquired in the way of accomplishments, languages, love of

art and music — everything brings us into contact with somebody, and gives us the power of influencing them for good, and all to the glory of God." [1] The effects of missionary culture have been, and will be, to raise the standard of theological education at home. The work which began in this country almost simultaneously with the improvement of theological education will quicken and adorn it in proportion as the church imbibes and fosters this spirit.

We are taught, also, that we can afford to wait with patience for the complete triumph of Christianity. If the object were simply to multiply churches, to enrol converts, to gain an intellectual assent to creeds, or submission to outward rites, we might look for more rapid gains. But when the whole nature of man is to be elevated, we need not be discouraged by apparently slow progress. We may rather wonder that so much has been done, and in so short a time. If we may interpret, according to his own teachings, the plan of the Divine Redeemer, it is not merely to save men for the life to come, but to impart to his disciples his own glory; to rear a body of Christlike men through whose influence the whole church shall be so exalted and prepared for his coming, that when he shall appear it may not be said again; "He came unto his own, and his own received him not." Especially we may rejoice in the comparison of religions now going on before the eyes of the world. Different systems have met together in the old world and in the new, and their principles are compared and discussed by the most enlightened minds. Can we doubt that good will come out of this comparison? Can we fear for the triumph of Christianity, when its principles and its practice are distinctly set up before the nations? In India meet together the Mohammedan, the Buddhist, the Brahman, the Christian. Who can doubt that the gospel will ultimately bear sway? Many of the Brahmans have broken loose from tradition, and are studying with great earnestness the literature of Christian England. This movement towards an

[1] Life of Bishop Patteson, Vol. i. p. 187.

escape from the bondage of superstition is called by the great philologist, the Oxford professor already quoted, in language which would seem extravagant in other lips, "the most momentous in this momentous century."[1] The very sight of Christian men and women and Christian family life is working a wonderful result in all who behold it. The silent, yet resistless power of the spiritual in Christianity is well expressed by the saying of an African chief, who, when asked to send his children to school, replied: "I am afraid of that white man; he comes and sits down softly in my country; I don't know what he will do."[2]

Finally, the missionary work is peculiarly attractive to youth. In addition to the lofty motives that inspired the pioneers, there is now an accumulated impulse from their own character. Missionary biography affords delightful attractions. There is nothing more instructive in all recent literature, nor more worthy the attention of scholars, than the volumes which record their life and work. All classes of men may find absorbing interest in the life of Bishop Patteson, whose piety and self-devotion shine through every trait of his brilliant culture. It is for the youth of our day to study these inspiring examples. That is the period of life when spiritual forces take strongest hold. Then self-sacrifice is easy, and appears glorious. The mind is not bound by custom, nor hampered by suggestions of worldly prudence. The movements of this missionary age originated in the minds of the young. Youthful enthusiasm pressed them into life and efficiency when older men doubted and condemned. The twenty-five years which remain of this century are years of vast importance to the world. Those now entering upon life will doubtless witness remarkable changes, in which they may take an important part. Let them remember that with the missionary work all other Christian work is vitally connected. Let them remember that no church can be truly prosperous that does not

[1] Lecture on Christian Missions.

[2] Gammell's History of American Baptist Missions, p. 252.

stretch forth its hands to aid the diffusion of the gospel to the ends of the earth. Let them remember that Christ makes distant things near; that we ourselves are the children of those who were converted from heathenism by heralds from afar; that we are now living on the other side of the world from the birth-place of Christianity; and that the remotest pagans are more accessible to us than Italy and Spain were in the days of Paul. The coming generation of Christians may carry the triumphs of the gospel to every part of the world, and only on condition that they are faithful to this high calling can they expect to retain its power at home.

ARTICLE II.

AN EXPOSITION OF THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF GENESIS I. AND II.

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§ 6. Light.

The first potential act of creating is expressed by the divine word, "Let light be." We know no definition of light so complete, terse, and unexceptionable as that given by a Christian apostle: "Whatsoever doth *make manifest* is light" (Eph. v. 13). Without any philosophical pretension, it covers all applications of the word. We accept it. We are content with it — the more readily and perfectly, because philosophers themselves have so remarkably failed, differing among themselves in their own definitions. We say, then, that the light here introduced to our notice was the somewhat which made material objects manifest or visible.

"Let light *be*." In all languages the verb of existence is more often used to denote some qualified or some local existence than to denote it only in the abstract, or irrelatively. When the verb and its subject stand alone, — without surroundings, precedents, or sequences, — it then denotes

existence merely. As in the statement "God is," in distinction from this, "God is good"; or from this, "God is in this place." In the case before us, the verb and its subject do not stand alone, but with qualifying surroundings. Place and condition of place are its immediate antecedents, essentially qualifying its import: "the waters," place; the waters in "darkness," condition of place.

At this point the writer limits himself to the field of this our own world in its then condition — earth-solid and water-deep and darkness. The next statement, therefore, is not that God called light into *being*, but that he called it to be *here* — on the face of the waters — in the place where the darkness was. A definite presence, in a definite locality, and in lieu of a definite light-absence, is the simple idea presented. Standing, as the words do, in close sequence to the statement of a contrary and preceding state, they legitimately signify only, let light be *in the place* of that darkness. They do not present the idea that there was no light in existence; and therefore we have a right to say that there may have been light elsewhere, when upon "the deep" there was none. At least, we have no right to reverse our supposition, and to interpret the phrase as signifying that there was no light elsewhere; no right to suppose that the "thick darkness" — the world's "swaddling-band" — was "thick" as infinite space. Indeed, the invocation intimates, if it does not signify, that there *was* light somewhere else, and that the foreign light *should come*.

Thus, for aught which yet appears in the text, there may have been light elsewhere at the very moment next preceding the invoking word. If the words indicate anything on this point, they indicate that there was; and if any reader or interpreter be disposed to exclude all idea of light existing away from the surface of the deep, he should at least pause and ask himself: "How do I know that there was none?"

This interpretation detracts vastly from the grander and electric idea of the *birth* of light, — of cosmic light, of universal light, — commonly considered to be here expressed; and, as

we are aware, it must seem almost profane to those who have hitherto clung, with reverent awe, to the traditional and sanctified interpretation. But we cannot, for we may not, read here, "ubiquitous, first-born light" for the writer himself forbids us. He does so by expressly defining our horizon, the narrow limit of our own world. How can we extend the horizon? Would not *this* be "profane"?

Let light be — whence?

1. Scientific experts tell us of "cosmical light" — a light co-extensive with the universe. We have no disposition to question their philosophy; as little, to question that so great a light was sufficient for the case in hand. But, if we understand them correctly, their doctrine is this: That the primal state of universal matter was that of inconceivably boundless and minute diffusion, and also of absolute quiescence; that, moreover, the first grand orgasm of this universal matter was productive of a flash of light co-extensive with itself. Be it so.

Now it has been assumed, somewhat axiomatically, that *this* light was *the* light which came in obedience to the invocation here recorded. Was it? or was it not? We think that the assumption disproves itself; and for this reason, — that the sacred historian here brings to our view not primal matter universally diffused and unindividualized, but a specific portion of universal matter already solidified and individualized, — viz. our own world, — and which had also attained to its solidity and individuality long before. Therefore cosmical light, which must have been evolved long before any condensation and separation of world-bodies, could not have been produced at the time when this creative drama opened. To say that it was, is simply to perpetrate a very great anachronism.

2. Again. Was this light an entity latent in "the deep," or in "the darkness" on the deep, a light which God commanded to *come out* thence literally? (Lange, pp. 130, 165.) Sometimes called "auroral," because the polar *night* (!) is presumed to "*give rise* to the northern aurora"!

We have two grave objections to such statements. First, they are purely conjectural. They have no more support from the text than any other conceivable possibility has. We cannot allow ourselves to admit conjecture to the office of interpreter. Secondly, the statements are inconceivable. To us it is not conceivable that light, which "makes manifest," should be where there is no manifestation; that it should be hidden within an opaque body, except in the sense of being boxed up, as "under a bushel" — a sense too low and puerile for a theme so august. It is also inconceivable that light should be *in* darkness, which is simply a *nonentity* — the *absence* of light. The statement is equivalent to this — that light is present where it is absent!

If any one cites that expression of Paul, referring to this same event, — "God who commanded the light to shine *out of* darkness" (2 Cor. iv. 6), — we have only to reply, that this is English, and not Greek. Paul's words are: *Ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς ὁ εἰπών· ἐκ σκότους φῶς λάμψει.* The Greek particle *ἐκ*, "out of," like all particles, very variable in its significations, resents being made to represent an absurdity. Therefore we select for it one of its meanings which is *not* incongruous to its position here. We read it thus: "God who commanded the light to shine *after* darkness"; the particle denoting simply succession of time.

Rejecting, therefore, and most decidedly, these two modes of answering our question, we repeat it: *Whence* came the world's light, when invoked? We will seek an answer which shall be in harmony with the obvious purpose and language of the writer, and independent of our previous interpretations.

1. The writer states, very simply: There was darkness on the deep; God commanded light to be on the deep; light was on the deep.

This was written for the purpose of giving information. It was written to be understood, to be understood by us — gentle and simple, learned and unlearned alike — who know of no other light to the world than that which comes, directly or indirectly, from the world's sun. Consequently, if we

have no preconceived and pre-judging theory upon the subject (and we ought not to permit it to come in here, if we have), we are at once given to understand that the light invoked came from the only light-source which we know. To us this is the normal teaching of the words. They are certainly adapted to convey the idea to persons situated as we are. We have a right to adopt it, because they are fitted to excite it, and because, unless we beg the question and stiffly deny a sun, the idea *is* excited, without fail and without process of reasoning. It requires some pre-judgment to exclude it; we having gone only so far in the text, outside of which, or of its co-equal authority, we have no right to go as interpreters.

2. We suggest, however, another analogous consideration. If we suppose that this light came from any other source than our sun, we place the writer in a very singular position. Men utterly ignorant of any other possible world-light, — that is, the mass of men, for whom the narrative is intended, — such men could not understand the text thus far as indicating any other than sunlight. But if so, then the writer has made a great mistake. If he did not mean sunlight, and wished to express what he did mean, he has made a great mistake in using so little language. Or, if he did not mean sunlight, and yet uses such language, plainly fitted to suggest sunlight, there is a negative duplicity. Not writing a literal untruth, he has acted an untruth.

3. Again, if we suppose that this light came from any other source than the sun, we place *ourselves* in a very singular position. None of us pretend that the writer assumes to teach natural science. It is admitted, on all hands, that he did not, and that we ought to interpret him accordingly. And yet, denying sunlight, we make him a teacher of natural science, and of very abstruse science, too, if we make him to represent light as inhering to a body not luminous (dark), or as an element present where itself was absent — a sort of science which baffles our understanding. We present him under a popular mask, and using

popular language in a popular way; and yet represent him, by our "cosmical light," as using a purely scientific phrase; and, by our "auroral light," as using a term of deepest mystery — in each case terms which belong to the schools, and not to the people. And thus, as expounders also, we are in a very singular position; for we must first take a child or an untutored Indian to a college and through a laboratory before we can help him spell out the opening words of the Bible.

4. Another point. We make much of the fact that there is here *no* mention of a sun. Instead of arguing from it that there was none, we argue from it that there was one. (1) If there was none, it seems to us remarkable, and even unaccountable, that, instead of using language liable to mislead common readers, — the mention of world-light, — the writer should not have put them on their guard by distinctly stating that the world-light was not sunlight. (2) We consider this silence a negative indication of the sun-fact. *Under the circumstances*, we consider it equivalent to a declaration emphatic that the reader takes that fact for granted; that it is understood and admitted by both parties; that it was to be by each so clearly presupposed — light being announced — that to state the sun's existence in due form were superfluous — somewhat like a puny tautology. Thus we regard silence upon the point as a *tacit* recognition of the fact, and as having both the more of force and the more of dignity *because* tacit.

Not saying that there was, is not saying that there was not. We have therefore as good a textual right, at least, to say that there was as any one has to say that there was not. We have given reasons for thinking that we have a better.

Light; no mention of a sun, because no mention needed, supposing there was one. Light; no statement of *no* sun, unaccountable, supposing there was none. But:

5. "God separated between the darkness and between the light." We give the literal rendering of the Hebrew words. That is to say, darkness and light were *co-existing* — co-

existing *on the deep*. For co-existence is involved in "separation," as much as in co-presence. Co-existing somewhere else than on the deep? somewhere else in the field of boundless space? This is not affirmed or denied. But it is expressly excluded by the very terms *of limit* which are employed. Co-existing, then, upon the face of *the world;* for this is the field of vision to which we are restricted. Not co-present, however; for that could not be. Not co-present; for they were separated between — a place for the one and a place for the other, — a place where there was light, a place where there was none, — both on the world — different localities at the same time. This is clearly expressed by the word "separation," and yet more sharply by the word "between," and by its repetition. So, and for the same reason, do we repeat, *two localities at the same time upon the same world*. Light and darkness both on the world; the one on some one part of it, the other (none of the one) on some other part of it.

Reduced to a simpler form, the statement of the text is clearly this: Light was on the world, but was not all over the world.

Just before, the darkness was all over the world. Now, a change, as described. This new state of things — co-existence, separation — was an effect. Of what cause? The divine power or will, throughout the narrative expressed by "God said." But, contrary to the analogy of the narrative, *this* effect is not preceded by the formula. That is, it is not stated that God said: "Let there be a separating." Therefore (reasoning by the analogy) he did not say it. This effect was not from such words; yet it was an effect — this separating — and (analogically) must have been an effect of some divine and causal word. What word? The only word recorded, of course: "Let light be." By *that* word, *two* effects — two effects coalescing and agreeing — an effect within an effect — the one comprising the other — two effects simultaneous. That is to say, the invoking of the light was the cause of its coming, and the coming the cause of the

separating. Another decree would have been but a repetition. *By* its coming the light was *here; there*, not. Such is the purport of the record's analogy.

But it contains another testimony of the same purport. The Hebrew particle Vav (ו), when standing between a stated cause and its stated effect, is more than a conjunctive particle. It is declarative — *this* was produced by *that;* a significance pervading the narrative, and which must not be overlooked. "*Thus* did God make the expanse, and did separate between the waters under and the waters above," that is, by his speaking. So here, "God said, Let light be. *Thus* light was (and God saw the light that it was good). *Thus* did God separate between the light and between the darkness," that is, by his speaking. The coming and the separating were the co-effects of the same potential cause. The analogy and the pregnant particle concur.

These things being so, — antecedent and consequents, cause and effects, — the light which fell upon the world could not have been a *surrounding* light, in which the world was merged as in a sea. To suppose it was is only flat contradiction to the world-separating between the light and the no-light. This light did not fall upon the entire world at once.

Where light is and remains, there is no possible way of effecting darkness (or of making a separation between the two) but by the interposition of some opaque body which shall cut off the light from beyond itself (the body); thus serving as a partition or "separating" wall between the two; no light where otherwise light would be. So, too, and for the same reason, where light falls from a luminous body upon another not luminous and not translucent (being, by consequence, *itself* a "separating" wall), there must be light on one side of the latter (no matter what its shape), and at the same time no light (from the luminary) upon the other side, and there is no possible way of effecting such co-existence upon such a body other than the coming of such a light as described. Therefore, if it was not a surrounding

light which fell upon the world, — as it could not have been, — then it must have come from some foreign source opposite that part of the world on which it was. Therefore such a fact, and such only, is consistent, in our understanding of things, with light and no-light co-existent on the world, and also with the fact that the very coming of the light effected this co-existence. Conversely, too, the fact of this co-existence (as stated in the text) being admitted, the other fact (a foreign source) is inevitably admitted also. It seems to us, therefore, that the language before us *discloses* the existence of a sun; that it *compels* us to recognize its existence, and to recognize it as the fountain of that light.

In brief, our reasoning stands thus: The fact that there was no distinct decree for the separating indicates the only decree which is stated as its cause; the analogy of the record does the same; the local force of the Hebrew particle (וַ) — an imperative index-finger — does the same. Therefore the coming of the light involved the separation, and the separation involved the presence of a sun.

Another point. God invoked the light to come where the darkness was. The light came. But the entire object of its summons had not yet been answered; because (at the very first) on the one part of the deep there was yet *no* light, as is proved by the separation-fact. Therefore the luminous body whence light came must itself have been in motion so as to throw light upon the entire world (that is, so as to fulfil the decree), the darkness receding as the light moved from part to part; or the world must have been in motion so as to produce the same effect; that is, so as to keep up the separation. But — addressed, without any explanation, to us who have only our own knowledge to guide us to an understanding of the writing — the statement "God separated" is equivalent to a statement that the luminous body did not move around the world to its great whole, but that the world so moved as to present its whole toward the fixed luminous body. In other words, "God separated" tells us not only that there was a sun, but also that the world

was revolving on itself to get the light, according to the scope and purpose of the edict, from that sun.

A fixed luminary. A revolving world. Astronomical arrangement.

Be it observed, however, that it was only sun "light" which had reached the surface of the deep, not the sunshine in its strength. The text authorizes us only to say "light," only to understand that the "cloud-garment" (Job xxxviii. 9) had become less "thick"; that it was only *translucent*. This is confirmed by the fact that neither sun nor moon had yet been "set in the expanse — the heaven." And thus we may recognize only an imperfect light upon the deep — a light like that of dawn.[1]

Thus, for the several reasons given, we cannot resist the conviction that the statements about "light" and the "separating" — standing as they do without any explanation, and addressed as they are to all people of all times and classes, who know no other world-light — do quietly point us to our sun as that light's source.

Yet we do not rest our opinion upon this particular textual reasoning alone. It stands here as on distinct and independent ground, to be sure; but it has also another basis to which we religiously adhere — the reasoning which we have pursued from the previous statement, that the world, before this point of light, was but one in the present astronomic family, and had once borne its burden of created life.

The two textual indications are harmonies. Each points out a harmonic system, glorious, of old, and never broken up. Each points out the same mute, but eloquent harmony of brilliant planets having a common central sun; one only blighted and shrouded, but not lost.

We say, then, that "in the beginning" there was a sun. We do not say it presumingly; we do not say it rashly. We

[1] To show that we are not over-nice, we refer to Neh. viii. 3; and particularly to Job xxiv. 14 (Moses's writing?) where the same word אוֹר "light" occurs which is here used. In the first text, it is translated "morning"; in the other, it evidently means *early* dawn.

say it upon authority, interpreting our authority *by itself*, honestly and as well as we can.

But our conclusions involve the astronomical arrangement of the world in the fullest sense. They involve not only the presence of the sun, but of the moon and stars in their present relations. They involve, too, the same veritable relations *on the eve* of the light's advent — to go no farther back. Yet while the cosmos, in all its fulness and strength, was round about, the world itself was then in darkness. The light, glowing all around, did not reach it. This indicates some light-excluding medium; and, if we do not misread, the testimony of God himself is, that the light-excluding medium was a cloud-garment, or an envelope, in its position and effect like a cloud (Job xxxviii. 9).

Are we wrong? Do we mistake our premises? Do we misread our authority? Do its words mean that there were a sun and a sun's satellites and a revolving world? Or do they mean that there were not? We confess that we cannot read them otherwise than as we do, having gone only thus far in the Article before us. And this our conviction we shall feel bound in all honesty to retain, unless herein-after something shall appear to disprove or to qualify it. In such a case, we shall be afloat and bewildered as we look back upon the text we have examined; and in such a case we shall ask some questions hard to be answered in consistency with the record. Indeed, doubting, the while, whether we shall have such occasion, we will ask them now.

Here was fresh light upon the world. What light, save a sun, ever did give, or ever could have given, light *to the world?* What light *precisely?* What light, while yet on part of the world was *no* light? When any other *such* world-light shall have been proved (not conjectured) to have existed, or even to have been possible, then will it be time to discuss the possibility of its having been *the* light introduced to us here. Then will it be time to work up that light (if we can) into harmony with this previous and succeeding context.

An after-thought here occurs. It is conceded, we think, by all, that the first development of cosmic light was coëval with the first movement of cosmic matter. This is equivalent to saying that the first act of cosmic creating was the development of cosmic light. Very well.

Now, if the first sentence of this document expresses the creating of the cosmos, then does it deny that the words "Let light be," uttered long after, on the first of the six days, express the creating of light. Or else, if these words do express the creating of light on that "day," then do they deny that the first sentence expresses the creating of the cosmos. Either supposition makes the writer self-contradictory.

But if "Let light be" does not express the creating of light, and if the first sentence does not express the creating of the cosmos, then we have a narrative consistent with itself and also in harmony with a chief rudiment of cosmic science.

§ 7. Day.

We have largely anticipated the opinion of many meditative and gifted minds, that the creative text is laden with "wonderful language — strange, mystic talk." The opinion is radical. A corresponding interpretation ("strange") springs from it as a pure necessity.

A mystic "day" is one of its necessities. According to the foregoing exposition, be it right or be it wrong, — instead of common words, household words, with strange meanings attached to them, and "above the common sense," we have only the common words, with the common meanings, and in the way of common sense. We hold that our mode of exposition is textually justifiable in its application to the word "day." We shall try to show this, so that we may be disentangled from this particular and acknowledged "mysticism" before going farther.

The mystic theory about this word (it is, confessedly, only theory) seems to claim that the creative days were "not common days," solar or natural; that they were "in-

effable," "not comprehensible in their nature, only divisions in the great creative work." Be it so. What then?

1. Of course, the light here spoken of was ineffable, and not comprehensible; for God said that "day" and "light" were one. The light was not solar light, nor cosmical light, nor phosphorescent light, nor auroral light, nor electric light, nor any other "common" or "natural" light. It was ineffable, which neither of these are.

From this it follows that so far as the words "day" and "light" are concerned, the writer, — whom *we* regard as *in loco Dei*, — ostensibly teaching us, gives us no teaching at all. By the confession involved, we do not know what the "light" was, that is, what the "day" was. Indeed, we do not know that the אור, "light," *was light* at all, or anything like light;[1] and, following out the word-anomaly, we do not know the meaning of any of the words here employed. For aught we know, every one is "strange, mystic talk."

2. If the ineffable days were not natural-light days, then they were not *topical* days. But God commanded the light (day) to come where there was none — upon a definite *topos*, the surface of the deep. Whereas the ineffable light (day) was not *there* in any *conceivable* sense; being itself "not comprehensible," or being itself only "a division of a work." We cannot understand that it had any *topos* whatever. Thus the non-natural light or day and God's light or day do not agree.

3. If day or light was not natural-light day, then there was no natural-darkness night, either before or at or after the coming of the light. If the light was not natural light, then it had no natural negative, nor any other negative. "A division of a work" can have no negative; for a part has not a negative. But the creative light had a negative. It was on the deep. It was darkness — natural darkness; it was night — *no*-light. It was a negative pregnant, affirming the co-existence of light or day, such as does not exist for

[1] Perhaps it was "herbs." See Isa. xviii. 4, where it has this "strange, mystic" translation.

the confirmation of a non-natural light or day. Therefore the creative light or day was not this light or day, incomprehensible, non-natural.

Or if on the deep there *was* natural darkness notwithstanding, yet it was in no degree mitigated, much less dispersed, during or by the days of *non*-natural light; more especially, if they were only so many "divisions of a work." A light which is *not* natural has no antagonism to a darkness which *is* natural. Ineffable day or light cannot come where effable night is, to drive it away or to neutralize it. Indeed, we cannot conceive of *incomprehensible* light or day as doing anything, changing anything, or bringing anything to pass. It is simply incomprehensible; of course, to the understanding, non-competent; and that is all we know about it. It certainly must be incompetent to take the place of darkness, to extinguish it, or to take any other place, or to demolish any other thing. It certainly is neither entity nor non-entity; therefore without place, without prowess, without potentiality.

4. If day was not natural light, making manifest natural things; if it was neither solar nor auroral, — as it could not be, not being natural, — then during those not-natural days there were no corresponding nights, effable or ineffable.

We do not mean to repeat, exactly, what we have already said. We mean, particularly, to confront these non-natural days with the fact, before commented upon, that in God's separating between the light and between the darkness, in his doing this by the very coming of light, there were produced on the world co-existing day and night. If the light which then came was non-natural, then it did not make manifest any natural things. And if it did not make manifest any natural things, then it did not leave unmanifested, at the same time, any other natural things. It did not effect, and could not have effected, any separation between itself and the natural darkness. It could not occupy in part the place of darkness, and leave another place-part unoccupied. Only some natural light was competent to this. Thus the

theory of a light (day) non-natural is *in conflict* with the separation-fact predicated of light. Indeed, it is itself a negation — a "light" which does *not* "make manifest."

This sort of day, if it be a sort, is unpleasant to us, repulsive, because it is so harshly inharmonious with different statements in the text, with both the letter and the spirit of what we are trying to interpret. It perplexes us. It saddens us; and the more, because all shadow of reason for supposing "day" to have been "ineffable," or for supposing it to have been of immense duration, vanishes when we reduce our view from a universe to a speck.

So much, in our view, for incautiously wandering from the true creative field, and thus becoming bewildered in the vast and the incomprehensible.

"And God called the light day." This divine definition is clear, simple, explicit, obligatory — involve what it may, exclude what it may. We have no right to add to it, to subtract from it, to question it, to cavil at it. The light was day; the day was light. That is all.

Therefore throughout the narrative day means light — nothing more, less, or any other than the same light, the same day, as here; unless, indeed, some other kind of light or day be herein-after signified. This proviso, always.

Light is not time. Day is not time. Light, or day, does not present the idea of time. We mean pure light, pure day; that is, light alone. Time and light are as diverse as time and typhus, as time and water, as time and darkness. Light no more gives us an idea of time than darkness does, than water does, whether we think of a second, or of twenty-four hours, or of a thousand years, or of the vast cycle of eclipses. Therefore it is not for us to say that the God-day is any definite or indefinite part of duration. It was not. It was light, and only light.

Yet light or day affords us a measure of duration (ineffable light does not); that is, it marks out to us so much or so much time. In connection with something else it does; but not alone. Give us motion, in connection with light or day,

and then we may get an idea of time, or we may not. Hence it is that the technical "ineffable day" has utterly and confessedly failed to give us any idea of time; because no motion has been associated with it, or could be. Standing, in the disciple's eye, all alone, without anything moving, or even which could move, he has been utterly at a loss to say how long it was, and utterly unable to find any co-existing and corresponding night.

Give us motion with light, even though the light itself be motionless, and perhaps we get an idea of time — a definite portion of duration. We say "perhaps," because there must be not only movement, but regularity of movement, somewhere, and having a relation to the light — a relation so patent and intimate that we might almost say the two are in combination.

And yet it is not true that exact regularity of movement in association with light is the only way by which to get an idea of time, or to measure time. A watch, when it moves, gives us time. But in such case light or day has nothing to do with the problem. So with darkness, equally; for the watch moves as well and tells as much in the darkness as in the light. The sand in the hour-glass, the regular motion of anything else, effect the same measurement; but light, or day, does not enter into the process at all. Thus, *with* light we get an idea of time, and *without* light we get it. As we have said, the two are independent.

We should be careful, then, when reading of our God-day that we do not confound the two. Light is that which "maketh manifest"; nothing more. Day is that which "maketh manifest"; nothing more; nothing else.

If, then, no motion, no regular motion, was associated with the creative days, — that is, the creative lights, — they give us no idea of time. They do not pretend to. The element of time is not in them, and in them we cannot find it. And it is as irrational, as unphilosophical, to predicate of them immense time as to predicate of them a second of time, and *vice versa*. We wrong the light, when we call it

time; we wrong "day," when we call it time. If, agreeing with the text, we say that light is *only* day, and that day is *only* light, then we exclude time, and have no right to talk about it.

But do we not get our idea of time — our most accurate idea — from day? We do. To us, therefore, is not day time? By no means; not day, but day *and* motion; from *both*, the idea. Our luminary, coming and going at regular intervals, would give us the idea, and afford us a measure, of time. But it does not come and go. Relatively to us, it has no motion; yet in association with its light, there *is* motion — motion of the world's surface under that day, at regular pace, into it, out of it, at regular intervals; the light or day itself *one* and *perpetual*. It is thus only that we get our idea, or take our measures, of time from day. A sun and no motion — *no time-metre*.

Accustomed as we are to find our chief and most accurate idea of time from "day," we have come to use the word, conventionally, but not truthfully, as a very synonyme of time. We forget — the motion being imperceptible — we forget to what we are indebted for our time-idea. We speak an untruth so often that we have come to think it truthful.

The practical point of all which is this: Unawares and intensely we have transfered to the God-day our untruthful idea of man-day. Can we not correct ourselves? Ought we not? — thus sparing ourselves the perplexities and mistakes into which we must run, if guided by an untruth.

We may here notice another fact. Nothing is said about time in the whole narrative. Things said, to be sure, which could not have been said, except as there were all the while light and motion, indicators of time. Still, no word about time actually marked out. This because, as we think (and may yet show), time was of no importance, having no partnership in creating; because God did not take time in creating. Creatively, he did not use it.

Confining ourselves to the record, this is all we know about the creative "day" — it was *light*. To us the divine

definition seems good enough; and it seems very plain, very simple. Good enough, without adding or pruning, without stretching or contracting. Good enough, just as it stands, for "all the earth," for "the end of the world," for the wise man and the simple, for the man-mind and the child-mind, for all alike.

Outside the writing, we find "strange talk" about a "God-divided day" and a "God-divided night." The words are, confessedly, suggested only by an "impression," an impression which our own interpretation wonders at, "an impression of strangeness, of vastness, as coming from the account itself — an impression of wonderful things told *out of the common use of language*."[1]

God divided — separated — *between* the light and *between* the darkness. But he never *divided* the light; he never *divided* the darkness; and we ought not to say that he did.

What, now, is the signification-difference between a world-light and a world-day? None at all. The different words express the same reality — pure synonymes. Therefore, if at any time we use the word "day" to express anything else than light, — and conventionally or philosophically or rhetorically we may very properly do so, — we surely use it to express something else than a creative day. In such a case, our word is not the divine word. And we would seriously suggest to the many who speak of the *mystery* of this revelation (!) whether they may not have been led astray in their conceptions of what is written, by applying (perhaps unconsciously) some meaning to this important word other than that which it here bears — some meaning other than light? Whether, if they keep rigidly and constantly in mind this divine definition, they may not find reason materially to modify their conceptions? We have tried to show, in some particulars, wherein we are all liable to hasty and wrong conclusions, through lack of sufficient care and of sufficient scrutiny of the textual language. We hope we have not erred.

[1] Lange, p. 131.

We say — and our reason for it is patent and potent — that "light" and "day," in this account, should be held as pure synonymes; and yet, while world-day was *only* "light," it was also light *in certain phases or conditions*. As we have said, light on *the world*, not in heaven; light on the *world*, not in the sun, supposing there were one. Light sufficient to displace the very darkness which had been on the entire world, not merely light enough to make manifest a single drop or a superficial inch of the deep.

Rigidly holding that day creative was only light, we take up the modifying phase of that light as expressed in the text: "There was evening and there was morning — one day"; descriptive of the light which was a day. The whole of the light was the day; the day was wholly light; yet the day was evening and morning. Evening and morning, therefore, were light, each of them. The two — that is, light-evening and light-morning — constituted one day, or, if one please, *a* day; for the simple force of our indefinite article is familiar to the Hebrew cardinal. Whatever, precisely, "evening" and "morning" may mean, "a day" was *light under these conditions*, or having *these characteristic aspects*.

Now, what was (עֶרֶב) "evening"? What was (בֹּקֶר) "morning"? We stand here as simple inquirers, not taking into consideration at all our previous conclusions, not affirming or denying that there was now a sun, not perplexing ourselves with any outside considerations, as of etymology or philosophy. What do these terms mean, in their belonging to the light, the day? They belong to it here; and we may not apply them to anything else, conceivable or inconceivable, but to the light. We say, then, that in their application to the light or day — the world's light or day — they mean precisely the same as our corresponding English words in the same application. Respectively, the lessening or declining, and the increasing or shooting forth, of that light. Topically, the faint light growing fainter, and the faint light growing stronger. "Evening," light decreasing;

"morning," light increasing; "day" proper, the entire light *so conditioned*. So, in the same application, are the words uniformly used throughout the Hebrew Scriptures.

In the text we have an evening-and-morning day. For the sake of perspicuity only, let us now transpose the synonymes before us. "There was evening and there was morning — one *light*." We have the same reality, the same idea. What, then, was an evening-and-morning light? light fading, light growing? (It was on the *world*, remember!) We answer: The whole light *from* that world-point, on the one extreme, where it was at its minimum, increasing thence to its maximum, and *thence* decreasing *to* that world-point, on the other extreme, where also it was at its minimum. Or, more simply, the whole light from its feeblest presence on the one extreme to its feeblest presence on the other extreme — the whole world-light; light upon the world; light, with a geographical application; light, with a geographical measurement; light, with a geographical *reach;* light, within that reach. This, exactly, was "day" — a world-day — a day to be measured not by time, but by geographical degrees, by leagues, by miles. Wherever, between these two extremes, the light touched the deep, there and that was one world-day. Such, in part, is the idea expressed by light or day, with an evening and a morning — by light or day in a condition of simultaneous decrease and increase.

No idea of darkness is here expressed, no idea of motion, no idea of duration, no idea of cessation, no idea of "pause," no idea of succession, no idea of number, other than "one." One light, one day, one evening, one morning, one world, one part of the world. This is all.

Now, excluding what is excluded and grouping what are expressed,— decrease, increase, the world, and reach,—how shall we reason about this light, this day? Of *what* light can we conceive which could have "made manifest" the deep, and which could have fulfilled only and all the conditions nominated in the text? What light is *suggested by* the evening-and-morning condition, — to say nothing of the

others? What light is peremptorily *indicated by* a world-light in a condition of evening and morning? The thought which comes to us irresistibly is this — that light or day, so conditioned, must have come from some source beyond the deep and distant from it. In other words, we cannot conceive of any light fulfilling such conditions, unless we accept as a fact the presence of a sun — a natural luminary, emitting a light which could "make manifest" the natural-deep surface, and exist there as morning and evening. In this case, and only in this case, we can conceive of an evening-and-morning light — of an evening and morning "they twain one," they twain one day. We may go farther, and say: Natural light, "making manifest" a natural object, — the deep, — and in an evening-and-morning condition, could not have been furnished in any other mode. And thus the language of the text thrusts this fact upon us. Accepting as verities these avowed conditions of light which made it a world-day, they themselves appear natural and simple when we also accept the presence of a sun as a fact in them involved. Then, and then only. We therefore accept the fact. We cannot help it.

Thus, by a route other than we have before followed, and independent of it, we are again brought face to face with a sun; by other language of the same text too. If there were no sun, is not this a little singular?

Reasoning, as we naturally and properly do, from "evening and morning" to a luminary competent to such evening and morning, we accept also all which is involved in the deduction. Particularly, that the virgin evening-and-morning light or day was produced in the same way as the like light of our own "day"; conventionally speaking, by the setting and rising of the sun. This, we think, is indicated fairly and even cogently by the language employed for our instruction. And we must so hold, until it shall be proved that we are wrong. But this, as well as what we have said before, involves the axial movement, and, of course, the astronomical arrangement, of the world when the light-edict was issued.

But observe, we have come at this result, also, by another route.

We have said that light, in a condition of decrease and increase within a certain reach, expresses the creative day only *in part*. Let us explain.

When God invoked light, he invoked it to "be" on the place of darkness, that is, on the *entire* deep. But the light falling upon the deep was "separated" from the deep's darkness. The light on the world was where it fell, and elsewhere on the world was *yet* darkness or *no*-light. Thus and there the two co-existed. Therefore, when light first came upon the deep, the edict had been fulfilled only *in part*, — only on that part of the world where light was, and not on that part where as yet no light was. Now, how and when was the light-edict fulfilled? How and when did light get at the whole place of darkness — the whole face of the deep?

Light, conditioned as evening and morning, presents only the idea of a fixed condition. It does not give us any idea of light retiring and advancing from point to point along the surface of the world. And yet this idea of movement is involved in that of evening-and-morning light, when taken in connection with the divine order that it should visit the whole place of darkness. To accomplish the order and to maintain the evening-and-morning condition, there must have been movement. But light, with its evening-and-morning condition, was *fixed;* for the very separation, as we have shown, declares this. Or, if such declaration be doubted, our compulsive deduction of a sun declares it. Well, the light a fixture, the edict accomplished, and movement essential to the accomplishment, — what follows? The movement must have been an axial movement of the world. Which brings us once more — but this time *on the footprints of the day* — to an astronomical arrangement of the world, and, of course, to the presence of a cosmos. So, as we read along, every once in a while we are brought up again to the same great underlying facts.

So much for the *how* the light-edict was accomplished. But the *when* — when the world-revolution was accomplished, — whether twenty-four minutes, or twenty-four hours, or twenty-four years, as we reckon time. But on this point the record is silent; for God did not use time, and nowhere in the account is time brought to view. At this point we may figure it out if we can. But we cannot do so from the data given; we must get our data elsewhere.

When the world's first revolution after the moment when the light first touched it, which was (as we may show) the very moment when the edict first touched the light, — when the world's revolution after this was *exactly* accomplished, — then was exactly accomplished *one* day *to the world.* And thus, although day was light and light was day, we get the idea of a true world-day only in part, when we think only of the arrival of evening-and-morning light. There is no need of words to show that, as the day was perpetual, and as this revolution was also, therefore the darkness was perpetual also; receding as the day or light advanced; and each, by blending (עֶרֶב), producing evening and morning.

One point more. It is not said, it is not intimated, that the light or day came and withdrew. It is only written, "it was." Invoked, it came; but it was not revoked. And as it could not come without invoking, so it could not withdraw without revoking (a point reserved for confirmation). It was; and it was; and still and ever it was, and has been, and now is. This we must consider true, unless some voucher of revocation is produced. The same light or day, from the same source, on the same world, having the same reach. A local day, a perpetual day, a fixed day. One day, one light, one source, one evening, one morning, one world — one of each — one, the same, of each, ever since. The light has shone steadily, faithfully, with no ebbing and flowing. Only when and where, and always when and where, light has been, then and there has been day. It is a grand and immutable unit. This has three witnesses — "light was," "the light — day," cosmical physics.

On divine authority, however, there were, in the beginning, days successive, days computative — allotments of indivisible, immutable light into individualities admitting of numerical designation. Day but one, and yet days! Where is the agreement? Just here: *Really*, day is a unit, a perpetual unit; *topically*, one or more, according as the *topos* remains in, or goes from, the light or day, which is always one and always there. Of both these facts the record advises us. Of the day perpetual and one, when it says, "Light was"; of days topical, when it says, "God separated between the light or day, and between the darkness or night," both which continued terrestrially to be. But light or day being perpetual, there could not be succeeding lights upon the world, a plane and stationary; nor upon the world, a sphere, unless revolving. Thus related, the light (the more at its meridian, the less at its evening and morning) was day, *sectionally* considered. But *spherically* considered, — that is, truthfully, in the entirety of the truth, — it was but part of one day; for one day, thus considered, was not one light merely, but one world-entire light. The revolution completed, one day had been won to the surface of the deep. Not until then had there been one entire day where before had been one entire night. Therefore, day being a very unit, in the numbering of days in this account, is a sort of mathematical demonstration, under the divine finger, that the world was astronomically arranged (sun, moon, and stars) when this numbering began. So here we are, again, with a revolving world and a cosmos.

Any source of light to any *topos* must be constant, unless the source is cut off, or moves away, or the *topos* moves without the range of the source. During these days or lights the source did not dry up nor move away, nor did the *topos* (the world) move out of range. Yet it did move; for it had upon its entire surface successive days or lights. What, then, was its motion? Not being out of range, the motion must have been upon itself; its surface passing along under and out of the day or light. But this is rotary motion.

And this rotary motion involves cosmical arrangement, and particularly the existence of a luminary, before which, to meet its own necessities, it presented itself entire. Are we, then, in fault, — are we going beyond the record, — when we affirm the sun to have been the source of day one, and the succession of days to have been occasioned as were days ever after? We think not; unless, indeed, it can be shown that those days or lights had some other source, or were of some other sort, than ours now. If we cannot demonstrate this, why object to our showing exegetically, as we think we do, that the day or light and the sun were the same then as now? Even if we are wrong, not only show our error, and show it by showing the fallacy of our exegesis, but give us in return a sound and exegetical (not theoretical) substitute. For charity's sake, do not take away our crust of bread, and give us only a stone. If we have now a Mosaic day of twenty-four hours, no thanks to darkness for it. A day "consisting of light and darkness" may be well enough in popular parlance; but in a God-sense, and in common sense, day or light *never* includes darkness or night — dictionaries and critics to the contrary, notwithstanding. *Our* days are "after the kind" of the first — their progenitor; each making the circuit of the sphere to accomplish its own entirety, and wiping out night all the way, from its own fading evening to its own glowing morning. In the first day we have a standard measure of all world-days — light sweeping *from* a given point around and backward *to* it. It is for a reason, and, we think, for a Mosaic reason, that we say, "backward to it" [1]

In conclusion, we observe that the object of the Mosaic

[1] A word here in regard to Gen. ii. 4. The writer under very different circumstances, however, suddenly uses the word "day" in a new and very different sense. And he does so without giving *formal* advisement of the change. But not without a *real* advisement, an advisement consisting in the tacit assumption that both he and his readers were competent to count six. It is of less importance to scrutinize this change, because it bears equally upon *any* interpretation of the word "day" as used in the first chapter. It troubles us, if at all, no more than it troubles interpreters who differ from us.

narrative is, exclusively, to set forth the creative work of God upon *this world*. Of course, he does not set forth the history of other worlds. But if a sun *were* in existence, and if astronomical teaching were purposely let alone, then the writer necessarily used only just such language as was consistent with, and, of course, indicative of, a sun. But if, indeed, there were *no* sun, such language as he has used could not have been used in honesty.

ARTICLE III.

CHARLES JAMES FOX AS AN ORATOR.

BY THE LATE GEORGE SHEPARD, D.D., PROFESSOR IN BANGOR THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE subject of the present Article is Charles James Fox, — an extraordinary character, who lived at an extraordinary time. Could we but do tolerable justice to our subject we should have no fear as to the interest or profitableness of the Article. Charles James Fox has carried the reputation of being, on the whole, the greatest parliamentary orator in English history; and yet we have to state the strange fact that no biography of him has ever been written; and we find ourselves under the necessity of ranging through libraries to gather the authentic facts and material for a performance like this.

Mr. Fox was born on the thirteenth of January, 1749. He was the second son of Henry Fox, afterward Lord Holland, and through his mother (Georgina Carolina Lenox, of the house of Richmond), he inherited the blood, and even the features, of the royal house of Stuart. But Mr. Burke says that in character he bore a much closer resemblance to Henry Fourth of France, another of his royal progenitors.

The fortunes of the Fox family commenced at the Resto-

ration. Sir Stephen Fox, the grandfather of Charles, came into the lucrative place of paymaster of some regiments, gathered a magnificent estate, made splendid charities, and, at the age of seventy-six, married a second wife, became the father of two sons, and, through these, the founder of two noble families; the eldest son, Stephen, being created Earl of Ilchester; Henry, the younger, Lord Holland.

Henry Fox, Lord Holland, was, in many traits, very like his father; in all, very unlike his son Charles. By management and thrift he laid the foundation for his own honors and fortune. He became a member of Parliament, and there displayed very considerable powers of debate, which he often exerted against the overmastering energies of Lord Chatham. It is remarkable that these distinguished men, thus commonly set in opposition, should leave behind two so illustrious sons, to be arrayed against each other nearly the whole of their political life. Lord Chatham left to his family no wealth. He left them the sole inheritance of an unsullied reputation and of a proud and great name. Lord Holland handed down to his family enormous wealth, accompanied with the blasting opprobrium, "public defaulter of uncounted millions." It was as paymaster of the forces that he acquired this wealth and became subjected to these dishonoring accusations. Charles, the second surviving son, was the favorite of the father, as he early saw in this son the germs of future greatness. He conducted the domestic education of this son upon the preposterous principle of unlimited indulgence. "Let nothing be done," said the father, "to break his spirit"; by which his lordship doubtless meant, let there be nothing to subdue his will. And there was nothing; his own will and way Charles Fox had always.[1]

[1] Fox was guilty of some enormous instances of boyish insolence. I find such as the following in contemporary history; and still one feels they can hardly be true. His father, when Secretary of State, in the midst of the war, having one night a great number of important expresses to despatch, took them home from his office, in order the more attentively to examine their contents before he sent them away. Charles, then about nine years of age, came into the study

Intending his son, from earliest infancy, for parliamentary business, Lord Holland conversed with him, when a child, on public affairs, encouraged him to deliver his sentiments, and trained him to deliver them with form and propriety. At the table, when a mere boy, he was permitted to enter into the conversation of men, and would often acquit himself to the astonishment of those present. A similar course was pursued with Pitt; his father not only conversing with him on state affairs, but requiring him to utter his thoughts methodically, — standing him on the table for declamation and speech-making. But here, I would remark, is almost the only similarity between these two notable characters. In all other respects their training and unfolding is in entire contrast. Fox's early education was far less a home education than Pitt's; Fox, being thrown forth upon the world, "passed through all the gradations of boyhood, youth, and maturity, with that change of character which is naturally created by each; but Pitt, like the northern year, in which summer commences without any spring, seemed to leap at once from infancy to manhood, without any intervening period of adolescence."

At the age of fourteen Fox was placed at Eton, where he was distinguished alike for scholarship and dissipation. His classical attainments were rapid, accurate, and great. He there practised declamation and debate, and thus early began to acquire his remarkable faculty of expression and argument. From Eton he went to Oxford, and there pursued, with great gust and diligence, both dissipation and study. His favorite language was the Greek; and his favorite authors were Homer, Demosthenes, Longinus, and Aristotle. Of the great

and taking up one of the packets, which his father had examined and laid apart for sealing, perused it with much seeming attention for a time, expressed his disapprobation of its contents, and then coolly thrust it into the fire. The father, without administering any rebuke even, very quietly proceeded to make out another. At another time when his father had finished a long despatch, Charles, standing by with his hand on the inkstand, said, "I have a mind to throw the ink over the paper." "Do, my dear," said the Secretary, "if it will give you any pleasure." Whereupon the boy dashed on the ink, and the Secretary sat down submissively to rewrite the despatch.

Grecian poet he became an absolute master and an accomplished critic. Aristotle's Ethics and Politics he read with great thoroughness. Indeed, history, ethics, and politics were made prominent studies, as preparatory to the course of life he contemplated.

At the age of nineteen he was elected to Parliament for Midhurst. He began his political career as a high tory, his maiden speech being against Mr. Wilkes' petition and the liberty of the press. It is, indeed, a singular fact that the first colleague of Mr. Fox should have been Lord North, and his first oratorical adversary Edmund Burke. Under Lord North, Fox was placed on the Admiralty, and in 1772 was promoted to the Treasury. Though Mr. Fox thus commenced the insolent enemy of the whigs, and for four years made them smart under the lash of his invective, he then suddenly turned about, — the cause is hardly known, — and became their ally and advocate, and at length their leader. It was in 1774 that he took his stand with the opposition, and there were mighty men in the ranks with him — Burke, Barre, Sheridan, Dunning, and, for a little season, William Pitt. It was his wonderful facility and transcendent powers of debate which gave him the singular pre-eminence of a leader amongst such men. The great question in Parliament onward for seven years was the American war. Fox and his coadjutors were all the while the strenuous advocates of peace and American independence. In March 1782 the ministry under North gave way, and the Rockingham administration was formed. Mr. Fox now came into power as one of the secretaries of state, and he was, perhaps, the controlling mind during this brief administration, which lasted only till the death of the marquis in July. On account of a violent displeasure at the complexion of the Shelburne administration, which succeeded that of Rockingham, Mr. Fox, early in 1873, formed a coalition with Lord North. This "unscrupulous coalition" with the tories, considering the opposing principles and the diverse character of the two men, and the seven years of impassioned and contemptuous oppo-

sition made to North by Fox, injured the latter exceedingly. The result of this coalition was the overthrow of the Shelburne administration, and the formation of a new one, with the Duke of Portland, a man of straw, for premier, and Fox and North as secretaries together. The measure which occasioned the overthrow of this administration was Mr. Fox's famous bill for the government of India. This bill, probably drafted by Burke, was introduced by Fox in November 1783, in one of his most wonderful speeches. It failed. Pitt and the opposition triumphed. The king dismissed his ministers without the courtesy of a personal interview. As the tables are turned again, we find Mr. Pitt in power and Mr. Fox in opposition. In 1784 there was another general election for Parliament, and Fox stood for Westminster. The whole influence of the government was brought to bear against him, resolved, if possible, to defeat him. For a number of days he ran behind; till at length the ladies went out and engaged in his behalf, even adopting a dress in compliment to him, composed of a mixture of garter blue and buff. The most conspicuous and serviceable of these was the Duchess of Devonshire, then in the height of her beauty; of whom, when soliciting votes for Mr. Fox, it was said, that "she was the loveliest portrait that ever appeared upon a canvass."

There is not time to follow Mr. Fox in all the detail of his political conduct. He was chiefly employed in resisting the measures of his rival, William Pitt. It was a perpetual struggle between them — through the twenty-five years during which Pitt was premier and Fox in opposition. A leading measure at issue was the new India bill. This Fox and his friends opposed with all their marshalled strength. In immediate connection came the impeachment of Hastings, a most imposing affair, in which Fox took a prominent and splendid part. In 1786 came the king's indisposition, a season of mental derangement, a state of incapacity. Here Fox stood prominent, and, unfortunately for himself, advocated the virtual demise of the king, and the full succession of the Prince of Wales, who was a whig, and a fast friend

and fellow of his own. On this question the two great champions met in one of the most masterly argumentative contests ever witnessed on the floor of parliament. But the king recovered; the Regency bill died; and Pitt rose still higher in the royal favor — rose, indeed, into the ascendency. In 1789 came the French Revolution which received our orator's unqualified approval, and, through its whole duration, continued a fit theme for his impetuous eloquence, and constituted one of the most important and touching passages in his life. It was here that he broke with Burke, — rather Burke with him. Most violently did he oppose the war then waged by the ministry against France. In 1791, in the midst of the panic which seized conservative England at the condition of affairs in France, at the very time Burke issued his Reflections on the French Revolution, Mr. Fox introduced his Libel Act. This measure, which was supported by Mr. Pitt, transferred from the judge to the jury the power of deciding whether any matter was libellous in character.

In 1791 Fox, disgusted with the course of affairs, withdrew from Parliament for a season. In 1801, taking advantage of a short peace under Addington's administration, he visited Paris, where he was honored with the special notice of Buonaparte.[1]

When war began again Pitt returned to power, and formed a new league on the continent. This Fox opposed and condemned; and here he was the true prophet, for in two months the allies were utterly discomfited in the battle of Austerlitz. Poor Pitt, enfeebled by disease and overloaded with care, was completely crushed, yea, heart-broken, and died with the words: "My country! how I leave my country!" trembling on his lips. In less than eight months

[1] The chief object of this visit was the collection of materials for a historical work upon the reign of James II., which he began in 1800, and on which he was then engaged. At this period he was largely occupied in writing, and in his private letters of this date there are frequent "allusions to various literary projects, such as an edition of Dryden, a Defence of Racine and the French Stage, Essay on the Beauties of Euripides, etc. — E.

his illustrious rival followed him. Fox died of dropsy, September 13th, 1806; his death, which was in the midst of his friends, furnishing some scenes of very solemn and tender interest. His age was fifty-seven years and eight months. Pitt was ten years younger. Such is a mere outline of Mr. Fox's political course. Of his character as a politician I shall not speak farther than to say that neither consistency nor cunning was a quality of it.

As to his moral character and example, they were altogether unworthy of him. In almost all respects he was an irregular man. Ambition was not the sin of Fox, but a splendid dissoluteness. He said, indeed, there were two things he was resolved to attain to: the first place of power, and marrying the handsomest woman in the kingdom. Mr. Fox commonly had as his companion an elegant and fascinating woman; but the words of Scripture, with a slight change, might at any time have been applied to him, "she whom thou how hast is not thy wife." Fox was an enormous gambler. His passion for the gaming-table and the race-ground was unparalleled and uncontrollable; for it began early, and grew with even his boyish growth. When travelling on the continent at the age of fourteen his father indulged him with five guineas a night to be spent in games of hazard. It is stated by an eminent banker of England, that in the house of which he was a partner, one hundred thousand pounds had been paid by Lord Holland's order to discharge the debts contracted by his son during his minority. After having spent whole nights at the gaming-table, and there lost thousands of pounds, Fox would go home, adjust his person, repair immediately to the house, and pour forth torrents of his invective eloquence. When he was a member of the Board of Admiralty the clerks were often obliged to wait upon him at the gaming-houses in St. James and Pall Mall, where, with a pen in one hand and cards in the other, he signed warrants, orders, and other papers without knowing a word of their contents. In addition to love of gaming of this sort, he was greatly addicted to the pleasures of the

turf, — making great preparations under this head; having some thirty horses in training in a single year, and hazarding many thousands at a race. In this way, before he was thirty years of age, Mr. Fox squandered his entire inherited estate, which was sufficient to yield him an annual income of about four thousand pounds; consequently at this early period he often had not the means of defraying his most necessary expenses. I refer to these traits and extravagances simply to indicate how strange the traits and monstrous the habits in England's greatest orator.

In his social character it is obvious that Fox was free, generous, convivial; thus acquiring the familiar appellation he was everywhere receiving, of Charles Fox. His conversational powers, it is said, were not very remarkable. This could not have been through a lack of command of his resources, or of ease of utterance, but through a voluntary inactivity; being so transcendent in the greater sphere, he had no ambition to be distinguished in the lesser. It is stated by Mackintosh, that "Mr. Fox united, in a most remarkable degree, the seemingly repugnant characters of the mildest of men and the most vehement of orators." These seemingly repugnant characters are, in fact, very often united. Perhaps more commonly than otherwise do we find that men who have written or uttered the intensest eloquence, the men who have been the most violent in controversy, the most dogged in opposition, the most fiery in debate, the most terrible in sarcasm, the most withering in rebuke, have been the meekest, the mildest, the most generous and amiable of men in their private character and retired intercourse. The philosophy of this mental phenomenon we have, at present, no time to consider.

The improvidence of Fox extended beyond mere pecuniary matters. He was apt to be reckless of what he poured from his mind as well as of what he poured from his purse. It would have been well for him, frequently, had he kept his seat when he rose to speak. For what the elder Pitt said of himself was true of Fox: "When once I am up, everything

in me comes out." Fox ruined his prospects by his freedom of utterance; going behind the minister, he assailed the king: "We are called upon," said he, in 1780, referring to the customary address to the throne, which was then before the house, "we are called upon to recognize the blessings of his majesty's reign. I cannot concur in such a vote, for I am not acquainted with those blessings. The present reign offers one uninterrupted series of disgrace, misfortune, and calamity." A few months later he says: "The reign of Charles II. has been denominated an infamous reign, but the evils inflicted on this country by the Stuarts, were happily retrieved by a revolution, while the evils of the present reign admit of no redress." This freedom of speech threw him out of the pale of the royal favor and planted him, with the exception of a few brief months of office, in the ranks of bitter and reckless opposition.

To Mr. Fox's literary character and habits, and his acquisitions in that line, I have already alluded. He made himself originally a thorough classical scholar. And he did not, as is too commonly the case, abandon classical studies on entering upon public duties. Even amid his wildest excesses, during his early parliamentary career, he kept up an habitual intercourse with the writers of Greece and Rome. An intimate friend once called upon him soon after a desperate risk and loss, expecting to find him bewailing his misfortune and sunk in despair, even dreading lest he should discover about him the weapons of the suicide, and actually found him calmly engaged in reading a Greek Herodotus. Even late in life he had a plan of study to which he inflexibly adhered. An hour before breakfast was dedicated either to the acquisition of a new language or to the recollection of one in some degree obliterated. At this period he reviewed the entire field of his Greek studies. The time from breakfast till two was occupied in reading, which he pursued in strict method. It was his practice in reading an author to erase with his pen all unnecessary words — a practice which if now applied with his severe notions of style would, doubt-

less, make a fearful shrinkage in not a few books. The counsel and companionship of Burke, before they broke apart on the rock of the French Revolution, was of incalculable service to Fox. From this great fountain of wisdom and knowledge he drew his richest stores; he, himself, acknowledging that if all he had learned from other sources were put in one scale, and what he had been taught by Burke in the other, the latter would preponderate.

Though Fox was a man of extensive reading and finished taste, though very rapid, commonly, in the extemporaneous utterance of his thoughts, he yet composed slowly and with great labor. This fact seems somewhat remarkable. We should suppose that the individual who could speak readily would also be able to write readily. But it is not so always; often is it the reverse. The fact that Fox did not succeed with his pen, that whilst his spoken style was glowing and natural his written style was formal and frigid, led him to forego all attempts to preserve his own eloquence. There is but a single speech, we are told, that he prepared at all beforehand, or even corrected for the press. The consequence is, we have no perfect records of his eloquence. We have the course of the argument, the rude substance of what he said, but nowhere the eloquence, the real language, the *verba ardentia*.[1] We have to imagine what the original

[1] "He had employed many days in writing his Letter to the Electors of Westminster, in 1793; and even the publication of his speech on the late Duke of Bedford (the only instance in which he ever revised what he had delivered in public) occupied a greater portion of his time than could be easily imagined by those who were unacquainted with his scrupulous attention to all the niceties of language. Having mentioned these works, I take this opportunity of adding, that, with the exception of the fourteenth and sixteenth, and perhaps a few other numbers of a periodical publication in 1779, called the "Englishman," and an Epitaph upon the late Bishop of Down, they are the only pieces of prose he ever printed; unless, indeed, one were to reckon his advertisements to electors, and the parliamentary papers which he may have drawn up. There are several specimens of his composition in verse, in different languages; but the Lines on Mrs. Crewe, and those to Mrs. Fox on his birthday, are, as far as I recollect, all that have been printed. An Ode to Poverty, and an Epigram upon Gibbon, though very generally attributed to him, are certainly not his compositions."—Vassal Holland in Preface to "Fox's Historical Work," pp. xiv and

was from these fragments and from the descriptions and testimonies of history.

The following are the acknowledged characteristics of Mr. Fox's eloquence, — its powerful and its faulty traits.

1. One thing was, it was intelligent; in other words, the eloquence of one who took a strong hold of his subject, and was master of it, and master of all the knowledge bearing upon it he had ever acquired. Endowed with a wonderful quickness of apprehension and discrimination, he could seize the subject, and, separating from it what was foreign, present it, when he chose, with simplicity and clearness.

2. The eloquence of Mr. Fox was pre-eminently an argumentative eloquence. He loved, he courted discussion; not declamation, but discussion, argumentation. And often would he go to an excess, and expend it upon trifling or conceded points — thus doing himself what he complained of in Adam Smith, one of his favorite authors, whom he charges with being so fond of deduction that he practised it where there was nothing to deduce — proving where no one could doubt, and entering upon a chain of reasoning to produce a most unmeaning result. This gratuitous thing, which Mr. Fox, as well as Adam Smith, sometimes did, can never be done without forfeiting a large measure of power. But Mr. Fox's argumentative skill was not always expended upon trifles. It was commonly expended upon the solid argument of his adversary. He loved to come after a great speaker, and meet a great and compact argument. As an opening speaker, he was ordinary, because he depended for his power upon the excitement of the debate. The greater the power of the adversary that preceded him, the better for his effort. The mightier the argument that went before, the mightier the argument of the reply. In the reply, if he

xv and note. This fragment of the proposed History consists of an Introductory Chapter giving a *résumé* of facts, from the reign of Henry VII., and three chapters of the history of James II., pp. 273; and an Appendix giving the Correspondence between Louis XIV., and M. Barillon on English Affairs from Dec. 1684 to Dec. 1685, etc. pp. clviii. — E.

had a good cause, Mr. Fox was sure to meet the full force of the argument which had been, or might have been, adduced on the other side. On his part, there was no dodging, no evasion. Indeed, he would often alarm his friends by apparently helping his opponents, by making the statement of the argument stronger than they had made it, stronger than they could make it, stronger, even, than seemed to admit of demolition. Then came his moments of power, of proud triumph, when he rose in all his conscious might upon such an argument and overthrew it, tore it to atoms, and cast it to the winds. Mr. Fox often employed wit — "a battering, piercing wit" — in this work, particularly in exposing the absurdity of, and holding up to ridicule, the weak points of an opposing speech. A portion of Fox's argumentative power must be resolved into the strength with which he grasped, and the tenacity with which he held, and the rigor with which he applied, *great first principles*. By analyzing the arguments of an adversary, and bringing his refined and complicated reasonings to the criterion of first principles, he made their hidden sophistry to appear, and took away all their seeming strength. It is not said that Mr. Fox never reasoned unfairly and deceptively. To say this would be to say that he was never on the wrong side, or had a weak cause. One who heard the great reply of Fox to the great speech and argument of Pitt on the Regency Bill — an occasion on which these two mighty combatants exhibited exploits they probably never exceeded, thus speaks of its effect upon himself. "We felt our ideas, as if under the influence of sorcery, become dim and confused by a change in the position of their objects, and by the intervention of new ones, seemingly as substantial as those which they eclipsed. We were conscious, for the moment, of two coexistent and contradictory impressions, — a conviction of Pitt's doctrine, and astonishment that it could be produced by arguments so false, so absurd, and so detestable."

3. Whilst the eloquence of Fox was argumentative it was not dry, dull, frigid. All agree that vehemence was a

marked and pervading characteristic. Not that he was always earnest and vehement, for he was not always eloquent. When he was not excited his efforts were in no wise remarkable. When unwarmed, unroused, there was a decided want of fluency. It was only when greatly and profoundly stirred that the thoughts, the matter, came quickly, vividly forth. Even then he was not always fluent; not, however, for want of thoughts offering themselves to the utterance, but from an excessive and crowded abundance, clogging the passage. His thoughts often came too fast for the slow and mechanical process of speech. There was interference and embarrassment from the multitudinous rush to the place of egress. Hence there was occasionally something like violence in his large frame, as if, in the strife and press, the ideas were trying to overleap the narrow boundaries that confined them; or tumultuously to break a passage out, instead of waiting to be let out in the lawful way. "It is no wonder that he expressed himself," says an eye-witness of this state and exertion of his powers, "in hurried sentences, in involuntary exclamations, by vehement gestures, by sudden starts and bursts of passion. Everything showed the agitation of his mind; his tongue faltered, his voice became almost suffocated, and his face was bathed in tears. He reeled and staggered under the load of feeling which oppressed him; he rolled like the sea beaten by a tempest."

4. This conflicting and interfering of thoughts, when Mr. Fox was in his excited and vehement strain, indicates the obvious fact which was felt as a serious defect in his eloquence, namely, the want of a skilful and suggestive arrangement of his thoughts. With this arrangement there could hardly have been anything like a tumult; for with it he could have said authoritatively to the several ranks and orders, "Stand quietly in your place till you are called for." Even when — a very rare thing — the speech was premeditated and an arrangement was adopted, it was by no means remarkable for its fitting adjustment and connection. He often, however, confessedly spoke without any plan at all — a miserable

practice, as it seems to us, no matter how great the orator. He would make sudden sallies in the impulses and sportings of his mind, and follow out conceptions which occurred to him on his course. Hence there were complaints of inability to follow him; and it was often a wonder to his friends how he kept on his way and came out so well as he did. In some of his brilliant desultory efforts, he exhibited the most astonishing powers of recollection. It is said that, "rising toward the end of a long debate, and bursting into a speech as immethodical as it was impetuous, he would yet recall without a single omission, every topic of importance that had been touched upon through the night." While he thus showed himself a prodigy of memory, it was at the expense of his hearers, who would have been better pleased, and far more permanently profited, if there had been some bond of union, some link or law of association, by which the whole mass might have been securely held by him and easily handed over to the keeping of others. It is difficult to reconcile what is said of this want of method, or skilful, logical adjustment and arrangement with what is said of his sweeping power of argumentation. Of course, it could not have been argument in close concatenation, but rather in separate masses and blows, coming so pat and heavy as to overturn and demolish the adverse positions.

5. Again, the eloquence of Mr. Fox was plain, in both senses of the word. His language was always clear, intelligible. Every hearer could understand, and understand him without an effort. His language was plain, too, as devoid of ornament. There was scarcely any rhythm, or music in his periods. He seems never to have attempted a fine expression. Though something of a poet, and a lover of poetry, at least in his earlier days, there is an utter restriction, if not annihilation, of the imagination in his oratory. His eloquence, in this respect, is of the hardest and severest kind, there being little in it to please the ear or gently move the sensibilities. The green fields and the adorning flowers we look for in vain. The style was not only plain, but

positively bad; not merely wanting in rhetorical beauty and finish, but abounding in grammatical blunders. There were solecisms and clumsy constructions, unpardonable in an ordinary speaker, unaccountable in an admired master of eloquence.

6. If we go to the person and manner of our orator we do not find in it, more than in the style, anything to please and captivate. Cicero says, a man to be an orator must not be "*vastus*," not gross, bulky, unwieldy. This rule of the great rhetorician Mr. Fox was guilty of violating. His figure broad, heavy, inclined to corpulency, and appearing destitute of all elegance or grace; his features harsh, repulsive, overhung with two huge, black, shaggy eyebrows; his voice, without much compass or flexibility, always shrill and piercing, sometimes rising to a distressing screech; his action earnest, natural, but devoid of ease and grace, — such the manner.

7. In looking over the description of Mr. Fox's eloquence there seems to be about as much that is negative as positive. Without skill in method; without remarkable fluency— rather given to an impetuosity which choked fluency; without the aid of imagination; without the accomplishments of style; without the charm of person, voice, manner, — pray, how does it appear that Mr. Fox was so much of an orator? That Mr. Fox was a great orator, that he had some of the rarest and best elements of this species of greatness, is evident from the concurrent testimony of history, and from the fact that he wielded so decisive a power, notwithstanding his want of many of the usual accomplishments of the orator. His was the power of thought, of argument, of passion. He was effective because he strongly grasped his subject — became interested, absorbed in it, filled and fired with it; then, forgetting himself, and yielding all his excited powers to convey his own convictions to others, he uttered himself with entire simplicity and naturalness; he swept along on a tide of vehemence, bearing others with him, because such was the style, the structure, the whole appearance, so aloof

from artifice, that all deemed him sincere, knew that he was not acting a part, but pouring out his own mind and heart upon them; and the stream came so direct, clear, intense, and impetuous, that those before it could not keep from being carried by it.

But there is nothing in the remains of Fox, in the speeches left behind, which will at all justify the reports of his eloquence. We can therefore give no examples. There are no beauties of Fox, no brilliant passages, no splendid illustrations. We have nothing more than the mere hulk of his speeches, — the rough-timbered outline. To adduce specimens of these, then, would not be likely to further our attempt at description.[1] Our design, perhaps, would be better aided by falling a moment upon the law of contrasts. Mr. Fox is so much of an original in the entire line and company of orators that his qualities may be set forth more perfectly by showing the contrasts than the resemblances between him and other speakers. Some may think, however, that there should be a single exception to this remark; inasmuch as it is often said that the character of Fox's eloquence is very similar to that

[1] In another and earlier copy of this lecture is the following: Mr. Hume says somewhere, that "criticism is nearly useless without examples." But as satisfactory specimens of Mr. Fox's eloquence are nowhere in existence, a single example must suffice. It is not necessary to make careful selection, since, open where we may, we shall probably see the ardor, the strength, the simplicity and something of the slovenliness. Here is a part of what he said when he and his party were accused of struggling in the opposition for place and power. "I can bear well enough, in some respects, and even make allowance for, the ignorance, incapacity, corruption, love of emolument and power in these men. I can even pity them for their wants, their impudence, and their gross stupidity. I feel for their miserable infatuation, not knowing whether to rush headlong into immediate ruin or retreat with safety. Despicable and unprincipled as they are, I have nevertheless learned to regard their persons with respect from the conspicuous stations they hold in view of the public. But when such men, thus involved, and involving others, in every possible misfortune and disgrace, urge their claims of merit for what deserves an axe or a halter, and under a complication of great national calamities, coolly contend that those disasters which every individual feels, do not exist, or if they do, that they may justly be ascribed to opposition, such a lump of deformity and disease, of folly and wickedness, of ignorance and temerity, thus deeply and incurably smitten with pride and distended by audacity, breaks all measures of patience." — E.

of Demosthenes. Even Mackintosh pronounces him a most Demosthenean speaker. Unquestionably, there are points of resemblance, There are also as many, even more, points of contrast. The Englishman resembled the Grecian in a severe simplicity ; in a rapid, sweeping vehemence ; in argument impregnated with passion; in self-forgetting absorption in his subject; in rhetorical repetitions, — though by no means so skilful in these repetitions as the Grecian. Some of the differences were, that Demosthenes prepared his orations, even to a most polished finishing; Fox preferred to open his mouth and pour out his matter as it rose in the heated effervescence of the occasion. The most powerful of the speeches of the former were the most thoroughly elaborated. The weakest and the worst speech of the latter was, it is said, his only carefully prepared speech. The style of the Athenian was wrought to the utmost strength and beauty; that of the Briton was left in all the rudeness of nature. The former studied the graces and the energies of manner,— declaimed with suspended weapons above him and with pebbles in his mouth. The latter took no such pains. " If, like the ancient, he had practised speaking with correcting blades and points around him," says a contemporary, " such were his gestures, his risings, his rollings, that his whole ample frame would have been one bleeding wound; and as to speaking with pebbles in his mouth, he never seemed to speak without them." It has been well said that " Fox was the raw material of Demosthenes." Discipline, such as that of the great Grecian, would doubtless have brought him into a closer resemblance.

Fox resembled Chatham in the vehemence of his eloquence and in his plain common-sense arguments and views of things ; and here the resemblance ceased. Fox relied upon the extended argument; Chatham, upon the indignant and overpowering burst of feeling. Fox liked to come after, Chatham before, a great speaker. Fox wrought his effects by the fervor and seeming honesty of his sentiments. Chatham achieved wonders by the range and thrilling tones of his

voice, the withering intensity of his look, and the speaking significance of his gesture. With Fox it was equality, good, generous fellow-feeling, securing the good-will of his auditors. With Chatham it was the tone of lordly command. He rose high, and thundered and lightened; he frowned; he awed, he overwhelmed his auditors.

Fox and Burke resembled each other in negligence of dress, and in their want of the accomplishments of utterance and manner. Burke, however, was far the worse of the two, his speech being vitiated by an Irish accent as broad and strong as if he had never left the banks of the Shannon. They resembled each other in rapidity of thought; though Burke was never clogged and embarrassed by that rapidity like Fox. They were alike in facility of classical allusion, though Burke made such allusions more frequently. Burke had more scope, Fox more concentration. Burke was the ocean, Fox the stream. Burke wanted the practical part, Fox the scientific. Burke had too much imagination, Fox too little. Burke could give the philosophy of a thing, Fox could stir the fury of it.

Between Fox and Pitt there was nothing in common, except that they each came into Parliament with the high advantages of birth, and set forth upon a tide, strong and favoring, already raised for them. Mr. Fox came from a tory father, and crossed over to be a whig; Mr. Pitt came from a whig father and passed over to be a tory. The cry of the mass in one section was, Fox and a popular government; in the other quarter, Pitt and the constitution. Fox was hardly ever, Pitt was always, in office. Gibbon made a great mistake when, on the first rise of these rival orators, comparing Pitt's eloquence to "a pretty, painted, little pleasure-boat," he pronounced it doomed to be sunk by Charles Fox's great, black collier. Fox's business was attack; Pitt's defence. The former was heavier in his blow; the latter surer in his aim. Fox furnished the intense argument; Pitt was skilled in the imagery, the method, the arrangement. Fox was followed with difficulty and remembered with ease;

Pitt was followed with ease and remembered with difficulty. Fox loved the Saxon element of the language; Pitt the Latin. Hence the former was rough and pungent in his style; the latter, round, swelling, imposing. Fox gave the lightning; Pitt, the thunder of eloquence. Fox excited wonder at the rush of his torrent; Pitt, at the beauty of his flow.

Fox's power lay in the strictly *extempore*. Here, where comparatively few ever succeed, he succeeded highly. The rareness of high success in this line grows out of the extreme difficulty of the execution. To get the right thoughts, weighty ones, and to clothe them, at the moment, with terse and elegant expression, to keep the torrent still pouring as it presents itself, and to keep the mind stretched ahead to secure matter to supply the rapid and enormous waste, is a multiform and lightning-like operation which, when well-sustained, is, perhaps, the most astonishing feat of the human mind. Few upon great and responsible occasions venture upon it; but equip and fortify themselves by some sort of preparation, when any is practicable. This, what most men do; this, what Fox never did. The tendency of this — I mean the pure unpremeditated *extempore* — is to degenerate; to grow thin, watery, unnutritious. The noble gift sinks into mere fluency, — fluency, an every-day and everywhere sort of thing.

Power in the off-hand, — how great the influence it will sometimes give a man, and how great the reputation and fame that will arise from it! The masses everywhere think very highly of this gift; never more than now. The person who can speak readily, and keep speaking on every occasion that comes along, they set down as unquestionably a man of profound abilities; while he who, at the moment, can say little or nothing, whatever he may know in reality, knows nothing at all in the judgment of the people. They will have it that the ready man is the richly replenished man. They judge of the contents of the barrel by the spurt at the spigot; if that is smart and strong they are sure the vessel

is choke-full; their philosophy never having taught them that a great pressure of wind on a comparatively empty vessel will produce an equally vigorous issue.

9. The career of Mr. Fox goes to establish the maxim that the orator is made — *orator fit.* Though Mr. Fox stood on a proud pre-eminence, it was only by long and hard struggle that he reached that eminence. Burke, speaking of him after their unhappy difference, says: "I knew him when he was nineteen (at which age he entered Parliament), since which time he has risen by slow degrees to be the most brilliant and accomplished debater the world ever saw." It was by slow degrees, trying, tasking practice, speaking at every opportunity, and this persisted in. "During five whole sessions," he says, "I spoke every night but one, and I only regret that I did not speak on that night too." It is not to be supposed that one who was always speaking could always speak well; but, well or ill, there would be some benefit to himself; a growth in facility, and even power, of speaking.

10. But while persistent practice will nurture the orator's facility, it requires the conflicts and taskings of antagonism to bring out the highest powers, the truly gigantic exertions in this line. This is shown in the case of Fox and Pitt. Had these great performers been on the same side, together they would not have possessed nor approached the measure of strength which each, alone, possessed in opposition to the other. As it was they were kept on the stretch of effort; now and then were strained to the very highest tension of endeavor; and they grew colossal under the stress. They found no match but in each other. They replied on great questions to none but each other. On one occasion Erskine made a speech immediately after one by Fox. Pitt at first announced his intention of replying to both, but afterward said: "I shall make no mention of what was said by the honorable gentleman who spoke last; he did no more than regularly repeat what was said by the member who preceded him, and as regularly weaken all he repeated."

11. In observing different speakers there is nothing we

become convinced of sooner than this, that it behooves every man to be himself — to act and speak like himself. No one can with impunity allow himself to be moulded into the shape and bearing and to shine with the finish and polish of somebody else. Doubtless it would have seemed to many a good thing to have had Mr. Fox smoothed, schooled, adjusted, and presented before us a handsome speaker. But the process would have been a shearing of the Samson. We may criticize such a man as Fox — his style and manner; but greatly change him, and you spoil him. Where, indeed, such powers and aptitudes as his exist, there especially should education come in to improve and perfect them. Had Fox been an educated orator, had he cut off excrescences, and cherished and carried forward his excellences, he might have surpassed all English speakers, and stood next to, if not on a full equality with, the great Athenian. He might have been educated with no abatement of that racy naturalness which gave him such power. But take away from this man what you call his faults — his awkwardness, his uncouthness, his heaving, his rolling — and you take away some of the essentials of his strength; because these were his characteristically, intensely his, in his blood and bones and marrow and soul. There was never a truer remark than that which came from John Randolph in his latter-day ravings, "a natural fool is preferable to a learned one;" that is, faulty things which belong to the man, and which would be intolerable as caught by another, are sometimes amongst the elements of his greatness. We have this same thing illustrated in the late Dr. Chalmers, who has been called the most eloquent of modern preachers. Perhaps he was the most eloquent. Most certainly, the man who could empty the coffee-houses, and even the counting-rooms, of Glasgow into the Trow Church for two of the best and busiest hours of Thursday forenoon, and this on successive weeks, to hear from him a religious discourse, must have been pre-eminently an eloquent man. Still a critic according to the books might fall upon him, and eat at him till he had well-nigh

eaten him up, — so faulty in everything; his style rugged and unruly, refusing the gait of other people, and playing gigantic pranks, ever and anon towering and swelling into an unmanageable, not to say outrageous, magnificence; his voice pouring out a torrent of the harshest provincialism; his hands, one employed in grasping and holding on upon his manuscript, which he servilely read, the other going up and down with a sort of spasmodic jerk, as though the lightning of the soul were relieving itself through the muscles of that member. That was it; *the lightning of his soul*, pervading the massiveness of the thought and the clumsiness of the manner, which in Chalmers and in Fox redeemed everything else. This vehemence of the soul is the life of all true eloquence. All the leading orators, while they differ even oppositely on other points, have this. Where this is, other things may be wanting, or be awry, but the speaker will demonstrate to the minds and the hearts before him that *he* is not wanting.

12. But when we come to moral defects it is a different matter. It has been a wonder to many that Fox brought so little to pass. Strange it will seem to most that that superlative intellect, often so sublimely waked and working; that sunlight-clearness and vehement strength of argument; that grandeur of plain and intuitive sense, — that all those prodigious gifts and powers brought upon that great arena, where questions involving the fate of millions were canvassed, accomplished no more for himself, for his country, and the race. It was the moral defects, the shameful vices of the man, the dissipation and licentiousness, which turned all that consummate eloquence and statesmanship to comparative impotence. Admirable, almost preternatural, gifts all but thrown away. So in this case; so in every case. History reads her lesson loud and clear, having other examples, though few so notable as this. Let those coming upon the stage, and those now on the stage, accept the lesson. And let the lesson in this its immortal connection, and with this its imperishable record, go down to the last day of time.

In concurrence with, and in the phrase of, the ablest of modern essayists, "We wish the greatest genius on earth, whoever he may be, might write an inscription for this great statesman's monument to express in the most strenuous of all possible modes of thought and utterance, the truth and the warning that no person will ever be accepted to serve mankind in the highest departments of utility, without an eminence of virtue which can sustain him in the noble defiance, 'Which of you convicts me of sin.'"

ARTICLE IV.

THE DERIVATION OF UNQUAM, USQUAM, AND USQUE.

BY PROF. LEMUEL S. POTWIN, WESTERN RESERVE COLLEGE, HUDSON, OHIO.

THE derivation of *Unquam* from *unus* and *quam*, given in Andrews' Latin Dictionary, and even in White and Riddle's, is probably satisfactory to no one. Such a use of *unus* is without example, and if admitted would only explain the form *unquam*, leaving the other form *umquam* inexplicable; while, as to the *meaning* of the word, neither *unus* nor *quam* contains the idea of *time*, which is fundamental to *unquam*.

In seeking for the origin of *unquam*, or *umquam* (from which the former comes by euphony), the first suggestion from its *form* would be that it comes from some interrogative or relative word, by the addition of *quam*. This suggestion, which, indeed, at the outset, amounts to evidence from analogy, arises from such familiar words as these: *quis-quam*, *uti-quam*, *uti-que*, *ubi-que*, *undi-que*. It is to be specially noted that in several words of this class the initial *k* sound has been lost, as is proved by the forms, *ali-cubi*, *ali-cunde*, *unde-cunde*. There can be no doubt, also, that *uti* arises from *cuti*. In the light of these examples then, *um-quam* appears to be a changed form of *cum-quam*, or *quum-quam*.

Let us turn now to the *meaning* of *umquam*. *Quis-quam*

means *any one at all*. How it comes to mean this is not essential to our present inquiry; but we may observe, in passing, how often an interrogative, by being closely connected with an enclitic or a prefix, becomes an indefinite, as in *siquis*, *nequis*, *numquis*, *ecquis*, *aliquis*, *quispiam*, *quisque*, and that *quam* passes readily from the idea of *manner* to that of amount and degree, as in *quam multi*, *quamdiu*. Thus *quisquam* would mean *any-as-much-as*, or *just any*, and in implied negative connection *any at all*. But whatever be the process, the result is that *quisquam* means *any one at all*, and is used in negative and exclusive sentences. Let us try this as our guide in interpreting *umquam*. *Cum-quam* would mean *at any time at all*, and would be used in negative and exclusive sentences. Such, precisely, is the meaning, and such is the use of *umquam*.

But, if this derivation is correct, why do we not find the form *um?* The answer is easy. First, we could not expect to have both *cum* and *um*, meaning the same thing, any more than *cubi* and *ubi*. Secondly, if two forms of *cum* were required, for a distribution of meaning, and either consonant should give way, it would be the weaker. Now every reader of Latin verse knows that *m* final is weak. Mr. Roby says, without special reference to poetry, "At the end of words it appears to have been scarcely audible" (Gram. p. 27), *cum*, then, if it were to be reduced to one consonant would be, not *um*, but *que*. In fact, we can see that the weakness of *m* has preserved the initial *c* — the *um* being too weak to stand alone — for as soon as *cum* is strengthened by *quam*, its *c* falls away, and it follows in the path of *ut*, *ubi*, and *unde*.

But why, then, do we not have *umque* instead of *cumque?* Because *cumque*, by itself, is little used, and thus the *c* is rarely initial, although it is often preceded by a vowel, as in *quicumque*, *ubicumque*, *undecumque*, *quocumque*. In similar circumstances we find the *c* in *alicubi*, *alicunde*, *necubi*, *necunde*.

Every consideration, then, of both form and meaning

points to *quum-quam*, and the root of *quis*, as the origin of *unquam*.

The derivation of *Usquam* is not so obvious, but the method employed in investigating *unquam* can hardly fail to guide us aright. Assuming that *usquam* comes from some interrogative, its *meaning* at once directs us to *ubi*; for *usquam* means *at any place at all*, and is used in the same kind of sentences as *quis quam* and *unquam*. This presumption is strengthened by the fact that we never meet with the form *ubiquam*, while we have in *usquam* precisely the notion that *ubiquam* would regularly express. The case at this point seems so strong that one is inclined to say that somehow the word *must* come from *ubi*, even if the form is without analogy. But analogies are not lacking. Notice the forms in composition, of the three Latin prepositions that end in *b*—*ab*, *ob*, *sub* — when they come before *c*, *q*, *p*, *t*. From *ab* we have *abs-que*, and, with the *b* dropped, *as-pello*, *as-porto*. From *ob*, *obs-trudo*, *os-tendo*. From *sub*, *subs-cus*, *sus-cipio*, *sus-que*. Nothing is wanting to complete the analogy, unless one makes a point of the final vowel of *ubi*. But all these prepositions have in Sanskrit and Greek, final vowels; and the two forms *uti* and *ut* at once suggest the form *ub* as possible. But it is not necessary to suppose the existence of this separate form. The final vowel of *ubi* is variable in quantity. Long in *ubique*, it is short in *ubivis*. If we suppose it to be short in *ubiquam*, we see that the unaccented *i* would easily drop out and *ub-quam* become *ubs-quam* and *us-quam*. We find an almost exact parallel in the different forms of the name of the Oscan people, *Opici*, *Opsci*, *Obsci*, *Osci*.[1]

[1] This fatal fondness of *b* for *s* may possibly explain some other words, whose etymology is as yet unsettled, e.g. *Luscinia*. Its form would be reasonably satisfied by coming from *lub-et* and *cano*, and the meaning would then be the *pleasure-singer*, or *passionate-singer*. But can it not be harmonized with the words *luscus* and *luscitiosus*? Perhaps the key to these last two is found in *nuscitiosus*. This means *night-seeing*, and implies two other words *nuscitia* and *nuscus*. But *luscitiosus* also means the same, and through *luscitio* comes from *luscus*. This gives the suggestion of two forms of the same word, *nuscus* and *luscus*. Some plausibility is given to this by the words *νύμφη*, and *lympha*. If

We conclude, then, that both the form and meaning of *usquam* indicate its derivation from *ubi* (*cu-bi*, *quo-bi*), and ultimately from the root of *quis*.

Passing to *Usque* we can apply to it all that has just been said on the first syllable of *usquam*. Indeed, we are shut up to a derivation from *ubi*, for we have the weighty example of *usquam* itself, in addition to all the others; and we have *no* examples pointing to a different origin.

Let us pass, then, to the *meaning* of *usque*. Taking *quis-que* for our guide, as before we took *quis-quam*, we should expect to find that *u(b)s-que* means *in each*, or *every*, *place;* and its use should not be confined to negative or exclusive sentences. That this approaches the meaning of *usque* is apparent, but it is *exactly* the meaning of *ubique*. Now it is not difficult to see that the actual meanings of *usque* have arisen from a *distribution* of senses which might all have remained under *ubique*. In the first place, it would be natural that *ubique*, as *ubi*, should have a secondary meaning of *time*, but it does not, this meaning being wholly transferred to *usque*. In the next place, the local and primary meaning of *ubique* would naturally, in connection with prepositions of motion, as *ad* and *in*, pass from simply *everywhere* to *all the way;* and this meaning also is transferred to *usque*. *Ubique*, therefore, and *usque* are complementary derivatives. They together fulfil all the requisitions of a derivative from *ubi* by an appended *que*. Moreover, as to the double form, we find the key in the variable quantity of the *i* of *ubi*. Remaining long it acquires the accent and keeps the form in full, *ubique*. Losing both length and accent it leaves the form to drift to *usque*.

this is so, *luscus*, *l* being weaker than *n*, must come from *nuscus*, and we are led to *nub-ere* as containing the root. *Lus-cus* would mean the *covered* or *veiled* one, then as a secondary meaning, *one-eyed*, and *lus-* (*nus-*) *cinia* would mean the *veiled singer*, or one that, as Milton has it, "Sings *darkling*, and in shadiest covert hid Tunes her nocturnal note." This would not make *luscinia* come from *luscus*, but from the root *nub*, common to both, and *cano*, the ambiguous form in *-inus*, *luscinus*, being responsible for some confusion as to the origin of the words.

In discussing these three words almost no reference has been made to other languages, because the changes have obviously gone on within the Latin itself. They are strictly *res domesticae*. In such subordinate branches of etymology each language should be allowed to mind its own business.

ARTICLE V.

COTTON MATHER AND THE WITCHCRAFT DELUSION.

BY PROF. R. D. C. ROBBINS, NEWTON HIGHLANDS, MASS.

The Views of Cotton Mather and his Age concerning Unseen and Spiritual Agency.

BEFORE proceeding to the direct investigation of Cotton Mather's connection with witchcraft, for which he has been so severely censured, and his name been made a synonyme for all that is harsh and unloving, it seems appropriate to examine briefly his views of the influence of unseen agents in moulding the destiny of human beings. And in doing this, it may not be amiss to bear in mind now what we shall have occasion more than once to refer to, that his belief was substantially that of the best and most intelligent men of his age in this country, and to a great extent that of the most religiously inclined in England.

In the education of his children he dwelt much upon the presence and influence of good angels, "who love them, help them, guard them from evil, and do many good offices for them; who likewise take a very diligent notice of them, and ought not in any way to be disobliged." In reference to evil angels, his kindliness of nature took precedence of his theology, for he did not say much about them, his son says, lest his children should be haunted by "frightful fancies" and "apparitions of devils." Still, "he would not have them ignorant that there are devils who tempt them to wickedness, who are glad when they do wickedly, and who may get leave of God to kill them for it."

In his own experience, when on a certain occasion "he looked over his catalogue of mercies from the God of heaven" and compared "what he read in the book of heaven of the agency of angels, he enumerates fourteen distinct particulars in which he thinks he discovers angelical agency in his affairs, and quotes passages of Scripture appropriate to, or corroborative of, each."[1] By this contemplation he is so transported in spirit that he casts himself on his study-floor before the Lord, and in his rapturous praise to the God of angels, he exclaims: "If any good angels of the Lord are now nigh unto me, do you also bless the Lord, ye heavenly ministers; and, oh! adore that free grace of his which employs you to be serviceable to so poor, so mean, so vile a wretch as is here prostrate before him." In connection with his supplications to God for a continuation of the aid of angels, which he needs in so many particulars, he also supplicates for preservation from the "illusions and injuries of evil angels."

Cotton Mather expresses vividly in a sermon his belief in the activity and influence of evil spirits, and although the passage has been often quoted, it is too apposite to my purpose to be omitted here: "No place that I know of has got such a spell upon it as will always keep the devil out. The meeting-house wherein we assemble for the worship of God is filled with many holy people and many holy concerns continually; but if our eyes were so refined as the servant of the prophet had his of old, I suppose we should now see a throng of devils in this very place. The apostle has inti mated that angels come in among us. There are angels, it seems, that hark how I preach and how you hear at this hour. And our own sad experience is enough to intimate that the devils are also rendezvousing here. It is reported in Job i. 5, when the sons of God came to present themselves before the Lord, Satan came also among them. When we are in our church assemblies, oh, how many devils do you imagine crowd in among us? There is a devil that rocks one

[1] See Life, by Samuel Mather, p. 119 sq., and also Dr. Chandler Robbins's History of the Old North Church, p. 102 sq.

to sleep. There is a devil that makes another to be pleasing himself with wanton and wicked speculations. It is also possible that we have our closets or our studies gloriously perfumed with devotions every day; but, alas! can we shut the devil out of them? No, let us go where we will, we shall find a devil nigh unto us. Only when we come to heaven we shall be out of his reach forever."

But the devil, though the foe and opposer of all improvement in knowledge and civilization everywhere, was supposed to be specially active in this new world. His own territory was invaded. He had held full sway over the aborigines of this country before the inroads of Europeans. He even, it was supposed, had induced these descendants of the Israelites to come upon this continent, so as to have full control over them. Cotton Mather says: "Though we know not when or how those Indians first became inhabitants of this mighty continent, yet we may guess that probably the devil decoyed these miserable salvages hither, in hopes that the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ would never come here to destroy or disturb his absolute empire over them." In England, too, this same notion prevailed. Joseph Mede, one of "the most profound scholars of his time," and esteemed for "brilliant genius and an enlightened spirit," says, "that the devil, being impatient of the sound of the gospel and cross of Christ in every part of the Old World, . . . and foreseeing that he was like to lose all here, . . . drew a colony out of some of those barbarous, nations dwelling upon the Northern ocean, into America, where they have increased since into an innumerable multitude. And where did the devil ever reign more absolutely and without control since mankind first fell under his clutches?"[1]

"No intelligent person in those times," Mr. Poole says, rejected the theory of diabolical agency, unless he rejected also the authority of the Old and New Testaments, the existence of angels, and a life beyond the grave. A belief in

[1] See Upham's Salem Witchcraft, Vol. i. p. 396 sq., where much more to the same effect is quoted.

witchcraft was essential to the maintenance of a Christian character.[1] Mr. Upham, too, allows "that the errors that led to the [witchcraft] delusion were not attacked from any quarter at any time during that generation, and have remained lurking in many minds, in greater or less degree, to our day."[2]

What better soil could be found for the delusion of witchcraft to spring up upon than such a belief in the power and dominion of evil spirits over the human mind? The responsibility which the belief that was prevalent, both abroad and here, in reference to New England as the stronghold of the adversary of souls, imposed upon the colonists especial activity in resisting his influence; and they naturally wished to discharge their duty in this respect, "faithfully and manfully." "They were told," Upham says, "and they believed, that it had fallen to their lot, to be the champions of the cross of Christ against the power of the devil. They felt that they were fighting him in his last stronghold, and they were determined to tie him up forever."[3]

"It was the blades and learned witlings of the coffee-house who ridiculed the doctrine of satanic possession," whilst "Cotton Mather, his father, and all the religious men of that day went to their graves in full belief of its reality."[4] And, at the same time, it should not be forgotten that the reason is to be found in the infidelity and the careless disregard of religion and good order in the one class, and a conscientious determination to crush out impiety and every evil work in the other.

Are Cotton Mather and the Clergy and Authorities of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay Sinners above all other Men in Matters pertaining to Witchcraft?

I have no inclination to apologize, contrary to justice, for the actors in "the saddest tragedy of early New England

[1] North American Review, April, 1869, p. 396 sq.

[2] Salem Witchcraft, Vol. ii. p. 457.

[3] Salem Witchcraft, Vol. i. p. 400.

[4] See Calef, p. 10, and North American Review, April 1869, p. 397.

history"; but it seems to me that our fathers have received, and are constantly receiving, more opprobrium than justly belongs to them, as compared with the rest of the world. The majority of the community, I imagine, feel that the early settlers of Massachusetts Bay, with Cotton Mather at their head, leading them on, are not only sinners above other men, but almost the only men that had the hardness to take the life of their fellows for supposed complicity with evil spirits. It would scarcely be believed, by those who have not examined the matter, that no form of religion and no nation or age prior to the Salem witchcraft "can claim immunity from this superstition." Little is known of the two hundred thousand persons executed, and mostly burned, in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Who speaks of the thirty thousand who in England were the victims of this superstition? or of one thousand who were executed in Germany, annually, during the century from 1580 to 1680?[1] Whilst all the details of the execution of the twenty victims at Salem are known and read of all men. Who ever notices the fact that, as Howell says, "in the compass of two years, near upon three hundred witches were arraigned, and the major part of them executed, in Essex and Suffolk Counties in England; and that more witches have been put to death in a single county in England, in a short space of time, than have ever suffered in New England altogether, from first to last"? "Scotland swarms with them now [in 1647] more than ever, and persons of good quality are executed daily."[2] "In Scotland," too, "seven men were executed for witches, in 1697, upon the testimony of one girl about eleven years old."[3]

In judging of the actors in the trials of witches in Salem village, and elsewhere in New England, do we not too often forget that at that time, in all countries, witchcraft was not only treated as a reality as much as any of the processes of

[1] See S. G. Drake's Introduction to the Witchcraft Delusion, p. xxvii.

[2] Familiar Letters of James Howell, Historiographer Royal (p. 427), quoted by Poole in North American Review, Vol. cviii. p. 343.

[3] Hutchinson, Vol. ii chap. 1.

nature, but by the laws of all nations, Catholic and Protestant, it was regarded as a capital crime more heinous than any other? To let it pass unpunished was to have complicity with the devil, and to be guilty of treason to laws civil and divine.[1]

But my present object is not to discuss witchcraft in general, or New England witchcraft, at length. Still, some idea of the state of feeling of the time seemed necessary to an intelligent view of any particular actor in it. It is one thing to live in a community and an age where a belief in witchcraft was an essential requisite of Christian character, and the disbeliever in it ranked as a disbeliever in the Bible and its doctrines of angelic existences and a future life, and quite a different matter to live when the idea of satanical possessions is the acme of all superstition, and as inconsistent with mental sanity as religion.

Moreover, if our fathers in general have received a greater than the just measure of reprobation, in comparison with others who have had to do with the punishment of witches, is it not even more apparent that Cotton Mather has received more than his share of censure, as compared with his compeers not only in old, but also in New, England? "This delusion received the sanction of all the learned and distinguished English judges who flourished within the century (the seventeenth), from Sir Edmund Coke to Sir Matthew Hale."[2] Do we hear their names in the mouth of every school-boy, as the designation of the embodiment of superstitious credulity? Has not the latter, especially, though

[1] Hutchinson says that there was no Colonial law in force at Salem against witchcraft at the time of the first execution at Salem, and that the whole action of the court was based upon that passed under James I., 1603, by which all who were convicted were to be consigned to the pains and penalties of death as felons. There was a law passed in the colony as early as 1641: "If any man or woman be a witch, that is hath, or consulted with, a familiar spirit, they shall be put to death," and this law the General Court which was in session at the time of the first execution made "a law of the province." — See Upham, ii. pp. 256, 258, and S. G. Drake's Introduction to the Witchcraft Delusion, p. 21 sq.

[2] Upham, Salem Witchcraft, Vol. i. p. 400.

acknowledged as the leading authority in the trial of witches,[1] been ever revered, even in New England, "for his knowledge of law, and gravity and piety"?

Richard Baxter published his book on the "Certainty of the World of Spirits"; kept up a constant correspondence with the Mathers, urging them to faithfulness in their efforts to suppress witchcraft; published in England, with a Preface, often quoted from and encouraged the sale of, Cotton Mather's "Memorable Providences"; and pronounced those who did not receive it, with "its full and convincing evidence," as "obdurate Sadducees who will not believe."[2] And yet no one, for all this, is filled with hatred and scorn for the author of the "Saint's Rest," as unchristian or foolishly credulous. Such writers as Dr. Henry More, of Christ's College, Cambridge, Dr. Calamy, and others, wrote volumes to prove the reality, and instruct in the detection, of satanic possession; and yet their names are scarcely tarnished by these things that would, if his enemies could accomplish their ends, utterly blacken that of Cotton Mather.

It would seem, too, that New England and Cotton Mather owe their prominence in the dealing with witches over Pennsylvania and the good Quaker, William Penn, rather to a special providence in favor of, or a want of legal acumen in, the latter, than to any immunity from superstition. For Upham says: "William Penn presided, in his judicial character, at the trial of two Swedish women for witchcraft; the grand jury, acting under instruction from him, having found bills against them, they were saved not in consequence of any peculiar reluctance to proceed against them arising out of the nature of the alleged crime, but only from some technical defect in the indictment." Otherwise, as the annalist of Philadelphia suggests, "scenes similar to those subsequently occurring in Salem village might have darkened the history

[1] He published his Trial of Witches in Suffolk, in 1664. See Hutchinson's History.

[2] See his Letter to Increase Mather, quoted in Drake's Witchcraft Delusion. Introduction, p. 30, and Magnalia, Vol. ii. p. 403. See also Hutchinson's History of Massachusetts Bay, Vol. ii. p. 20, and Upham, Vol. i. p. 401.

of the Quakers, Swedes, Germans, and Dutch who dwelt in the City of Brotherly Love and the adjacent colonies."[1]

What was Witchcraft?

Some idea of what is meant by the term "witchcraft," and the relation of the witch to Satan and to men, as held by the actors in it, and by people generally in the seventeenth century, should be taken into the account in judging of the culpability of those who took severe measures against it.[2] A witch was a person who had made a formal compact with Satan to do his behests, to oppose all good, to aid him in his opposition to God, to Christ, to the church; whilst, on the other hand, the devil was to use his supernatural power in behalf of his disciple, and to communicate the same to him as he should show himself worthy.

The power of the two united was almost unlimited. The human element brought the satanic into connection with the life of men, and there was scarcely anything of evil or suffering that might not in this way be wrought out for mortal endurance. Knowledge, too, of the past, of the future, of the spiritual world, the ability (such as modern spiritualists claim) to bring back departed spirits, who could give an account of their experiences in another life, and seduce from the paths of virtue and allure to vice whomever they might wish, were a part of the power of this combined human and satanic agency.[3]

[1] See Upham, Vol. i. p. 414.

[2] See various definitions of it in Drake's Witchcraft Delusion. Introduction, p. 11 sq.

[3] A passage in Mr. Brattle's Letter referred to below well characterizes the spirit of the time to rely upon the utterances of those supposed to be under the influence of unseen spiritual agents, and the desire of the Mathers to counteract this hurtful and dangerous tendency: He says, "A person from Boston, of no small note, carried up his child to Salem, near twenty miles, on purpose that he might consult the afflicted about his child; which accordingly he did, and the afflicted told him that his child was afflicted by Mrs. Cary and Mrs. Obinson. The man returned to Boston and went forthwith to the justices for a warrant to seize," etc. But he adds: "The Rev. I. M. (Increase Mather), of Boston, took occasion severely to reprove the said man; asking whether there was not a God in Boston, that he should go to the devil in Salem for advice; warning him very seriously against such naughty practices," etc.

This was not, it should be remembered, a mere hallucination of the ignorant, credulous, uneasy, speculating few, but sanctioned by learning, philosophy, and theology, embalmed by centuries of almost unbroken adherence, and firmly established in the conscientious belief of the most devout and wary. Who can wonder that a mortal terror of such an influence — creeping in no one knew whence or how until its results became apparent — stirred up our fathers to eradicate it, root and branch, from the colony which had been especially devoted to Christ and his church? Their culpability, it must be acknowledged, was not in waging a war of extermination against such an enemy as they supposed [1] was among them, but in not rising above the intelligence of the then existing world, and employing other than carnal weapons in this warfare.

Some Early Cases of Witchcraft in New England.

The cases of witchcraft that occurred before Cotton Mather was born, or when he was in his cradle, are, of course, to be left out of the account; although he would almost seem to be held responsible, by many writers on the subject, for all that was done in the preceding generations. It is noticeable, however, that, fifteen years before his birth, the first execution in New England of which the particulars are on record was that of Margaret Jones of Charlestown, under Governor Winthrop, "the staid and judicious founder of the Massachusetts Colony," who not only presided at the trial, and signed the death-warrant, but wrote out, in his journal of June 4, 1648, the particulars of the evidence relied upon and deemed satisfactory.

Soon after this, there were several trials and two executions in the Connecticut Colony. In 1656 Mrs. Ann Hibbins, the wife of a Boston merchant, was hanged. According to Hutchinson, three witches were condemned in Hartford,

[1] The feeling of the community upon the subject is well exemplified in such publications of the time as that of Rev. Mr. Turell of Medford, on the Detection of Witchcraft, printed in Mass. Hist. Coll. (2d Series), Vol. x. p. 6 sq.

on the 20th of January 1662(3), twenty-three days before Cotton Mather's birth. Several other executions followed in Connecticut; and, in imitation of the English trials, the water test, by which the death of one hundred persons was accomplished in three counties in England, was tried there. It is almost to be wondered at that some one, in his desire to stigmatize Cotton Mather's credulity, has not hinted that the air had become tainted, and the moral sense of the community perverted, by his approach to the earth at this time, so as to influence the decisions in these cases.

It is unnecessary to enumerate other instances of trial and execution that occurred during Cotton Mather's early years. It is enough to say "that the colonies were in a constant ferment from supposed diabolical agency, for more than forty years before 1692. In every community there were suspicions and accusations which never came to a public examination";[1] the same was true to a still greater extent in England.

The first case of witchcraft that Cotton Mather can be accused of having been concerned in, or in any way aiding and abetting, was that of the Goodwin children (four in number), in 1688. The family seem to have been reputable people, who had recently come from Charlestown to reside at the North End of Boston. The father, Hutchinson says, "was a grave man and a good liver"; and "the children were all remarkable for ingenuity of temper, had been religiously educated, and were thought to be without guile."[2] The first unusual developments were with the eldest daughter, thirteen or fourteen years old, who, after the abusive language of an Irish woman of bad character, whose daughter (a laundress) she had accused of purloining some of the family linen, fell into fits supposed to be diabolical in their origin. Three other children, a sister and two brothers, were soon after similarly affected. All of them it is said,

[1] See Poole in North American Review, April 1869, p. 346; see also accounts of other cases in Magnalia, Vol. ii. p. 389 sq.; and also in Drake and Upham.

[2] Governor Hutchinson, History of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, Vol. ii. pp. 19, 20.

were sometimes "tormented in the same part of their bodies at the same time, although kept in separate apartments, and ignorant of each other's complaint. Sometimes they would be deaf, then dumb, then blind, and sometimes all these disorders together would come upon them. Their tongues would be driven down their throats, then pulled out upon their chins; their jaws, necks, shoulders, elbows, and all their joints would appear to be dislocated; and they would make most piteous outcries of burnings, of being cut with knives, beaten, etc.; and marks of wounds were afterwards to be seen."[1]

The father, after he found that the aid of friends and physicians was of no avail, concluded that this kind were not to be cast out but by prayer, and made application to the "four ministers, Mr. Moody, Mr. Willard, and Mr. C. Mather of Boston, and to Mr. Norton of Charlestown, members of whose church the parents were; considering ... that as his afflictions were more than ordinary, they called for more than ordinary prayer; ... and earnestly desiring them that they, with some other praying people of God, would meet at his house, and there be earnest with God on the behalf of himself and his children."

It should be noticed here that this was the first connection of Cotton Mather with this case, and that it was at the invitation of the father, and in common with that to other ministers in Boston. But we will quote the father's testimony, under his own signature, that neither Cotton Mather nor others of the clergy had anything to do with this matter, except to offer their prayers as asked by him, until *after* the condemnation of the supposed witch.

"Let the world be informed," he says, "that when one of my children had been laboring under sad circumstances from the invisible world for about a quarter of a year, I desired the ministers of Boston, with Charlestown, to keep a day of prayer at my house, if so be deliverance might be obtained. Mr. Cotton Mather was the last [perhaps on

[1] Hutchinson, Vol. ii. p. 19, and Mather's Magnalia, Vol. ii. p. 399.

account of his youth and inexperience, as he was then only twenty-six years old, and had been settled only four years] of the ministers that I spoke to on that occasion; and though, by reason of some necessary business, he could not attend, yet he came to my house in the morning of that day, and tarried about half an hour, and went to prayer with us before any other minister came. Never before had I the least acquaintance with him. About two or three months after this, I desired that another day of prayer might be kept by the aforesaid ministers, which accordingly they did; and Mr. Cotton Mather was then present; but *he never gave me the least advice, neither face to face nor by way of epistles, neither directly or indirectly.* But the motion of going to the authority was made to me by a minister of the neighboring town [probably, Mr. Poole thinks, Mr. Bailey, of Watertown], now departed; and matters were managed by me, in prosecution of the supposed criminal, wholly without the advice of any minister or lawyer or any other person. The ministers, and among them Cotton Mather, would now and then come to visit my distressed family, and pray with and for them. Yet all the time he never advised me to anything concerning the law or trial of the accused persons; but after that wicked woman had been condemned about a fortnight Mr. Cotton Mather invited one of my children to his house; and within a day or two after that the woman was executed." [1]

Cotton Mather, "according to his custom with all prisoners, visited the Glover woman (the supposed witch) twice after her condemnation, as a spiritual adviser," and, as it has been said, "her soul went to its last judgment on the wings of his prayer." She, in her conversation with him, revealed the names of four other persons who had been present with her in her meeting with her prince, whom she intimated was the devil. But Cotton Mather refused to give the names of

[1] See a Book published in Boston, 1701, by parishioners of the South Church, in defence of their pastors, entitled: "Some Few Remarks upon a Scandalous Book by one Robert Calef," with the motto, "Truth will come off Conqueror." See also Mather's Memorable Providences, Magnalia, Vol. ii. p. 467.

these individuals, because, as he characteristically says, "we should be very tender in such relation, lest we wrong the reputation of the innocent by stories not enough inquired into." After beseeching her "to break her covenant with hell," and "to pray for herself, which she denied that she could do," he prayed with her against her will, which, he adds, "if it were a fault, it was in excess of pity."

I cannot doubt that it was in pity, too, and with a hope of benefiting the eldest daughter, that he took her into his house, and kept her during the autumn and winter, and endured all sorts of annoyances from her vexatious pranks mixed with affected piety, without a reproach or complaint. He doubtless, as has been said, believed that prayer was the proper antidote against the influence of the evil one; and he, having, as he believed, received manifest answers to prayer for specific objects, hoped that he might avail in this case. How easily, if he had been (as he is often accused of being) desirous to perpetuate this delusion, he might have brought not only the cases of these children, but also of those criminated persons whose names he refused to divulge, before the courts, instead of persevering in his acts of charity and mercy, until, as he supposed, he had exorcised the demons by his importunate supplications.

We have from him this simple record of the final result of his efforts for this family: "One particular minister [himself, doubtless], taking a particular compassion on the family, set himself to serve them in the methods prescribed by our Lord Jesus Christ. Accordingly, the Lord being *besought thrice*, in *three* days of prayer, with fasting on this occasion, the family then saw their deliverance perfected."[1]

It may not be amiss to quote here what Hutchinson says of the subsequent developments of this family: The children returned to their ordinary behavior, lived to an adult age, made profession of religion, and the affliction they had been under they publicly declared to be one motive to it. One of them I knew many years after. She had the char-

[1] Magnalia, Vol. ii. p. 403.

acter of a very sober, virtuous woman."[1] The parents brought letters to Mr. Mather's church, of which the children subsequently became members.

Thus far, it should seem that Cotton Mather's influence was entirely *opposed to*, rather than in favor of, any judicial proceedings in cases of witchcraft, or any other than the kindest treatment of those afflicted by the supposed satanic influence. Furthermore, his endeavor was manifestly not to extend, but to suppress this delusion, as appears especially in his refusal to divulge the names of those who had been implicated by the confession of the woman condemned for bewitching the Goodwin children.

Cotton Mather's "Memorable Providences."

After these Goodwin children had been recalled to a proper course of life, and rescued, as it was supposed, from the power of the devil by prayer, it is not strange that Cotton Mather, whose pen was ever ready for use in every cause that he considered as good, felt compelled to give to the world an account of this whole matter, which he deemed so manifest an exhibition of God's willingness to aid Christians in their opposition to all evil. It is not to be denied, of course, that he maintained to its fullest extent, in his "Memorable Providences," the reality of witchcraft;[2] which, too, all of his colleagues in the ministry, and indeed all Christians in New England, were in their own minds fully assured of.[3]

[1] Hutchinson's History, Vol. ii. p. 26.

[2] He says, after challenging all men to detect any false representations in it "from the egg to the apple": "I am resolved after this never to use but just one grain of patience with any man that shall go to impose upon me a denial of devils or of witches. I shall count that man ignorant who shall suspect [i.e. I suppose, those not guilty of complicity with the devil]; but I shall count him downright impudent if he asserts the non-existence of things which we have had such palpable convictions of." — p. 40 of the 1st ed., published in 1689, and reprinted in London, 1691.

[3] The American edition was accompanied by a commendatory Preface by three other Boston ministers, as the English edition by one even laudatory by Richard Baxter.

In his Prefatory Remarks he gives the key-note to the whole narrative: "Prayer is the powerful and effectual remedy against the malicious practices of devils and those who covenant with them." And in the conclusion he echoes the same sentiment: "Prayer and faith was the thing that drove the devils from the children." And he adds: "I am to bear this testimony unto the world — that the Lord is nigh to all them that call upon him in truth, and that blessed are all they that wait for him."[1]

Furthermore, it has been truly said that "a spirit of kindness and charity towards persons afflicted and accused pervades the volume from beginning to end." Thus it well corresponds to his whole action in the case. We should not forget, too, that this publication was made after English books of a similar nature had become numerous, and sanctioned by such men as the sage Sir Matthew Hale, and, indeed, it has been said, "constituted the light reading of the day." "It cannot be gainsaid, then, that there is nothing in his whole conduct in this case — *literally nothing* — which is unbecoming to his character for thoughtful, sympathetic, and gracious piety."[2]

Initiatory Development of Witchcraft in the Family and Parish of Mr. Parris in Salem Village.

There is not extant, it is believed, any evidence that the initiatory development of the Salem witchcraft, connected with the family of Rev. Mr. Parris in Salem Village, was in any way aided or abetted by Cotton Mather. That he was there in person, or had any personal intercourse or acquaintance with any of those concerned in it, is not pretended. But he is accused of fostering the delusion there by publishing his account of the Goodwin children in his "Memorable Providences." We have seen above the nature and spirit of that book, and if it was abused, the most that can be said is,

[1] See Memorable Providences, p. 49, and Poole, North American Review, April 1869, p. 359.

[2] Boston Daily Advertiser, April 9, 1870. See also Richard Baxter's opinion of this treatise, p. 479, above.

that he erred in judgment where any other serious-minded man of his age, if situated as he was, and with his facility in writing, and if he had equal faith and desire to do good, would have done the same. The book, without doubt, met the approbation of leading minds in this country and in England.[1]

But, as a matter of fact, no persons who gave an account of these proceedings, and are relied upon as authority, mention the name of Cotton Mather in connection with them. Mr. Thomas Brattle, who wrote a letter, at the request of some clergyman not named, October 8, 1692,[2] and was personally acquainted with the prominent actors, gives the names of other persons who incited and abetted, and those who utterly disapproved and denounced the proceedings; but he never, except incidentally, and that in a manner favorable to his innocence, mentions him. Governor Hutchinson, whose faithfulness and accuracy cannot be impeached, and who wrote with all the documents and records before him, many of which are now lost, does not allude to any agency, or connect the

[1] That it was considered desirable and a duty to put on record the more wonderful and unusual dispensations of Divine Providence among men, such as "apparitions, possessions, and enchantments, is indicated variously in the history of the time; as for instance, in the request of the President and Fellows of Harvard College in 1694, to "the ministers throughout the land" to manifest their pious regards unto the work of the Lord and the operation of his hands," by taking care "to observe and record the more illustrious discoveries of Divine Providence in the government of the world." With the Mathers were associated Rev. Messrs. Allen, Willard, and Morton, and Mr. Brattle; two of them, (Willard and Brattle), the men, if not the only men, of any account, who wrote formal criticisms of the Salem trials soon after they took place; Mr. Brattle's Letter, elsewhere referred to, and Mr. Willard's "Some Miscellany Observations," published anonymously. This alone would be a sufficient refutation of the accusation that Cotton Mather rushed into the publication of such matters from an inordinate desire for notoriety.

[2] This Letter, although written at this date, was entirely of a confidential nature, and was not published until several years afterward. He shrinks from the public judgment upon what he writes: "I should be very loath to bring myself into any snare by my freedom with you, and therefore hope that you will put the best construction on what I write, and secure me from such as would interpret my lines otherwise than they are designed." I suppose Mr. Thomas Brattle, F.R.S., Treasurer of Harvard College, to be the author of this Letter, as it is attributed to him in Mass. Hist. Coll. (1st Series, Vol. v.), and not to Mr. William Brattle, merchant of Boston, as is done by Mr. Upham.

name of Cotton Mather in any way with these proceedings in Salem in the beginning of 1692.[1]

But further, the circumstances in which this most disastrous delusion appeared are not only sufficient to account for it; still more than this, they render it more than probable that the "Memorable Providences" had nothing to do with it at its first appearance, and too little influence afterward; as otherwise the results might have been more in accordance with those in the case of the Goodwin children.

It cannot, it should seem, be doubted that the two Indian servants of Rev. Mr. Parris had great, though unintentional, influence[2] in the first developments of the Salem witchcraft. A circle of young girls, eight or ten in number, including the daughter and niece of Mr. Parris, were accustomed, in the winter of 1691(2) to assemble in his house to practise "palmistry and other arts of fortune-telling, and of becoming experts in the wonders of necromancy, magic, and spiritualism."[3] They were probably interested and incited to these things by the stories of the slaves John Indian and Tituba his wife in reference to the wonders performed by the necromancers of their own native tribes "in the Spanish West Indies and the adjacent mainlands of central South America," who also seem to have acted as teachers of these young girls in the performance of their tricks. This is rendered probable, among other things, by the fact, stated by Mr. Upham, that "persons conversant with the Indians of Mexico and on both sides of the isthmus, discern many similarities in their systems of demonology with ideas and practices developed here."[4]

A proper watchfulness of the parents of these girls, and

[1] In this emergency Gov. Hutchinson says: "Several private fasts were kept at the minister's house, and several more public by the whole village, and then a general fast through the colony to seek God to rebuke Satan." "But the notice, and pity, and compassion" bestowed upon the children only "confirmed them" in their irregular courses." — See Hutchinson, Vol. ii. p. 25.

[2] Other influences are enumerated by Mr. Upham, Vol. ii. p. 450, such as the spirit of the times, parish difficulties, characteristics of Mr. Parris.

[3] See Upham, Vol. ii. p. 2 sq., where the particular individuals are spoken of by name.

[4] History of Salem Witchcraft, Vol. ii. p. 2.

especially of Mr. Parris over both servants and children, would have put a stop to these procedings. But they were allowed to go on until their experience and skill in tricks of legerdemain attracted "appreciating notice"; and after that, things went on from bad to worse. Their undisciplined minds began to lose the power or the willingness to distinguish between the imaginary and the real. Their bodies sympathized with the morbid state of their minds. "The trouble with these girls," Mr. Rice says, "arose with the long listening to stories which were bewildering, exciting, terrifying, and fascinating. These stories wrought upon their imagination, and their imagination upon their nerves. In a little time they were scarcely able, we may believe, to distinguish between what they imagined, and what they saw, heard, or felt. They grew to be excited, bewildered, bewitched. They were unnerved, unbalanced, unstrung, and in all things unlike healthy and sensible girls."[1]

The physician was then called in. He gave it as his opinion that they were bewitched. Mr. Parris, too, and the whole community, in accordance with the spirit of the times, readily fell in with the result of his diagnosis. Whether these girls had any of the English works on witchcraft to guide them in all of these matters does not seem certain. One or more of these books was found in Mr. Parris's library; but it is not at all impossible, as has been suggested, that Mr. Parris, after the physician's decision that his children were bewitched, sent to Boston and got Perkins's "Art of Damnable Witchcraft," or some other similar book, to see if their symptoms were delineated therein.

It seems, at least, quite certain that Cotton Mather's "Memorable Providences" had nothing to do with the early developments in Salem Village, since, as has been intimated, no mention is made of it in any of the proceedings of the occasion; and, furthermore, his method of dealing with the bewitched would have, it should seem, crept into some of

[1] Rice's History of the First Parish in Danvers. Appendix, p. 251.
[2] History of the First Parish in Danvers, p. 213.

the conversations of Mr. Parris with those with whom he consulted, or of the children, who would, if his book had been in their hands and in any way an incitement to them, have betrayed a knowledge of it; and thus it would have come into notice in the proceedings of the occasion. "It is, however, an unfortunate circumstance," as has been well said, "that this book was not found [and perused] there; for the little manual would have taught the family and the Salem authorities a safe and judicious practice in treating the subtle enemy. Prayer and fasting were Mr. Mather's method of dealing with evil spirits, not hanging."

The Method of Trial for Witchcraft that Cotton Mather Approved.

In order to fully understand Cotton Mather's subsequent connection with the Salem witchcraft, it is necessary to state here, in brief, the two methods of procedure followed in England in the witchcraft trials, one or the other of which was adopted by those connected with such trials in this country. The one method was based upon the supposition that "the devil can employ only the spectres of such persons as are in league with him," and so it is necessary to accept the testimony of such persons as to the reality of the league; "since no other person was ever cognizant of the making of a contract with men by the devil, or saw the signing of his book; and hence the testimony of a witch is all the direct evidence that can be had, and must be accepted, or witches go unpunished."

On the other hand, Gaul, Perkins, and Bernard, and others contended that a trial for witchcraft should be conducted by the same rules of law as a trial for murder or arson; only that even greater circumspection should be used, inasmuch as there is greater danger of mistake in matters so uncertain, and where the devil is some way mixed up, who is a liar from the beginning, and will cheat, if he can, into a condemnation of those who are innocent. The testimony of a witch must, of course, be excluded, and the evi-

dence must be strictly *human*, i.e. what a person in the ordinary use of his faculties, and in their ordinary operation, has seen or known, without any supernatural or preternatural assistance, either from God or the devil."[1]

It was the latter form of trial that Cotton Mather always contended for when a civil suit was supposed to be necessary. And if the judges at Salem had listened to him (and, indeed, most of the other ministers coincided with him in opinion), the judicial murders which have cast such a shadow over our Colonial history would in all probability have been avoided.

But, it may be asked, what proof is there that this was the sentiment and teaching of Cotton Mather? His son says: "Mr. Mather, for his part, was always afraid of proceeding to convict and condemn any person as a confederate with afflicting demons upon so feeble an evidence as a spectral representation. Accordingly, he ever testified against it, both publicly and privately; and particularly in his letter to the judges he besought them that they would by no means admit it."[2] He himself says: "The world knows how many pages I have composed and published, and particular gentlemen in the government know how many letters I have written, to prevent the excessive credit of spectral accusations."

Fortunately for the truth of these assertions, which have been called in question, one of the letters referred to has been preserved, written by Cotton Mather, May 31, 1692, to John Richards, his parishioner, and one of the judges at Salem. It should be noticed that this was three days before the trials commenced, and is the very first connection that he had in any form with Salem witchcraft. It is necessary to give a somewhat extended quotation, in order to show his feelings in reference to the matter and the influence he wished to exert over the judges.

"I most humbly beg you," he says, "that in the management of the affair in your most worthy hands you do not lay

[1] North American Review, April 1869, p. 348.

[2] Samuel Mather's Life of Cotton Mather, p. 44.

more stress upon pure spectral testimony than it will bear. When you are satisfied, and have good, plain, legal evidence, that the demons which molest our poor neighbors do indeed represent such and such people to the sufferers, though this be a presumption, yet I suppose you will not reckon it a conviction, that the people so represented are witches, to be immediately exterminated. It is very certain that the devils have represented the shapes of persons not only innocent, but also very virtuous; though I believe that the just God then ordinarily provides a way for the speedy vindication of the persons thus abused.

"Moreover, I do suspect that persons who have too much indulged themselves in malignant, envious, malicious ebullition of their souls may unhappily expose themselves to the judgment of being represented by devils, of whom they never had any vision, and with whom they have much less written any covenant.

"I would say this: If, upon the bare supposal of a poor creature's being represented by a spectre, too great a progress be made by the authority in ruining a poor neighbor so represented, it may be that a door may be thereby opened for the devils to obtain from the courts in the invisible world a license to proceed into most hideous desolations upon the repute and repose of such as have been yet kept from the great transgression. If mankind have thus for once consented unto the credit of diabolical representation, the door is opened! Perhaps there are wise and good men that may be ready to style him that shall advance this caution a witch-advocate.[1] But in winding up, this caution will certainly be wished for."[2]

Cotton Mather's Connection with the Trials for Witchcraft at Salem.

The court for the trial of witches first met at Salem, June

[1] It should be noticed, that Cotton Mather feels that in carrying cautionary measures in the trials so far as he wishes to, he may not carry the sense of the Christian community with him, but incur the odium of witch-advocate from them.

[2] Mass. Hist. Coll. (4th Series), Vol. viii. p. 392, 393.

2d, and, giving little heed, apparently, to the admonitions of Cotton Mather, tried and condemned one Bridget Bishop; and then, in seeming consternation at the number of the accused and the excitement that had arisen, took a recess until June 29th. In the meantime the Governor and Council, in accordance with the custom of the age, made application to the ministers of Boston and vicinity for advice in reference to what should be done in this trying emergency, which was soon after communicated to them.

Cotton Mather's ready pen was employed to draw up this paper. It reiterated, even more emphatically than his previous letter, the necessity of very "critical and exquisite caution," and of "exceeding tenderness toward those that may be complained of," and asked that "as little as possible of such noise, company, and openness as may too hastily expose those that are examined should be admitted." He further urges "that there may be nothing used as a test for the trial of the suspected, the lawfulness whereof may be doubted among the people of God, but that the directions given by such judicious writers as Perkins and Bernard be consulted in such a case."[1]

The whole paper is worthy of repetition here, did not its length exclude it. The only parts of the document generally referred to by writers on this subject are Articles ii. and vii., which, taken by themselves, make a very wrong impression. All of the rest advocates the most extreme delicacy and unstinted caution in these trials. In concluding their advice, how could these ministers, with their belief, and the belief of the community, in the reality of satanic possession, have said less than they did in reference to unflinching perseverance in these examinations of these supposed criminals? If they had advised to give up farther attention to these cases, would they not have outraged the feelings of the whole Christian community, who believed that the devil should be resisted, especially when his subjects had become the perverters of all law, human and divine?

"It was no fault of the clergy, as Hutchinson suggests, that

[1] Hutchinson's History, Vol. ii. pp. 52, 53.

the magistrates paid more regard to the last article than to all that preceded it, and chose to carry on the prosecutions with all possible vigor to the neglect of the 'exquisite caution and excessive tenderness' which had been so earnestly recommended."[1] The wrong, in this case, it seems plain, was not in the advice given by the ministers, but in the failure of the magistrates to act in accordance with the spirit of their advice. If there were disorders in the community they should be dealt with as other misdemeanors, "in accordance with the directions given in the laws of God and the wholesome statutes of the English nation." It has been well said of this advice of the clergy that, "Take it altogether in its relations to the prevailing sentiment, as the expression of men who had no motive in life but the service of their fellow-men and the glory of God, as they understood it, this advice is as honorable a memorial to their fidelity as the wisdom and humanity of that age affords."[2] We are not now "called upon to undertake their championship in terms which will vindicate their superstitions or their severities." But are they not "justly entitled to be set forth in the light of their own age, under the guidance of their own sincere convictions, and with an intelligent, truthful recognition of their master motive"?

At the time of the suspension of the trials, between June 2d and 29th, 1692, Cotton Mather, never content to be inactive when there was the least hope of the accomplishment of good, made another attempt, on his own personal responsibility, to put a stop to the proceedings now imminent, and to allay the excitement of the community. The cases of supposed satanic possession were multiplying, and the jails were fast filling up. What can be done? must have been in the thoughts of every good man; but all were not as fertile in expedients as the younger pastor of the Old North Church.

[1] See Rev. Chandler Robbins's History of Old North Church, p. 117.

[2] Boston Daily Advertiser, April 9, 1870, and see also Dr. Robbins's History of the Old North Church, p. 108 sq.; and Dr. Palfrey's Semi-Centennial Discourse.

I am unable to find a hint that any other one than Cotton Mather, at this stage of the excitement, was ready with hand and heart to make proposals to stay the hand of legal authority. Others, doubtless, were sufficiently burdened with anxiety, but had not the same confidence in the efficacy of prayer and personal influence. His proposition was to scatter those accused where personal influence would be exerted over them. He says: "After that storm was raised at Salem, I did myself offer to provide meat and drink and lodging for no less than six of the afflicted, that so an experiment might be made whether prayer with fasting, upon the removal of the distressed, might not put a period to the trouble then rising, without giving the civil authorities the trouble of prosecuting these things."[1]

Whilst the trials were in progress at Salem, Cotton Mather was never present at them either "as adviser, witness, or spectator." He did make visits to Salem at the time of the trials, which has been set down to his disadvantage, but is now plainly shown to be in favor of his kindness and compassion for the accused. Thomas Brattle, unquestioned authority, after speaking of the protestations of innocence of those condemned, says: "With great affection they entreated Mr. Cotton Mather to pray with them; they prayed that God would discover what witchcrafts were among us; they forgave their accusers"; they "seemed to be very sincere, upright, and sensible of their circumstances on all accounts, especially Proctor and Willard."[2] This Cotton Mather, the

[1] See Calef's "More Wonders," p. 11; Life by S. Mather; and Magnalia, i. p. 210, where Mr. Mather alludes to the offer without indicating that it was made by himself. Dr. Robbins says of this offer, that "it was refused, as we might suppose; for all men had not the same faith as our pastor in these remedies. But that he was earnest in his offer is evident, not only from the general tone of his opinions and practice, but also from the fact that he himself, during the witchcraft trials, spent a day almost every week in secret fasting and prayer in reference to it." — Old North Church, p. 107.

[2] See Mr. Brattle's Letter in Mass. Hist. Coll. (1st Series), Vol. v. p. 61 sq. This Letter, previously referred to (see p. 488), is exceedingly valuable in reference to the influence of the clergy generally and the Mathers in particular. He quotes Increase Mather by name as opposed to the proceedings, and in all prob-

only person mentioned as counsellor, was, without doubt, the one who has been accused of being especially instrumental of bringing them into a condition so much needing comfort. If it had been so, would his services in these last hours have been tolerated, much more asked for with great affection?

How comes it about, it may be asked, that Cotton Mather of Boston became the chaplain of prisoners in Salem? Very naturally. Proctor, in particular, had asked Rev. Mr. Noyes of Salem to pray with him, but had been refused, unless he would confess that he was guilty. Now, it appears from Felt's History of Salem, that Proctor and Willard had been previously in jail in Boston where they had doubtless known Mr. Mather and valued his services, since, as we have before intimated, "he was an habitual visitor of prisons." So we have not only one reason for Mr. Mather's visits to Salem, but that horse and rider which have cast such a shadow over Cotton Mather's character and our history in connection with the executions at Salem are naturally accounted for.[1] The rider was present, as was the custom then and now, to perform the last sad act of kindness to those whose counsellor he had been in prison; and the unoffending horse had brought him there, as modern conveniences for travelling were then unknown.

That Mr. Mather's course throughout these trials was most kindly to the sufferers, and most anxiously conscientious that no innocent person of a good character should suffer in person or name, is plain from various other passages in his writings besides those above alluded to. That his spirit was constantly burdened by the condition of things at this time is equally plain. "Oh condition truly miserable!" he ex-

ability Cotton Mather, without mentioning his name. At any rate the father and son both *claim* to be of one opinion in reference to these matters (see p. 499). Brattle, too, equally with the Mathers, believed in the reality of witchcraft and in the sincerity of the judges, although he believed that they greatly erred in judgment, and very severely condemned the Salem justices.

[1] See School Books. Quackenbos, for instance, says that at a certain execution "Cotton Mather appeared among the crowd on horseback," etc. See also, Calef's More Wonders, p. 104.

claims, "it is wonderfully necessary that some healing attempts should be made at this time. I should think dying a trifle to be undergone for so great a blessedness."[1]

Cotton Mather's "Wonders of the Invisible World," and Increase Mather's "Cases of Conscience."

In reference to Cotton Mather's "Wonders of the Invisible World," with a "Discourse concerning Temptations," published near the end of 1692, it is necessary to say but little. It was undertaken "by express command of the Governor as a record of the Salem trials." "The reports of the trials,"[2] he says, "are an abridgment collected out of the court papers on this occasion, put into my hands. . . . . I have singled out four or five which may serve to illustrate the way of dealing wherein witchcraft use to be concerned." "I report matters," he affirms, "*not as an advocate*, but as an historian." In the excited state of feeling he feels compelled to pour oil upon the perturbed waters, and thus he recognizes the anxious solicitude of the judges, and expresses his belief that "if there have been mistakes, they have, at worst, been but the faults of well-meaning ignorance." Farther than this, he does not feel compelled to sit in judgment upon the action of the legally constituted authorities, albeit they had failed to act in accordance with his plainly expressed advice in his letter to them quoted above.

The existence of devils and their malign influence over men, the necessity of resisting most strenuously and persistently all of their advances in every form, he most pointedly and repeatedly affirms and descants upon with language that could only be the outpouring of strong conviction. One of his first propositions is, "That there is a devil is a thing doubted by none but such as are under the influence of the

[1] Samuel Mather's Life of Cotton Mather.

[2] A passage in a letter to the Clerk of the Court at Salem, Mr. Stephen Sewall, an intimate acquaintance, to whom he wrote for the evidence given in at the trials, has been perverted to his discredit. But, if it needed any apology or comment, Dr. Pond in his account of "The Mather Family" has sufficiently explained it. See, The Mather Family, pp. 134, 135.

devil." But he reiterates his belief in Perkins's method of dealing with supposed witches; and thus, by implication at least, dissents from the principles upon which the judges had to a great extent acted. His heart's desire was that previous excitements and strife should be now ended; and he expresses the hope that "we are to unite in such methods for this deliverance as may be unquestionably safe, lest the latter end be worse than the beginning." [1]

Cotton Mather has often been censured as being more in fault in his course at this time than most of the other ministers of Boston and vicinity, and especially more so than his father, Increase Mather. But that matter has been set at rest, if what has already been said in this Article is not sufficient to refute it. Increase Mather, at the request of the ministers in and about Boston, gave a more extended statement of their views than could be comprised in their "Letter of Advice," drawn up by his son. The volume entitled "Cases of Conscience concerning Evil Spirits personating Men" was published early in 1693, and endorsed by fourteen ministers of Boston and vicinity. In a postcript to this book, Increase Mather says explicitly: "Some, I hear, have taken up the notion that the book published by my son [Wonders of the Invisible World] is contradictory to this of mine. 'Tis strange that such imaginations should enter into the minds of men. *I perused and approved of that book before it was printed;* and nothing but my relation to him hindered me from recommending it to the world." "Myself and son," he says also, "agreed unto the

[1] It is not without significance that the spirit of Mr. Brattle is the same with that of Cotton Mather, although in his confidential letter to his clerical friend he speaks more decidedly in reference to the mistakes that had been made at Salem. He says: "Far be it from me to have anything to do with those men your letter mentions, whom you acknowledge to be men of a factious spirit, and never more in their element than when they are declaiming against men in public place, and contriving methods that tend to the disturbance of the common peace. I never counted it a credit to my cause to have the good liking of such men. 'My son,' says Solomon, 'Fear thou the Lord and the king, and meddle not with them that are given to change,' Prov. xxiv. 21. However, sir, I never thought judges infallible." — Hist. Coll., Vol. v. p. 61.

humble advice which twelve ministers concurringly presented before his Excellency and Council respecting the present difficulties, which let the world judge whether there be anything in it dissenting from what is attested by either of us."

Cotton Mather, too, expresses his entire acceptance of his father's view as expressed in his "Cases of Conscience." He says: "But what gave the most illumination to the country, and a turn to the tide, was the special service which he did in composing and publishing this book."[1]

His Age and Position at the Time of the Witchcraft Excitement in Boston and Salem.

Cotton Mather's age and position, too, have not been sufficiently taken into the account in judging of his responsibility in connection with witchcraft. He was simply a young clergyman, only twenty-five years old at the time of the exhibitions of the Goodwin children, and scarcely thirty when the Salem trials took place; and had not, of course, yet the established character in religious and political matters that he afterwards attained unto. He did not receive his degree of D.D. at Glasgow until 1710, seventeen or eighteen years after the excitement at Salem village. When spoken of and thought of in connection with witchcraft, he seems to be clothed with all the maturity and reputation which was his in riper years.[2] Although so young and inexperienced, he was put forward, doubtless, by his elder brethren, not only as a facile writer and a ready worker in every good cause, but also as conservative in the treatment of spiritual maladies; although no one could be found, perhaps, who was a firmer believer in the reality of satanic influence over the minds and bodies of men. Would not that have probably proved true which has

[1] Increase Mather's Book was mainly devoted to the detecting and punishing of witches; but he implies and strongly affirms his unswerving belief in the existence of witchcraft. "The Scriptures," he says, "assert it, and experience confirms it. They are the common enemies of mankind, and set upon mischief."

[2] Even Mr. Peabody speaks of the young man of twenty-nine as the "venerable doctor." See Sparks's American Biography, Vol. vi. p. 225.

been said of him, that "if he had *then* passed from the scene he would have been forgotten; or if he were remembered, it would have been as one who played a singular, but quite subordinate part"?[1]

His youth and want of prominence in the community is not improbably a reason for Mr. Brattle's not mentioning Cotton Mather, in particular, as opposed to many of the proceedings at Salem. He only mentions by name two of the "Rev. elders,[2] Rev. Increase Mather, and Rev. Mr. Samuel Willard," among "several about the bay, men for understanding, judgment, and piety inferior to few if any in New England," who "do utterly condemn the said proceedings in the courts at Salem."

Why did not Cotton Mather disapprove of all Civil Suits against Witches?

The question probably arises in many minds, Why did he not more decidedly discountenance all civil tribunals for the trial of witches? In reply it may be asked, Why did not his father and all the clergy associated with him? Why did not Sir Matthew Hale, William Penn, Richard Baxter, and a host of others — indeed, almost every good man in England and America *at that time?*[3] It was hazardous to reputation as a Christian or patriot, if not to life, for one to do so. "The Catholics were ready to burn him as a heretic, and the Protestants had a vehement longing to hang him for an atheist."[4]

[1] Boston Daily Advertiser, April 9, 1870.

[2] He mentions in other stations only: "Hon. Simon Bradstreet, Esq. (our late governor); the Hon. Thomas Danforth, Esq. (our late deputy governor), and Maj. N. Saltonstall, one of the judges."

[3] Mr. Drake says: "The solitary individual who dared to stem so popular a torrent. .... had nothing to expect on all hands but obloquy, derision, and contempt."

[4] Mr. Brattle nowhere protests against civil tribunals taking cognizance of the conduct of those supposed to be possessed of devils, but only of the manner of apprehending and trying upon "spectral evidence," especially that of "afflicted children," and "the confessors," i.e. these who acknowledge "that they have signed to the devil's book, were baptized by the devil," etc. (See Hist. Coll., First Series, Vol. v. p. 66). Mr. Drake says: "Those who questioned

Besides, the matter had been already, without his privity or consent, brought before the courts. The community was in a state of intense excitement, which not even the wisest and most wary had escaped. No one doubted that a most terrible infliction from the devil had fallen upon the community. The most vigorous measures must be resorted to in opposition to this diabolical spectre, which was insinuating itself into a secret alliance with so many, especially of the elderly women and the children, as the accused and the accusers. That it was really a satanic influence no one doubted. How little adequate any mild remedy would be, in the view of the community, to check this terrible disease, the silence with which Cotton Mather's proposition to relieve the courts by scattering the afflicted in private families, was received, is a sufficient proof. Not at all improbably the very persons who afterward wrote most severely against the doings of the courts, and have been so much commended for it, would have most violently condemned, at this time, any one who would have resisted judicial action, as himself in complicity with or in favor of the devil.

I do not suppose, however, that Cotton Mather was so much deterred by the danger to his person or fear of injury to his reputation as a man, as from shrinking from setting himself in opposition to civil authority, both at home and abroad, and an unwillingness to be, or seem to be, found as an opposer of good order, morality, and religion. His conviction of the power of the devil as the agent of all misdoing was so strong, and his hatred of him so real and ingrained, that he shrank even from an appearance of complicity with him. Had he been less conscientious and less faithful in defending what he supposed to be right, he would have avoided much of the censure that has been so persistently and abundantly heaped upon him.

He himself gives a clew to the ground of the insinuations against him, some time after the trials had ended at Salem.

the legality of their proceeding (punishers of witches), were at least infidels in the most obnoxious sense, and they were generally treated as such, and were to be shunned by society." — Witchcraft Delusion, Introduction.

After stoutly maintaining his advocacy of "great caution and charity" in dealing with those accused, which his own writings yet extant fully authorize him to do, he says: "How came it to pass that so many people took up a different notion of me? Surely, Satan knows. Perhaps it was because I thought it my duty always to speak of the honorable judges with as much honor as I could — a crime which I am generally taxed for, and for which I have been requited. This made people who judge at a distance to dream that I approved all that was done. Perhaps, also, my disposition to avoid extremes ..... had caused me to be generally obnoxious to the violent of all parties. Or perhaps my great adversary always had people full of Robert Calef's malignity to serve him with calumnies and reproaches."

The Best Authorities in reference to the Salem Trials do not criminate Cotton Mather.

Governor Hutchinson, as is well known, wrote a "History of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay," several times before referred to, which is acknowledged by all to be in every respect reliable. Upham says, that "he enjoyed an advantage over every other writer before, since, or hereafter, so far as relates to the witchcraft proceedings of 1692." All the "records and documents relating to it, which have since been lost, he had at hand." And "his treatment of that particular topic is more satisfactory than can elsewhere be found."[1] Now, if Cotton Mather's influence was so great as has been pretended in encouraging and abetting the proceedings in the Salem trials, how happens it that Governor Hutchinson never mentions him in connection with them? How could he have left out, in his account of them, the principal motive power?

Mr. Thomas Brattle, too, whose decided opposition to the method of the courts was fully expressed, fails to criminate Cotton Mather in this particular, or even mention his name. Could this have been, if he had exerted a tithe of the

[1] Upham, Vol. i. p. 415.

influence imputed to him in after times? It seems not improbable, however, that Mr. Brattle, without mentioning his name, speaks with high commendation of Cotton Mather in connection with the Salem trials. After referring to the influence of the clergy and some other leading men as opposed to the action of the judges, and naming several, he says that, "excepting Mr. Hale, Mr. Noyes, and Mr. Parris, the reverend elders almost throughout the whole country are very much dissatisfied."[1] Here it is plain that Mr. Brattle does not include Cotton Mather among those who are satisfied with the action of the judges.

But he goes on farther to say: "In particular, I cannot but think very honorably of the endeavors of *a Rev. person in Boston*, whose good affection to his country in general, and spiritual relation to three of the judges in particular, has made him very solicitous and industrious in this matter. And I am fully persuaded that had his notions and proposals been hearkened to and followed when these troubles were in their birth, in an ordinary way, they would never have grown to that height which now they have. He has as yet met with but little but unkindness, abuse, and reproach from many men; but I trust that in after times his wisdom and service will find a more universal acknowledgment; and if not, his reward is of the Lord."[2]

This has been claimed as designating Mr. Samuel Willard, and there is no absolute certainty that it does not. But the internal evidence (and there appears to be no other extant) is against referring it to him. He has just been mentioned by name; it is not natural to refer to him anonymously in the same connection.[3] On the other hand, Mr. C. Mather is not elsewhere alluded to by Mr. Brattle in the *immediate* connection, and not at all except as the spiritual adviser of those condemned.[4] Besides, the language so well describes the character and relation of the young minister of the Old North Church that it seems almost strange that it has ever

[1] Mass. Hist. Coll. (1st Series), Vol. v. pp. 74, 75. [2] Ibid., p. 76, 77.
[3] Ibid., p. 75. [4] Ibid., p. 68.

been claimed for any one else. Three of the judges might be said to be "in spiritual relations" to him — Mr. Richards, who was a member of his church, Mr. Stoughton who was closely united in friendship with him, and Wait Winthrop, "whom," he says, "he reckoned among the best of his friends," and whom at his death he honored with a funeral sermon and an epitaph. And the latter part of the paragraph quoted could scarcely apply more naturally than to him who had offended both parties; the one, because he had spoken and written upon the reality of satanic possession with so much zeal; and the other, because he did not give the trials that support which was expected of him.[1]

Calef's "More Wonders of the Invisible World."[2]

This book, of which so much has been made in these latter days[3] by those who have written against the Mathers, seems to have originated as much, at least, from a personal ill-feeling toward them and others of the clergy, and especially toward Cotton Mather, as from any strong feeling of opposition to the witchcraft proceedings at Salem. Its spirit is sufficiently characterized by such passages as this: "It is rather a wonder that no more blood was shed; for if that advice of his[4] pastors [the Mathers] could have still prevailed with him, witchcraft had not been so shammed off as it was."[5]

It is full, too, of uneducated prejudices[6] and insinuations,

[1] See more extended discussion of this point in North American Review, April 1869, p. 387 sq.

[2] This book was first published in London in 1700, eight years after the executions at Salem. The Preface or Introduction is dated 1697, three years earlier. It was reprinted the same year (1700), at Salem. Much of it, however, had been circulated in manuscript as early as the beginning of 1693, when Mr. Mather's Letter was called forth.

[3] See Upham's Salem Witchcraft, Vol. ii. p. 471, 472.

[4] Governor Phipps.

[5] See More Wonders, p. 153, quoted also by Poole.

[6] Calef was a Boston merchant of apparently little culture, whose name would have, in all probability, been long since forgotten, but for the notoriety occasioned by the opposition to his book in his own time, and the use made of it within the last half-century by those who have written against Cotton Mather. He is nowhere mentioned by Brattle in his Letter on Witchcraft as exerting an influence against it.

and with some show of candor seems to me to be sadly wanting in it. One would suppose that he thought that education was at the basis of the whole trouble. "Witchcraft," he says, "was a relic of heathenism transplanted into Christian soil." "Among the pernicious weeds arising from this root, the doctrine of the power of devils and witchcraft, as it is now and has long been understood, is not the least. The fables of Homer, Virgil, Horace, and Ovid, etc., being, for the elegance of their language, retained then [in primitive times of Christianity] and so are to this day in the schools, have not only introduced but established such doctrines to the poisoning of the Christian church."[1]

It is not, I imagine, always remembered that Calef did not write or show himself as disapproving of the proceedings at Salem until the heat of the excitement had cooled, so that there does not seem to be much occasion for the exercise of the moral courage so vauntingly attributed to him. And the book is certainly, notwithstanding the praise bestowed upon it by Upham, not, when examined critically, characterized by an accurate observation of facts and occurences, or a clear and truthful statement of them. But it cannot be denied, I think, that Mr. Poole[2] is right in saying that "what it contains condemnatory of the Salem proceedings was stated earlier and in a clearer and more forcible manner in the writings of the two Mathers and of Samuel Willard." It is equally true that the letter that Cotton Mather wrote to Calef in refutation of his misrepresentations, and that other of "his composures" which Calef was "so uncivil as to print utterly without and against his consent," constitute the chief historical value of Calef's book. Cotton Mather himself says of it: "The good providence of God has therein overruled his (Calef's) malice; for if that may have impartial readers, he will have his confutation, and I my perpetual vindication."

It is not strange that Cotton Mather's temper was some-

[1] See his Preface and also p. 45.

[2] See North American Review, April 1869, p. 379.

what aroused by what he considered a malicious perversion of his motives, and false statements of what he said and did, assiduously bandied about among all classes of people, to the detriment, as he at first supposed, of his character and that of his father. The ridicule that Calef attempted to heap upon him in the case of Margaret Rule, in giving an account of an interview with her, when both the Mathers and Calef and thirty or forty others were present, called forth from Cotton Mather a denial of the truthfulness of the representation more plain than courteous. "There are," he says, "as many lies as lines in it." And so confident is he of the injustice of the representation made, that he appeals to the "by-standers," who, he feels, will bear witness that he did not use such language as Calef puts into his mouth. After an examination of the manuscript of Calef, which he characterizes as "an indecent travesty," he gives his more deliberate judgment of it. "I do scarcely find any one thing in the whole paper, whether respecting my father or self either fairly or truly represented."[1]

As a specimen of Calef's perverse representations, and as explaining Cotton Mather's prominent object in visiting and questioning this woman, I quote from his letter to Calef: "When the main design in visiting the poor afflicted creature was to prevent the accusations of the neighborhood, can it be fairly represented that our design was to draw out such accusations?" Nothing is plainer than that, from the time of the interview with the Glover woman (the first case that came under his immediate cognizance) onward, it was his special object to prevent the accusations of others by those who were under the influence of evil spirits. But he further explains why he put the

[1] That Cotton Mather had any agency in "getting up the case of Margaret Rule," is so utterly without proof that I will not spend time to discuss it. He only visited her, as did his father, Calef, and many others, to learn the particulars of her case; and as ministers of the parish, the Mathers naturally were prominent in asking questions to bring them out. Cotton Mather, too, as we shall see, wished to guard against the bringing of others into trouble by her accusations. See Drake's Witchcraft Delusion, Introduction.

question which both Calef and others censure: "When we [he includes his father with himself] asked Rule whether she thought she knew who tormented her, the question was but an introduction to the solemn charges which we then largely gave, that she should rather die than tell the names of any whom she might imagine that she knew. Your informers have reported the question, and report nothing of what follows as essential to the giving of that question." [1]

It is not strange that Mr. Mather, annoyed and vexed by Calef's assiduous circulation of his slanders, commenced a prosecution for libel. It is equally characteristic and natural that when he found that no one whose opinion he most valued was influenced by them, he did not pursue the civil suit, trusting to the vindication of his friends in the "Some Few Remarks." In a letter published in this book he expresses his feeling in reference to Calef's accusations and his reason for disregarding his influence. "I have," he says, "had the honor to be aspersed and abused by one Robert Calef. I remember that when this miserable man sent unto an eminent minister in the town [Mr. Samuel Willard] a libellous letter, which he has now published, and when he demanded an answer that reverend person only said: 'Go tell him that the answer to him and his letter is in the twenty-sixth of Proverbs and the fourth.'" [2]

Still it cannot be denied that this book was a great annoyance to the sensitive nature of Cotton Mather. He believed that it was written in opposition to the best interests of religion, and was a hinderance to him in his work. Soon after it was published (in 1700) this entry is found in his diary:

5d. 2m., 1701. "I find the enemies of the churches are set with an implacable enmity against myself. And one vile

[1] See More Wonders, p. 20.

[2] In the Massachusetts Historical Society there is a copy of Calef's Book with a Note in Cotton Mather's own hand-writing. "Job xxxi. 35, 36: My desire is that mine adversary had written a book. Surely I would take it upon my shoulder and bind it as a crown to me. Co: Mather."

tool, namely one R. Calf,[1] is employed by them to go on with more of his filthy scribbles to hurt my precious opportunities of glorifying my Lord Jesus Christ. I had need be much in prayer unto my glorious Lord that he would preserve me, his poor servant, from the malice of this evil generation, and of that vile man in particular."

Did Mr. Mather's Complicity with Witchcraft prey upon his Spirits and undermine his Health?

The accusation that Mr. Mather retired from his overweening exertions[2] in carrying on and perpetuating witchcraft broken in health and spirits seems too absurd and contrary to all the facts in the case to require much notice. After over *thirty years* of incessant literary and parochial labor, subsequent to the Salem trials, producing almost one book a month, pursued amid numerous domestic trials and anxieties,[3] Mr. Mather's health and spirits, three years before his death, gave way for a time. He gives in his diary a variety of causes that contribute to his low spirits and morbid repinings for a want of that success in his life-work which he would have desired; but nowhere gives an intimation that remorse for his conduct in reference to the witchcraft delusion, having lain smouldering these thirty years, has now just broken out and put in an outward show. This feeling, if it had been in him, would certainly have shown itself; since, as has been well said, "He wore no disguise. There is scarcely a character in history that had so little concealment. What he felt, he uttered. What he thought, he said. He had no tact to conceal his faults. If he had

[1] His name seems to have been sometimes written Calfe or Calf, and at others, Calef.

[2] For these accusations see Upham, Vol. ii. p. 503.

[3] Thirteen of his fifteen children had died, his son Increase under the most painful circumstances. His third wife, who, it is most charitable to suppose, was insane, had compelled him to seek a home elsewhere for his remaining daughter, "a child of so many afflictions all her days." His numerous fastings and vigils, too, must have had influence in connection with his labors and trials upon the man of now more than three-score years in bringing about the beginning of the end, which took place three years later.

been more cunning, he would have passed for a much better man." [1]

It is unnecessary to pursue this subject here; and I will do little more than quote some passages from his writings to show with what entire conscientiousness he felt that he had acted, neither needing confession or allowing remorse. "In short," he says, "I do humbly, but freely affirm it, there is not that man living in this world who has been more desirous than the poor man I to shelter my neighbors from the inconveniences of spectral outcries. . . . . The name of no one good person in the world ever came under blemish by means of any afflicted person that fell under my particular cognizance; yea, no man, woman, or child ever came into any trouble for the sake of any that was afflicted, after I had once begun to look after them." On the contrary, he says: "How often have I had this thrown into my dish, that many years ago I had the opportunity to have brought forth such people as have in the late storm of witchcraft been complained of, but that I smothered all." [2]

He even felt that he might have gone so far in that direction, as to be blameworthy. For he adds: "Yea, I am very jealous I have done so much *that way as to sin* in what I have done, such have been my cowardice and fearfulness whereunto my regard unto the dissatisfactions of other people has precipitated me." [3]

The above was written in 1693, the next year after the trials. Eight years later, writing to his parishioners, he says: "About the troubles we had from the invisible world, I have at present nothing to offer you, but that I believe they were too dark and too deep for ordinary comprehension; and it may be that errors on both hands have attended them, which will never be understood until the day when Satan shall be bound after another manner than he is this day. But for my own part, I know not that I have ever advanced any opinion on the matter of witchcraft but what all the ministers

[1] Dr. Robbins's History of the Old North Church, p. 72.
[2] Published in Calef's More Wonders, p. 17.
[3] See Calef, p. 11.

of the Lord that I know of in the world, whether English, or Scotch, or French, or Dutch (and I know many), are of the same opinion with me." [1] Truth seems to bear out even the stronger assertion "that not a single person who held the faith of the Christian church at that day can be named who had any other belief." Even Calef,[2] Brattle, and Pike, whose authority is so often quoted, fully indorsed the popular theory as to the reality of witchcraft. "To deny the existence of it was precisely the same as to deny that the Bible was a revelation." [3]

In his visitations of the "afflicted," he feels that his motives have been pure and unselfish. He says: "Truly, the hard representations wherewith *some ill men have reviled my conduct*, and the countenance which other men have given to these representations, oblige me to give mankind some account of my behavior. No Christian can — I say, none but evil workers can — criminate my visiting such of my poor flock as have at any time fallen under the terrible and sensible molestations of evil angels; let their afflictions have been what they will, I could not have answered it unto my glorious Lord, if I had withheld my just counsels and comforts from them; and if I have also with some exactness observed the methods of the invisible world, when they have thus become observable, I have been but a servant of mankind in doing so; yea, no less a person than the venerable Baxter has more than once or twice, in the most public manner, invited mankind to thank me for that service." [4]

Even Mr. Peabody, who says that if Cotton Mather, after the frenzy was over, had lamented and publicly acknowledged the blind fanaticism under which he had acted, he would have been more generally forgiven, adds "that to the day of

[1] Some Few Remarks, p. 42.

[2] Calef says in his "More Wonders," "That there are witches is not the doubt; the Scriptures else were in vain, which assign their punishment to be death, but what this witchcraft is, or wherein it does consist, seems to be the whole difficulty." p. 17.

[3] See Drake's Witchcraft Delusion, p. 30.

[4] See More Wonders, pp. 10, 11.

his death he seems to have retained his full conviction that all was preternatural"; and asserts "that it is clear that no uneasiness from within, no self-upbraiding for the part he had acted, ever disturbed his repose."[1] How could he have *lamented* and *publicly acknowledged* a fault which he did not feel that he had committed?

Conclusion.

In conclusion of this perhaps too protracted discussion of Cotton Mather's connection with witchcraft, I will merely add, that whilst he was strongly imbued with the superstition of his age in his belief of satanic agency and of the hold that the evil one had upon individuals in the community; whilst a curiosity which may be deemed prurient led him to interest himself enthusiastically in any new phenomenon of mind or matter, and an ability to express on paper his own thoughts and those of his compeers, and a strong desire to exert an influence on the side of what he thought right living,[2] made him conspicuous in this most unfortunate movement,— I cannot find evidence that he was actuated by any other than the kindest feelings, which led him to counsel the most lenient treatment of the accused, and by the most conscientious belief that in all that he did he supposed himself not only an advocate for the best interests of the colony, but faithful in his duty to God in opposition to the devil.[3]

That he not only did nothing intentionally to bring men under the influence of civil tribunals, but that, on the contrary, he used his influence and devised means more than any of his compeers in clerical or civil life to prevent it, and

[1] Sparks's American Biography (1st Series), Vol. vi. p. 43.

[2] These traits of Cotton Mather are specially conspicuous in his so successful advocacy of the introduction of inoculation for small-pox, in opposition to almost the whole medical faculty of the time.

[3] Dr. Robbins well says: "That he was under the influence of any bad motives, any sanguinary feeling; that he did not verily think he was doing God service, and the devil injury; that he would not gladly have prevented the disorderly proceedings of the courts, the application of unlawful tests, and everything unmerciful in the trials, and inhuman in their issue, — the most careful examination has failed to make me believe." — Old North Church, p. 111.

that when they were thus arraigned he advocated the exercise of the most extreme caution, that no other than legal evidence should be brought to bear upon them, seems to us unquestionable. Can we censure the young man under thirty very severely because he did not rise entirely above the superstitions and prejudices of his age, and, in opposition to the clergy of his own and other nations, and the legal tribunals of the civilized world, anticipate the more elevated views which a century or two has disclosed to the more enlightened nations of the earth?

Those who accuse Cotton Mather with so much severity seem to forget that "by taking an individual of a past generation out of his relations with his own times, and putting him upon the background of modern civilization and refinement, and then reproaching him with opinions and practices now shown to be erroneous, but which he shared in common with all his contemporaries, it is very easy to make any character appear ridiculous, and even culpable. But this is not the historical method of dealing with the reputations of men of a former age. We of the present shall need a more charitable interpretation of our own opinions and acts on the part of those who follow us. Did the man act well his part with the light he had? Did he, in a time of intense excitement, when life and reputation were at stake, act with reference to his duty to God and in charity to his fellow-men?"[1]

[1] Mr. Poole in the North American Review, April 1869, p. 349. I have often, as here, quoted from, and referred to, the able Article of Mr. Poole, and gladly acknowledge my obligation to it in the preparation of this Paper. I have so often found the view that my study of the character of Cotton Mather and his relation to the Witchcraft Delusion has given me, so well expressed by him, that I have felt constrained repeatedly to give his expression of it rather than my own.

ARTICLE VI.

ARISTOTLE.

BY D. McGREGOR MEANS, MIDDLEBURY, VT.

No. II. — HIS CRITICISM OF THE PLATONIC IDEAS.

Few subjects in the whole range of philosophy have excited, or indeed deserved, more interest than the Platonic theory of ideas. The charm of this theory is ever fresh; for in the higher walks of philosophy every new generation of men finds itself strange and unaccustomed to what has gone before. The society and religion of the ancients indeed arrest our attention, but we are conscious, however great our sympathy, that we are looking down, that we have reached a higher plane of development, and that "the gray barbarian" is "lower than the Christian child." But in philosophy every one must begin for himself anew from the starting point of the old Greeks, and he will not come into the inheritance of the intervening ages, nor fully understand his own position, unless he shall have penetrated into the spirit of the earlier times. For many centuries all science slumbered; but what was to natural science a new birth, to philosophy was but a re-awakening. "*Die Griechen, die Griechen, und immer die Griechen,*" cried Goethe, intoxicated with their art; and it is still to the Greeks that the philosopher looks back.

The first encounter with Plato's theory as given by himself, especially in the great passage in the Republic, is to the young student a veritable shock. For a moment there is the feeling of having received a revelation. The name of the theory had, perhaps, long been known, but the matchless words of the author add to it a fascination that transforms theory into living truth. The theory itself seems to acquire the creative force of its own ideas, and to impress itself instantly on the whole universe of fleeting phenomena,

bringing out of unintelligible chaos a beautiful order. As Plato himself says: "Any young man when he first tastes of these subtilties is delighted, and fancies that he has found a treasure of wisdom." [1] Nor is the charm confined to youth alone, for genuine Platonists are by no means extinct even in modern days. Even those who reject the theory can never be uninfluenced by it, and it will continually reassert its power over every poetic and aspiring mind. "The light dove, while cleaving in free flight the air whose resistance she feels, might easily imagine that her movements would be even freer in airless space. So Plato left the sensible world as setting too narrow limits to the mind, and ventured beyond on the wings of the ideas into the empty space of the pure understanding." [2] While such imaginative natures exist there will always be such wanderings, and it is, perhaps, well that there should. The office of those who attract and interest is not less important than that of those who analyze speculation and reduce it to system.

It would be a mistake to suppose that the controversy concerning the ideas is of interest to the metaphysician alone. All science is colored by metaphysics; and it is not a difficult task to classify the writers whose disputes occupy the pages of our periodicals according to the metaphysical schools to which they sometimes unconsciously belong. The discovery that the battles in which they are now engaged had been fought out by the Academics and the Peripatetics, the Realists and the Nominalists, might excite an astonishment less agreeable than, though similar to, that of the Frenchman who found out that all his life he had been writing prose. In the special field of philology, and the larger one of biology, the great controversy as to the origin of language, and the greater one as to the origin of species, are really metaphysical, and depend upon the definition of metaphysical terms. *Species*, be it remembered, is the word by which the Greek *form* or *idea* was rendered into Latin. The Platonic theory has a modern representative in Max Müller, and a still more

[1] Phil. 15. extr.

[2] Kant, Kritik Einl. iii.

open one in Professor Owen. The very title of one of the works of Professor Owen is in fact Platonic — The Archetype and Homologies of the Vertebrate Skeleton; and he seems to adopt the hypothesis of ideas as "a sort of models or moulds in which matter is cast, and which regularly produce the same number and diversity of species."[1] It is not necessary, however, to connect the doctrine of special creations with the theory of Plato; for it is quite possible to adapt this theory to all modern discoveries, however fast they may occur. Spencer, in fact, employs the results of Owen as materials for his own hypothesis; acknowledging his indebtedness, but asserting independent conclusions. The question at issue in all these discussions lies back of phenomena, and can never be settled in the laboratory or dissecting-room.

It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that Plato left no exact statement of the theory that bears his name. He himself, in some of his Dialogues, as the Parmenides, brings forward objections that he nowhere else refutes. Although this is probably one of his later works, yet it appears that in his old age he did propound a theory in which the ideas were mingled with the Pythagoric numbers and the Summum Bonum in a somewhat perplexing manner. It is said that Aristotle during Plato's life opposed the theory,[2] which would imply that Plato had, at least, not abandoned it. The lost treatise of Aristotle on The Good, is supposed to have been a criticism of this later aspect of the theory. But whatever may have been Plato's relation to the ideas, the theory had evidently by the time of Aristotle assumed a tolerably definite form as a Platonic doctrine. It has been stated in modern times with almost Platonic eloquence, in a passage which is here given:

"That man's soul is made to contain, not merely a consistent scheme of its own notions, but a direct apprehension of *real and eternal laws*

[1] See Appendix to H. Spencer's Principles of Biology for a discussion of this theory.

[2] Scholium in An. Post. Brandis p, 228 b, 16, in the Berlin edition of Aristotle, which is quoted throughout.

beyond it, is not too absurd to be maintained. That these real and eternal laws are things *intelligible*, and not things sensible, is not very extravagant either. That these laws, impressed upon creation by its Creator and apprehended by man, are something distinct equally from the Creator and from man, and the whole mass of them may be fairly termed the world of things purely intelligible, is surely allowable. Nay, further, that there are qualities in the supreme and ultimate cause of all which are manifested in his creation, and not merely manifested, but in a manner — after being brought out of his super-essential nature into the stage of being below him, but next to him — are then by the causative act of creation deposited in things, differencing them one from the other, so that the things participate of them (μετέχουσι), communicate with them (κοινωνοῦσι); this, likewise, seems to present no incredible account of the relation of the world to its author. That the intelligence of man, excited to reflection by the impressions of these objects thus (though themselves transitory) participant of a divine quality, should rise to higher conceptions of the perfections thus faintly exhibited, — and, inasmuch as these perfections are unquestionably *real* existences and known to be such in the very act of contemplation, that this should be regarded as a direct intellectual apperception of them — a union of the reason with the ideas in that sphere of being which is common to both, — this is certainly no preposterous notion in substance, and by those who deeply study it will, perhaps, be judged no unwarrantable form of phrase. Finally, that the reason in proportion as it learns to contemplate the perfect and eternal, *desires* the enjoyment of such contemplations in a more consummate degree, and cannot be fully satisfied except in the actual fruition of the perfect itself — this seems not to contradict any received principle of psychology, or any known law of human nature. Yet these suppositions, taken together, constitute the famous *Theory of Ideas*," etc.[1]

It must, however, be said that the view here expressed is rather a development of the theory than a statement of it. There was no such pronounced theism in Plato's language; the relation of the human mind to the ideas is correctly given, but Plato is nowhere distinct as to the relation between the ideas and God. Some passages may be found, as in the Timaeus, that suggest this relation, but they are very indistinct. We have here in fact, by implication at least, the celebrated proof of the existence of God that passes under the name of Anselm or Descartes, and it cannot be fathered upon Plato.

[1] W. Archer Butler, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. ii. p. 117 sq

The theory was really a compromise between two tendencies in the earlier philosophy. The Eleatic doctrine was that of an absolute Ens as opposed to Relative Fientia; true existence, and phenomenal existence or becoming. Heraclitus, on the other hand, denied or ignored the eternal and permanent Being, and maintained the celebrated theory of the "Flux," — that all sensible things were in a constant process of change, and nothing positive could be asserted. Plato remarks that all previous philosophers except Parmenides, might be classed with Heraclitus.[1] Aristotle in the first book of the Metaphysics gives a short historical account of these philosophers,[2] confirming, to some extent, the remark of Plato about Parmenides,[3] and showing the relation of Plato to his predecessors. His statements are, on the whole, so clear, although condensed, that a translation of the whole passage is desirable; for the historians of philosophy rather becloud the discussion through over-much explanation. At least, we may say that this passage should be read in connection with the histories of philosophy. It should also be borne in mind, that when Aristotle speaks of Plato we are to understand his school, and not his personal opinions, which are often contradictory. Aristotle goes on in chapter sixth to say:

"After these philosophies there arose the system of Plato; in most respects following these Pythagoreans, but in others having peculiar tenets beyond the philosophy of the Italians. For while young, becoming associated first with Cratylus and the Heraclitean opinions, that all sensible things were always in a flux, and that there was no knowledge respecting them, these views he ever afterward entertained. But when Socrates concerned himself with the discussion of ethical problems, and not at all with nature as a whole, and in these problems was searching for the universal, and was the first to apply his reason to definition, Plato, praising him on account of this course, thought that concerning other things this could be done, and not concerning sensible particulars. For it was impossible in his view that there should be a common definition of sensible particulars, while these were always changing. He therefore called such existences ideas, while sensible things were beside these and according to them; for according to participation were most equivocals

[1] Plato, Theatet. 152 A. [2] Met., 1. 3–6. [3] Met., 1. 3. extr.

univocals with the ideas. But he changed merely the name of participation; for the Pythagoreans say that existing things are by imitation of numbers, but Plato says by participation, changing the name. However, they equally neglected to investigate the imitation or participation of the ideas, whichever it be called.

"And, further, beside the sensibles and the forms he affirms that mathematical things are media, differing from sensibles in being eternal and immovable, but from forms in that there are many of them alike, but every form is one alone. But since the forms are the causes of other things, he thought the elements of these were the elements of all things, and accordingly as matter he took the great and small as principles, but as substance he took the one; for out of these by participation of the one, the forms became numbers. But that the one was substance, and not that something else existing was called the one, is the Pythagorean doctrine, and also that numbers were the causes of other substances.

"But in place of the Infinite as one, Plato made the Dyad, and the Infinite from the great and small, which is peculiar to him; and, also, that he affirmed that numbers existed beside sensibles, while they said the numbers were things, and did not interpose mathematical existences. The fact that he made the one and the numbers beside the objects, and not identical with them, like the Pythagoreans, as well as the introduction of forms, arose from his dialectical method of treatment; for those before him had no share in dialectic. But the introduction of the Dyad as another nature arose from the fact that the numbers, except the first, are produced from it in a consistent way, as from a certain image. Now it is evident from what has been said that he employed two causes only, the essence and the material cause. For the forms are the causes of the essence to other things, and the one to the forms. And there is a certain underlying matter according to which the forms are said to be connected with sensibles, but the one is in the forms, because the Dyad itself is the great and small. Further, he assigned the well and the ill to the elements, each to each, which we regard as investigated especially by Empedocles and Anaxagoras."

Another allusion to the school of Heraclitus is worth quoting for the gleam of humor with which Aristotle introduces his *reductio ad absurdum:*

"And seeing the whole of nature in motion, and nothing verified respecting what was changing, at least what was changing in every way and everywhere, they thought it impossible to truly assert. For from this principle there grew out that most extreme opinion of the philosophers just spoken of, the followers of Heraclitus, and such a view as that held by Cratylus, who, at last, held that one ought not to speak at all, and simply moved his finger; he also rebuked Heraclitus for saying that it

was impossible to go into the same river *twice;* for he thought that it was impossible to do it once."[1]

We cannot here examine Aristotle's refutation of these sceptical philosophers, although it is of great interest. As the principle of contradiction is the basis of his philosophy, — as, indeed, it is of any positive philosophy, — he feels obliged to enter into a long defence of this law. He certainly shows that Cratylus occupied his strongest position when he declined to make any assertion at all; for then, at least, he did not contradict himself. And this is perhaps as good a way as any of silencing scepticism. But when this was once done, Aristotle seemed to feel himself free to dismiss these philosophers from his mind as no longer dangerous opponents. On the other hand, the theory of ideas haunts him incessantly; and he is continually breaking off his argument to give a thrust at Plato. It is not necessary to suppose that there was any personal enmity between the men, nor even, as Maurice assumes, that Aristotle suffered from a vague feeling of inferiority.[2] It is rather to be maintained that he felt the seductive charm of Plato's theory, and was aware that others would feel it and yield to it, while he was himself convinced that the theory was not true, and would prove a hinderance to the truth. His position was that of one who knows that the truth is with himself, but who has at the same time the consciousness that it is too deep for popular apprehension; while the theory of his antagonist, though false, has such a delusive appearance of

[1] Met., iii. 5.

[2] Separated from these stories the quotations, we think, prove no more than that Aristotle felt a certain irritation and displeasure when he perceived there was something in the words of Plato which his large intellect and immense information did not enable him to comprehend. To be continually haunted with a consciousness of this kind; "In all definable qualities I am equal, nay, superior to my predecessor; I have reduced subjects into far greater order; I analyze far more perfectly; I have a far greater store of facts at my command; and yet there is in him something quite *undefinable*, which seems to make an incredible difference between us." This may, no doubt, have been very vexatious, even to an honest and great mind. — Maurice, Moral and Met. Phil., in Cyclop. Met., vi. Div. iii. Sect. ii.

truth, and is withal so easily laid hold of by the many, that it is almost hopeless to contend against it.

The foregoing extracts are perhaps sufficient to present the main points of the Platonic theory. The objections brought against it by Aristotle may now be classified and considered. And first, it should be remarked that the controversy mainly turns on the relation between universals and particulars. While it would not be correct to say that particulars are to Aristotle all that universals are to Plato, it is yet true that the philosophy of Aristotle rests upon his development of particulars. Aristotle would never deny the existence of universals, properly defined; nay, more, he would admit that they may exist, in some cases, as independently as Plato maintains.[1] But Plato has far less consideration for the world of particulars, as a reference to any of the Dialogues where the ideas are introduced will show. Plato recognized in the world of phenomena the doctrine of Heraclitus; but he did not rest content with scepticism. He recognized, also, something common in these fluctuating things, namely, their similarities. Here, then, was something permanent and unchanging, far more worthy to be called real existence than that of sensibles. So far Plato was right, and was followed by Aristotle; but he went farther, and removed these similarities, or forms, or ideas into a super-sensual world of their own, making the sensible world a mere shadow of the real world. This step marks the divergence of the system of Aristotle. He saw something common *in* the world of sensibles; but for that very reason he declined to see it outside of that world. He recognized the fact, which ever remained a mystery to Plato, that numbers were abstractions, and not real existences, — least of all, creative forces.[2] He was aware more certainly than Plato that the likenesses or forms discerned in sensibles ceased to exist if the sensibles ceased to exist, although he would maintain that the sensibles would equally cease existence if the forms no longer existed. In this respect he may be

[1] Met., vi. 16.

[2] Met., 12. 3; Phys., ii. 2; iii. 4.

classed as a moderate realist, holding to *universalia in re*, as a comparison of the following passages will show:

"Such, then, are the difficulties necessarily encountered in discussing the principles, whether they exist universally or, as we say, in individuals. For if they exist universally they will not be essences; for nothing that is common to many things signifies a "this," but a "this kind." But an essence is a particular "this." If a universal were a particular essence, and that which is predicated as common were a particular, then Socrates would contain many animals — himself, and man, and animal — so far as each of these concepts signifies a "this" and a "one." This would be the result if principles are universals; but if they are not, but are like particulars, they will not be cognizable, for the knowledge of all things is universal. So that if there is to be a science of principles, there must be other principles prior to these if they are predicated universally."[1]

In the fourth book at the end of the fifth chapter, he remarks:

"In general we may say if only what is perceived by the senses exists, then nothing would exist if there were no perceptive beings; for there would be no perception. That in this case the sensible objects and the perceptions would not exist is true enough (for perception is a quality of a perceiving being), but that the "substratum" which causes the perception should not exist is impossible, whether there is any perception or no. For perception is not a perception of itself, but there is something different from it besides, which is necessarily before perception. For that which moves is by nature prior to that which is moved, and this is none the less true when both are spoken of in relation to each other."

We here recognize clearly enough the "Ding-an-sich" of Kant.

For a full understanding of the significance of Aristotle's position in regard to particulars, it would be necessary to examine the categories and analytics with considerable detail. We can only say that he asserts in the first category that the particular thing, the *hoc aliquid*, is the true existence; the universal only existing together with it as a predicate, without being anything of itself apart from its subject. Again, the third category is quality; but qualities such as the good, the true, etc., would be essences in the highest degree, according to Plato. This position is fundamental to the system of Aristotle; and he adheres to it with great

[1] Met., ii. 6, extr.

consistency. He by no means denies existence to these qualities or predicates, for he spends much time in treating of them; but their separate existence is not admitted; the sensible particular being always for him the real existence. We might say that for him substance is the possibility of predicates; for so soon as predicates are added it is no longer mere substance. The most explicit statement of this view is in the Metaphysics, vi. 1:

"Substance is that which exists first, not any particular existence, but existence absolutely. Now what is first may be spoken of in many ways, yet of all things substance is first, in reason, in knowledge, and in time; for of the other categories none is separable but this alone. And in reason this is first, for in the reason (or definition) of everything that of its substance must inhere. And we then think that we know each thing, when we know *what* man is, or fire, rather than the quality or the quantity or the situation; since we then know each of these things when we know *what* the quantity or the quality is."

The whole of the first part of this book is of great value as throwing light on Aristotle's conception of substance, but we must refer to the note for further extracts.[1]

It must always be a disputed point whether universals or particulars stand first. But in another respect Aristotle made a most important advance upon Plato,—an advance that has only partly been maintained by modern philosophy. The difficulty that led Plato and others to the ideal hypothesis was their inability to understand how one form could be in many objects at the same time. The trouble was and is that we find it almost impossible to conceive of existence

[1] See Met., ii. 4, where the question is stated; vi. 8. extr.; vi. 13, where it is strenuously maintained that universals cannot be substances, and particulars are. Thomas Aquinas shows in his commentary here the importance of the Aristotelean distinction between potential and actual existence. "Duo enim quae sunt in actu, numquam sunt unum actu; sed duo quae sunt in potentia sunt unum actu, sicut patet in partibus continui. Duo enim dimidia unius lineae sunt in potentia in ipsa linea dupla quae est una in actu. Ex hoc ideo quia actus habet virtutem separandi et dividendi." Many of the difficulties propounded in the Platonic dialogues may be solved by bearing in mind this distinction which Plato is unconscious of. See also ix. 2; the discussion is reviewed in xii. 4. How definition is involved, An. Post. 11, p. 77 a, 5. See also De An. ii. 1. 412 a, 8, 2 extr., iii. 4. 429 a, 27.

except under spatial conditions, and it is an axiom that the same thing cannot be in two places at once. How strong this materializing tendency was may be seen from the theory of Democritus, that the ideas that we have of sensible objects are effluvia or emanations from the bodies — their ghosts, so to speak. Now it is easily seen that this gives a materiality to forms that almost necessitates some such theory as that of Plato to afford at least a temporary escape from scepticism.[1] Aristotle, however, solved the difficulty completely, by showing that form might be one in every respect but number; and, hence, that we could properly say that the same form was in many objects. In a word, he discovered that such existences as forms had a real existence independent of spatial relations; and, hence, that the same form might be in many places, and many forms in the same place. Many of his objections to Plato cannot be understood without reference to this principle. Here Aristotle came very near to Kant.[2]

The third main point of difference between the view of Plato and that of Aristotle, and the one that has the greatest modern interest, is in reference to the causative or creative force of the ideas. It is on this ground that most of Aristotle's objections are brought, and so conscious is he of the vital importance of the point to his philosophy, and indeed to philosophy in general, that he incessantly in all his writings recurs to this question. We have indicated in a former Article his view of the causal force in the universe, that it was the Divine Energy, the unmoved Mover; a conception far more comprehensive than that of Plato, although, to a certain extent, combined with it in later speculations. Plato sought to escape from his difficulties in this world, first by assuming another. But it is plain that this could be only a temporary makeshift unless the perplexities in the present world ceased to exist in that of the ideas, and secondly unless this ideal world somehow explained the existence of the

[1] See Tylor's Primitive Culture, i. 497.

[2] Met., iv. 6, extr.; vi. 8, extr.; ix. i. init. Space is discussed, Phys., iv. 1 sq.

world of sensibles. Now Aristotle elaborately shows that neither of these conditions is complied with by Plato's hypothesis, and apart from other absurdities the law of parsimony would therefore compel its rejection. His own theory, on the other hand, avoids the difficulties that beset the path of Plato and is not exposed to the objection, "entia non multiplicanda." He remarks :

"But one is chiefly perplexed as to what the forms contribute to things that are eternal among sensibles, or to those that are generated and corrupted. For they are not the cause of any motion or change to them whatsoever. Nor are they of any assistance to the knowledge of other things (for they are not the substance of these, or they would be in them); nor to the existence of other things, not being inherent in the things that participate; for they might be conceived as causes possibly in the same way that the white mingled with the white might be a cause of whiteness. Since, in general, wisdom is concerned with the cause of phenomena, this will be overlooked, for we say nothing of that cause whence the principle of change arises; neither such as we see to be a cause to the sciences on account of which every mind and every nature operates; nor do the ideas have anything to do with that cause which we call one of the principles.[1]

"It would not be of any service if we should make substances eternal, as those do who hold to ideas, unless there should be inherent some principle capable of change. But this would not answer any better, nor would there be any other substance besides the forms; for if it does not energize there will be no motion, nor if it does energize; but its substance is in capacity, for there will not be eternal motion, for it is possible that what exists in capacity does not exist. Accordingly, it is necessary that there should be such a principle whose substance is energy.[2]

"Admitting that there are forms and numbers, they will not be the cause of anything; and if not, they will at least not be the cause of motion. Farther, how will magnitude and continuity arise from what has no magnitude? for number will not produce continuity either as moving or as form. But there will be nothing of the contraries that is both creative and moving, for it would be possible for it not to exist. But certainly to make is subsequent to the capacity; hence there are no eternal entities — but there are. Some one of these views must therefore be rejected (as said above). Now in what way numbers, or the soul and the body, and, in general, form and the thing may be one, no one says anything, nor can say anything, except as we say, viz. that that which causes motion is that which creates."[3]

Plato soon saw that to assume another world entirely

[1] Met., ix. 1, med. [2] Met., xi. 6.

[3] Met., xi. 6, fin. See also De Gen. et Cor. ii. 9. 335 b, 6.

distinct from the world of sensibles could be of no assistance in explaining this world. Accordingly he was led to propound the theory of participation. According to this view the ideas have indeed a separate existence, but they nevertheless participate in sensible objects. As Aristotle remarks, in the passage quoted above, this was but another form of the Pythagorean theory, that sensible objects are imitations of numbers. Aristotle perseveringly criticises this view, which, after all, is but another way of allowing a causative power to the ideas. Many of his objections are very striking, and in general his reasoning is able and acute, although sometimes hard to follow. It must be observed, however, that his objection to the separate existence of universals on the ground that they exist in sensibles is inconsistent with his own reasoning that there is a distinction between identity in species and identity in number. He would probably reply to this, that the separate existence of universals was merely potential, while their actual existence was to be found only in sensibles. In any case the objection is valid against Plato, for it is obvious that by introducing participation Plato really returned to the point from which he started, having still before him a mingled world of sense and idea. The original difficulty still remained — how to connect the ideas with sensibles. Aristotle shows that if any attempt is made to connect them they will have something in common.

"According to necessity and the opinions concerning forms, if they participate there can only be ideas of the substances; for they are not participated in according to accident; but they must participate in this way in each idea except in so far as it is said of the subject. For example, if anything participates in the two-fold-in-itself, it also participates in the eternal; but accidentally, for it is an accident to the two-fold to be eternal. Hence forms will be substance. For the same things both here (sensibles) and there (eternals) signify substance, or what will be the meaning of saying that there is something besides these things, the one in many? and if there is the same form of forms and of those things that participate there will be something in common. ..... If there is not the same form, they would be equivocals, and it will be just as if we should call both Kallias and a stick of wood man, observing nothing in common to them."[1]

[1] Met., i. 9. med. See also Top. vi. 10; Met., vi. 14; xii. 4. extr. The

A second attempt at establishing a connection between the world of eternal and unchangeable ideas and that of phenomena was made by interposing media, whether mathematical or of other nature. As it was seen that a participation of sensibles in the ideas involved numerous difficulties, while the entirely separate existence of the two worlds was of no assistance in understanding either, a third world was introduced as a mean between the two. This course of thought is of great historical interest as bearing, how directly we do not undertake to say, upon the development of the doctrine of the Trinity. In both cases there seems to have been a feeling that some bridge was necessary to establish relations between the eternal and the evanescent. Aristotle, however, pursues this new form of the theory with undiminished vigor. The most prominent of his objections is that there is nothing gained by increasing the number of things to be explained when all the difficulties remain unchanged. He in fact compares this process to that method of computation indicated by the formula, Guess at half and multiply by two. He states his opposition to this attempt, as well as to the ideal theory itself, in the following language:

"Those that assume ideas as causes, in the first place, seeking to ascertain the causes of existing things, brought forward other things equal in number to these, as if any one wishing to count things smaller in number should think himself unable, but by making them more should be able to

comments of Thomas Aquinas on this difficult subject are of considerable service. He observes (Lib. 1. Lectio x.), Plato first introduced the formal cause. He called Universalia ideas or forms in so far as sensibles are constituted in their likeness, species in so far as through their participation they have substantial esse. Or Ideas "in quantum erant principium essendi, Species vero in quantum erant principium cognoscendi. Unde et sensibilia omnia habent esse propter predictas et secundum eas. Propter eas quidem in quantum Ideae sunt sensibilibus causa essendi. Secundum eas vero in quantum sunt eorum exemplaria." This is unquestionably true, but it must not be taken to mean that Plato himself made this distinction, or was fully aware of it. . . . . "Nam species vel idea est ipsa natura speciei qua est existens homo per essentiam. Individuum autem est homo per participationem, in quantum natura speciei in hac materia designata participatur. Quod enim totaliter est aliquid non participat illud sed est per essentiam idem illi. Quod vero non totaliter est aliquid habens aliquid aliud adjunctum propriae participare dicitur." So of heat and fire, fire participates heat, but heat exists *per se*.

count them. For, doubtless, the forms are in number equal to, or not less than, those things from seeking the causes of which they passed to the forms; for there is an equivocal for each particular. Of some things there is no necessity that there should be a syllogism, but of others — and those not the ones we should expect — forms arise. For, according to the definitions from the sciences, there will be forms of all things of which there are sciences; and according to the idea of unity in plurality, there will be forms of negations; and according to our conception of what is corruptible, there will be forms of things corrupted; for there is a certain appearance of these things."[1]

We give below, in the note,[2] a somewhat extended ar-

[1] Met., i. 9, init. Also Met., x. 2, init.; xii. 4, med.

[2] "How we call forms (or ideas) causes and substances in themselves has been already discussed; the absurdities are manifold; not the least is to say that there are other substances beside those in the heavens, but that they are the same with sensible objects, except that the former are eternal, the latter perishable. For they say that man-in-himself and horse-in-itself and health-in-itself exist, but nothing further; very much like those that say the gods exist, but are of the form of men. For they neither make them anything more than eternal men, nor do these (Platonists) make the ideas anything more than eternal sensible objects. And if one supposes in addition to the ideas and the sensible objects a mean between them, he falls into many difficulties. For it is evident there must exist lines beside the lines-in-themselves and sensible lines, and so of all genera; so that since astronomy is one of these genera there will be also a heaven beside the visible heaven, and sun and moon and all the other heavenly bodies in like manner will be two-fold. But how is this credible? for it is neither reasonable that such a heaven should be immovable, and it is entirely impossible that it should be movable. In like manner concerning the things of which optics and mathematical harmony treat, for it is impossible that these things should exist beside the sensible ones through the same causes. For, if there is a mean between things perceived and perceptions, it is plain that there must exist animals between the animals-in-themselves and perishable animals. And any one would be puzzled to know for what things such sciences must be investigated. For if geometry differs from surveying in this alone, that the one is of things not sensible while the other is of sensible objects, it is evident that together with the healing art there is another science (and also of each of the other sciences this is true) between the healing art in itself and the healing art in application. Yet how is this possible? for then there must be a health apart from the health of sensible objects and health-in-itself. Nor is it true that geodesy is confined to sensible objects and perishable magnitudes, for then if they were to perish it would perish. Even astronomy would not be a science of sensible magnitudes nor of this heaven; for neither are sensibles lines such as the geometer describes them, for nothing of sensible things is precisely straight or round. The circle in sensible objects does not exactly fit the rule as Protagoras showed in his refutation of the geometers, nor are the motions and windings of the heaven similar to those about which astronomy treats, nor the

gument showing the numerous absurdities consequent on the Platonic theory. The introduction of mathematical entities and especially of the Pythagorean numbers added complications to those already existing. A large part of what Aristotle brings forward on this head is either absolutely unintelligible, or else too trifling and indefinite to deserve repetition. We find in general that Aristotle discerned the same latent weaknesses in the theory, no matter how disguised. In some places he insists that a mere number or ratio could not be the cause of any particular thing; for all monads are alike, and they cannot, therefore, produce different objects. But we cannot wander into the vast field of possibilities opened by the introduction of Pythagorean proportions and harmonies, nor even follow Aristotle in his somewhat extended discussion of monads. The last two books of the Metaphysics are chiefly taken up with these abstruse speculations. Yet it would be inconsistent with the requirements of our subject to pass over the discussion concerning mathematical entities and numbers apart from their Pythagorean sense. The true character of numbers has ever been a matter of controversy on the same ground as the ideas, and in addition their singular properties of combination have given them a certain mysterious charm not possessed by other abstractions. In fact it might well be contended that there is far more ground for maintaining the separate existence of numbers than that of other generalities. Aristotle himself seems less positive in his objections to this development of the theory, although he consistently opposes all assignment of causal power to numbers. His criticism is to the following effect:

images of the stars of the same nature as the stars. There are some that say that this mean between ideas and sensible objects does exist, not apart from the sensible objects, but in them. It would be impossible to enumerate all the impossibilities that this would lead to, but the following may be mentioned. For it is not reasonable that this mean alone should exist in the sensible objects, but the ideas might also just as well, for both are governed by the same reason Hence there must be two solids in one and the same place, and the mean could not be motionless if it was in a moving sensible object. In short, why is the mean supposed to exist, but to exist in sensible objects? All the before-mentioned difficulties recur; there would be a heaven beside the heaven, only not apart, but in the same place, which is even more impossible."— Met., ii. 2, extr.

"They have put mathematical entities between the ideas and sensibles as a certain third thing besides the forms and those things that are here; but there is no third man or horse besides itself and the particulars. But if not as they say, about what is the mathematician concerned? For it is not about those things that are here, for nothing of these matters is the subject of mathematics."[1]

"In the Phaedo it is said that the forms are the causes of existence and generation. But even if the forms exist, still the things that participate would not be produced unless there were a moving force, and many other things would be produced, as a house and a ring, of which we do not say there are forms. Hence it appears that it is possible for the other things to exist, and to be generated by such causes as we speak of. And if the forms are numbers, how can they be causes? Will existing things be other numbers, as this number is man, and this one Socrates, and this one Kallias? In what respect would these be the causes of those? Nor will it make any difference if these are eternal and the others not. Now if the things here are ratios (λόγοι) of numbers, as harmony, it is evident that there must be some one thing of which they are ratios. Now if this be a particular thing, as matter, it is plain that the numbers themselves will be certain ratios of one thing with another. I mean, for example, that if Kallias is a certain ratio in numbers, of fire and earth and water and air, it will be also of certain other subjects, and the idea will be a number. And man-in-himself, whether there be a certain number or not, will nevertheless be a ratio in numbers of certain things, and not a number, nor would there be on this account any particular number. Moreover, out of many numbers one number results, but from forms how can one form result?"[2]

[1] Met., x. 1, med.

[2] Met., i. 9, med. See also De Coelo, i. 9. On the question of number, Thomas Aquinas throws considerable light. "Differunt vero Mathematica a speciebus quia in mathematicis inveniuntur differentiae secundum numerum, similia secundum speciem. Alias non salvarentur demonstrationes mathematicae scientiae. Nisi enim essent duo trianguli ejusdem speciei frustra demonstraret Geometria aliquos triangulos esse similes et similiter in aliis figuris; hoc autem in speciebus non accidit. Nam cum in specie separata nihil aliud sit nisi natura speciei, non potest esse singularis species nisi una. — Patet autem diligenter intuenti rationes Platonis quod ex hoc in sua positione erravit, quia credidit, quod modus rei intellectae in suo esse, sit sicut modus intelligendi rem ipsam. Et ideo, quia invenit intellectum nostrum dupliciter abstracta intelligere, uno modo sicut universalia intelligimus abstracta a sensibilibus, alio modo sicut mathematica abstracta a sensibilibus, utrique abstractioni intellectus posuit respondere abstractionem in essentiis rerum. Unde posuit et mathematica esse separata et species. Hoc autem non est necessarium. Nam intellectus et si intelligit res per hoc, quod similis est eis quantum ad speciem intelligibilem, per quam sit in actu, non tamen oportet quod modo illo sit species illa in intellectu quo in re intellecta. Nam omne quod est in aliquo est per modum ejus in quo est.

Although it is doubtful if Aristotle fully understood this subject, at least if we judge him by the writings that have come down to us, it is yet possible to see that his objections to the Platonic view of numbers were of three classes. In the first place he maintained that mathematical entities could not subsist in sensible bodies, that is, they could not in so far as they were *entities;* for, in the first place, there would then be two bodies occupying the same space, which was impossible; and, secondly, in case of the division of the bodies, what would become of the mathematical entities?[1] Perhaps Aristotle ought not to be blamed for a conception of mathematical entities that might be called materialistic, when our most prominent English logician holds very much the same view; and, farther, this argument, although inconsistent with the higher conception sometimes expressed by Aristotle, is good enough against the Platonists. The second class of objections must be regarded as an advance upon the first. "Granting," he says, "that mathematical entities are prior in definition (λόγος), it does not follow that they will be prior in substance." Separate and transcendent essences

Et ideo ex natura intellectus quae est alia a natura rei intellectae necessarium est quod alius sit modus intelligendi quo intellectus intelligit et alius sit modus essendi quo res existit. Licet enim id in re esse oporteat quod intellectus intelligit non tamen eodem modo. Unde quamvis intellectus intelligat mathematica non co-intelligendo sensibilia et universalia praeter particularia non tamen oportet quod mathematica sint praeter sensibilia et universalia praeter particularia. Nam videmus quod etiam visus percipit colorem sine sapore, cum tamen in sensibilibus sapor et color simul inveniantur. Sicut species sunt sensibilibus formae ita unum est forma specierum.—Assignabant rebus pro materia magnum et parvum et quasi substantia rerum idest forma dicebant esse unum. Sicut sensibilia constituuntur ex principiis universalibus per participationem specierum ita species quas dicebat esse numeros constituuntur secundum eum (ex illis) scilicet magno et parvo. Unitas in diversas numerorum species constituit per additionem et subtractionem in quibus consistit ratio magni et parvi. Unde cum unum opinatur esse substantiam entis quia non distinguitur unum quod est principium numeri et unum quod convertitur cum ente, videbatur sibi quod hoc modo multiplicarentur diversae species separatae ex una quae est communis substantia sicut ex unitate diversae species numerorum multiplicantur. Other philosophers posited unity of matter and diversity of form, but Plato assigned duality to matter and unity to form. Aristotle compares form to the male animal which can impregnate many females. — Lib. i. Lectio, x.

[1] See note 2, p. 528, also Met., xii. 2, init.

are prior in substance; but things are prior in definition when their definitions are from other definitions; Whiteness, for example, is not prior to a white man in substance, but in definition; for it cannot exist separately, but must co-exist with the substance, in the concrete. The distinction is known to us in the phrases "order of nature" and "order of time."[1]

Thirdly, Aristotle declares that mathematical entities and numbers are abstractions. It cannot be maintained that he held very firmly to this argument, but when he does advance it he states his views with such distinctness that it is safe to regard it as his mature opinion, particularly as it would coincide with his general system. It is, perhaps, not going too far to say that the synthetic power of the intellect in conception, which Kant so forcibly insisted on, is really alluded to by Aristotle in speaking of mathematical diagrams. They are discerned, he observes, in actuality, that is, by division, or abstraction. Until the division is performed, the figures have a merely potential existence; when we have abstracted, the figures appear. Now it is intellection that is the cause of this change from potential to actual existence; by creating we know.[2] The best method of investigation, he elsewhere remarks, is to regard as separate or abstract that which is not separated, as the arithmeticians and geometers do. Man, in so far as man, is one and indivisible. The arithmetician treats of unity as indivisible, and then considers whether man in so far as he is indivisible has any accidents. The geometer looks on him neither as man nor as indivisible, but as solid. Solidity, therefore, may potentially exist in man, but its actual existence is determined by the mind of the geometer.[3] But after all it must be admitted that Aristotle is often obscure on this point, when we should welcome explicit statements.

The question as to genera and species is of course closely connected with the general one concerning ideas. It is,

[1] See note 2, p. 528, also Met., xii. 2, extr.

[2] Met., viii. 9, extr.

[3] Met., xii. 3, extr.

however, rather logical in its character, and therefore of subordinate interest for our present purpose. We shall, therefore, pass over it briefly, calling attention only to the most important points. The chief objection of Aristotle, undoubtedly, was to the material character given to genera and species, for the absurdities arising from the co-existence of many genera and species in the same object, and of the same genus or species in many different objects, afforded a fruitful field for logomachies. In a word, by regarding species as having separable existence all the difficulties felt in regard to forms were repeated. Then there must be a species of species, and what kind of existence could be predicated of them? There must be a "third man"; that is, apart from the individual man and the man-in-himself, there must be a third man to embrace both. But it would be tedious and profitless to follow out a controversy that really involves no new arguments. Passages bearing on the question are given below in the note.[1]

[1] It is a false definition to divide genus by negation, as those do who define a line to be length without breadth, which signifies merely that it has no breadth. Now the genus must share in the species, since every length either lacks breadth or has breadth; for concerning everything either affirmation or negation may be truly maintained. Wherefore the genus of the line, which is length, will either lack breadth or have breadth. But length lacking breadth is the definition of the species, and likewise length having breadth, because without breadth and having breadth are differences; but the definition of the species is the genus plus the differences. Hence the genus might receive the definition of the species. In like manner the definition of difference, since of the given differences the other will be asserted of the genus by necessity. Now this is useful against those maintaining that there are ideas. For if length-in-itself exists, in what way can it be asserted of the genus that it lacks breadth or has breadth? For concerning every length one of these must be truly said, if it is to be truly said of the genus. But this is not the case, since there are lengths which lack breadth and which have breadth. So that this place is useful against those alone who maintain that genus is one in number; but those who hold to ideas do this, for they say that length-in-itself and animal-in-itself are genera. Top. vi. 6. 143 b, 24; 8. 147 a, 6; vii. 4. 154 a, 19; Phys., ii. 2. 193 b, 36; 3. 194 b, 9, 26. Thomas Aquinas gives a statement of the whole question; see note 1, p. 527, and the following comments: Platonici enim assignabant solum principia substantiarum accidentia praetermittentes. Accidentia propria principia habeut. — Species componuntur ex genere et differentia et sunt species universales substantiae separatae. — Si enim ponantur species esse separatae constat quod unum genus est in pluribus speciebus simul sicut animal in homine et equo. Aut ergo hoc ipsum quod est

Several minor objections are from time to time brought forward by Aristotle as they suggest themselves either in the course of his criticism of the general theory, or as they occur to him while considering other topics. Such things as come after numbers — that is lengths and surfaces and solids — he asserts have no grounds in reason; for they cannot possibly be forms if they are not numbers; or media, for those are mathematical; or things corruptible; they must, therefore, make a fourth genus unprovided for by Plato.[1] He indulges in a sneer at the doctrine of anamnesis, that has been a staple weapon for modern disbelievers in intuitive knowledge. It is impossible, he says, that we already know what we propose to ourselves to learn. If we have a knowledge of things born within us, it is very remarkable that we are in ignorance of our possession of such a treasure as this most excellent of sciences.[2] Occasionally he introduces a practical objection to the effect that, if forms are immovable they cannot exist in movable objects. The heaven, for example, moves, and therefore it can have no form.[3] So if it were said that there are forms in us; for

animal in homine et equo existens est unum et idem numero aut alterum in homine et alterum in equo. Inducit autem hanc divisionem quia Plato ponebat ideas specierum non autem generum cum tamen poneret communiter universalia esse substantias. — Species componuntur ex genere et differentia et sunt species universales substantiae separatae — cum genus sit in specie sicut substantiam rei significans sic erit animal in equo sicut tu es in te ipso qui es substantia tui ipsius. Sic autem non est possibile aliquod unum esse in pluribus separatim existentibus; non enim tu es nisi in te ipso. Es enim in pluribus non separatim existentibus sicut in carnibus ossibusque quae sunt tui partes. Animal igitur si sit unum et idem non poterit esse in pluribus speciebus ut in homine et equo cum species separatae secundum Platonicos sint quaedam substantiae ad invicem diversae. Platonici ponebant solas species esse ideas particularium, genera vero et differentias non esse ideas specierum. Et hoc ideo quia idea est proprie exemplar ideati secundum suam formam. Forma autem generis non est propria in formis specierum sicut forma speciei est propria in dividuis quae conveniunt secundum formam et differunt secundum materiam. Sed si sunt diversa animalia secundum diversas species unicuique speciei respondebit aliquid de substantia sui generis sicut propria idea. Et ita etiam erunt genera ideae et similiter differentiae. Non ergo alteri universalium erit quod sit idea et alteri quod sit substantia, sicut Platonici ponebant dicentes quidem genera esse substantias specierum species vero ideas individuorum. — Lib. vi., cap. xiv.

[1] Met., i. 9, med. [2] Ibid., extr. [3] Met., xii. 2, med.

they must be both moved and motionless, sensibles and intelligibles; it cannot be denied that we move, and if we have immovable forms within us, they must move at the same time.[1] Again, in the Ethics, Aristotle falls foul of this theory, and devotes a long time to repeating his objections; in this case to the separate existence, or the mixed existence, of the good as a substance.[2] But nowhere are the objections so fully stated as in the Metaphysics, to which he evidently refers when he speaks of the "full discussion elsewhere indulged in."

We have reserved for our final consideration the theory that the forms are types, plans, or models, or even the ideas or thoughts of God, possessing a strange ethereal sort of existence, something like that of the angels, between God and man. Unquestionably this is the most popular form of the theory now, as is seen by the vigorous defence of the permanence of species by many naturalists — a doctrine that has positively nothing to stand upon but the Platonic theory. Aristotle considers that forms are called paradigms, in which other things participate, by a mere figure of speech, a "poetic metaphor." It is quite possible that there should both exist and be generated something similar to another without being made in its image. (This is just the ground of the modern evolutionist.) A being like Socrates could be produced whether Socrates did or did not exist, and if Socrates were eternal, there would be many paradigms of the same thing, as also forms, as of man there would be animal and two-footed and man-in-himself. There would also be paradigms of forms as well as sensible objects.[3] But the main ground of his objection is that this or any form of the theory supposes that universals exist prior in time to particulars, and independent of them.

The fundamental ground of repugnance in the mind of Aristotle arose from his inability to admit the proposition that a cause can act where it is not. It has been generally

[1] Top. ii. 7.

[2] Nik. Eth., i. 4; viii. 2, 4, 5; Eud., i. 8; vii. 2; viii. 1; Mag., i. 1.

[3] Met., i. 9, med.; vi. 8, extr.; xii. 5, extr.

accepted that a cause requires immediate connection, or at least, an intervening medium, in order to operate. This dogma was assailed by John Stuart Mill in his Logic, and in place of it the assertion is made that place has nothing to do with causation. The moon is held to the earth not by the force of gravity, but simply by the earth; not because of the earth's attraction, but because of the earth. Recent investigations, however, tend to establish the existence of an ether that exists as the medium through which heat, light, electricity, and even gravity operate. The retardation of comets is one of the most important facts in support of this view. Granting the existence of this ether, the old dogma reasserts itself in a still more positive manner; for this all-pervasive ether supplies it with all that was necessary to establish its validity.

This dogma being established, it is obvious that it is fatal to the creative power of the Platonic world of ideas. If they have an entirely separate and motionless subsistence, how can they cause sensible phenomena? They cannot act where they are not. The interposition of media does relieve the difficulty, for these media must be either in motion or not in motion. If they are in motion, how can the media be affected by the motionless archetypes? If they are not in motion, how can the changing world of sensibles be affected by motionless media? Obviously, as Aristotle again and again insists, Plato omits the efficient cause, and without this all his creations are of no avail. The great fact of motion, of change, that unexplained element that we denominate *force*, is the lacking condition, and this Aristotle supplies in the creative mind of God. All secondary forces are in his grand scheme mere names for the different modes of operation of the one unmoved Mover of the world. There can be no special acts of creation according to this view, no pre-existent types that impress themselves somehow on matter, but one eternal and incessant force that creates every instant, in the act of preservation, and whose influence throbs through every pulsation of the world of life, and shows

itself in every change in the world of matter. Even matter itself is a manifestation of this infinite force, and all our thoughts are but forms of its motion. In this way the ideas of Plato lose their independent active existence, and become objects of thought, principles of knowledge; eternal, it is true, but only as the mind of man is eternal, and active only in his activity.

ARTICLE VII.

NOTES ON EGYPTOLOGY.

BY JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, D.D., LL.D., BERLIN.

Dr. Brugsch's History of Egypt under the Pharaohs[1] will hardly prove what the Germans style an "epoch-making" book; but it certainly does mark an epoch in the science of Egyptology — the transformation of scattered individual monuments and dismembered inscriptions into a consecutive chronological history of the Egyptian empire. Thirty years ago Bunsen made his bold attempt to determine "Egypt's place in Universal History." The materials were not then ready for such an undertaking, and hence Bunsen's was too much a work of speculation to serve as a permanent basis of history. Yet Bunsen had the true notion of what was to be learned in Egypt, and through Egypt for the history of mankind, and though his methods were faulty and his results incomplete, his principles were unquestionably sound. He grasped the conception that the monuments of Egypt were true records of her chronology; that by means of the monuments it would be possible to restore the chronology embodied in the dynasties of Manetho; and that this chronology would furnish a sure foundation for Egyptian history. And he declared his confidence in this system of investigation in

[1] Geschichte Aegyptens unter den Pharaonen. Nach den Denkmälern bearbeitet von Dr. Heinrich Brugsch-Bey. Erste deutsche Ausgabe. Mit 2 Karten von Unter und Ober-Aegypten und 4 Genealogischen Tafeln. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs. 1877.

these prophetic words: "We are convinced that it may and will be the lot of our age to disentangle the clue of Egyptian chronology by the light of hieroglyphical science and the aid of modern historical research, even after the loss of so many invaluable records of the old world; and thus to fasten the thread of universal chronology round the apex of those indestructible pyramids, which are no longer closed and mysterious."[1] This prophecy is in part fulfilled in Brugsch-Bey's history, which is based directly upon the monuments, and is built up around a frame of chronology for which the monuments furnish materials vastly more abundant than were known in Bunsen's time. Indeed, since Dr. Brugsch published the first part of his Monumental History of Egypt[2] in 1859, researches, discoveries, interpretations, have so increased these materials that in this first German edition the author has been obliged to recast the whole work, and to modify opinions and conclusions then put forth with confidence.

With the candor of the scholar, Dr. Brugsch supplements the deficiencies and corrects the mistakes of his earlier attempt; but even the experience of twenty years does not seem to have taught him the caution which is as necessary to the historical critic as to the scientific investigator. His fancy is too ready to supply some coveted information; his enthusiasm sometimes gets the better of his judgment; and he often weaves into his historical narrative the loose strands of conjecture. These tendencies make it necessary for the reader to exercise the critical caution which is so often wanting in the author. Time has justified the habitual reserve with which, in former years, these "Notes on Egyptology" in the Bibliotheca Sacra have treated points of chronology and history. Dr. Brugsch has the merit of writing in a clear, direct style, with singleness of purpose, and with a complete mastery of his subject. An octavo of eight hundred pages of Egyptian history as constructed from the

[1] Egypt's Place in Universal History, Vol. i. Introduction.

[2] Histoire d'Egypte. Premiere Partie, L'Égypte sous les Rois indigènes. 1859.

monuments challenges a close scrutiny of the materials and their authority. How much, then, do we really know of ancient Egypt as authentic history? In other words, to what extent does the reading of the hieroglyphs supply us with trustworthy materials for the history of Egypt? The following facts may be regarded as settled to the acceptation of all Egyptologists.

1. The hieroglyphs are of a mixed character; partly pictorial, partly phonetic; the pictorial signs being divided into special and general, the phonetic into alphabetic and syllabic. The scheme of interpretation based upon this discovery of *Champollion le Jeune*, in 1823, is confirmed beyond question by the bilingual "Tablet of Canopus," discovered in 1866.[1] The mode of decipherment being thus conclusively established, the interpretation of hieroglyphic records and inscriptions is simply a matter of patience and detail. "So great has been the progress made that the purport of all texts, and the entire translation of most, is no longer an object of insurmountable difficulty."[2]

2. Menes is an historical person, the first known king of Egypt; that is, he appears not only in traditions and legends, but upon the monuments in dry chronological tables, heading the list of kings. Hence it is evident that the Egyptians regarded him as a real person, distinctly dividing the historical from the mythological, the human from the divine. These stone records give Menes a more certain place in history than can be claimed for Arthur of Britain.

3. The great Pyramid dates from the Fourth Dynasty, as is proved by the names found in its inner chambers, and is an imperishable monument of the strength and grandeur of Egypt in that remote antiquity and within so short a period, say three or four hundred years, after the consolidation of the kingdom by Menes.

4. The dynasties of Manetho were for the most part consecutive; and though it is still an open question whether

[1] See a description of this Tablet in the Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. xxiv. p. 771.

[2] Dr. S. Birch in "Transactions of the Second International Congress of Orientalists." Inaugural Address, p. 13.

some dynasties were not contemporaneous, all Egyptologists agree in recognizing them "as representing strata of time."[1] The two lists of the first Pharaohs, found in the temple of Abydos, the list found at Sakkarah,[2] and a fourth, in a private tomb at Thebes, show conclusively that Manetho's lists must have been compiled from records and monuments which, in his time, were regarded as chronological lists of consecutive dynasties. True or false, this was the notion the Egyptians had of their own royal succession. The question of time, that is, of the duration of these dynasties, in the absence of conclusive dates, is quite distinct from the fact of chronological order, though the order of succession furnishes a proximate rule for the computation of time.

More weighty even than these monumental lists in evidence of consecutive dynasties is the fact that memorials of kings whose capital was in Upper Egypt have been found in Lower Egypt, and *vice versa*. Professor Richard Owen put this point forcibly in his Address to the Congress of Orientalists at London.[3] "If, for example, statues and laudatory memorials of the kings of a Memphite dynasty were found only in Lower Egypt, and those of kings of an Elephantine dynasty only in Upper Egypt, there would be ground for suspicion that the Egyptian priest had aggrandized the rule of both series of limited monarchs, and had lengthened out their history by making certain dynasties successive which had, in fact, reigned contemporaneously. There were periods, indeed, when Upper and Lower Egypt had respectively their own Pharaohs, but the normal relations of such were hostile. Manetho records such conditions of the monarchy, and notes some of the Theban kings as contemporaries of the Shepherd Kings reigning at Tanis. But a Pharaoh of the lower country permitted not his usually hostile contemporary in the upper country to dedicate to himself monuments at Tanis; nor

[1] Dr. S. Birch, "Rede Lecture at Cambridge University." 1876.

[2] For an account of the lists of Sakkarah and Abydos, see Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. xxiv. p. 773.

[3] Transactions of the Second International Congress of Orientalists, Ethnological Section, p. 366.

would a Theban king permit a Hyksos one to set up his abhorred image at Elephantine. The discovery, therefore, by Mariette, of such monuments of one and the same Pharaoh, or dynasty of Pharaohs, occurring the whole length of Egypt,[1] from north to south, is a scientific fact testifying to the truth of the lists of the successive kings recorded by the Egyptian priests. Testimonies by contemporary sculptors have proved, for example, the Sixth Dynasty, which chose for its capital Elephantine, to have succeeded the Fifth Dynasty, which chose for its place of business Memphis. They have similarly and satisfactorily demonstrated the Fourteenth Dynasty of Xois to have succeeded, in time, the Thirteenth Dynasty of Thebes."

5. Lower Egypt was invaded and conquered by roving tribes from the east — the Hyksos or Shepherds of Manetho — who for centuries maintained their dominion in the Delta, and broke the continuity of the Egyptian empire. These Shepherd kings were at last expelled by Aahmes or Amasis I. and with them a promiscuous host, "a mixed multitude," contemptuously described as the "plagues" or "lepers."

6. The Eighteenth Dynasty, which began with Aahmes, lifted Egypt to the height of splendor at home and of power abroad. Under Thotmes III. the conquests of Egypt extended to Nineveh and Babylon in the east, to Nubia in the south, and to the islands of the Mediterranean in the north and west. "This was the apogee of Egyptian greatness, and it is scarcely possible to realize the relative magnificence of the period. The inscriptions relating to the time on the walls of Thebes, translated to Germanicus, astonished the Roman masters of Egypt and the civilized world. A pylon at Thebes gives twelve hundred names of places conquered or garrisoned by the Egyptians."[2] The glory of Thotmes was subsequently rivalled by that of Ramses II. of the Nineteenth Dynasty, the Sesostris of the Greeks.

7. There are important synchronisms with Syria and

[1] Professor Owen here follows the classification of dynasties given by Manetho. Brugsch, for example, assigns the Fifth to Elephantine, and the Fourth and Sixth to Memphis.

[2] Birch, Rede Lecture, p. 26.

Persia in the later period of the Egyptian empire, which serve as guides to the chronology of the Egyptian kings.

Every point stated in the above specifications is distinctly supported by the monuments and records of Egypt; and it will at once be seen that these furnish a good back-bone of chronology and a tolerably well articulated skeleton of history. But when we attempt to construct the body, with form, organs, integuments, life, the real difficulty begins.

With all his research, acumen, industry, enthusiasm, Dr. Brugsch has not established the chronology of Egypt, nor any one satisfactory date in that remote antiquity which possesses the highest interest for the elucidation of both biblical history and the general history of mankind. A glance at his table of royal epochs is a most disappointing sequel to his glowing pages. It is easy to mark the dates of the conquest of Egypt by Alexander, and two centuries before by Cambyses; and we may feel our way back, step by step, to the close of the sixth century before Christ, and may gain two or three proximate dates in the tenth and eleventh centuries B.C.; but when from the twelfth century onward our author assigns to each reign an average of thirty-three years, allowing but three reigns to a century, and his columns read 1200, 1233, 1266, 1300, 1333, 1366, and so on back to 4400 B.C. as the date of Menes, we see that such tables are as really "cooked" as are the antediluvian tables of the Septuagint. Dr. Brugsch assumes that the first sixty-five names of the royal tablet of Abydos represent not only the regular official succession, but also the direct lineal succession from father to son, in the house of Menes. Then, taking as a basis the calculation of Herodotus, that on an average three successive lives of the same stock fill out a century, he gives to these sixty-five kings a range of two thousand one hundred and sixty-six years before the beginning of the Eighteenth Dynasty, which he assigns to the year 1558 B.C. — thus making a total of three thousand seven hundred and twenty-four years. But he also allows five hundred years for the interruption of the Egyptian

monarchy by the Hyksos invasion, and hence goes back to the forty-first century B.C. for the ascension of Menes to the throne.[1] Now this whole calculation proceeds upon a purely artificial theory; and, though the condition of Egypt at that early period seems to have favored stability and longevity, yet the monuments show the frequency of wars and the habitual exposure of the king in battle. Hence, in view of the ordinary vicissitudes of government, history teaches that we must allot to sovereigns a shorter term than the average of human life, — say, five or six reigns to a century, rather than three. This would reduce the era of Menes to about 3000 B.C., "the lowest point to which a chronologist can venture to depress the date of Menes."[2] The following are the principal dates, B.C., to which German Egyptologists have assigned the beginning of the Egyptian kingdom: Boeckh, 5702; Unger, 5613; Brugsch, 4455; Lauth, 4157; Lepsius, 3892; Bunsen, 3623 — a difference of two thousand and seventy-nine years. And, be it remembered, in the first eighteen dynasties not one solitary date has been fixed with absolute certainty as a point for evolving the chronology of the period.

It is a great advance toward historical certainty to have fixed with so much definiteness the names of the kings of Egypt and the order of their succession. What is yet wanting is the date of the accession of some of the leading Pharaohs of the older time. This once made sure, it may be possible to frame a chronology of Egypt that shall elucidate or rectify the chronology of the Hebrews.

It is another gain for historical truth that the domination of the Hyksos in the eastern delta is established by contemporary monuments, and the era of their expulsion is celebrated in a hymn of triumph. But the origin of these invaders and the dates of their coming and going are still involved in mystery. "These *Shasu* are not merely shepherds, but nomads, the crossers of the desert, the wanderers of the world, or pillagers, the tribes that migrated from place to place; the advanced guards of Asia carry Egypt by storm."[3] The

[1] pp. 37–39. [2] Birch, Rede Lecture, p. 8. [3] Birch, Rede Lecture, p. 23.

attempt to connect the Hebrews with these "shepherds," and the Exodus with their expulsion, has not proved successful. The discovery of the Hebrews under the name of *Aperin* on the monuments[1] is brought in question by the subsequent finding of the *Aperin* on monuments much earlier, and also much later, than the reign of Ramses II., to which the exodus is usually assigned. It is not unlikely, however, that in Egypt, as in Babylon, some of the Hebrews chose to remain after the great body of the people had departed.

Dr. Brugsch revives the theory of the exodus which he propounded at the Congress of Orientalists in London.[2] He brings nothing new in the way of argument or evidence, and as yet he has not won a single Egyptologist of note to a theory which demands so many conjectures in geography and such fanciful analogies in philology.

The great service which Dr. Brugsch has done in this work is the bringing together of a mass of materials — inscriptions, tables, documents, etc., — systematically arranged and lucidly interpreted, so as to give to the monumental remains of Egypt the form and expression of an intelligible consecutive history, covering unnumbered centuries. And what a history it is! Sculptured on these monuments, sketched on these fragments of papyrus, portrayed on the walls of these temples and tombs, is an empire great in power, war, and dominion, great in architecture, science, and the arts of life — an empire that for a hundred generations withstood the forces of time and decay, and that even in its ruins represents the oldest, and as yet the most enduring, civilization upon the surface of the globe. It is a notable achievement of modern science thus to repeople the Egypt of the Pharaohs with a nation whose language we can decipher, whose thoughts and doings we can read, whose manners we can study, whose government, society, worship we can reconstruct, and whose life, so long mummified and entombed, we can make as vivid as a traveller's sketches of the Egypt of the Khedive.

[1] Chabas, Melanges. 1862. [2] See Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. xxxii. p. 185.

A very clever transformation of the monumental records of ancient Egypt into a moving panorama of domestic and public life has been achieved by Professor Ebers, of Leipzig, in his new novel "Uarda."[1] The historical romance is a difficult art; but Professor Ebers had already shown, in his "Daughter of an Egyptian King," that he knows how to keep clear of its two chief perils — anachronism and exaggeration. His first romance fell within the Persian epoch, and was more Persian than Egyptian in its coloring. But Uarda carries us back to the fifteenth century before Christ, — the time of the great Ramses, and of the poet Peutans who has celebrated his glory. Professor Ebers knows how to use the imaginative faculty without prejudicing the historical. Indeed, he approaches the historian in his romance, just as Brugsch approaches the romancer in his history. Nothing of men, manners, institutions, events of the time is pictured in this story that has not some substantial evidence in the monuments. The author's knowledge of the times in which he has laid his story is as complete and minute as can be gathered from the monumental records. His descriptions of the hierarchy, both political and sacred, of the schools of religion and science, of palaces, temples, tombs, and hovels, of castes, customs, and superstitions, of warriors, priests, princes, women, are true to the records in every particular. Though the grouping of the scenes and figures is of course the work of his own fancy, each individual scene and figure is a copy of some known original. His success in giving life to the figures and reality to the scenes lies in his knowledge of human nature, which enables him to touch those springs of action which are deepest in the human soul, and are common to all forms of humanity and all phases of life. Hence his figures move, speak, and act in harmony with their surroundings, but as human beings amid those surroundings. "Uarda" has already reached a third edition, and "The Daughter of an Egyptian King" a fourth.

[1] Uarda, Roman aus dem alten Aegypten von George Ebers. 1877.

ARTICLE VIII.

CHARACTERISTICS OF HOMERIC POETRY.

BY PROF. JACOB COOPER, RUTGER'S COLLEGE, NEW BRUNSWICK, N.J.

If we look at the amount of interest which the Homeric poems keep alive in the highest literary culture of this age, we might easily be led to think that they had but just issued from the press, and not from the lips of a rhapsodist who sang nearly three thousand years ago. Indeed, they are so inwrought in our forms of expression and modes of thought that if they were all taken from us our literature would be like a garden from which most of the choice flowers had been plucked, and little left save the withered stems on which they grew.

How shall we account for this prevailing and self-perpetuating influence? It cannot arise from any transient literary excitement, which, like a contagion, sometimes spreads over a country, and then leaves no trace of itself save in the blighted and sickly condition which it has engendered. Nor can it result from the peculiar taste of any nation, or of many peoples having a kindred lineage, since the appreciation of these productions is co-extensive with civilization. Nor is it produced by the spirit of the age, except in so far as this is a part of universal humanity; for these poems are emphatically the hymns of the ages, since all generations subsequent to their first appearance have taken up their refrain. Their popularity, then, must be sought for in the roots of human nature, in the sympathy which they have with all that belongs to cultivated man; for thus only can we account for the hold they have retained upon the race.

There are four distinct periods or ages of Greek poetry, which shall be designated by their representative authors.

First, its youth, of which Homer is the all-comprehending exponent.

Second, its manhood, wherein Sophocles is the leader.

Third, its green old age, whose representative is Menander.

Fourth, its garrulous senility, led by Apollonius Rhodius.

It is not by accident that the different periods of Grecian song are named after the ages of man; for nations in their intellectual development are the counterpart of human life. That nations in their progressive civilization do resemble the different periods of life is apparent to many who have never seen the profound speculations of Vico on this subject (in his Scienza Nuova); and this correspondence cannot fail to strike any one who bestows upon it even a cursory reflection.

Of the several periods enumerated, the most interesting by all odds is the Homeric, just as childhood and youth are the most delightful parts of life. Our early days always come before us fraught with truthfulness, simplicity, and freshness. We are always young in imagination when we recur to the sweet days of youth. So Homer, as the exponent of this age of Greek culture, strikes a chord in the heart of every man capable of appreciating him, because he there perceives his own nature drawn by a master's hand. And as early youth is the most precious of all our times of life to revisit in memory, so this poet continues to be the most welcome of all who employed the master-language of earth to portray human thought.

The leading excellence in Homer is, undoubtedly, his sympathy with external nature. By this is meant his tendency to the objective, to the delineation of all that is external in the world and internal in man, as seen by direct vision in contrast to reflection. This sympathy is shown by his distinctness of outline, as well as accuracy of detail, in portraying scenery. In the descriptions of nature, the nearer language comes to painting the more pleasure such word-pictures must give to the reader or hearer; for the infinite variety and freshness which the external world affords is a source of perennial delight. Such pictures never grow old. They never become hackneyed by repetition; because each recurrence of a pleasure is a new creation. Hence the tints of

the rainbow, the unfolding beauties of the flower-bud, or the brightness of rosy-fingered morn are as fresh and pleasing as when the eye of man opened upon them for the first time. If these, then, can be reproduced in language they will charm as long as the world lasts; and in exact proportion to the ability of the author to recreate them will be his popularity. But he must reproduce them in such a way that the pictures stand out as realities, not as description; so plainly that we see not the man who speaks, or hear his words, but behold the originals in all the glory and beauty of their living reality.

Description of this kind preserves its youth and freshness so long as there is susceptibility to kindred impressions; and this will still be the case "while the races of man succeed each other like the leaves of spring." Nor is this susceptibility confined to those who are young in years merely, but is experienced equally by all those who retain freshness and vividness of feeling, who gracefully round off life by blending the vigor of youthful imagination with the wisdom of age. Such men, like Plato, Bacon, and Gladstone, set off the jewels of knowledge and experience with the casings of brilliant fancy; and the bees which settled upon their lips in the cradle continue to return to them ever freighted with sweets.

The descriptions of the Homeric rhapsodies are characterized by this excellence. They picture nature just as she is. The poet is neither seen nor heard. The scene is painted before the eye; and we look on what appears as a reality, not a description. Nor is the case altered when the feelings and pursuits of man as a part of nature are the theme. Here the actors play in character and speak their own pieces. We see them as the plain countryman saw Garrick and Mrs. Pritchard in Macbeth. The tall woman is so completely self-possessed, even when urging the commission of a most bloody deed, that there scarcely seems anything terrible in the murder of the king. But the "little man" is so frightened that we see the rising ghost, and tremble with him. Homer's heroes are created so true to nature that we

see neither picture nor screen to hide the picture, but men and women, heroes and gods, living and moving before us. In order to accomplish this result, the poet does not appear to let his images pass through his own mind, and be deflected by the medium; but they take his place, speak and act for him, while he is as much a spectator as they. It has been asserted by Humboldt that the Greeks did not excel in drawing pictures from nature. He says: "Imagination animated vegetable forms with life; but the types of poetry to which the peculiar direction of mental activity amongst the ancient Greeks limited them gave only a partial development to the descriptions of natural scenery."[1] But however deeply read in scientific research, yet this wonderful man showed by this assertion a meagre acquaintance with, or else imperfect appreciation of, Homeric poetry. For if there is any excellence pre-eminent in Homer, it is just this. After much reflection in endeavoring to account for Humboldt's criticism, this is believed to be the cause: Modern descriptions of nature are invariably due for their excellence in great part to the skilful combinations of the writers, rather than to the faithful transcript of the originals. While the pictures retain sufficient outlines of the objective in nature to enable them to be recognized as genuine resemblances, still, they have so much of the subjective that they become the unquestioned property of their painter. They have passed through his mind, have become naturalized during their transit, and so resemble the medium through which they are seen. They are no longer originals, seen through a transparent atmosphere, but colored — beautifully, it may be — by the windows of scientific combination through which we view them. In other words, they are meant to be pictures of nature such as Petrarch, Herder, or Southey saw them. Homer, however, spirits us away, and in a moment we see Olympus with its snow-clad summit and its wooded ravines. We stand with him on Ida, and hear the roar of the young lions which haunt this "nurse of wild beasts." But when

[1] Cosmos, ii. 377, Bohn's edition.

Petrarch takes us to Vaucluse we admire the fountain, and pluck a flower or two; but we all the time hear the chattering of the guide who conducts us, and see him waiting to receive his fee for showing it to us. And when we are invited to see the falls of Lodore, and have admired its "splashing and dashing, its rumbling and tumbling," we espy in the mist which the torrent of alliterative words raises the image of Southey; and louder than the cataract's roar is heard the voice: "I am the Poet Laureate." The feeling that an author is trying with all his might to describe something takes away much of our enjoyment in the contemplation of his picture. For we see therein not the reproduction of the scene, but a wearied and struggling author, who either excites our wonder at his acrobatic feats, or else arouses our sympathy for one who makes such painful efforts to please us. To him whose taste is gratified chiefly by skilful arrangement, wherein the intellectual vigor is prominent in combining with external nature to create a mixed picture, doubtless Homer and the other early Greek poets would seem greatly wanting. For among these nothing of artistic coloring appears in the lines wherewith the scene is reproduced. Modern word-pictures are nearly always the result of a purpose which cannot be concealed. The poet, when he comes to a beautiful scene, stops (and we must stop with him), until he takes out his sketch-book, sharpens his pencil, and draws his picture. We look over his shoulder, and are pleased because we see the beauty of the drawing, but still more so through admiration for the skill of the artist. But when he passes on we are conscious that we have to get up with him and go farther. Homer, however, when he comes to a beautiful prospect in nature takes us up gently, and noiselessly places us for a moment on some elevation where the whole scene is taken in at a glance; so that before we are aware of having stopped we see all the beauty he saw, all that was to be seen; and we follow not him, — for this poet is never seen, — but his heroes as they go in quest of new adventures.

Considering poetical description as an artistic effort, Homer, and all the Greek poets up to the time of Sophocles, in this assuredly fail. For in the youthful period which we are considering, a formal description was not even attempted. But when they describe we are conscious of a reality before us which we are so intent on beholding that we never think of a picture or a painter. And even when Homer speaks of the feelings by which his heroes are actuated, we see the motives which influence their actions discovering themselves through the clear medium of a character too frank for concealment. Nay more; where they practise deception toward each other, the tricks of both sides are so transparent that we see the workings of their hearts, as we look upon the mechanism of a clock which has a glass covering, not to conceal it from view, but to preserve it uninjured, that we may see it the better. For motives are seen in their immediate action upon rational beings; and we have no deep speculations, as in the later philosophical poetry of the Greek tragedians (and which, among modern writers, is so conspicuous in Shakespeare), where the complicated tissue of human passions is combined with subtile reasonings which force us to exclaim:

> "Many wondrous things there are,
> And nought more wonderful than man."[1]

The distinction made by the Schoolmen of *primae et secundae intentiones*, is apposite for illustrating the two kinds of description. The exhibition by poetical genius of the actors in life's drama working out their own destiny, makes an impression upon us apparently without the intervention of the author; and this constitutes the *primae intentiones*. But when the poet receives the impression himself, and puts it through the crucible of his own subtile combination, we have, not what men actually do in in real life, but what a profound reflection upon human action deems it proper they should do. In these particulars Homer's age agrees precisely with youth. In our own experience we receive impressions imme-

[1] Soph. Antig., 131, 132.

diately from nature, and enjoy them to the full, without troubling ourselves to reason upon them. It is sufficient that we derive pleasure from the sight; and while there is a constant succession of agreeable sensations, we are content to be receptive rather than weary ourselves by reproducing them moulded after the fashion of our own minds. Besides, at this period of life, we have neither the experience in turning the mind back upon its own processes, nor facts enough from which to make deductions. For a long time we can be learners only. Our minds are empty vessels which must be filled, or the blank leaf to be written over, before we can communicate to others more than the simple pictures which nature has traced. Thus the mind at this age reproduces the impression without change, and hence describes what it sees by words significant of its ideas, such as onomatopoea, or their immediate derivations, which are a simple transference from sound to another sense. All early languages, and especially such as are built up by one homogeneous people, show a wonderful aptitude for word painting. A single word stands for a complicated idea, because the mind seizes upon that which is prominent in the thing signified. Thus the lion is loud-voiced; the sheep is thick-wooled; the ox is trailing-footed and curved-horned; the sun is the passer-over; Jove is the loud-thunderer; morning is rosy-fingered; the west is *βουλυτόνδε*, the-place-for-loosing-the-oxen-from-the-plow. Like a child, susceptible to every external influence, who gives to each impression a designation by some sound which sums up his feelings without telling us why he felt so, Homer is the mouth-piece through which the senses speak. Such is the simple nature of Greek poetry in this Juventus Mundi; and it will delight us while we retain our youthful nature, and continue young as long as the world is kept alive by fresh blood coursing through its veins.

A second marked characteristic in the Homeric poetry is the undoubting faith exhibited by the author in his own creations. To effect belief in others, we must possess it ourselves

in that which we communicate; for, however plausible our story may be made by skilful imitation, still, if we do not believe it, this want of faith will betray itself at some unexpected moment; and the whole narration then becomes, like the chain, no more trustworthy than its weakest link. But it will not do for us to examine the poetry of an early age by the sober tests of scientific criticism, any more than to try the day-dreams of youth by the severe assay of subsequent experience. For such a process dissolves the dream in either case, and takes away all the pleasure of the reverie. Yet nothing can please a properly balanced mind but that which is essentially true. Hence the pleasure derived from an acknowledged fiction results from its verisimilitude. We are delighted because the parable is true to nature, in such a case as probably may arise, and therefore has its foundation in reality. Since the pleasure which poetry gives arises from its fidelity to truth, it is necessary for the poet to have unbounded confidence in himself so as to believe implicitly all the creations of his genius. Nor is it surprising that this should be the case in regard to the many marvellous and even grotesque stories which form the chief subject-matter of the Homeric poems. It is not to be supposed that the wandering rhapsodist invented them bodily. They were the common heritage of the nation, assuming gradually a more perfect form as they were divested of what seemed incongruous, until at last they came in perfect harmony with the spirit of the age. And hence where there was anything added by the poet this must be in sympathy with what was already received as true. Or, to go a step farther, if the bard introduces a new story, not an outgrowth of his national faith, he must first construct an atmosphere wherein his characters can live, as well as invest them with an attractive history. All the parts of the story must be consonant with each other, and mutually supporting, or they will fall "like the baseless fabric of a vision." Applying these principles to our subject they elucidate it clearly. There is not the shadow of a doubt manifested in Homer's poems of his belief

in all he uttered. There was at that age a faculty for growth and a quick receptivity for all impressions from within and without — an exuberance of fancy combined with eager curiosity. Nor had the critical rigor, which repeated deception begets in the history of centuries, as it does in the experience of the aged, been developed to try what was marvellous. So the story harmonized with their feelings, and contradicted none of their scanty experience; it was gladly welcomed as a contribution to their knowledge.

The similarity between youth and a nation in its earlier life is seen again in the fondness for what is marvellous, the blending of the supernatural with humanity. As childhood delights in stories of wonders, and implicitly believes all the tales of the nursery, even so the nation passing through a similar stage receives, with unquestioning faith, all that does not shock by its incongruity. For truthfulness and freedom from suspicion are equally large in both instances. We smile now at the absurd stories of the Arabian Nights, and forget the time when we walked around the monster egg with veracious Sindbad, or lashed ourselves with our turbans to the great leg of the Roc, and were carried down to the Valley of Diamonds. Yet, as children, we believed all such stories, provided we read them too early to have their statements falsified by knowledge of the world. Just so the nation in its childhood. And, therefore, when we read of gods and men holding familiar intercourse, of rivers and mountains addressed as sentient beings, we see no reason to think that Homer and his auditors questioned the truthfulness of such representations. What if Scamander, though a river, rose up to fight Achilles? What if Achelous coveted Dejanira? For to the child every object is animated, full of thought and feeling. It is addressed as a person, is the conscious author of pain and pleasure, and is visited with punishment because it incurs guilt. The child beats the stone against which it stumbled, and as readily scolds the plaything that will not work right as the human companion who will not take his proper place in the game. All children

are much alike. Xerxes scourged the Hellespont, and *branded* it with hot irons because it destroyed his bridge. The Hindoo worships his sacred river, because he believes it to be a veritable god. The Greek called himself an *autochthōn*, one sprung from the earth. The American Indian seats himself upon his mother, the earth, when, by a breach of politeness, the pale-faced general provides for him no chair. It is undoubtedly true that all the stories which form so large part of the Iliad and Odyssey were believed by Homer (and we have enough of this temper of childhood to believe in Homer as a veritable man) with genuine faith. Doubtless he had a deep-felt consciousness that he was the interpreter of his people's religion; that he was their prophet, who had a profound insight into all mysteries, human and divine. He had that primary element of all greatness and success, faith in himself; and therefore, in the absence of all revelation except that which is by the reflected light from Sinai, he was the highest embodiment of human wisdom, the organ of communication between gods and men. Nor was this feeling one of arrogance, because it had truth for its basis. He was so completely filled with his subject that he saw distinctly all he revealed. His was a self-confidence which rose above all arrogance, and discerned only its mission; for it looked not at its own personality, but simply at the inspiration wherewith it was filled. No man ever succeeded in imposing his opinions upon his fellows, unless he had unlimited confidence in the matter of his teachings; and the measure of his own belief — provided his mind was clear — was the measure of his influence on others. "As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he," is the utterance of divine truth; and thus he becomes the standard of all things unto himself, and as many as follow him.

In the childhood of Greece, that most marvellous childhood the world ever saw, Homer told his story. The elements of intellectual life for the whole earth were thick around him, and he quickened them unto growth. The creations of youthful fancy were perfected by his genius, and struck that chord

of undying popularity which vibrates only to the touch of a master. It may be impossible for us to explain the power of a truly great man, and he may never whisper to us "wherein his great strength lieth." But, in the two characteristics — unquestioning faith in his own creations, by which he sees in himself the highest realization of truth, and his sympathy with nature in all her forms of beauty — we see enough to account for that wonderful sway his songs have held over the cultivated intellects of successive generations; for all, when they return to him with the disposition of children, find a kindred spirit, ready to believe whatever satisfies imaginative curiosity, and delighting in everything which is lovely in nature.

ARTICLE IX.

AMERICAN ORIENTAL SOCIETY.

The publication of the Proceedings of the American Oriental Society has been unusually delayed, as has also that of the Second Part of Vol. x. of the Journal. The Society, however, still flourishes; and a notice of some of the recent communications of which an abstract is given in the Proceedings may interest our readers. At the meeting in May 1875, a paper was read by Prof. T. O. Paine, of Elmwood, Mass., on "the Way Collection of Egyptian Antiquities in the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston," in which some remarkable inscriptions were translated and commented upon. Egyptology has had few cultivators in this country; and it is gratifying to find so enthusiastic a student of the subject as Professor Paine turning to account the materials for its study which our collections supply. His interesting paper will appear in the next number of the Journal, soon to be issued. At the same meeting, the Rev. Selah Merrill presented a short, but carefully prepared essay on "The Condition of Woman in Assyria," as illustrated by the cuneiform inscriptions. Dr. A. O. Treat, of the North China Mission, exhibited and described a curious *praying-machine* in use among the Mongols, which enables the devotee to offer prayers with great velocity, by a manual operation, while walking, riding, talking, or smoking.

At the meeting in November 1875, perhaps the most interesting communication was from the Rev. S. I. J. Schereschewsky, of Peking, on "The Versions of the Scriptures in the Chinese Language," with remarks on a proposed Mongolian version on which he is himself engaged. There were also papers by Prof. Avery and Prof. Whitney, of special interest to Sanskrit scholars.

At the meeting in May 1876, Prof. Paine presented a communication on "the Holy Houses, or the Hebrew Tabernacle, the Temple of Solomon, and the Later Temple," giving some of the results of the studies of this subject which have occupied him for many years. These results will be embodied in a new, greatly enlarged, and improved edition of his work on "Solomon's Temple," etc., originally published in 1861. Prof. Whitney read a paper on "The Classification of the Forms of the Sanskrit Aorist," and another on "Ζεύ = *dyaùs*, and other Points relating to Sanskrit Grammar as presented in M. Müller's Recent Volume of 'Chips.'" We

[1] American Oriental Society. Proceedings, May and Nov. 1875, and May 1876. New Haven. 8vo. pp. xxiv.

would call special attention to this latter paper, as in it Prof. Whitney takes up in detail the four points belonging to Sanskrit grammar on which Prof. Müller, expressly or by implication, charges him with gross ignorance or carelessness. The *prestige* of Müller's name is such that many will assume that in a matter of this kind accusation by him is conviction. One, however, who has carefully followed this controversy, or other controversies in which Prof. Müller has been engaged, cannot have failed to observe that, through haste or carelessness, combined perhaps with some constitutional infirmity, he often gives a representation of the facts of a case which is far from being justified by the facts themselves.[1] In the present instance

[1] As a recent instance of a striking character one may take a mysterious allusion thrown out by Müller in the German translation of volume four of his Chips ("Essays," p. 337). Speaking of his proposal to submit the differences between himself and Professor Whitney to a tribunal of arbitration (*Schiedsgericht*), he says: "A similar procedure, as Mr. Whitney may perhaps know, not long ago had the best result; and it is only from personal considerations that I have made no use of the permission given me to make public the verdict of the three umpires(*Schiedsrichter*)." This statement seemed so adapted to give a very false impression, even to the few who knew something of the affair referred to, that the editor of the *Literarisches Centralblatt*, Professor Zarncke of Leipzig, felt compelled to come forward (in the Lit. Centralblatt for Jan. 1, 1877, col. 31) and explain the matter. It appears that Müller, feeling aggrieved by a criticism on his Rig-Veda by Professor Weber of Berlin (Lit. Centralblatt for Nov. 1, 1873), sent to the same journal a reply so violent that Zarncke was unwilling to publish it (particularly as it would have to be followed by a not less violent rejoinder from Weber), and strongly urged its withdrawal. In accordance with the wishes of Messrs. Müller and Weber, and with the ready consent of Zarncke, the reply and rejoinder were shown to three eminent scholars. But before any word of answer came back from either of them, Müller yielded to Zarncke's request, and consented to take back the occasion of the trouble. Upon this, Zarncke had only to seal up and lay away all the documents relating to the affair. The three scholars consulted had never conferred with one another; what they said, whether orally or in writing, was, as Zarncke remarks, intended for him alone, and was mainly of the most confidential nature; no eye but his, as he expressly declares, has ever seen a word that they wrote. Zarncke concludes his exposition thus: "If, then, the above-cited words of Müller admit of being interpreted by the uninitiated as signifying that an actual tribunal had been set up to judge the difference between him and A. Weber, that it had rendered a verdict in any form whatever relating to the substance of the matter involved — or indeed any verdict at all — and that, above all, permission had been given to M. Müller to publish such a verdict, the preceding exposition will show how erroneous such an interpretation would be. On the other hand, I never concealed the fact either from A. Weber or M. Müller (nor required them to keep it private), that those gentlemen certainly seemed to agree in *one* point, namely, in disapproving of *my* course, and in blaming me for having accepted without alteration that review, the bearing of which was, in fact, offensive. If

Prof. Whitney shows clearly — if one who is no Sanskrit scholar may venture to judge — that the charges referred to, so far as they are of the slightest importance, rest on nothing better than misconceptions or erroneous statements on Müller's part. As the publications of the American Oriental Society are probably seen by few of our readers, while the charges of Prof. Müller have the wide circulation of his popular works, it seems but a matter of justice to so distinguished a representative of the best American scholarship as Prof. Whitney to indicate the substance of his reply.

The first point noticed relates to two Sanskrit words in the Atharva-Veda-Prâtiçâkhya (i. 33), which admit equally well of being read in two ways. Prof. Whitney had read them in one way (Journ. Amer. Or. Soc. vii. 361), overlooking the fact that another reading and rendering was possible. Müller, in a note in his Sanskrit Grammar (§ 57), suggested the other reading as the right one, which Prof. Whitney in a later note on the passage (Journ. Amer. Or. Soc. x. 158) adopted, giving the credit of the correction to Müller. Here it might be thought the account was closed; but Müller, taking the matter up again (Chips, iv. 519), and representing it as one of "the principal bones of contention" between himself and Prof. Whitney (Chips, iv. 528, 530), sends the latter, as if he were a a school-boy, to a "very simple rule" in his Sanskrit Grammar, and tells him that "before criticizing Sanskrit grammars, it would be useful to learn at least the phonetic rules." Now, the fact is that the rule which Müller cites with such parade *has absolutely nothing to do with the case in hand;* and that, instead of proving Prof. Whitney's ignorance, he has given a signal illustration of his own carelessness. It is only in keeping that on the same page Müller ascribes to Prof. Whitney a statement respecting the Prâtiçâkhyas precisely the opposite of that which he has really made, and then undertakes to correct him.

As to the second point (Chips, iv. 490), Prof. Whitney is misrepresented — an essential part of the sentence quoted being omitted; and his criti-

one chooses metaphorically to call these expressions of opinion, given without concert, a verdict, he may do so; but then it must not be forgotten that the point of it was directed against *me*, and that it had not the remotest reference to the substance (*das Materielle*) of Weber's review."—For a few out of many similar contrasts between the facts of a case and Müller's representation of them, one may compare p. 432 of Vol. iv. of the Chips (American ed.) with the retraction to which he was compelled, p. 505; or what he says p. 517 (comp. p. 505) about "the whining and whimpering assurance made by the American professor that he never in his life said anything personal or offensive" with what Prof. Whitney actually said (Contemp. Rev. xxv. 729); or the extraordinary misrepresentation in Chips, iv. pp. 478, 479; or his contradictory and very inaccurate accounts of the matter referred to on pp. 510–514, with the *Zur Klarstellung* of Weber in the *Indische Studien*, xiv 409.

cism of Müller's translation of a passage of the Rig-Veda is not answered, but evaded, as any one will see who compares his Oriental and Linguistic Studies, i. 136–138, with Müller's Chips, iv. 490 f. He did not charge Müller, as is represented, with "a real grammatical blunder"; still less has he been guilty of one himself. In the criticism referred to, he is complaining of the want of proportion in Müller's notes; that, although professing to give "a full account of the reasons which justify the translator in assigning such a power to such a word, and such a meaning to such a sentence," he occupies excessive space with comparatively unimportant matters, while leaving the most serious difficulties unnoticed. Thus, in the first verse of the first hymn in his translation he gives a rendering exposed to strong and apparently fatal objections, pointed out by Prof. Whitney, on the ground of the resulting want of sense or gross incongruity, and which also involves a construction that he himself speaks of (in the Chips) as "anomalous" and "ungrammatical." Here Prof. Whitney had observed that he offers not a word of justification for taking as a nominative plural a form (*tasthúshas*) which should normally be either an accusative plural or a genitive or ablative singular, while he indulges in a note of more than eleven pages on the adjective in the same line translated "red." Müller now cites one passage from the Rig-Veda where a like anomalous form (as he thinks) occurs, refers to Kern for some examples which he regards as similar in the Epic literature, and, instead of meeting Prof. Whitney's objections to the meaning given to the sentence, accuses him of betraying such "ignorance of Sanskrit grammar" as would have led a scholar in former times, "after such a misfortune," "to take a vow of silence or go into a monastery"; because, forsooth, he had called that "an extremely violent and improbable grammatical process" which Müller himself describes as "anomalous" and "ungrammatical"! Müller further excuses himself for not remarking on this grammatical anomaly, because Benfey has been for years preparing a grammar of the Vedic dialect" (not even yet published, while Müller's translation appeared in 1869), and he "purposely left the grammatical questions to him"! But what if Benfey should take a different view of this case? And he *had* taken a different view of it; for he translates (Orient u. Occident, 1862, i. 13) *die wandelt* UM DIE STEHENDEN, understanding the form in question as an accusative plural. So Grassmann, takes it in his Wörterbuch zum Rig-Veda (Leipz. 1873), col. 1602. Ludwig, in his recent translation of the Rig-Veda (Prag, 1876), ii. 6, makes it ablative singular, — *den* VOM FESTSTEHNDEN *hinweg wandelden*, — agreeing with Prof. Whitney's view of the passage.

As to the third point, Prof. Whitney (Or. and Ling. Studies, i. 266) had criticized certain long Sanskrit compounds used by Müller in a series of synonymes for "surd" and "sonant" as being "of his own making," and "to be found in no Sanskrit grammarian." If this was intended, or

is likely to be understood, as meaning that no grammarian had formed and used those compounds in discussing Sanskrit phonetics, it was so far an error; but the full account which Prof. Whitney gives of the matter seems to show that his statement was perfectly correct as regards the value which Müller gave them. In the passage which Müller cites, they are, according to Prof. Whitney, not "synonymes of 'surd' and 'sonant,'" but merely "*lists* of the characteristic qualities of surd and sonant sounds," "each ..... put together in Hindu fashion into a copulative compound"; the first being equivalent to "opening + breath + tonelessness," the second to "closure + sound + tone." The Hindu grammarian does not say of the letters to which these words "are applied "these are" so and so, but "of these" [the qualities are] so and so. Müller's procedure seems to be much as if, having found in a scheme of the parts of speech and their characteristics the words *mode-tense-person* over against *verb*, one were to quote and use *mode-tense-person* as a grammatical term equivalent to *verb*.

The fourth point (Chips, iv. 430), that "it is strange to meet with *sarvanâman*, the Sanskrit name for pronoun, translated by 'name for everything, universal designation,'" as if this view implied gross ignorance, is shown to be already decided in Prof. Whitney's favor by the eminent scholar to whom Müller in the recent German version of his Article has referred it. It is a point on which good Sanskrit scholars are doubtful or differ; but after the arguments which Prof. Whitney has here presented for his explanation of the word, he seems fully justified in saying that "Müller, instead of assuming gross ignorance or blundering on the part of those who accept it, needs to see whether he can make out a good defence of his own opposing view." The distinguished etymologist Prof. Pott has recently expressed himself very decidedly in favor of the same explanation of the word which Prof. Whitney has given.

As the case now stands, it does not appear very likely that the German publishing firm who have selected Prof. Whitney to contribute the Sanskrit grammar to their complete series of Indo-European grammars will be led by Prof. Müller's criticisms to cancel this arrangement, or to repent of their choice.

We have seen the character of some of the charges brought against Prof. Whitney's scholarship. If he needed any vindication in this respect, it would be found in the insignificance of the errors imputed to him. One other example of these, and of the spirit of Müller's "In Self-Defence," it may be worth while to give. "What Prof. Whitney's knowledge of Zend must be," says Müller, "we may judge from what he says of Burnouf's literary productions. 'It is well known,' he says, 'that the great French scholar produced *two or three bulky volumes* upon the Avesta.' I know of *one* bulky volume only, 'Commentaire sur le Yaçna,' tome i., Paris, 1833; but that must be due to my lamentable ignorance" (Chips, iv. 515).

The extent of Prof. Whitney's error and ignorance may be judged of from the following facts: The principal publications of Burnouf connected with the Avesta were the work which Müller mentions, a large quarto of 941 pages, published in *two parts*, Paris, 1833–1835; an octavo volume of 433 pages, "'Etudes sur la langue et sur les textes zends," tome i., Paris, 1840–1850; and an edition of the Vendidad Sade, in large folio, Paris, 1829–43. It is to the two first only that Prof. Whitney's language "*upon* the Avesta" strictly applies. The remark which Müller cites is a merely casual one (Or. and Ling. Studies, i. 135), and the statement is not *perfectly* accurate; but in Prof. Whitney's Article on the Avesta, in the same volume, *all* of Burnouf's publications connected with the Avesta are described and remarked upon in detail (Or. and Ling. Studies, i. 176–178). Such are the facts, on the ground of which Müller not only charges Prof. Whitney with ignorance of Zend and of Burnouf's literary productions, but puts forward as No. 18 of "the principal bones of contention" between him and Prof. Whitney, which he wishes to have submitted to a board of "three *Professores ordinarii*, in any university of England, France, Germany, or Italy," the momentous question, "whether Burnouf has written two or three bulky volumes on the Avesta, or only one" (Chips iv. 530).

As to the other questions at issue between Messrs. Whitney and Müller, and as to the style and spirit of their mutual criticism, the materials for forming a judgment are sufficiently accessible. It is only to be regretted that the lack of proper references in Müller's Chips makes it often so difficult to investigate his charges, and that he has repeatedly allowed himself to put in quotation-marks, as the words of Prof. Whitney, language very different from what he really used. E. A.

ARTICLE X.

ON ASSYRIOLOGY.[1]

THE following Review, which appeared originally in E. v. Leutsch's *philologischen Anzerger*, Vol. vii. p. 532, is translated from the German of Professor de Lagarde, Lic. Theol., Ph.D., for the Bibliotheca Sacra, at his own suggestion. The Review is written by one of the leading Semitic scholars of the world, one whose knowledge of Syriac especially, and whose work in applying to the Semitic family of languages the same principles as Grimm and others have successfully followed in Indo-European comparative philology, has already given rich promise and rich fruit. What has seemed chaos begins to be orderly and living. What seemed only a field for empirics and mystics is beginning to reveal its real character under strict scientific treatment. Professor de Lagarde's opinion on Assyriology must be carefully heeded. We shall publish soon an Article on the subject by another leading Semitic scholar. An Article by Professor de Lagarde on another important subject will shortly appear in our pages, with his special permission. — Archibald Duff, Jr., assistant editor of the Bibliotheca Sacra, is the translator of the following Review.

In 1875 A. v. Gutschmid discussed in Teubner's *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, the new edition of M. Duncker's History of Antiquity; and in the discussion gave it to be understood, in a manner at once careful and strictly reasoned from beginning to end, that what the Assyriologists had published as facts, were to be used more cautiously than Duncker had done. A notice counter to this appeared in the Jenaer Litteraturzeitung, not from Duncker himself, but from E. Schrader. Gutschmid has thought proper to reply to this anticriticism by an octavo volume of one hundred and fifty-eight pages. In this he certainly acknowledges explicitly, as he granted in 1875, that the work of the mere deciphering of Assyrian monuments has been in the main successful. But he reiterates, and that much more exhaustively, the grounds he had previously laid down which forbid following the Assyriologists with any confidence, notwithstanding what he had granted, as above stated. I must say that I regret the precious time which Gutschmid has spent on this work, but I can see that such a *μέμνασ' ἀπιστεῖν* is necessary, since the Prussian Government has been

[1] New Contributions to the History of the Ancient Orient. Assyriology in Germany, by Alfred von Gutschmid. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. 8vo. pp. 158. 4 Marks. 1876. Neue Beiträge zur Geschichte des alten Orients. Die Assyriolgie in Deutschland: von Alfred von Gutschmid.

persuaded to give a seat and a voice to Assyriology, still extremely youthful, as it is, in Germany. For the experiment of J. Brandis ought not surely to count. The warning is necessary too, since younger savants bow down before this rising sun in enthusiastic and rather loud worship (cf. F. Delitzsch's preface to his brother's German translation of Smith's Chaldee Genesis. — Ed. Bib. Sac.); since, also, in theological, and other periodicals, and in books of reference, the new wisdom is eagerly brought before the public. Men are constructing here a "public opinion" as they do on other qestions, in order that they may afterwards be able to prove themselves right by reference to this public opinion. Among men who are not amateurs, and who have been able to follow the literature of the subject, it has long been unquestionable that least of all may historians count upon the supposed results of Assyriology as additions to their stock of facts. The Egyptologists are able to decipher names with some certainty, but with texts they can deal only in such a way as to excite doubt in the minds of the few who are skilled in Coptic. Upon this subject I have recently expressed myself in plain terms. But Assyriologists are, least of all, able to decipher names, since ideography and polyphony are perpetually laying snares for them (cf. in confirmation of this, Smith's Chaldee Genesis, chap. i., beginning, where the same fact is stated and explained by Mr. Smith. — Ed. Bib. Sac.). Translations of Assyrian texts, such as those of the Descent of Istar into Hell, if made by a scholar with Oppert's talent for feeling the way, his tact and practical experience, give the impression of being, on the whole, reproduced with fidelity to the sense. Oppert would be the last to deny that advance can be made from day to day, and therefore he will not feel himself aggrieved, if we do not immediately adopt the results of Assyriology into our school-books. If other Assyriologists are more exacting in their claims they will find themselves compelled to render a reckoning to the future (see Delitzsch's preface, as above quoted, for statements which merit this opinion. — Ed. Bib. Sac.). It may be easily seen how much right Gutschmid has, as I think, to caution historians. Let me urge the reader to study the subject further in Gutschmid's book itself. This seems especially indispensable for all teachers of Ancient History. I cannot think that a calm reader of the book should not be convinced by it. Every student of Greek will be pleased, let me add, that Gutschmid finds he is able to protect Greek classics and scholars repeatedly against the late news from Nineveh.

Gutschmid has very correctly remarked (p. 134) that Schrader's manner of conducting Assyriology can be successfully attacked, "can suffer such blows of the axe as will strike the roots, only by the hands of a linguist." I do not claim to be what Gutschmid terms a linguist. I have never declared myself to be other than a theologian. But since I have become rather intimately concerned with languages, and that too, with Semitic languages, because of the present condition of the study of the

History of Religion, and because of the problems therein which I have set myself to investigate, I must allow myself to say that the comparative grammar and comparative lexicography of the Semitic languages look very dubiously, and shake the head at the half of what is offered to us in Germany as Assyrian. The latter of these two departments is a science which was early begun, but which has lain long quite neglected; one in which I feel a peculiarly deep interest. It lies in the nature of the Assyrian mode of writing, which expresses ideas by conventional signs, that sharp-minded men, who are at home in this kind of representation, should be able to get at the sense of a slab without on that account being at all able to pronounce correctly even the majority of the arrow-head groups, much less all of them, that is to say, to pronounce them as the old Assyrians did themselves. The writing may be read as one reads musical notes or mathematical formulae. Anything more exact than this must be found out from a mass of widely scattered facts and phenomena (cf. my "Reliquiae Graece," 83 infra.). And from these sources it can be obtained only by one who is really thoroughly acquainted with the known Semitic dialects — acquainted with them by being in some measure at home in their classics. He must possess a sufficient measure of the gift of combination to be able to recognize the features of the common mother of these dialects — not to learn them in the grammars and dictionaries, but to gather them for himself from *the Grammar*, and from *the Dictionary*, that is, from the whole stock of words and constructions in the language. If we consider that, instead of the twenty-two letters which the original Semitic alphabet contained, there are but eleven to be distinguished in the Assyrian, we must acknowledge that to justify a man in expressing an opinion here he must know Semitic as perfectly as does the native who is able to read the hasty running-hand of another native. For no sensible person will to-day affirm that he knows Assyrian thoroughly. It will be readily believed that persons who have studied Semitic texts in rather considerable number, judge somewhat differently as to what is possible in Assyrian, from the way in which those judge who at the most have nibbled at a few books of the Old Testament, in the way so usual amongst us, and who have labored through attendance on some course of occasional lectures on a few Syriac or Arabic reading-lessons. In any case, three things are necessary to the genuine Assyriologist; namely, first, extensive knowledge of the inscriptions already accessible; secondly, an intimate, if not exactly an extensive, knowledge of Hebrew, Aramaic, and Arabic-Ethiopic, obtained not from text-books, but from personal investigation; thirdly, ability, when an inscription comes up for consideration, to think, as one observes, what facts of the mother Semitic grammar and the mother lexicon, so far as already known, afford an explanation of this and that combination of characters. This last qualification comes only to persons possessed naturally of a peculiar talent, and even to these it comes only on

condition that the first and second qualifications have been acquired by the quiet ordinary method of patient learning. Familiarity with the inscription material, a willingness to search grammars and dictionaries after the manner of the Indo-German comparative philologist, even the liberty to use Professor Fleischer's interleaved and annotated copy of Freytag; all these would be equipments none too complete. My medical colleague, Dr. Baum, may lend me his whole set of saws and knives, and I may still be unable to perform an operation. In order not to be misunderstood, let me add that the fact that one has heard lectures on the Old Testament is no proof of a familiar knowledge of Hebrew. Even the delivery of such a course of lectures is no proof thereof. Many deceive themselves into confidence in their Hebrew, because they find courage to have an opinion about some text, after the use of a hundred helps. Perhaps their acquaintance with the text has been obtained altogether through translations. A slight effort to understand Charizi, Judas the Levite, or Avicebron's poems, and, say, to compose idiomatic Hebrew by one's self, might be quite serviceable in teaching modesty to professors of Hebrew in Gymnasia, and even to others who count themselves something much higher than that. Do you count yourself a poet? Then command poetry.

We are not yet quite done with this. The brothers d'Abbadie showed, in the Journal Asiatique for 1843, that in the eastern part of Middle Africa there are spoken, besides Semitic languages, dialects which have much that is peculiar, mixed with much that is Semitic. So far as I am aware, these gentlemen were the first to point this out. H. Ewald made the fact known in Germany in the *Zeitschrift für Kunde des Morgenlandes*, 5, 410 ff. By considerations of a more general nature I came early to the conclusion that these African-Semitic dialects must be connected with Assyrian. In 1852 and 1853, while in constant active intercourse with my friend Edwin Norris, who was at that time busied with the arrow-head inscriptions of the Scythian class, I became interested in such inscriptions, and conceived the hope of being able to prove that Assyrian was the elder sister of the Saho, and of like idioms. It was evident that Assyrian was considerably different from what was already known as Semitic. The leaves of that early spring in my work have long since been scattered by a quickly following autumn; but to-day I regard the matter in the main exactly as I did at that time. I think that the Semites separated into two principal divisions, one of which had its centre in the territory about the mouths of the Euphrates and Tigris, whence colonies wandered, some to Africa, — the ancestors of the Saho people, — some to the north, and perhaps to the west. To the other, which does not concern us here, belonged the Ethiopians. Since in Assyrian a range of linguistic facts do not at all correspond with the characteristics of the Semitic languages hitherto known, and I have no right to doubt the Assyriologists when they tell us

there are such facts, it is evident to me that at least an effort must be made to investigate the relation of Babylonian and Assyrian not only to the sister dialects in general, but also especially to the native idioms of Africa. Of course, I should more correctly say, their relation to the probable original form of these idioms as it is to be discovered by exhaustive investigation. Let me remark, by the way, that Ewald did not know the real facts of the case, when he says, as above quoted (p. 421), that the termination of the third person of the perfect in *ûn* is something preserved from time immemorial in the Saho, but that this ending has been entirely lost in all the other Semitic dialects known to us, although it is a form thoroughly accordant with the original Semitic mother. The Arabic translation of the Psalms made in the diocese of Antiochia in 1050, which I recently published, has exactly this ending; to say nothing of Syriac (save that I purposely mention only A. G. Hoffmann, § 53, note 3, written in 1827).

It might be said, those who are thoroughly conversant with the comparative grammar and lexicography of the Semitic languages ought to undertake a criticism of the authorized Assyriology on the basis of the Semitic knowledge already obtained. It would not be absolutely impossible, in the nature of the thing, to satisfy this claim; but it is impossible, in the present condition of things. The number of those who have a right to a voice in the matter can be counted on less than the ten fingers, and for these such a criticism is not indispensable. Others would assuredly not be converted by a mere criticism, but would demand a positive reply to the whole question; since they would probably see in the multitude of details necessary to such an investigation and criticism as above required, nothing but much ado about trifles, or else ill-will. They would see this where nothing further really existed than the application of the faculty of reasoning from the smaller to the greater, nothing save the earnest endeavor to find the truth. Besides, in a question which is so closely allied with theological apologetics, there are too many interested to make it advisable to do otherwise than say a yes that means no.

The review just sketched will perhaps make it possible to see clearly how much will be dark in Assyrian even to any one who is skilled in Hebrew, Arabic, Aramaic. In like manner, another investigation, started at the suggestion of Oppert, but since left unfinished, will probably lead to a definite result respecting the polyphony of the Assyrian written character. If we may read one and the same sign, as *dich*, *umvus*, and *tip*; if "*most, if not all, of the Assyrian characters are polyphones*"; if the names Tigris, Babylon, Nabuchodnosor are expressed by groups of signs which at other times are read Bartikgar Sintirki, Anapasadusis, then this arrangement must have had a cause somewhere, although it seems to us, at first sight, like the work of insane persons. It is to be hoped that when this cause is discovered, and so the explanation of the phenomena, certain laws in the use of the signs will become evident.

In European languages something similar occurs to a small extent. Englishmen write the old sign for *litra*, that is usually an L, and read it "pound"; we write —, and read it "less," and also "minus." In stating a mathematical proportion we use the colon and the sign of equality, and we read the former "to," and the latter not "equals," but "is as." The sign for *litra* is the most suitable to serve us for an example. It points to the fact that the English are indebted for certain parts of their culture to an older people, one originally foreign to them. From Brugsch's Hieroglyphic-Demotic Dictionary, 1, 57 (aps), it may perhaps be gathered that we have to go very far back in our researches in this field. Oppert gave it as his opinion, in 1855 (see Z. D. M. G. 10, 288), that signs with double meaning in Assyrian writing belong in one of the meanings to the language of the people that invented the sign, and in the other meaning to the idiom of the nation that adopted the other nation's mode of writing. A rudely-sketched fish was read originally, perhaps, *ha*, because the inventor had called the fish *ha*. In Semitic tongues fish was called *nun*. Thus the same picture of a fish came to represent both *nun* and *ha;* the picture becoming unrecognizable as that of a fish, because it gradually came to be sketched not with lines, but with arrow-heads. I myself adhered long to this explanation of the matter, and even gave it public approval prematurely, in my "Gesammelten Abhandlungen," 217; but one circumstance now contradicts the explanation, viz. that the signs are not diphones, but polyphones. It is true that in 1855 it was taught that they were diphones, and nothing else was taught. It is not possible to conceive of four or five layers of peoples, so to speak, deposited one on the other, each belonging to a different lingual family, and each bequeathing its own reading of the common hieroglyphics to its extirpators and successors; the hieroglyphics remaining known and recognizable in spite of all the political revolutions and annihilations which had taken place, in spite, too, of the miserable mode of writing. The *beneficium inventarii* of inheritance probably did not extend, in those days, to the treasures of the mind. But even if Oppert's explanation of the phenomenon is impossible, some explanation of it must be obtained. It will be necessary to investigate the history of the writing in all the relations of part to part thereof. We may remind ourselves that it may be certain that the Cyprian syllabary arose under the influence of the same culture which wrote on the walls and earthen tablets of Assyria, and that that syllabary named must be instructive in the investigation of this culture. It is not flattering to Semitic philology that the process which has repeatedly been so easily successful in the Indo-Celtic field does not succeed in the Semitic.

After these expositions it will hardly be doubtful that thus far not even the foundations of an Assyrian philology have been laid broadly enough. One series of facts is already certainly obtained. More may be won if the students of Assyriology will only begin to go systematically to work,

if they will set about acquiring knowledge which we cannot do without, and which, as Assyriology now stands, must be had before investigators in other departments can attempt to co-operate. The Assyriologist must take for associate that sort of scepticism which tries a stone ten times before setting it into the wall of the building.

Again, it seems to me, pressingly urgent that the evil habit of ingratitude be not let spread over this field, that habit which now so widely overruns elsewhere. One may be almost certain concerning many books treating of Indo-German comparative philology, books now used and useful and highly esteemed, that nine tenths of what is in them is not the property of the man whose name stands on the title-page. The works on Assyriology are more easily numbered, and the workers are few. Only Hincks and Norris are no more: Rawlinson, Oppert, Ménant, Smith (now also gone, *Ed.*), Sayce, Schrader, still live. It would be well for the new science if there were prepared for it a book of reference, in which should be credited to each man what is his own, with exact references. No one likes to be unjust, and while there rules a race in Germany whose motto is *suum cuique*, it may even be held as patriotic to follow this watchword in all things. I think that the results of the investigation would be very surprising.

Gutschmid probably means Max Müller when, on page 128, he speaks of a talented linguist, who in an unfortunate hour coined the word Turanian; but that expression arose, not with Max Müller, but, further back, with Friedrich Rückert. I remember still very distinctly how, in November or December of 1844, in a conversation concerning the character of the South-Indian languages, Rückert surprised Müller and myself by the assertion that the lingual character of Turkish was exactly that of Tamul. cf. not my "Political Essays" (1853), for they are inaccessible, but my "Report on the present Situation of the German Empire," page 9.

On page 96 Nöldeke is thanked for the reference of the Syrian Agabatâma in Herodotus 3, 64 to Hamât, but Nöldeke is rich enough to be able to share these thanks with others. I myself have already treated this view as common property of the fellow-workers in this department of study (see Symmicta 121), although Gutschmid credits it to Nöldeke. F. Hitzig was the first to defend the view, as the ninth Thesis of his Dissertation "*de Cadyti urbe Herodotea*," on April 13, 1829, in Göttingen.

Both the treatises which were the occasion of Gutschmid's book are printed as a preface by Gutschmid.

It will be useful to note that I have written this present Article at special request.

PAUL DE LAGARDE.

ARTICLE XI.

ACROPOLIS OF ATHENS BY E. BEULÉ.[1]

This is a work of Art which has recently come to our notice, although it was published twenty years ago. The two volumes are devoted to descriptions of the old walls and fortifications of the Acropolis itself; the Propylaea and temple of Wingless Victory, the Parthenon and Erectheium. They are written with great care, in a simple and graceful style. The descriptions are accurate and graphic, and although often elaborate in their details, neither tedious nor obscure. The author's candor and courtesy of spirit, when dealing with the opinions of other writers at variance with his own, are admirable.

M. Beulé portrays the buildings as they are now in their ruins, and as they were once in all their beauty and magnificence. He brings to light the exquisite skill and nicety with which the Greeks adapted architecture to sculptural ornament, and made sculpture avail itself of architectural principles. Thus, in the porch of the Caryatides, the beautiful figures, like the columns of the temple, incline slightly inward, and their limbs bend in correspondence to their position. Those on the right of the portico facing the spectator bend the right knee, and the group on the other hand bend the left. Such a posture gives an aspect of resistance to the outer side of the Caryatides. Even the arrangement of the hair is made to give an additional support to the head. In order that the entablature may not press too heavily on the maidens which sustain it, there is no frieze, and the cornice rests upon the architrave.

For a long time the existence of sculptured figures on the frieze of the northern portico was not known. It was inferred from holes in the black stone for attaching bass-reliefs; and also from an inscription in the British Museum, — which is the Report of the Commissioners appointed by the Athenians long ago to give an account of the state of the Erectheium, — the expenditures, etc. The Commissioners say: "Around the temple is a frieze in Eleusinian marble. It has figures attached in bass-relief." Recent excavations near the Erectheium have discovered fragments of small figures corresponding to the height of the frieze; about the same time the accounts for the completion of the edifice were also discovered.

[1] L'Acrople D'Athènes par E. Beulé Ancien Membre de L'Ecole D'Athènes publié sous les auspices du Ministre de l'Instruction Publique et des Cultes. Paris: Firmin Didot Freres, Libraires imprimeurs de l'Institut. 2 vols. 8vo. 1854.

"We have bought," say the directors of the works, "two talents of lead for fastening the small figures of the frieze at Sostratus, of the burgh of Melitus, 10 drachmas." They also designate eleven or twelve pieces, name the artists which were charged with these, and indicate the price which was paid for them. These curious details deserve to be transcribed entire.

"*Phyromachus of Kephisia:* The young man with a cuirass, 60 drachmas; *Praxias of Melitus:* ... and the person seen from behind who drives him back, 120 drachmas; *Antiphanes of the Ceramicus:* The chariot, the young man, and the two horses which are yoked to the chariot, 240 drachmas; *Phyromachus of Kephisia:* The man leading a horse, 60 drachmas; *Myrmion of Agryle:* The horse, the man who strikes him, and the column which he has added later, 120 drachmas; *Soclus of Alope:* The man holding the bridle, 60 drachmas; *Phyromachus of Kephisia:* The man standing near the altar, leaning on his staff, 60 drachmas; *Iasos of Collytus:* The woman before whom the young girl is kneeling, 80 drachmas."

Among the pieces preserved in the little Museum of the Acropolis are two mentioned in this inscription: the young girl kneeling, work of Iasos, and the three rearing horses abreast, which were yoked to a chariot.

The question whether these marbles were painted is discussed very fairly; and that they were painted is, to our mind, satisfactorily proved. First, there are traces of colors, such as blue and green, about the triglyphs of the Parthenon, and ornaments of the ceiling and friezes of the various temples. Secondly, the accounts containing the very sums paid to the painters have been found and deciphered; thus: scaffoldings for the painters of the interior ceiling; painters — for having painted the cymatium on the interior architrave at the rate of five oboli a foot; gilders — for having gilded the conchs; to a painter who has painted the cymatium on the interior architrave at the rate of five oboli a foot, 113 feet; gold bought for the conchs, 166 leaves at 1 drachma the leaf, of Adonis, living in Melitus. These registers establish the decoration of the upper parts of the temple, but only of the upper parts.

Antiquity tells us that Phidias sculptured the great Chryselephantine statue of Athena. But we are left to conjecture whether the colossal statues of the pediments, the reliefs of the metopes, and the exquisite bass-reliefs of the frieze of the Parthenon are wrought by his hand, or designed by his genius. M. Beulé says: "I admit that, by the wish of Pericles, Phidias chose the men and distributed the works. But as it happens to-day in similar enterprises, each master, once called and his programme accepted, remains free and sovereign in his atelier surrounded by his pupils and workmen." Public opinion gives the name of Phidias more particularly to the frieze. His part in the vast work may have been the general design, the execution of some pieces for models, and a direct in-

fluence on the studies of his pupils. His inspirations, his counsels, his surveillance conducted the execution and sustained in an unknown manner the pupils whom he initiated in his art.

The elaborate description which these volumes contain of the Parthenon suggests many hints with regard to the architecture of Christian churches. The very structure of this temple indicates introspection, thoughtfulness, calmness, and dignity of spirit. Men who go into such a house of worship do not go in for the sake of looking out of the windows. The whole plan of the Parthenon is seen at once, and makes a permanent impression on the mind. There are fifty elaborate church edifices which we have looked at a hundred times, long before and long since we examined the Parthenon, but we cannot, even now, form in our minds an exact picture of those churches. Some of them even now are entirely indistinct in our memories; but the size and form and proportions of the Parthenon are indelibly impressed on our mind. It is certainly a great perfection of architecture that such rare beauty is allied to such admirable simplicity.

The Parthenon has been the delight and wonder of all ages. The beauty of its remaining stately columns still pleases the eye of the traveller. The blocks of marble are so firmly united that they look like one shaft. The shattered fragments tell how they were once put together. Each block had a square hole in the centre, into which was fitted a piece of hard wood, of a somewhat cylindrical form. The wood in the lower block had a round hole. The wood in the upper stone was prolonged into a pivot corresponding to the hole in the lower drum. These two were then placed the one over the other. In order to make the adhesion perfect, the surface of each of these blocks was divided into zones. The inner and outer were polished. The two others were hammered or slightly grooved, so that, in moving the top drum round upon the other like a mill-stone, all unevenness was ground into a powder, and every crevice was filled; not even the blade of a pen-knife can enter the joint. Many unfinished blocks lying on the ground have two ear-like projections on the rough stone for handles. After the operation of grinding is completed, these are taken off, and when the column is in place it is fluted.

It is scarcely forty years since the curvatures of the stylobate, architrave, etc., have been discovered. It is for want of these same curves that the Madeleine Church in Paris looks flat and sunken on the roof and elsewhere.

[The preceding is one of a Series of Articles on Art to be continued in future Numbers of the Bibliotheca Sacra].

ARTICLE XII.

GERMAN NOTICES OF MR. ROWLAND G. HAZARD'S VOLUME ON CAUSATION AND FREEDOM IN WILLING.[1]

This volume of a well-known manufacturer in Rhode Island has been translated into the German language. It has been briefly, but favorably reviewed in the *Literarisches Centralblatt* for June 24, 1876; also in the *Illustrirte Deutsche Monatshefte* for January 1877, and in other German periodicals. The following notice is from the *Theolog. Jahresbericht*, Vol. x. No. 12. We cannot but regard it as an honor to our country that the speculations of what we call a "business-man" and "a man of affairs" should attract so much attention among European scholars. He is studied by theological students as if he were a professed theologian, and by philosophical inquirers as if his life had been consumed in the schools.

'The author is highly esteemed in North America as a writer upon metaphysics. The present work, translated into German, shows that this esteem is well deserved. For many years I have not seen any philosophical investigations more sterling and more profound than these. And the results, in several of the most important questions of human knowledge and human life, at which the author arrives, seem to me to deserve in the highest degree the attention of all thinking minds. His problem is the great question of freedom in willing, in its relation to the general laws of the universe. It is notorious that our philosophers, and still more the naturalists of our time, are most of them about to decide this question in a way most unfavorable, if not destructive, to freedom. The answer is either pantheistic, — i.e. "determinative," — and sacrifices human freedom to unknown fate; or it is atheistic, — i.e. "naturalistic," — and sacrifices it to the Moloch of matter. Hazard shows that this method does not, and cannot, solve the mysteries of life, that it creates unending difficulties, and that it is as little honorable to the culture of our age, in other respects so great, as it would be to abandon the system of Copernicus, and to return to that of Ptolemy or Tycho Brahe. For to suppose, as many do in our time, that human actions are not a product of man's intelligence and will, but only of the space and time in which man finds himself; to suppose that all the facts and phenomena of the world do not depend

[1] Two Letters on Causation and Freedom in Willing, addressed to John Stuart Mill; with an Appendix on the Existence of Matter, and our notions of Infinite Space. By Rowland G. Hazard. English edition, Boston: Lee and Shepard. 1869. German edition, New York: B. Westerman, and Co. 1875.

upon an intelligent, self-knowing, and free-acting God, but on a multiplicity of unconscious and un-free agencies in matter — this fact "shows a retrograde movement in ideas, carrying us farther back than the mythology of the Greeks, or the rude notions of our Indian tribes, and landing us substantially in fetichism. Though the time is past in which mere power was deemed the proper object of worship, still, if we believed that all the beneficent and aesthetic conditions of existence were caused by material phenomena and events, we could hardly fail, as rational and emotional beings, to adore them" (Eng. ed. pp. 61, 62; Germ. ed. p. 65).

'The author shows it to be very difficult to pronounce more than bare suppositions on the originating cause of all things, or on the origin of the world. But one thing is certain: "All theories of causation, when traced to their foundation, must bring us to something which is already active, or that has in itself the ability to become so" (Eng. ed. p. 71; Germ. ed. p. 76). Can this be matter? Never! To understand its motion and action it would still be necessary to assume another force operating upon and preceding matter. Or might we believe that matter and mind have been co-existent from eternity? Once more, never! "We can only judge as to what was by what has since been. From secondary causes (or uniform modes of God's action now observable) the geologist seeks to trace the history of the formation of the rocks of our globe, through the mutations of a time which it overtasks the imagination to compass; as the astronomer, with a mightier stretch of thought, reconstructs the universe, and unfolds the mysteries of creation in its various stages of development. And if for all this we rely upon mere observation for our facts, and trust that the forces which we now detect in such minute proportions in the laboratory were then magnificently active in the great laboratory of nature, that the principles which now apply to the formation of a soap-bubble then applied to the formation of suns and satellites, may we not have as rational and as philosophic faith that the only power which we now know that can begin change, and modify and direct the material forces in our own little sphere, was then also active throughout the realms of space — that intelligence, so limited in us, in a mightier form sought, designed, and executed the symmetrical arrangement which so harmonizes with our own sentiment of beauty and love of order, with our aspirations for the sublimely vast and our admiration of the minutely perfect" (Eng. ed. pp. 72, 73; Germ. ed. pp. 77, 78).

'It is not matter; mind is the primary, the first cause in the system of the universe. And it is the power of mind, and by no means that of matter or physical substance, on which the individual facts and phenomena in the progress of the world depend. "That by observation we have found that certain events uniformly succeed certain other events is, then, a fact of great practical importance, enabling us to predict or conjecture, with more or less of certainty, the future course of events by which we are

liable to be affected. But it is thus important only for the reason that we have power in ourselves to act upon the future, and make it different from what, without our efforts, this uniformity in the flow of events indicates that it would be. If we had no such causal power, then this knowledge of the uniformity of the succession of certain consequents to certain antecedents would be of no practical importance, and inductive science would rank among those which merely furnish a play-ground for the intellect, or gratify an idle curiosity. It may be said that we only add our efforts to the other antecedents; but if we really do this, and thus change the subsequent events, or the order of them, we act as cause, modifying the effects of all causes extrinsic to us, though the relation of consequents to the antecedents, which embrace these efforts, is not less uniform than in other cases. Except in regard to instinctive actions, it is because of the uniformity in the effects of effort that we can know how to influence the future. This uniformity may arise from an occult connection, making it a necessity; but this does not affect the question of our freedom in making the effort" (Eng. ed. pp. 74, 75; Germ. ed. pp. 79, 80).

'The above quotation gives the principal contents of the first letter (Eng. ed. pp. 3–80; Germ. ed. pp. 1–84). The second and larger letter (Eng. ed. pp. 81–254; Germ. ed. pp. 89–274) mainly treats the question advanced by Hartmann's latest philosophy — how to consider the action of the active subject, since it is influenced by such untold numbers of outward relations and events of all kinds. Can we, in the face of these latter, really speak of freedom in human willing and human action? Or is all that man speaks, thinks, and does perhaps only a necessary result of the space and time in which he finds himself? Is the world in general and particular ruled by something conscious or unconscious? (To use an illustration of my own, must the political eminence which the new German empire possesses since the year 1870 over other powers be considered a mere result of the position of certain political constellations that unconsciously favorably arranged themselves? Or must we regard it as the consciously intended fruit of its own knowing and willing, of its progress towards power and liberty?) As might be expected after the first letter, the author takes a firm stand on the ideal side, on the side of consciousness and freedom of mind as against matter. He does not over-rate the truth of such expressions as "motion and action of matter." But if what happens must needs be the result of effort in some potent agent, he says, and surely with justice: "We never think or speak of the effort of matter. All effort is of the mind, which has no other mode of exerting its power" (Eng. ed. p. 120; Germ. ed. p. 129). "An unconscious effort is in thought as absurd as an unfelt feeling" (Eng. ed. p. 129; Germ. ed. p. 139). Of unintelligent matter it must be said that it "must be moved by something not itself, and then cannot stop its motion or change its direction, but for these also requires to be acted

upon by something not itself. A combustible material does not stop or change its course to avoid a consuming fire. An intelligent being will of itself stop or change its action to avoid painful consequences. To the action of a being with a faculty of effort, wants demanding effort, and knowledge to apply its effort to the desired ends, no extrinsic or prior application of power or force is requisite; for all that is necessary is that it should perceive that there is an occasion — a reason — for putting forth its own inherent power" (Eng. ed. pp. 137, 138; Germ. ed. p. 149).

'"It is urged by the advocates of necessity that the volitions are, and must be, in accordance with the disposition, inclination, desires, and habits; and, being thus necessitated, are not, and cannot be, free" (Eng. ed. p. 164; Germ. ed. p. 178). If this were true, we could not make criminals responsible for their offences; and society could do no more than to lock up criminals so long as there would be reason to expect criminal acts from them. In this connection, the author shows that we are logically reduced to the necessity of believing that the volition is conformed to the want and knowledge, not by any extrinsic power or force, but by the willing being himself; and such conforming being, in fact, the controlling or directing of his volition or effort, he in such volition or effort acts freely" (Eng. ed. p. 203; Germ. ed. p. 220). "The determination of a volition by the character is, in fact, the determination by the willing being" (Eng. ed. p. 210; Germ. ed. p. 227).

'The great question as to the relation between human freedom and the Divine government of the world receives the following answer from the author: "If there was any necessary incompatibility of Divine prescience with man's freedom in willing, he had, of these two alternatives, elected not to foreknow our volitions..... A Being of infinite wisdom does not require time to prepare in advance for what may arise, but can perceive at the instant what action is best; and if this preparation were necessary such a Being could anticipate every possible combination of conditions, and determine in advance what his action in each should be" (Eng. ed. p. 213; Germ. ed. p. 231). "God, even if he could foreknow the volitions of finite conative beings, may have chosen to limit his own knowledge, and not to foreknow them; and hence such volitions as they actually occur may become additions to his knowledge and the occasions of corresponding variations in his action. I have, however, also endeavored to show that all these variations may still be embraced in general rules of action in a more extended and complex uniformity, and that our efforts to ascertain the laws of nature, by which we are enabled to predict the recurrence of physical events, are only efforts to learn the uniform modes of God's action in reference to them. Even though there is a sphere in which his actions may be varied by that of other free agents, still there is a large material domain in which he may act as a sole First Cause,

and in which his action is not liable to be varied by increase of knowledge" (Eng. ed. pp. 220, 221; Germ. ed. p. 239). These are statements of philosophy in no respect inconsistent with the doctrines of Scripture. They find room for what the Scriptures tell us from the first page to the last — that the love of God wisely limits human freedom, but never in any wise destroys it. The Appendix (Eng. ed. pp. 255–281; Germ. ed. pp. 275–315) adds two interesting essays on the Existence of Matter, and our Notions of Infinite Space.' †

ARTICLE XIII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

A. GERMAN WORKS.

Böhmer's "History of the Development of the Scientific View of the World in Germany" (Geschichte der Entwickelung der natur-wissenschaftlichen Weltanschauung in Deutschland), though of course not professedly polemical, is to a considerable extent so in reality. The author does not, indeed, take the idealistic or spiritualistic side in scientific questions; on the contrary, his sympathies seem in the main to be with the mechanical, sensualistic view of man's nature; but still he does not form the high estimate of the theories of Darwin to which such men as Häckel and others incline. He allows the value of Darwin's investigations, but does not think his speculations altogether valid. It is an interesting contribution to the general subject.

Professor Karl Völker, in his "Popular Cosmogonic Lectures" (Populäre Kosmogonische Vorträge) favors a totally different view of the primeval development of our planet from that of the advocates of the theory of transmutation; namely, that which is based on the theory of ice ages, propounded by Schmidt. In this respect he is said to be akin to, if not a follower of, the celebrated botanist and palaeontologist, Professor Heer of Zürich.

Professor Häckel of Jena, who almost out-Darwins Darwin in his popular lectures on the natural history of creation has met with some sharp criticism. In the course of these lectures he maintains that Goethe taught something like Darwinism; but Dr. Oscar Schmidt proves him to have confounded ideal transmutation, a metamorphosis of the animal and vegetable types, with the now popular doctrine of the descent of all living things from one or more original germs.

Between Häckel and the celebrated traveller and ethnologist Dr. Bastian, who edits the valuable *Ethnologische Zeitschrift*, there have also been some hot skirmishes. Bastian says it is "childishness in the advocates of the

theory of evolution or descent to suppose themselves able to see through the plan of the law of the universe on the ground of the fragmentary knowledge afforded by this little corner the earth, and to attempt to trace out a regular development from protoplasms to man," and, amongst other things, describes Darwin's work on man as the "dreams of an afternoon napper." Häckel, in return, charges Bastian with ignorance of the facts in question, incapability of understanding the theory, lack of philosophical acquaintance with the world of phenomena, immeasurable confusion; and concludes his tirade with the words: "It is an interesting and instructive circumstance that those men are chiefly indignant at the discovery of the natural development of man from the monkey, between whom and our common tertiary ancestors there is the least observable difference, whether as to intellectual capacity or cerebral characteristics." Verily, our scientific men ought not now to talk about an *odium theologicum*, but about an *odium scientificum*. They certainly equal even the seventeenth-century theologians, which is saying a good deal.

Prof. Dr. F. Körner's "Animal Soul and Human Mind" (Thierseele und Menschengeist) is an attempt to show that there is truth in common both in the materialistic and what he terms the idealistic view of the world; but, though in many respects commendable, fails to show any sympathy with a positive Christian view of religion and morals. His point of view is the humanistic one so common in Germany.

To the same school, in the main, belongs *Dr. Edward Reich's* "Man and the Soul (Der Mensch und die Seele); or, Studies in Physiological and Philosophical Anthropology and in the Physics of Daily Life."

Dr. Albert Wigand endeavors to reconcile the fundamental idea of Darwinism with the assumption of a distinct creation of species, in his "Genealogy of the Primitive Cells as a Solution of the Problem of Descent or the Rise of Species with Natural Selection."

In the pamphlet entitled "The Dissolution of Species by Natural Selection," the anonymous author aims to show that the necessary result of a development in accordance with the principle of natural selection will be the final reduction of all organic species to one single, universal organism, in which meet the respective characteristics of plant, animal, and man; the final abolition of everything positive in the domain of culture and morals; and the complete conversion of man into an animal — a complete *reductio ad absurdum*.

Not because of its value, — for scientifically it is a mere hash-up of other men's thoughts, — but because of its violence, would we notice the work of *C. A. Specht*, entitled "Theology and Science" (Theologie und Wissenschaft). The following are samples of his expectorations: "It is against those black sons of night, those authors of intellectual bondage, the parsons, that the weapons of free thought, reason, and science must be directed." "The whole of parsondom, no matter of what creed, must be

sent to the right-about; that bogy theology must be cast into the lumber-room of monstrosities and absurdities." "Therefore," cries he, "O men of the earth, purify yourselves at last from blind faith, so that an end may be put to the swindling existence of those greedy blackguards, the parsons."

The anonymous author of "Creation and Man" indulges in very similar language, though he is not so completely carried away by his passion. He maintains that "a religious confession has never more than a very subordinate value, inasmuch as it misleads men to hypocrisy, indolence, and cruelty. In the great struggle between impulse and emotion, will and conscience, lie and truth, it is the fastness into which impulse, will, and lie retreat after every defeat, in order to collect strength for new attack." He also talks about delivering the people from "the claws of a demagogic parsondom." How a man in his senses can discover demagogues among the Protestant clergy of Germany is a mystery.

Very ambitious is the undertaking of *Dr. Dulk* in his book, "Animal or Man? A Word about the Essence and Destination of Humanity." Starting with the axiom that "the scientific question started by Darwin, which was a necessary product of the intellectual labor of the present century, bears a new world in its womb, and that if it be finally affirmed it must overthrow a view of the world and religious dogmas which have lasted thousands of years and were deemed everlasting," he proposes, "by drawing out from the source of the present consciousness of cultured man, and comparing the vital phenomena of the animal with those of man, to give such expression to the unity and distinction of the two as clearly to discover the boundary line where both creations meet and separate." In carrying out this design he collects a large number of facts, especially such as are due to religious fanaticism, which, in his view, show that man is merely a higher kind of brute. His own position seems to be a pantheistic one; and he speaks of "spirit as the brute-vanquishing ego of all men, or ego of humanity." A wretched production, but a sign of the times.

Dr. Alex. Braun, Professor of Botany at the University of Berlin, seeks in his brief treatise on "The Significance of Development in Natural History" to show that creation and development are not incompatible conceptions, if we regard creation not as belonging merely to the past, but as a continuous, omnipresent, divine activity. Darwin's theory, he believes, sets forth the history of this development or creation correctly in all essential features. To his mind it is an elevating, rather than a degrading, thought, to look upon man as the last and highest link in the great chain of development, and as thus so closely connected with the rest of nature as to be in the truest sense its son.

The philosopher *K. Ch. Planck*, who is a disciple of Schelling, declares open war against materialism in his work, "Truth and Superficiality of Darwinism," etc. He would have the law of development take its start from "the dominating inner concentration of the parts, and have its

essential nature in their progressive development" — whatever that may mean; whereas Darwin endeavors to explain "the organic from the co-operation of the individual inorganic elements." He does not complain of the effort to show that the development from the indifferentiated homogeneous whole to the complete differentiation and individualization is contained in the domain of the organic; but objects to the external, mechanical way of dealing with it. Herein, also, he seems to us to be right. An evolution, a development within the world, so to speak, would accord with the facts; the outward development advocated by Darwinists lacks, to say the least, adequate support in the region of fact. Planck's work contains much deep thought. Its chief defect is that too much German patriotism is mixed up with his philosophy and science for our taste.

The new edition of *Professor Ulrici's* very able work, "God and Man," contains some admirable remarks on the relation of Darwinism to morals and law. An idea of his position may be formed from the following words: "Law roots, it is true, immediately in the ethical nature of man; ultimately, however, in the nature of God. God himself is the absolute right, because he is the final ground and the absolute condition of human morality."

In the recent editions of his "Force and Matter," *Dr. Büchner* seems to favor the practice of abortion, and appeals as it were in its favor to the custom of such "natural" peoples as the Chinese and others.

The well-known traveller and anthropologist, *Dr. Gustav Fritzsch*, in his work on "The Natives of Africa Ethnographically and Anatomically described," laments that Darwin should have given up the caution observed by him in his earlier publications, and become untrue to himself by forsaking the soil of scientific observation for the great ocean of speculation. He also blames him for seeking to effect by bold theorizings what his investigations could never definitely settle.

The geologist, *A. Stutz*, of Zürich, raises his voice against the pantheistic theology of the Zeitstimmen party in Switzerland, and avows his belief in a God free from nature, and its Creator, in his revelation, in Christ, and in the miracles of the Bible, looked at from the point of view of science; and he is an able man — as able as many who take the opposite side. The title of his work is "Natural Science, a Free God, and Miracles. An Apologetic Discussion from the Point of View of Natural Science."

In his "Anthropological Studies," *Herr P. Rauch*, of Augsburg, has shown that the assumption of the descent of the race from one pair is scientifically admissible. He criticizes very acutely the positions of men like Vogt, Häckel, and others who are both Darwinians and upholders of the multiple origin of mankind.

The third and concluding volume of *Dr. Ludwig Weiss's* "Anti-Materialism" contains much that has an apologetic value, though its author's

own point of view will not strike ordinary Christian believers as very self-consistent. For example, though he accepts the facts of original sin and the atoning death of Christ, he rejects the Trinity and the Divinity of Christ. This volume specially addresses itself to Hartmann's "Philosophy of the Unconscious." The same writer has also given an able exposure of the feebleness and inconsistencies of Strauss' "The Old and New Faith," in a work bearing the same title. A whole series of books, indeed, has been directed against Strauss, written from the most divergent points of view. The best are by Froschammer (noticed in a previous number of the Bibliotheca Sacra), Huber, Ulrici, Zirngiebl, Nietzsche, Bona-Meyer, and Nippold. It is a satisfaction to find that even in Germany such extreme and fanatical materialism as that of Strauss' book awakens profound dissatisfaction. Huber and Ulrici write from a theistic point of view, as also Zirngiebl and Bona-Meyer; though the last-mentioned is the least positive and least favorable to the Christian faith. Nippold is a modern Heidelberger rationalist, who, whilst defending theism and religion — and, indeed, in a sense Christianity — cannot away with orthodoxy. Nietzsche is the most severe — severe alike in pity and mockery. "As Strauss speaks of his new faith no evil spirit will speak; in fact, no spirit at all; much less, a genius." He calls Strauss a "rank Philistine," the "representative of a class peculiar to modern Germany — the fanatical Philistines." The following words exhibit his spirit: "If I thought that young men could not only bear with, but even value a book like this, I should renounce all hope for their future. Can this confession of a wretched, hopeless, and truly contemptible Philistinism be the expression of the thought of the thousands whom Strauss included in his 'we'? and are these to be the fathers of the next generation? If so, he must feel as Goethe felt when he gazed into the sad atheistic twilight of the *Système de la Nature* — the book wore to him so dark, Cimmerian, and deathly a look that he had difficulty in bearing its presence, and shuddered at it as at a ghost."

Gustav Theodor Fechner, in his "Ideas on the History of the Creation and Development of Organisms," accepts the Darwinian hypothesis, though with important limitations and modifications; because, as he asserts "every other hypothesis is marked by the same imperfections in a very much higher degree." At the same time he confesses himself "unable to understand the opposition raised by the most decided Darwinians against the participation of a conscious creative activity in the rise and development of organisms, and thinks it due to the self-contradictions and illogicalities in the views of scientific men." He believes that "the universe, and especially the earth, have been produced by conscious activity, working with conscious prevision and for definite ends." This is important testimony to be borne by so eminent a philosophical authority as Fechner.

One of the most satisfactory scientific refutations of Darwin's theory is that given by *Dr. Albert Wigand*, the able Professor of Botany at the University of Marburg, in the first volume of his work, "Darwinism and the Natural Science of Newton and Cuvier." His general position may be gathered from the following words of his preface: "In Darwin's theory we have to do, not with one of those hypotheses which spring up in science at all times, and which either serve as new building material, or are soon cast aside, but with a purely scientific speculation. Further, its significance lies not in the scientific problem discussed by it, but in the fact that it is an attempt to introduce a totally new fundamental conception of nature and of the task of science — a conception which, if adopted, would lead science altogether astray." This strikes us as perfectly correct; this, too, is the secret of the hold Darwin's views have taken of the public mind. Not as pure science, but as a philosophy of the universe, have they been welcomed, especially by those who think they eschew philosophy. Dr. Wigand does not, however, reject all Darwin's results. He allows that there is a certain truth in the ideas of a struggle for existence, and of natural selection, but denies that the examples of artificial selection are valid evidence, and thinks that Darwin has in general pressed his facts far too strongly. In his opinion, Darwinism limited to the animal and vegetable worlds is not only compatible with, but leads to, faith in God as the Author of nature and of the moral law; but he regards it as a fatal blunder to have extended the theory to man, and as the sign of a total incapacity to understand man's spiritual nature. On this ground he believes it to be destructive of religion, and therefore destitute of truly scientific value, inasmuch as a religion without a living God is scientifically indefensible, and pantheism gives us merely the show and shadow of true religion. The work merits careful study by those who are capable of entering into its reasonings.

As far as mere science is concerned, much the same complaints are advanced against Darwinism by *Dr. Adolf Bastian*, in his "Geographical and Ethnological Sketches," as well as in his "Letter to Professor Dr. E. Häckel." He charges the adherents of Darwin with "apostasy from the genuine and true method of investigating nature," with "dishonesty towards the public."

Dr. Friedrich Pfaff, of Erlangen, does not avowedly assail Darwinism, but furnishes a good deal of evidence in his work on "Geology," of the purely hypothetical character of many of its theories and assertions. He insists strongly and most justly on the necessity of carefully discriminating between, and never mixing up together, as Darwinians mostly do, the sure results of investigation and the guesses or reasonings from modern analogies. By carrying out this canon he shows the baselessness of many of the positions of Lyell, and the consequences deduced therefrom by the Darwinians.

Another able geologist, writing in the same spirit, is *Dr. Ulrich Stutz*, Lecturer at the Polytechnic of Zürich. His blows are aimed mainly at his fellow-countrymen, Lang and Biedermann, and against Strauss. The title of his work is, "The Old and New Faith, or Christianity and Naturalism."

With the speculative boldness characteristic of the school, the *Freiherr du Prel* extends the idea of the struggle for existence even to the heavens, in his book, entitled "The Struggle for Existence in the Heavens. The Darwinian Formula shown to be applicable to the Mechanism of the Stars." One of his chief illustrations is taken from the ballet: Just as the ballet-dancers, after performing their harmonious movements, meet behind the scenes, then get into collision with each other, and afterwards return to resume their harmonious circlings and interweavings, so in the heavens!" More need not be added.

Friedrich von Hellwald, in his "History of Culture in its Natural Development down to the Present Time," almost outbids Büchner, in his assurances that the diffusion of the knowledge of the original and close relationship between man and the monkeys will be a saving gospel, and is the fundamental condition of scientific progress in every direction. He also prophesies that the time is not far distant when this will be the faith of universal humanity. In his view the history of religion is itself the history of human error. As to morals he says, "A morality in the abstract sense of the term does not exist; it is not a metaphysical, but a purely human, conception, changing according to time, nation, and needs." The corruption of morals, he maintains, progresses in direct ratio to the progress of Christianity!

Hartmann, the author of the "Philosophy of the Unconscious," has undertaken, in his "Self-Disintegration of Christianity, and the Religion of the Future," to inaugurate a new religion. He considers Christianity bankrupt, liberal Protestantism impracticable, and agrees with the opinion of Heine, that "pantheism is the hidden religion of Germany." "It is a vital question for the religiosity and idealism of humanity that pantheism should be engrafted on the consciousness of modern civilized peoples." "Christianity is opposed not only to science, but to every sort of culture." "Modern culture must render it impossible for those who participate in it ever to be believing Christians." Herr von Hartmann is plain-spoken, if he is not very complimentary; but his assurance seems to us to be proportioned to his ignorance.

Häckel's last work, entitled "Anthropogenesis," consisting of lectures delivered to students at Jena, is said not to contain much that is new, except, perhaps, the new assertions how certain his old positions are, and how good it would be for men to accept them. He hits hard all around, or at any rate tries to hit, not only priests and parsons and religious teachers generally, but men of science who disagree with him. Agassiz,

for example, is accused of "setting the phenomena of organic nature on their head by regarding them through the seven-angled prism of theological dreaming." In the name of a progressive knowledge of nature, he protests against the limits imposed on our capability of explaining mental processes by Dubois-Reymond, in his celebrated lecture on the "Limits of our Knowledge of Nature." That scientist's *ignorabimus* he considers parallel to the papal *ignoratis*. He evidently is not lacking in self-confidence. One of the wonderful features of his system — as indeed of all the Darwinians — is the way in which they hypostatize and anthropomorphize time, development, evolution, and the like abstractions. One would really almost fancy that the old gnostics had risen from the dead, and had resumed, under modern guise, their old play with Sophia, Pleroma, and the like. Given these mysterious forces "development" and "time," and you can "develop" any sort of "development" that can possibly be "developed." S.

B. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN WORKS.

THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF ANIMALS. With a Study of the Relations of Living and Extinct Faunas as elucidating the Past Changes of the Earth's Surface. By Alfred Russel Wallace, Author of the "Malay Archipelago," etc. With Maps and Illustrations. 2 vols. pp. 607, 503. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1876.

The perusal of these volumes has fanned to a flame an enthusiasm which has been smouldering from our youth. While yet in our teens we remember reading from beginning to end the ninth edition of Lyell's Principles of Geology. No work of fiction could have excited more interest. The charm of that great work lay not only in the lucid array of facts, each marvellous in itself, but far more in the perceptible bearing the facts had in illustrating the comprehensive processes of nature. The present volumes of Mr. Wallace touch the same chords of interest with those which responded to the great work of Lyell; and their perusal revives the impression, long entertained, that most authors who attempt to popularize science do not aim high enough. The search for truth is the most stimulating of all pursuits; and when the leader understands his prerogative, the young mind will follow him over a long and rugged pathway to obtain the prize.

Mr. Wallace is a Darwinian, but not a blind Darwinian. He believes in the derivative origin of species, but expresses his conviction that such investigations as he has entered upon in the volumes under review "may not improbably lead to the discovery of some hidden laws (supplementary to natural selection) which seem to be required in order to account for many of the external characteristics of animals" (Vol. ii. pp. 553).

The doctrine of the derivative origin of species is now used as a new "calculus" by which to obtain from the present distribution of animals

some knowledge of the past condition of the earth's surface. If the present distribution of species has come about through natural causes, it follows that attention to the facts regarding that distribution may throw light upon what the divine method of creative activity has been. The facts over which philosophical naturalists are now at work are not all so recondite but that an unscientific reader may see their bearing. We can give no better idea of the volumes under review than by presenting the elements of one or two among the large number of similar problems considered in them, and which, on the theory of the author, are capable of solution, but appear to be insoluble on any other. The Canary Islands lie in close vicinity to the west coast of Africa, some of them being not more than fifty miles distant. The Madeira group are to the northwest of the Canaries, and about four hundred miles from Morocco. The Azores are still farther in the same direction, being in the mid-Atlantic, nearly a thousand miles west from Lisbon. These islands are of volcanic origin, and all rise out of the ocean from a depth of from five thousand to eighteen thousand feet of water. It is therefore improbable that they ever had any land connection with the continent. Now, according to the general rule regarding the animals inhabiting islands thus situated, there are no native mammals upon them, except bats, though the conditions are admirably fitted to sustain numerous species of mammals when once they are introduced. The only indigenous animals, besides the land molusks, are birds, bats, butterflies, and beetles, whose presence can be accounted for by their power of flight when aided by the furious storms which sometimes sweep outward from the continent. In nearly every case, this animal life has its closest affinities with the species of Europe and Northern Africa. Of the two hundred and thirty-six genera of beetles from the Madeira group, forty-four are peculiar to the Atlantic islands. "Most of them are, however, closely allied to European genera, of which they are evidently modifications." A most striking fact regarding these genera of beetles is the prevalence of wingless varieties. "This is especially the case with groups which are confined to the Atlantic islands, many of which consist wholly of wingless species; but it also affects the others, no less than twenty-two genera of which are usually or sometimes winged in Europe having only wingless species in Madeira; and even the same species which is winged in Europe becomes, at least in three cases, wingless in Madeira, without any other perceptible change having taken place. But there is another most curious fact noticed by Mr. Wollaston — that those species which possess wings in Madeira often have them rather larger than their allies in Europe" (see Vol. i. pp. 206–216). Now for the explanation. It is easy to see that with beetles on a stormy island the absence of wings may be an advantage. If the beetle has no wings he will not use them. If he possesses only moderately strong wings, more likely than not he will be using them when a storm is arising, and that

will blow him into the sea, and he will be drowned. If, however, he has unusually strong wings he may get back; and so, as is frequently the case, the middling sort of individuals will drop out of existence, since they do not have the advantages of either extreme. There are two methods by which to attempt an explanation of these complicated facts; one of which is that these beetles were directly adapted to their conditions of existence by an act of immediate creation. This would account for the wingless condition of some and the superior power of wing in others, since these are both, though for opposite reasons, real advantages. But the hypothesis of direct creation does not explain the existence of rudimentary wings in many, and the conformity in pattern of all, to that of beetles on the nearest continent. On the contrary, the hypothesis of indirect creation of species through "descent with modification" by natural selection, explains all the elements of the problem, and furnishes no less evidence of design. Common descent from European forms explains the affinity to those forms. As a rule, other islands, which present the same conditions with these except that they are adjacent to some other continental area, have their affinities of animal forms with those other areas. The survival of those individuals best fitted for the conditions is a real power to secure the variation. A calculus which solves such problems as this by the score cannot be utterly rejected by thoughtful men, however much it may be abused by ardent and incautious reasoners.

Space does not permit more than an allusion to one other of the large number of analogous phenomena here treated. The Lemuroid group of animals belong to the same order with the apes. Their distribution is most singular. The sub-order Lemuroidea "consists of three families, the species of which are grouped into six sub-families and thirteen genera. One of these families and two of the sub-families, comprising seven genera and no less than thirty out of the total of fifty species, are confined to the one island of Madagascar. Of the remainder, three genera, comprising fifteen species, are spread over tropical Africa; while three other genera, with five species, inhabit certain restricted portions of India and the Malay islands" (see vol. ii. pp. 176, 179). The above facts are naturally explained on the supposition that these genera and species are the divergent varieties of a very ancient common stock of Lemuroid animals which had access to the distant regions in which they are now found. On changes occurring in the contours of the continent they became isolated, and under different conditions diverged, in response to their surroundings, into their present forms; the original stock having long since disappeared. Fossils of this group are found in the early Tertiary strata of Europe.

But it is impossible to give more than a glimpse at the contents of one or two of the eleven hundred pages of our author. The presentation of the facts in the order observed in these volumes is a new thing under the sun, and is an interesting result of the new departure which has been made recently

in scientific speculation. Part I. (Vol. i. pp. 1–104) treats of the Principles and General Phenomena of Distribution; Part II. (Vol. i. pp. 106–170) of the Distribution of Extinct Animals; Part III. (Vol. i. pp. 173–485; Vol. ii. pp. 1–164) of Zoölogical Geography: a Review of the Chief Forms of Animal Life in the Several Regions and Sub-regions, with the Indications they afford of Geographical Mutations; Part IV. (Vol. II. pp. 166–553) of Geographical Zoölogy: a Systematic Sketch of the Chief Families of Land Animals in their Geographical Relations. The volumes are provided with numerous and excellent maps and illustrations. To persons inclined to the study of nature the book is of surpassing interest. Notwithstanding the fact that the work abounds in details, the author is doubtless correct in believing "that any reader capable of understanding Lyell's 'Principles,' or Darwin's 'Origin,' will have no difficulty in following the main arguments and appreciating the chief conclusions arrived at" (Preface, p. xii). Mr. Wallace wisely decides to omit man "from the series of the animal kingdom as here given"; remarking that "Anthropology is a science by itself; and it seems better to omit it altogether from a zoölogical work than to treat it in a necessarily superficial manner."

To the student of philosophy and logic, desiring to become familiar with the processes of inductive reasoning, the volumes under review are indispensable. The book is doubtless a forerunner of what will be a most important class of scientific literature. The path over which our author has gone as a pioneer will soon be a beaten path. Those who tread it may at every step find some new interpretation of the system of nature. They may read by the way, and with fresh satisfaction, a newly-discovered handwriting of God. But their path runs parallel with that trod by theologians. We see no reason why there should be anything but friendly intercourse between us and our fellow-travellers on the highways of science. Let us provoke one another to good works, and not to evil. If the men of science can restrain themselves from attempting to distil theology from nature, we will be modest about trying to draw science from the Bible. Theology is no doubt in nature; but it is in a very diffused condition; and the unaided reason never can gather enough of it from that source to be of practical service. Doubtless, also, there is science in the Bible; but it is as the clothing to spiritual truth. The letter killeth; but the Spirit maketh alive. G. F. W.

Commentary on the Gospel of St. John; with a Critical Introduction. Translated from the second French edition of F. Godet, D.D., Professor of Theology, Neuchatel, by Frances Crombie and M. D. Cusin. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 462. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong. 1876.

The translators of this volume are two ladies, who seem to have per-

formed their task very well. Professor Godet is well known to our readers as the author of a Commentary on Luke's Gospel, and of other valuable works. In and some time after the year 1843 he was the esteemed preceptor of the present crown prince of Prussia, and is now highly honored by the Prussian royal family. His excellent religious character appears in all those parts of his Commentary which relate to the distinguishing doctrines of the evangelical system.

St. John's Gospel described and explained according to its peculiar Character. By Christoph Ernst Luthardt, Professor of Theology at Leipzig. Translated by Caspar René Gregory, Doctor of Philosophy, Leipzig. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 339. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong. 1876.

In this and other volumes Mr. Gregory has shown himself to be a faithful and pains-taking translator and editor. In minor particulars Dr. Luthardt differs from Dr. Godet. Each of the commentators has his own peculiar spirit. Luthardt is more disposed than Godet to linger on the difficult questions suggested by the fourth Gospel. Godet is more perspicuous and transparent than Luthardt. The two commentators interest us by their differences from each other. They interest us the more, however, by their agreement. In the main they teach the same truth; and each of them is the more instructive on account of the other.

The Life and Writings of St. John. By James M. Macdonald, D. D., Princeton, N. J. Edited, with an Introduction, by the Very Reverend J. S. Howson, D.D., Dean of Chester. 8vo. pp. 436. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1877.

This volume was published simultaneously in England and the United States. The author of it having been, during his life, a contributor to the Bibliotheca Sacra, is well know to our readers. He died while the sheets of the present volume were in press. The volume bears the marks of the author's originality of mind. It is peculiarly valuable in showing the influence of our Saviour upon the "beloved apostle"; and thus explaining the evangelical doctrines which were suggested to the apostle's mind by his intimacy with the great Teacher. The deeds and words of Christ were the theme of John's profound meditation during the three years of Christ's ministry on earth; and although these deeds and words were not clearly understood by the disciple during those three years, they must have had a peculiar influence in preparing him for his subsequent revelations. He was more meditative than the other disciples, and apprehended more vividly than they the character and instructions of his Master. His thoughts on that character and those instructions were, under the influence of the Paraclete, the means of working out the scheme of doctrine which is more or less clearly intimated in the Gospel, the Epistles, and the Revelation of John.

A Dictionary of Christian Biography, Literature, Sects, and Doctrines; being a Continuation of the "Dictionary of the Bible." Edited by William Smith, D.C.L., LL.D., and Henry Ware, M.A., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in King's College, London, Chaplain of Lincoln's Inn. Vol. I. A–D. 8vo. pp. 914. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co. 1877.

This work is designed to furnish a collection of materials for the history of the Christian church from the time of the apostles to the age of Charlemagne. It will not include the distinctive branch of "Christian Antiquities"; that branch being reserved for a separate work, of which the first volume has been published already, under the editorship of Dr. Smith and Professor Samuel Cheetham. Many of the ripest English scholars are engaged on this Dictionary of Biography, and it promises to be one of rare worth. The biographical sketches in the first volume are characterized by extent and accuracy of research, as well as condensation of style. We have seldom read so many short biographies with so little temptation to criticize any defect in them. There is a want of uniformity in the orthography of the proper names; as, for instance, in the Article on Chrysostom we read of Monica, but in the Article on Augustine of Monnica. There is an occasional obscurity in the style of some of the articles. There is to be published a Supplement to the Dictionary, designed to correct the errors which the volume contains; errors which are absolutely unavoidable in a work written by so many scholars, and on so large a variety of topics. Such a work is not to be judged by its few blemishes, but by its many excellences. The citations of authorities in the volume are particularly valuable. The writers have had access to the best original sources of information.

Questions awakened by the Bible. By John Miller, Princeton, N. J. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co. 1877.

The three questions discussed in the volume are: 1. Are souls immortal? 2. Was Christ in Adam? 3. Is God a Trinity? The first discussion occupies 178 pages; the second 97 pages; the third 152 pages, 12mo.

The author of this volume is not a clear writer; his meaning can be apprehended in process of time, but not at once. He is not a calm writer; he fatigues his readers by his impetuosity. He is not a plausible writer; he makes no effort to search out acceptable words. We think, however, that he deserves attention. He attempts in his volume to prove (1) that the soul of man is not immortal; that the whole man dies, is buried, and, at the last day, is raised; (2) that as we were so Christ was in Adam; "that Christ, however, was regenerated from the womb"; "that he was redeemed," and, "though liable to all our curse," he fought "a most fearful battle," and obeyed the law perfectly; (3) that, although Christ is God, yet God is not a Trinity; that the doctrine of the Trinity is unreasonable and unscriptural.

To the orthodox doctrines on these subjects the author presents, now and then, an objection worthy of regard. On this account, and on account of his originality of thought, he deserves to be read. Although he has not refuted the orthodox doctrines, still orthodox writers may learn from him to be more careful in their style. The advocates of truth are often responsible for harmful error resulting from their loose statements. It is often said by a parent punishing his children that he himself suffers a chastisement in the pain which he inflicts; in his act of correcting the faults of his offspring he feels himself corrected for his own fault; *his* fault was the occasion of *theirs*. We suppose that Mr. Miller expected to be disciplined by his Presbytery for the theories taught in his volume. We hope that some of the divines who unite in condemning those theories will ask the question, Do not we, by our unguarded language, drive our readers into heresy? We may use terms in such a way as to suggest errors which would otherwise have never seemed plausible. Speaking of a certain evangelical treatise, a Unitarian divine remarked: "I should never have been a Unitarian if I had not read that work." Now if a few sentences in that treatise had been changed, and if the substance of their teaching had been expressed in more accurate language, many sermons and poems which have been written in the spirit of Unitarianism would probably have been written in the spirit of Orthodoxy.

LANGE'S COMMENTARY ON THE HOLY SCRIPTURES:

VOLUME V. OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. — The Books of Samuel. By Rev. Dr. Ch. Fr. David Erdmann, General Superintendent of the Province of Silesia, and Professor of Theology in the University of Breslau. Translated, enlarged, and edited by Rev. C. H. Toy, D.D., LL.D., and Rev. John A. Broadus, D.D., LL.D., Professors in the Theological Seminary at Greenville, S. C. 8vo. pp. 616. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. — The style of Dr. Erdmann is involved and cumbrous. The translators must have found peculiar difficulties in it. The Commentary is, in general, a good one. Occasionally we meet a sentence which might with propriety be omitted. One of Osiander's remarks is: "Christians, too, must not be judged by the outward walk, since commonly, through the infirmities of their flesh, they have a bad appearance; while hypocrites, on the contrary, make a good show in their life" (p. 220). This sentence in its connection may be rightly understood. The additions which the editors of this volume have made to the homiletical and practical remarks are particularly valuable.

VOL. VII. OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. — The Books of the Chronicles, Theologically and Homiletically expounded by Dr. Otto Zöckler, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Greifswald, Prussia. Translated, enlarged, and edited by James G. Murphy, LL.D., Professor in the

General Assembly's and the Queen's College at Belfast, pp. 273. Prof. Murphy gives a new translation of the text instead of adopting the authorized English translation. The language of Dr. Murphy is more exactly accordant with the Hebrew, but is less rhythmical than that of our English Bible.

The Book of Ezra, Theologically and Homiletically expounded by Fr. W. Schultz, Professor in Ordinary in the University of Breslau, Prussia. Translated, enlarged, and edited by Rev. Charles O. Briggs, D.D., Professor of Old Testament Exegesis in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. pp. 100. — Dr. Briggs inserts no *useless* notes; none merely for the purpose of saying something. All his notes are pertinent and opportune.

The Book of Nehemiah, Critically and Theologically expounded, including the Homiletical Sections of Dr. Schultz. By Rev. Howard Crosby, D.D., LL.D., Chancellor of the University of New York. pp. 62. — This exposition by Dr. Crosby illustrates the advantage which an American expositor has over a German expositor for American readers; just as a German has an advantage over an American for German readers.

The Book of Esther, Theologically and Homiletically expounded by Fr. W. Schultz, Professor in Ordinary of Theology at Breslau, Prussia. Translated, enlarged, and edited by James Strong, S. T. D., Professor of Exegetical Theology in Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, N. J. pp. 96. — Dr. Strong has made some valuable additions to this work, especially on pp. 18–20 and 25–27. Professor Schultz's Section on the Canonical Dignity of the Book of Esther, pp. 11–18, is particularly valuable. We wish that it had been more expanded.

Sermons for the Christian Year. Translated from the German of the late Richard Rothe, D.D.; with a Preface by William R. Clark, M.A., Prebendary of Wells and Vicar of Taunton. From Advent to Trinity. 12mo. pp. 379. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong. 1877.

Nineteen of these sermons were translated by Miss E. Prince of Taunton; nine by Miss E. M. Brand of Edinburgh; one by Miss K. Clark; and one by Miss F. Prince. The whole translation has been revised by Rev. W. R. Clark. The translators deserve praise for their skill. Rothe's style is a difficult one. It is interesting to read his practical sermons; they are so different from his *Ethik*.

The Women of the Arabs. With a Chapter for Children. By Rev. Henry Harris Jessup, D.D., Seventeen Years American Missionary in Syria. Edited by C. S. Robinson, D.D., and Rev. Isaac Riley. 12mo. pp. 372. New York: Dodd and Mead.

"The threshold weeps forty days when a girl is born." "The best

son-in-law is the grave." Similar to these are many Arabic proverbs illustrating the contemptuous feelings of the Arabs toward the female sex. The volume of Dr. Jessup contains many affecting descriptions of the woes which women are condemned to suffer among this barbarous people. It was once deemed a virtue to bury female children alive. "To send women before to the other world is a benefit." "It is said that the only occasion on which Othman ever shed a tear was when his little daughter, whom he was burying alive, wiped the dust of the grave-earth from his beard." Dr. Jessup's volume abounds with illustrations of the fact that a man will often continue to cherish reverential feelings toward what he knows to be unworthy of them (see pp. 269–272). When his judgment is in exercise, he despises the objects which in moments of excited feeling he will adore. For its many instructive lessons this book deserves a wide circulation.

ARCHOLOGY; or the Science of Government. By S. V. Blakeslee, Oakland, California. 16mo. pp. 164. New York and San Francisco: A. Roman and Co. 1876.

This volume is written in a clear style and with much force. Its author is an independent thinker. He has wrought out his own system, and expressed it in his own way. While we do not coincide with him in some positions which he has taken, and do not approve of some phrases which he has adopted, we still have examined the book with much interest, and believe that the influence of it will be salutary. Mr. Blakeslee's views of the science of government are in the main rational, conservative, conformed to the spirit of the Bible as well as to the dictates of conscience. He deserves attention, for he is an enthusiastic as well as an independent inquirer for the truth; a sound and honest thinker. If the members of our national congress and state legislatures would study the eighteen chapters of this volume, they would obtain more definite ideas in regard to the science of government than they can obtain from the vast majority of all the speeches to which they are condemned to listen. Our legislators need to consult such a volume as Mr. Blakeslee's, and conform to it in their spirit and action.

SHORT STUDIES ON GREAT SUBJECTS. By James Anthony Froude, M.A., Late Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford. 12mo. pp. 400. Third Series. New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong. 1877.

This volume resembles the two preceding Series of Essays by the same author, and needs no further commendation.

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE CONCEPT OF GOD.

BY REV. GEORGE T. LADD, MILWAUKEE, WIS.

A THEME at once so promising and so transcendently lofty as this, demands of him who ventures to write his thoughts underneath it, an immediate disclaimer of undue pretensions. The author of this Article lays no claim to the discovery of any metaphysical secrets. He knows of no new instrument, like the intellectual intuition of Schelling or the dialectic development of Hegel, by which to view, as they are in themselves, the mysteries of the Divine Being. He is of opinion that the ancient organon of knowledge, the human soul, is trustworthy. He does not even venture to promise any wholly new light upon any of the questions with which he is to deal, much less the complete solution of any of them.

It cannot, however, fail to appear to any careful observer of the course of current thought, that questions which concern the reality and nature of the Personal Absolute, whom faith calls God, are the leading theologic questions of the day. Theology is called in question, not so much as to the validity of its special dogmas, as to its right to existence at all. The "stream of tendency," the "One not ourselves," coming from Greek thought, and the personal I Am, the One revealed in ourselves, coming from the Hebrew heart, have met each

other in the world's highway. Are the two one? and is that one the One everlasting and true, the absolute and infinite God? To answer these inquiries the thinkers of the age are taxing the resources of thought. The true, permanent answer does not depend upon the decision of investigators; it will be given vitally in the experience of the individual, in the history of the race. But the answer, so far as the investigators can furnish one, must consist in more thoroughly analytic criticism of the facts and laws of nature, history, and consciousness.

What each investigator especially needs is a point of view from which to conduct the criticism of difficulties. From such a favorable point of view we should be able to distinguish between real, insuperable difficulties, and alleged but removable ones; also to see in some measure wherein and why the real, insuperable difficulties are such.

In the January number of this Quarterly there appeared an Article upon "the Origin of the Concept of God." The view then expressed may be summed up in two or three sentences: "This concept is the resultant of God's revelation of himself to the human soul"; "It is a centre upon which converge many lines, not only of argument, but also of intuition, feeling, and purpose"; "The organon for receiving the divine self-revelation is the entire soul of man." I do not say that this way of viewing and authenticating that knowledge of God which the human soul furnishes will solve any of the difficulties which accompany the knowledge. On the contrary, it shows that many of the difficulties are necessarily involved in the constituent elements of that knowledge. It does, however, seem to furnish help for the classification and criticism of these difficulties. It seems to offer suggestions which may be used so as to show whence and why the difficulties arise, in what they consist, what is their rationale, so to speak, and what ones among the whole number are likely to be either lightened or solved by the progress of the race. So far as the former discussion has led to a true opinion upon the nature of this concept as to origin, it

will also help to a true opinion upon its nature as to its obscure and seemingly contradictory elements.

The object of the present Article is, then, *The Classification and Criticism of some of the Difficulties of the Concept of God as they appear when examined in the light of the former Article upon the Origin of this Concept.* And though the present Article can be only fragmentary, it is our hope to make it so much one with the former, that whoever accepted the truth of that will be helped by this over difficult and dangerous paths of research.

We enter, then, the present discussion with a certain basis laid in that which has gone before. We find the truths from which to take our points of starting in these following statements, which are corollaries of the central truth just stated, viz. "The concept of God is the resultant of God's revelation of himself to the human soul."

According to this view of the origin of the concept of God, all knowledge of God is of the nature of divine self-revelation. God unrevealed is an unknown God. This statement is true of every form of knowledge, however derived from any of the manifold sources of self-revelation, in which the divine is made known to man. The proof of this statement consists partially in a criticism of the forms under which all knowledge comes to the human soul. All knowledge of principles is in some sort a self-revelation of God; and the subjective necessity which marks all principles as such, is an assertion of the divine vigor with which their revealer impresses objective law and fact upon the organon through which his revelation is made. The postulate of all rationality in man is a self-revealing God. But the special proof of this statement is discovered when we analyze the concept and the organon through which the concept is given, and observe how the truths given in the concept correspond with the faculties given to the organon. The analysis shows us one common source for the soul which knows God, and for the facts and laws which reveal God. The facts and laws thus take the form of a self-revelation of the same

One who constituted the soul capable of receiving the revelation.

And, farther, according to this view of the origin of the concept of God, there is a certain necessary disparateness between the finite organ and the infinite object of revelation. Known as self-revealed to the finite soul, God cannot be fully known; there must always be more beyond in the boundless recesses of divine being. And according to the laws of intellectual research, this necessary incompleteness of every concept of God will give rise to difficulties insurmountable by the intellect. Comprehension is the work of the intellect, and the intellect is not satisfied until it can comprehend. The intellect never rests in its concept so long as there are in it elements which baffle its attempts at detecting their genesis and at classifying them with the other elements of the concept. Not only is intellectual research stimulated by this uneasiness, but it also tends to stimulate the more practical and emotional activities of man. Reverence, awe, and sense of mystery feed upon the food which is but husks to the intellect. Trust, love, hope, and self-sacrificing obedience thrive upon the hardships of the understanding.

According to this view, however, there is implied in the fact of any divine self-revelation at all, a participation in the divine nature and in its real truth upon the part of man. The dictum which Mr. Mansel quotes with approval, "To know God as he is, man must himself be God," is ambiguous and unsatisfactory. But when Trendelenburg asserts, "We apprehend God, so far as we apprehend him, only through that in us which is of divine lineage, through the necessary in knowing and through the good in purposing, and, above all, through the union of the two,"[1] — we find in the assertion a philosophic basis for believing at once in the limitedness and in the objective validity of our knowledge of God. "And God said, let us make man in our image, after our likeness."

This view of the origin of the concept of God makes the

[1] Logische Untersuchungen, ii. p. 507.

entire soul of man the organon for the divine self-revelation; and in doing this it also makes the constitutional soundness and symmetry of man's total being responsible for the validity of the concept. It forces, then, either the acceptance of the truth about God, or the alternative of utter scepticism as to all fundamental truth and utter misplacement of man's deepest intuitions and cravings.

This view also indicates with much clearness the source and nature of some of the special difficulties which men have with the concept of God. Some of the difficulties are seen to be due to such weakness and lack of symmetry in the organon as have an ethical significance. It is not as pure intellect that man is like God, or fitted to know God; but as endowed also with moral affections and ideas, with free will, and with a spiritual nature. We may, therefore, have error and confusion from the trenching of one set of faculties upon another, or from the choice to exclude the revelation from any one of its channels of influx.

This view of the origin of the concept of God suggests the truth that the divine self-revelation to man must be historic, evolutionary. It must take the form of an objective process, conditioned for its acceptance in different stages upon the point reached by the soul of man in a corresponding subjective process. Historic limitations and a historic process of freeing the soul from limitations are of the very essence of divine self-revelation. God reveals himself in connection with historic phenomena and processes. That which is back of all development does not itself develop; but the revelation is given to us in the form of development. It is only as in pursuit of a goal that God is made known to us. It is only as itself being more and more lifted forward toward the comprehension of the goal that the soul is fitted to apprehend the truths which appear in the process of development.

These corollaries, derived from the argument upon the origin of the concept of God, will for the present sufficiently indicate the points of view from which I now propose to

consider some of the difficulties of the concept. The former argument will also furnish a classification of these difficulties.

If "the concept of God is the resultant of God's revelation of himself to the human soul," the difficulties of this concept may be divided into three classes, according as they belong (1) to the object itself, so far as it is unrevealed, (2) to the organon through which the revelation is made, so far as it is made, and (3) to the changing relations which exist between the revelation and the organon. God himself, the soul itself, and the process of revelation, will all be concerned in the criticism of these difficulties.

The first class of difficulties are those which forever inhere in the unrevealed being of God. They render it forever impossible that God should be adequately, in all his essence and attributes, comprehended, or otherwise known, by man. If perfect comprehension were necessary to any valid knowledge whatever of objective truth, the dictum "to know God as he is, man must himself be God," would be the final word upon the matter. These difficulties of the first class — if we may venture to give a name to anything so shadowy and impossible definitely to fix — we will call the transcendental. They are not capable of statement in any form of words which is not itself self-contradictory. They are the outcome of that constant conflict between the consciousness of limitation and the longing to pass the limits which ministers, *as a conflict*, to the growth of the human soul. As soon as these difficulties are driven to fix themselves in any definite shape, they pass at once out of the transcendental sphere. They then become difficulties which are to be investigated and distinguished between, as either inherent or removable, by a criticism of the contents of consciousness. But the shadow of the more beyond still rests upon them.

"The means are wanting," says Trendelenburg, "to a direct and adequate knowledge of God." Supposing the metaphysical problems all settled to the satisfaction of all disputants, supposing an entire agreement as to the objective validity of a certain concept of God, as to the personality of the Abso-

lute, as to all the cognizable qualities, motives, and laws of this Personal Absolute, there would still remain the impulse toward dissatisfaction, the suspicion of difficulties in the more beyond, which belong to the transcendental nature of the object of the concept.

Even in the case of the finite and conditioned our knowledge of the necessary is indirect, and there is always the suggestion of a shadowy something which is beyond the positive contents of consciousness. There is no commonest act of sensuous observation which, when analyzed, does not make us feel the vastness of the unrevealed more beyond; for there is vastly more than we can know in the smallest object of sense. Of all the forms of sense which surround us we may truly say, as Sir William Hamilton makes the church Father, "materiam spiritumque cognoscendo ignorari et ignorando cognosci" is the only way to real knowledge. There is a vast transcendental field of both finite and infinite being, of the qualities of which we can only declare that they are unrevealed, and therefore unknown to us. The unrevealed infinite meets us on every hand and in every act of our finite knowledge. We know the whole of nothing. Know as fully and as truly as we may, there is much more beyond, involved as a fact, but not disclosed as to its mode, in every act of knowledge. The skirts of the Infinite are heard sweeping by us in every moment of intuition, but the hand of the Infinite is over our eyes. The wind which the train of his glorious raiment awakens plays upon the harp of feeling, but bears to us no definite knowledge of the unseen face of the wearer of the raiment. But when the hand is removed we behold his hinder parts, and live. In the case of perception by the eye we do not complain of our limitations. We examine, indeed, to find the grounds upon which rests our confidence in the act of vision. We criticise the contents of vision to determine what of them are accidental and phenomenal merely, what are by their necessity proved to belong to objective and eternal truth. We do not spend much time and strength in longing to know by vision qualities of matter

which either are not in themselves visible, or can never, because of their lack of relation to our organs, become visible to us.

But it is the peculiarity of the metaphysics of absolute being that it is not content to remain metaphysics; it longs to overleap the barriers and come into some impossible sort of communion with what is beyond. This longing is part of the stimulus toward the divine which acts from so many points of impact upon man. It can never, however, give us what it is neither in the will of the Self-revealer nor in the capacity of the organ of his self-revealing to permit.

Nor are these difficulties escaped, nor even intrinsically lessened, by introducing some extraordinary means or act of knowledge. Were the knowledge thus gained valid it could never be complete. Let the soul soar to heights of logical development or intellectual intuition, far above all ordinary ken, beyond all realms of self-conscious experience, it still comes down from its sublimation both dazed and panting for more breath and light. Beyond that which is itself beyond all the intuitions of ordinary man there is still infinitely more. Were it true, as the mystic metaphysician informs us, that "there dwells in us all a secret wonderful faculty, by virtue of which we can withdraw from the mutations of time into our innermost disrobed selves, and there behold the Eternal under the form of immutability," the longings of the soul would not even thus be satisfied. The "secret wonderful faculty" of Schelling, in so far as it is faculty, is only a limited means of knowing; it, like every most common-place faculty, can bring only knowledge limited by its own construction.

We find, indeed, the vain attempt to transcend by some act or process of knowledge the limitations which belong of necessity to all our knowledge of both infinite and finite, in those systems of the philosophy of theology which Hamilton and Mansel have criticized as though they were mere word-building. But those systems, judged by a criticism which includes the full contents of consciousness, are somewhat more than

mere word-building. They contain, in pretentious and often invalid form, the real substance of the truth which we need to recognize in our present contest with the philosophy (?) of nescience. So far as they pretend to knowledge beyond the limitations of all knowledge, they are fallacious. So far as they insist upon the correspondence between thought and real being, so far as they afford a ground for insisting upon the objective validity of those acts of the soul by which the eternal realities of the divine are conveyed, in the form of necessary ideas and principles, to the soul, they are true and helpful counter-irritants of positivism.

Mr. Mansel is indeed right in his metaphysics when he criticizes these German philosophers for their failure to found their systems in a criticism of consciousness. But much of his own criticism is as abstract and contradictory of the contents of consciousness as are the systems he criticizes. The critic of philosophy should no more enter the battle in the vale of Valhalla than the philosopher himself. Joining in this battle, he may find that he has unwittingly given a sword thrust, not to the shade of an opponent, but to the real person of a friend. We can posit the incomprehensible, but not the self-contradictory, through faith. We, too, believe with Mr. Mansel that "to know God as he is, man must himself be God," if by this sentence is meant that no adequate and complete revelation of the divine is possible within the finite organon of revelation, and that all our knowledge of the divine must therefore be fragmentary and unsatisfying. But we quite dissent, if by this sentence is meant that no revelation at all corresponding to his being is possible for God, and that the organon of revelation can give us no ground for affirming the objective validity of its own work. The necessary forms of sense-perception may be only some among many unknown forms of knowledge; and they certainly give conditions to all our perceptions of things of sense. But to affirm that they are *only* regulative, that we have no right to aver the real correspondence of things to the forms, is a step beyond toward the gulf of utter scepticism. Surely the very

conditions of all knowledge aver it to be limited. But it may, nevertheless, contain postulates and intimations and intuitions which reveal the absolute truth beyond. Only a perfect analysis, ending in complete breaking up of all the foundations of thinking, can warrant us in saying that this partial is, though confessedly partial, also unfaithful to the reality of things.

Thus much, then, seems true of this first class of difficulties inherent in the concept of God. Only so much of the divine is known as has been revealed to us. The unrevealed God is the unknown God of Mr. Spencer and his followers. Of the infinite whole which is back of and beyond all the divine self-revelation, we can only say that it is there. We are driven to the affirmation by the constant unrest and dissatisfaction which we find in all known forms of the concept, regarded as fit to satisfy in full the desires of the rational soul for knowledge. That which is transcendental in God also stimulates us to the the sense of awe, mystery, and worship before the unknown. To God unrevealed, to that in the depths of the divine being which he has not disclosed to us, we cannot say that any of our terms of knowledge apply. We know God as a person; but we feel that our conception of personality does not adequately represent the whole being of God. We believe in him — granted that we know him — as the Absolute ; but we also believe that the word and the idea of the absolute does not adequately represent God. The heart affirms him as Heavenly Father; but the term father, sweetest of all in which to express our more practical relations, we are confident is quite below the unrevealed reality of God. He is first cause and causa sui — so revealed to us; but terms of condition and causality do not fully set him forth. We summon all the glorious names with which men have learned to address the Eternal One, and taken all together they give, when analyzed, in one grand picture the sum-total of the self-revelation of God; but they do not tell us of the more beyond, except to affirm that it is there.

In criticizing the second class of difficulties found within

the concept of God, we shall need to remember the truths just stated. These difficulties, however, unlike those of the first class, present themselves in forms of thought which demand criticism and contain positive contents of objective validity. Yet a false philosophy of nescience would have us treat both classes alike. With the claims of nescience fully carried out, metaphysics is transcendentalism. With it, therefore, difficulties which require research into the foundations of knowledge are transcendental difficulties. Of course, then, it finds the concept of God not merely inadequate; it finds every possible concept self-contradictory. This its theology is the spurious child of its false philosophy. To it the sphere of infinite being is not light in the centre, but is shaded into obscurity along its infinite stretches in every direction from the centre of light; to it there is only darkness, formlessness, and void in all the vault of infinite being.

That is to say, such results in philosophy and theology as these, nescience claims in general terms as the precious boon of all mankind. But in the special terms in which even the claim is made, whenever it defines itself, there lie always concealed vast stores of positive knowledge. The very treasures of truth, formally banished by deliberate act of judgment from the kingdom are smuggled in again by some naïve unconscious decree of judgment. To know as much as Mr. Spencer, for instance, knows in his denial of the divine self-revelation, is almost enough for a wise man to know of God. "A great deal, it appears," as Father Dalgrains sarcastically remarks, "is known about the Unknowable." The Unknowable is indeed expected to move feeling and influence the practical life; for it is printed in large letters to excite fear, it is conjectured, "like grenadiers' caps."

In proof that the various elements of this concept of God correspond to certain positive and definite contents of consciousness, we cite the following facts of experience. And first of all, the very dispute shows the reality and persistence of human convictions as to the subject in dispute. If the concept of God in some form or other perdures, and the

difficulties which attach themselves to it perdure, this of itself tends to assure us that in some positive contents of human thought we must seek the reason, and in part the answer, for these difficulties. There is something where so much dust of controversy arises; so much intellectual fuss is not about absolutely nothing.

And farther, the manner of stating and discussing the concept with its difficulties clearly shows certain definite forms of the positive contents of consciousness which give rise to these difficulties. Nothing is more certain than that men have certain definite conceptions which they name God; that they believe in the objective validity of their conceptions; that they insist upon the fatherhood of the Infinite, the personality of the Absolute, and upon many other alleged verities of religious sort. But the persistence of the concept of God, and of its difficulties in these special and definite forms, shows that the philosophical treatment of the concept in regard to these forms is at once a gift to, and a demand upon, the human soul. In considering, then, the personality of the Absolute and other similar questions, to resolve all the phenomena into impotency and try to sweep them off the board of analytic dissection with one majestic wave of the hand is merest child's play. There have been many attempts to put out the candle of theology's logic, as preparatory to putting out the light of the human soul, in whose indestructible thought, feeling, and purpose positive theologic truth has its warm hearth, its fruitful womb. "Put out the light, and then — put out the light." The extinguisher has fallen upon the tallow and wick of argument; but the light, the soul in which the truth of God shines, will not therefore be put out.

And farther, in proof of the unceasing demand made by this concept upon the critical faculty, to find in the elements of the concept real knowledge of objective verity, we are to notice how the soul of the destructive critic avers the impracticability of his own attempt at destruction, when in the very act. So often as the giants of destructive criticism go

over the field of proof and cut down the ripe stalks of the theologic harvest, they are forced to leave enough seed to sow again the entire field. The sentence which the author of "First Principles" quotes with much evident approval,— "A God understood would be no God at all," — contains a certain undoubted truth; we cannot perfectly comprehend God. But it is a long way from this sentence to the one with which he closes the same chapter on "ultimate religious ideas," and declares, as the result of conclusive argument, "The Power which the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable." Mr. Spencer himself knows it is *not* "*utterly* inscrutable." For he has himself made the illogical, but inevitable leap from thought to being, has learned to call the objective reality a Power, and spell it with a capital, has found it manifested in the universe. And if manifested by the universe, may we not examine the form of manifestation, and conclude something as to the nature of the Power? No; for the Power is utterly inscrutable. Yes; for it is manifested in the universe, and known as Power. There is something more to note in all this than the imbecility of language, or even the impotency of human thought about the Absolute; there is pre-eminently to note the strength of the soul's postulates and primitive convictions triumphing over the logic of nescience.

Nor does the writer from whom Mr. Spencer quotes so largely escape making an example of himself to the theologian, even though engaged in offices supposed friendly to theology. It is a singular anomaly when the philosophy which fights so valiantly to rescue the objective in the region of sense-perception from the clutch of sceptical idealism surrenders without a blow in defence when the objective in the region of truths necessary to religion is attacked by a sceptical positivism. In the Absolute and the Infinite, written in capitals to excite veneration, and arrived at through impotency and the consciousness of "counter inabilities," we have no interest at all. With such terms, handled in purely abstract fashion by either philosopher or critic of philosophy,

anything may be done in the way of word-building and logomachy, nothing can be done in the way of coming at truth. What is put into them at first by him who uses them may be, so often as he will, taken out of them again; but in all the process of shortening and elongating the contents no new substance of information is gained.

Should Mr. Mansel or any one else succeed in disproving the authority of the positive contents of consciousness to testify to objective truth about God, he would overthrow the rational grounds of religion. No refuge of faith would save the case; for the act and faculty of faith must establish themselves by the very authority which has been discredited. It is not juggling with abstract terms, but faithful criticism of all the contents of the soul, which is needed in dealing with these difficulties.

The entire discussion increases our conviction that there is with man positive truth about God. To this conviction — Hegel while asserting a philosophy which finds the Absolute in the very process of thought itself, Mansel while denying to all philosophy the power to establish the objective validity of this process in which Hegel found the Absolute, Spencer while laying again the foundations of a philosophy in which the Absolute is known only as the Unknowable, "writ large" — all alike contribute elements of strength.

In dealing, then, with the second class of difficulties, we may begin our work of criticism with the conviction that certain positive and definite contents of consciousness correspond to all the elements in the great concept of God. The work will raise this conviction to the dignity of the postulate which really underlies all attempts at philosophical criticism of this concept.

The work is such as to demand criticism which is both metaphysical and complete — in the meanings of these adjectives which subsequent discussion will explain.

Metaphysical criticism of the difficulties of the concept of God is that which examines the concept, to find what elements of objective validity are in it which distinguishes the

accidental from the necessary, and which tests the ground upon which the so-called necessary rests.

And the criticism of this concept must be what I have called complete, as well as metaphysical. It must be such criticism as recognizes all the phenomena, and makes the self-conscious effort to adjust the relative weight to which are entitled the elements contributed by all the various parts of the soul. The soul of man is the organon of the divine self-revelation. The criticism of those difficulties of the revelation which are due to the constitution of this organon requires, then, a thorough knowledge of the human soul, so far as psychology at present furnishes the knowledge. Not only the grounds and objective validity of the soul's necessary truths must be tested; but the activities of the soul in their manifoldness, the relations of reciprocity, harmony, and what I may call supplemental quality must be taken constantly into the account. It must not be permitted that intellect ride out of its sphere and over-ride feeling. Feeling must not be allowed to nauseate rationality by taking it upon its unsteady boat and over the disturbed seas of its changeful voyage. Yet must it be remembered that there is eternal verity in feeling, and criticism can detect it. There are truths wrapped up in the heart's embrace through all the centuries of human life, and gentle, heartfelt philosophy can disentangle them. Complete criticism will also recognize and aver the sphere of faith, and as well of freedom. It will consider how in faith the soul not only lays all the foundations of her most cherished knowledge and of her dearest convictions, but also how in faith she lifts up herself eternally above the clouds of scepticism, the snow-capped summits of intellectualism, into the immediate sunlight of God. Complete criticism will also recognize how, even in the work of the senses, seemingly standing at the extreme from faith, there is concealed the presence of the Absolute, and how the problem of their power to testify to objective truth under the form of necessary notions and intuitions is closely interwoven with the problem of the objective validity of the concept of God.

Nor will the complete criticism of which I speak fail to recognize everywhere the dominant and yet limited power of choice in man — a power which weaves into every argument for God, and every objection to each argument, the element of choice, and which constantly calls the soul to decide between what is pleasing to the senses or to the pride of learning, and what is subject rather of spiritual trust, hope, and enlightenment. Such criticism will always aver the existence of a spiritual nature in man, of a part of the human soul which is peculiarly adapted to be the organ of the highest self-disclosure of God.

The difference between the application of barren dialectics and complete metaphysical criticism to difficulties of this kind may be illustrated by a passage from an author already quoted. In answer to Schelling, Mr. Mansel asks, in his Metaphysics (p. 273): "Can I be conscious and not conscious, substance and accident, reality and phenomenon, personally existing and merged in the absolute, at one and the same instant, in one and the same act?" To such barren questions we may reply either Yes, or No, according to the positive contents we have put into them. To the question, "Can I be conscious and not conscious at one and the same instant, in one and the same act?" we may reply: Yes, I can, in a certain sense which it is very important to investigate. The activities and possibilities of my finite ego are very far from being measured by, or wholly indicated in, any individual act of consciousness. Whether I can acquire knowledge, and even go through processes of ratiocination, out of self-consciousness, or not, is certainly a question which admits of debate. My selfhood of which I have never been conscious is doubtless, as intimations derived through my conscious self inform me, decidedly the larger part of me. And as to being substance and accident, reality and phenomenon, at one and the same time, all the validity of my knowledge not only, but of my being, depends upon this being possible for me. However incomprehensible, the thing is realized in every act of self-consciousness. Even

the last question may be answered affirmatively: I am "personally existing and merged in the absolute," my personality is grounded in the divine; for "in him we live, and move, and have our being."

Since, then, the existence of positive and definite contents of consciousness given in the elements of the concept and the need of thorough metaphysical criticism are apparent, we will call the second class—The Metaphysical Difficulties of the Concept of God. They are such difficulties as inhere in the nature of the organon through which the divine self-revelation is made to man. But such difficulties are twofold, according as they concern the objective validity of the concept and the power of the organon to authenticate its concept, or concern the harmony and adjustment amongst themselves of the various elements contributed within the one organon to the one concept. Of the second or metaphysical class there are, then, two kinds of difficulties, which we will call the ontological and the psychological.

The ontological difficulties arise in the attempt to authenticate the objective validity of the concept of God. Thus far in all our discussion we have spoken only of a *concept*. But what about the reality? To the very word "concept" there is attached the suggestion of unreality. That there are and have been manifold human conceptions of God there can be no doubt. But scepticism inquires whether these are not mere misconceptions, and whether there be a reality underlying them all. If such reality exists, then in the next step criticism can inquire, What is it?

Every discussion of the ontological difficulties should keep constantly in mind the following truths:

First, every inquiry into reality of whatever sort ends in ontological difficulties similar to those which lurk concealed in the concept of God. In all research we come ultimately upon the same problem, and are forced to ask ourselves: Does the concept, though resulting from clear and necessary intuition and logical correctness of reasoning, after all correspond to the reality of things?

Secondly, in no form of the inquiry can we find any guarantee which is not, directly or indirectly, given us in the process or product of thought itself. We cannot compare the concept with the reality, because we cannot have the reality given to us in some form other than the human form of knowledge, nor see by some process other than that of comparison whether the two agree or not.

Thirdly, we find in every act and product of thought elements which reveal themselves as necessary, and which by this their form of revelation contain postulates of the reality of things. These elements of knowledge the soul grasps and holds as a veritable possession of objective truth. There is in the grasp and grip of the soul the conviction not of impotency and of being regulated, but of strength and of being made the subject of a divine self-revelation. The metaphysical limits of the human mind are not so much sources of weakness because they are limits, as sources of strength because they mark off the domain in which the mind holds sovereignty over its own subjects.

Fourthly, not only is the guarantee of objective validity to our thought given in the necessary of thought itself, but this guarantee is practically sufficient for all men, philosophically so for him who understands aright the true philosophy of human thought. Thought postulates the objective validity of its own work. In all thought, then, is involved, as the very condition of its existence, the conviction that reality is cognizable and actually known by the soul. And, to use the words of Trendelenburg, "this confidence would be a contradiction, if somewhat thinkable were not presupposed in things themselves, if truth were not presupposed in the actual." All finite thought is the result of the interpenetration of the finite mind with real being; and to reach the case in hand we may add, All finite being is interpenetrated with divine thought. Therefore,

Fifthly, the concept of God, like every other concept containing elements of necessary truth, asserts its own objective validity in the persistence and necessity of those elements.

Yea, this concept affirms its objective validity in that it takes up and unites the various necessary elements of human thought, and appears of its own nature as the one concept presupposed in every form of human thought, in every form of objective being, and especially in the correspondence of the two. The true link between the two realities of thinking soul and thinkable universe is found in the reality of God.

Sixthly, even necessary truths offer themselves in some sort to the soul of man for free and rational acceptance. As the conclusion of all ontological research, there remains the call to a choice; and in the last analysis intuition and trust, the act necessary and the act in some sort spontaneous, are seen blended together. The receptive attitude of insight toward fundamental truths is at the basis of all philosophy. But these truths, if not accepted to be with choice and joyfully held, do not cease their regulative function nor their insisting upon such acceptance. In the case of the concept most lofty and comprehensive, the elements of choice are of all the most important. Atheism, then, whether in the form which denies God, or in that which refuses to affirm him, must ever remain invidious. No courtesy of belles-lettres or Christian charity can altogether remove its odium. For atheism results from the refusal of the soul to affirm its confidence just upon the one subject of human knowledge which is not only most important and comprehensive as subject of knowledge, but also most obligatory and helpful as object of trust and love.

With these preliminary remarks, we proceed now briefly to sketch the grounds within which lie all the proofs of the objective validity of the concept of God. The objective validity of the concept of God is given both as the postulate of conviction and as the result of argument.

The objective validity of this concept is the postulate of conviction. We may argue from the conviction; but it is not as furnishing the basis of argument that this conviction does its most efficient work. Its work is vital, rather than logical. History and self-consciousness alike show us that,

argue as they may, men cannot successfully argue against God — that he is pleading his own cause with a hundred indestructible voices in the constitution of the soul. As the basis of the argument the postulate may seem a *petitio principii;* but as the vital effect of a divine self-revelation it will inevitably, in the long run and the large number, gain its holy cause. The undying conviction remains, and will do its work. To the conviction, indeed, in some form or other, all its sceptical critics are fain to come round. Mr. Spencer postulates an "inscrutable Power," which the universe manifests to us, as the most certain of all objective verities; Mr. Arnold, "an eternal not-ourselves, which makes for righteousness." We accept their concessions only as special and fragmentary forms of the same conviction which dwells within ourselves, viz. that by thinking man knows the reality of God. But the cause will live without their concessions: it has God and the soul upon its side.

The objective validity of the concept of God is also given as the result of argument. Science — it is true in some sort — may, if it will go deep enough, arrive at the underlying fact from which, as the postulate of conviction, religious instinct and faith take their rise. It does not, however, arrive at this fact by direct argument. The objective validity of the concept of God cannot be the conclusion of a direct argument. For the ontological difficulties, in the case of this concept as elsewhere, concern first principles and the basis of all truth; and "first principles, as principles, admit of no direct proof, but only of indirect verification." In all consciousness the primal, most important elements never emerge to be looked at in their naked and abstract reality; yet they are just the elements which are underneath and present in every act of consciousness, and which alone make self-consciousness possible. Strictly speaking, there is no consciousness of the ego, nor of freedom, nor of time, nor of space, nor of any of the necessary forms of thought. The real things are the very ones which I never meet face to face, and what I do thus meet is what I call phenomenal,

unreal. But in every act of self-consciousness there is found entangled, as postulates of all its acts, and of thinking and being as well, certain verities given to the human soul. Thus God is, so to speak, found entangled in all the phenomena of self-consciousness and of the objective universe.

It will be seen that what I have called the postulate of conviction is the same thing under another form with that which I now call the result of an argument. Only, in the argument the soul has become conscious of the postulate — *has reasoned its way up to the postulate, and found it there.*

The objective validity of the concept of God is reached as the conclusion of an indirect proof, when we consider God as the postulate of all thought. In all thought there are detected universal and necessary elements, and in every mind there is revealed a work of order and of rationality. If a "not-ourselves which makes for righteousness" is the postulate of moral law and order, a not-ourselves which makes for rationality, and reveals his own rationality within us, is the postulate of all thought. No explanation of evolution, no concatenation of phenomena, goes one step toward unfolding the mystery of human thought, until we ground it in a universal thinking being, not ourselves. All thought is possible for man only as a divine self-revelation; a divine revealer is the postulate of all thought. Cogito, ergo sum; Cogitamus, ergo Deus est; these sentences are alike not the inferences of a syllogism, but the simple averment of postulates of thought — one upon the subjective, the other upon the objective, side.

The objective validity of the concept of God is also reached as the conclusion of an indirect proof, when we consider God as the postulate of a thinkable universe. To be the object of thought the universe must be thinkable. Objective forms, adapted to reason, and therefore bearing the stamp of a rational author, are implied in the fact that the universe is, though only partially, at all intelligible to man. All science of nature, so-called, implies the objective validity of its underlying concept, which is the concept of an intelligible universe.

But the intelligible finite forms of the universe reveal, as their postulate, the same One who is revealed by the intelligent forms under which the thinker thinks them; both alike reveal God. He is therefore the postulate of an intelligible universe, the ground of the intelligible forms which the universe reveals to man. Behind all theories of ideas, behind all doctrines of evolution, behind all those philosophies of nature which deny to man any knowledge besides that of the phenomenal or which assert the existence of an unknowable Absolute, there lurk and play forever the twin forms of immortal conviction — the universe is intelligible, and man may know the reality of it. We must *think* the universe, if at all, under some form; and if *we* think it under any form, it must be that form under which it is given us to think. To try to think it under any other form than the highest, results in thinking it under some form lower than the best possible for man. In thinking the universe under the form of "sleeping plants" or "dreaming beasts," and so talking of "plastic life-principle" or "unconscious purpose to build," we do not escape the necessity of postulating a thinkable universe and objectively valid thought. In thinking the universe as grounded in the same One in whom we see our own thought to be grounded, we make a higher and more consistent use of the same postulates.

And from the subtile, but persistent and comprehensive, reciprocity of the thinking soul and the thinkable universe, we gather more than twofold strength to our conviction that the ground of both is in one thinking and creative God.

The objective validity of the concept of God is also reached as the conclusion of an indirect proof, when we consider God as the postulate of the world's evolution. There is a process of unfolding, there is a goal toward which the cosmos is moving. We see only fragments of the process, we catch only dim glimpses of the grand goal. To suppose that the laws of Darwinian evolution are anything more than the merest fragments of the whole, is to betray that foolish confidence in having reached an ultimatum, with which so

many thinkers have cheated themselves in all ages. Nor is Darwin, any more than Hegel, upon the right road to the secret of evolution — Hegel quite as much as Darwin; for the process of unfolding is as surely a process of thought as it is a product of physical forces. It is both. The belief in a goal of the universe, in laws and a process of advance toward the goal, is confirmed by observation and reasoning, but is not wholly their product. In this belief there are certain postulates of an underlying power, of an all-engrossing purpose, of an all-worthy end. To think of going no whither and of moving with no purpose, is as painful for reason as to think of coming no whence. We are urged onward to lay the ground of evolution in God, and to find the goal toward which the world is moving in his final purpose.

The real being of God is required by thought to serve not only as the ground of all phenomena, but as the ground for the orders of phenomena and for all forms of human science which deal with the various orders. The being of God is the one rational explanation of nature, history, art, and politics, of the unfolding ethical and religious life of man, and of the relations which maintain themselves amongst all these complex interests and forms of growth. And not only our explanation, but our sole guarantee of the reality of human progress, is in the real being of God. To show this truth will occupy us in another Article. For the present it must suffice simply to state the great truth that, when we speak of a cosmos, of a course of history, of a destiny for the race, when we assert the improvability of man and the hope of improvement, when we trace a progress of the universe in rational form, from diffused gas through azoic rock to highly organized and reciprocally related forms of animal life, and trace a progress of history from rude, disjointed savagery to civilizations highly organized and organically bound together by commercial, social, political, and ethical ties, we make an attempt to understand the whole only so far as we posit for its ground and cause and goal — a Personal Absolute, who is the living God. As another has expressed the thought, "we

read the great world-poem in the idea of God." We lose all warmth and light from the focus of our own being, and from the hearth of the universe, in losing God.

Of what has been said upon the objective validity of our concept we make, then, the following summary. The concept of God is our guiding idea in reading the cosmos. Experience and the idea demand one another, and the greatness and conclusiveness of our knowledge lie in this, that they everywhere so interpenetrate. The concept of God enables us to read, not perfectly in all details, and yet as one intelligible whole, the universe of God. No other concept will do this; no idea — that is, no concept with power to grasp and unify the phenomena — of the world is possible without God. We are justified in saying to any inquirer, on grounds of reasonableness alone, accept God as the postulate of thought, thinkable universe, and unfolding cosmos. But we recognize in our exhortation the possibility that he will make choice of another way of viewing the universe.

But, be it especially noted, in not accepting the theistic view of the universe he will misuse his choice and starve his affections. He will continue to feel, if feeling be not destroyed, as did Dr. Bushnell, "My heart wants the Father"; and the Father will continue to say to him in the divine self-revelation, Here am I; take me. And when he heeds the invitation, the inquirer will find that he has grasped, as the object of faith's choice, the same One who appeared to his reason, as the postulate of the many and positive necessary convictions within the soul.

There is one form in which pre-eminently the human soul postulates the objective validity of its concept of God. This form is that of conscience, with its insight into the eternal verities of the moral law. The "eternal not-ourselves which makes for righteousness" is God. Mr. Arnold may attempt to show how he can arrive at this "not-ourselves" without metaphysics or faith, but will never succeed in the attempt. It is by metaphysics or faith, and in the categorical imperative, that he will be forced to search for the object of his admira-

tion. Both metaphysics and faith lead us to the same conviction, viz. the "categorical imperative" postulates the reality of a Personal Absolute with a moral nature, who is God.

The second division of the metaphysical difficulties of the concept of God meets us next in this inquiry. To them I have given the name psychological. If we rest in the objective validity of any possible form of the concept, the question still remains, what special form is valid? In the effort to sketch any such valid form new difficulties at once emerge. These difficulties, as well as the ontological, concern the inherent form of the organon in which the divine self-revelation is made.

Of such psychological difficulties only one, and that too briefly for thoroughness, will now be considered. We find the concept of God given to us in the form of a Personal Absolute or an absolute personality. But there are special difficulties with this form. They are claimed by some to be such as wholly to destroy the concept. It is said, personal and absolute are mutually contradictory and mutually destructive epithets. They cannot co-exist in the same concept. And besides this, one of them, viz. absolute, represents no positive thinking whatsoever; we cannot possibly "conceive" the absolute. To think is to limit, to condition; the absolute is the unconditioned, the ground out of all relations, etc. And other elements of the concept of God besides that of personality can never be united with the absolute; we cannot think of absolute cause, etc.

What I have at present to say upon this difficult question of the Personal Absolute will be given in the following remarks.

First, the term personality is not to be looked upon as exhausting all the divine being in its possible or actual forms of being. We know God as personal because he is so far revealed to us who are ourselves persons, and whose own personality presupposes and affirms as its ground the personality of God. The more beyond of God may be farther

depths of personality, or farther depths of divine being not to be brought under the term personality at all. That this unrevealed more beyond is contradictory to personality we cannot surely say until we know the more beyond. That it is not contradictory we may affirm on the ground of what is revealed. As Mr. William Knight has said: "With entire consistency, therefore, we may affirm at once the personality and the transcendency of God."

Secondly, our knowledge of personality affirms itself as not complete, but true so far as it goes. If we know anything, we know personality. With the phenomena of our own personality we stand momently face to face; we have no other knowledge so immediate and convincing as that which is given in the knowledge of ourselves.

And yet, Thirdly, all the essential marks, the secret and the sub-conscious ground of personality, are quite incomprehensible to us; the senses and the intellect, that is, cannot represent them adequately under their forms. "Know thyself," is the most familiar of exhortations to knowledge; and what can be readier at hand than the sufficient means for such knowledge. Yet who of the wisest psychologists at all comprehends his own personality? What possible life can be after that form which human life is known to take? This is the riddle of the Sphinx; and it is an all-devouring Sphinx who propounds it. The ground of our limited personality, the ego, is not taken cognizance of by outward or inner sense, is not conceivable, is not representable by an act of the imagination, is not the conclusion of a debatable syllogism. We talk of self-consciousness, and criticism recognizes the postulate and averment of a self in every act of consciousness. But no man can by senses or intellect come directly at that selfhood in which he inevitably believes. The existence and persistence of the ego is the postulate of man's whole self-conscious being. Every ego is, then, in some sort, an absolute; it is the invisible and incomprehensible ground of self-conscious life.

The essential qualities, the constant activities of this same

ego, are themselves incomprehensible. The mystery of finite thinking even is unsolved; we think, we know we think; but *how* we *can* think, no man has yet told. The finite thinker cannot understand his own finite work. To adopt that abstract style of setting forth the contents of consciousness and then involving them in contradictions, which Mr. Mansel and others have adopted, we may say all thought is self-contradictory; for, in thought we are two and one at the same time, otherwise the self-conscious subject and his object could never come together in the same act. And thought involves memory, which is, when handled in Mr. Mansel's fashion, a self-contradictory act. Nor can any man begin thinking; for thought is comparison and comparison involves memory, which involves thought, or else two become one, before they are two, and there is a beginning which is supposed to be absolute, and yet presupposes a previous beginning, etc. That freedom is impossible, and has been proved to be so over and over again, every reader knows; but without freedom there is no true personality. When a writer, however, proves by abstract reasoning the impossibility of the actual on the ground that it cannot be understood, or explains away the plain postulates of thought by confusing them through a ratiocination, every step of which presupposes those same postulates, we may perhaps reply to him: It makes us sad to hear the conclusions of your philosophizing; but then — as said Böhler to Wesley — "Mi frater, ista philosophia tua excoquenda est."

You cannot "conceive" the Absolute Person, says the objector to the reality of such a being. No, I cannot "conceive" my own finite personality, cannot even represent the possibility of it in terms satisfactory to logic. But I shall continue to believe and know that I am a person, if I cannot conceive my personality. The impossibility of conceiving is a very different mental state from the positive and indestructible affirmation with which the soul lays down its own postulates. I have such affirmation for my own personality, and, in a measure, for that of God. I frankly say I do not

wish to be able to "conceive" either my finite or his absolute personality; for, what I can conceive I am apt comparatively to disregard — it is the phenomenal and transitory.

Since, then, we can neither "conceive" nor understand our own personality; since there lies in its essential characteristics the possibility of involving them in the contradictions of an abstract logomachy; since we can only get our knowledge of personality in the form of postulates of the soul which testifies to the validity of its own prime convictions; since we find in these postulates the assertion of positive but incomprehensible contents, — we are warranted in being very modest about affirming what is not a possible form of personality. The actual form of that definite act of the soul called self-consciousness, we immediately know; but possibilities of personality in general lie much farther in the background. On the other hand we *do* know with a knowledge which carries immediate conviction, that certain forms of manifestation testify to an underlying personal being. We know much better what are actual manifestations of personality than what are its abstract possibilities.

Fourthly, that inscrutable background of being which we detect lying beyond and lurking within the phenomena of our self-consciousness should teach us other lessons in addition to that of modesty. The essence of personality may not be, does not seem to be, in the limited of the individual phenomena, so much as in the ground which lies back of them. In this background of our own being we can see intimations of the unconditioned, the absolute. Rationality and conscience do not reveal themselves so much as necessary outcome of our limited personality, but rather as fragmentary specimens, so to speak, as intimations of a personality that encompasses ours. "There neither is, nor can be but one reason," says Coleridge, "one and the same, even the light that lighteth every man's individual understanding, and thus maketh it a reasonable understanding." So that Lotze may be believed when he teaches that our finiteness is "not a productive condition of personality, but rather a hindering barrier to its

perfect development." And again, "In God alone is perfect personality; in all limited spirits there is only feeble imitation of it."

Fifthly, as to the other factor in the Personal Absolute, it is perfectly easy to juggle with the word "absolute." The self-contradictions evolved from it all depend upon the contents previously given to it. If the absolute means the absolutely unconditioned in any sense and way whatever, it is manifest at once that we cannot converse or reason about it at all. We cannot even say that it is, or is not; for, what *is* for thought must to some extent come under the conditions of thought. We have not interest enough in an absolute that is absolutely absolute to debate or even inquire concerning it. But even Mr. Spencer's absolute, which is so abstract that to affirm personality of it is to limit and so destroy it, gets itself limited by its author, when he speaks of it as the "utterly inscrutable Power which the universe manifests to us." It is plain that we cannot rescue the idea of the absolute from "the death-kingdom of abstract thought"—where, as we suppose, exist (pardon the unphilosophical assumption involved in the word) the Hegelian Nothing, the inscrutable Power, and other stalwart heroes begotten by the fathers of lofty speculation, — without proceeding at once to clip its celestial wings and bind it down. And it is equally plain that as soon as we proceed to limit the absolute, we, with unerring philosophic and religious instinct, introduce into it some of the elements of personality.

We begin by speaking of it as the ground of being, as the power which the universe manifests. And when forced to inquire under what characteristics and forms does the universe manifest this ground of its own being, we say: Why, to be sure, under the forms of force, rationality, final purpose, and — we are inclined to hope — also love, which are all prime qualities of personality. The utterly inscrutable power is manifested to us thus in the scrutable forms of personality; and so we spell it with a capital — Power — as Mr. Spencer does. But we should lament with Mr. Arnold, to

observe that the personality of the "not-ourselves" is here brought in again upon "the poor old dead horse of so-called natural theology"; did we not, unlike him, have a high respect for natural theology. Indeed, is it not plain, that only by belittling the idea of personality and evaporating to a minimum residuum that of the absolute, can the two be kept from uniting in the concept of God?

We do not claim by the term absolute to exhaust the transcendent being of God. We accept it and define it so far as we find its validity is guaranteed in the soul's positive contents of truth. For — and here we return to our guiding thought — the self-revelation of God is real, but conditioned upon the organon through which it is made.

The proofs of a Personal Absolute are abundant and convincing, if we approach them with the ground cleared from the objections. These objections consist in wishing us either to think too high or too low. For, on the one hand, we are invited to consider the self-contradictions involved in abstract ideas of personality and the absolute; or else, on the other, we are required to conceive just how God can come to individual acts of self-consciousness resembling our own, and still be the Absolute. But barren dialectics and positivism, under its two forms of nescience and "reasoned realism," are always alike unsatisfying. When the soul accepts the divine self-revelation it finds rest where only, as says a German philosopher, "the restless movement of the spirit quiets itself," viz. "in the conception of the whole."

The proofs of the personality of the Absolute have been in a measure brought forward while discussing the objective validity of the concept of God. They lie partly in the forms under which the universe manifests the Absolute to us as its ground, and partly in the wants of the human soul.

No investigator can attempt the phenomena of the physical universe without constantly postulating the objective validity of underlying force. When the wonderful relations of these phenomena are more clearly seen, when their classification under laws and species is found to be most widely

possible, and when the conception of a cosmos — of an orderly whole which represents the sum-total of the phenomena in their relations — grows strong within the mind, then the investigator is ready to affirm that the underlying force is one and intelligent. For, thought is then seen to be, not the posthumous and illegitimate child, but the parent of the universe. Force is then written Will, and seen to be guided eternally by thought.

And final purpose also, entangled in the phenomena of the universe and liable to misinterpretation, still inevitably appears. There has, doubtless, been much falsehood taught, much mischief done, by finding final purposes otherwise than they really are. But the fact that final purposes are manifested in the universe is a simple, undeniable fact. Investigation would be folly without, would indeed negative itself; for there would be no tracks in nature for the investigator to follow, no power in the investigator himself to make consecutive search for them.

We confess that the grand final purpose, and the goal to which we are destined, cannot as yet be discovered by human research. But there is revealed to faith a hint and a hope, which accord in good measure with the mind's reasoning, and more fully with the cravings of the whole soul. We are given glimpses of a consummation which is devoutly to be wished — the complete triumph of love, the vindication of the method in the reaching of the goal. And at these glimpses the soul so raises herself from the slumber of indifference or the down-sinking of despair that she stands erect upon her feet, and with glowing eye and beating heart overlooks all the intervening obstacles, to grasp by faith the end.

Will, Thought, and Final Purpose, guided by Love — these are the forms under which, more or less clearly, the phenomena of the universe manifest themselves, when we rise to the conception of them as a whole grounded in the Absolute. They then reveal to us that absolute who is their ground, as a person. The Personal Absolute is God. Let it not be sup-

posed, however, that the soul of man would attain this truth — especially the conviction that love is the motive, and the victory of love the goal of the universe — without the silent, potent pressure which comes from its inmost cravings. Long before it has self-consciously examined facts and proofs, the cravings of the soul will, it is likely, have forced it to a hope, or even a joyful and firm conviction. "A legitimate satisfaction for the religious emotions" of him who blends thought with his feeling is found only in the Personal Absolute.

That a conceivable view of the Personal Absolute may be given which shall prove, if accepted, immensely comforting and helpful to the hungry heart of man, there can be no valid doubt. It is comforting to believe that the Power, which is manifested in, and moves the universe, is united with intelligence and such love as secures a benevolent consideration of each individual, and a lofty goal for the whole. But the sceptic insists that the belief, though comforting, may not be true. The cravings of the soul, however, do not meantime stop; there is much practical force in them. We find, therefore, that the world of men will not, that even the aristocracy of thinkers, which sets itself up within and above the world of men, cannot, coolly weigh the arguments pro and con God, as though they had no personal heart-interest in the turning of the scale. In the objectors and in the objections there is a self-revelation of God; even by the objections the manner of this self-revelation is more clearly made known. For argument, conviction, and hope alike teach us that God has revealed himself to man as the One who supports, penetrates, and moves forward all the universe with his own force, intelligence, and love.

But all this is gross and contemptible anthropomorphism in the sight of certain philosophers and critics of philosophy. Well, be it called anthropomorphism, or whatever other title these wise men will, we will bear the opprobrium of the title. We would rather honestly earn our bread for the soul, and have it fresh, than smuggle it in stale, to eat it with fear and

clandestinely, in a corner. We do, indeed, think God, so far as we think him at all, in human forms of thought; we do this with positive affirmation, with the joy which comes from the consciousness of possessing a true self-revelation of God within the soul. To be that μορφή of soul which is called man, and which is therefore capable of receiving a limited but true revelation of the divine, is our glory and crown of honor. We choose rather to think God anthropomorphically than to think of him after the fashion of "sleeping plants" and "dreaming beasts."

We believe also that we have better reason to think *Him* thus than even to listen to the arguments of objectors. Were it not unlikely to accomplish any good thing, we should flout at them in the words of Mr. Kirkham: "But in the name of all proportion and modesty have I not ten thousand million times more pregnant evidence, in this daily course of life and mercy, and in all these convincing voices within and without me, that the living God is here in the plenitude of love and wisdom, than I have that inside that incongruous heap and patchwork of appearances, yclept Atheist, there is a mind and conscience like my own."

Many of the minor psychological difficulties of the concept of God disclose themselves as in part akin to this central difficulty of the Personal Absolute. Problems concerning the origin and nature of moral evil, the relations of the finite and the absolute, the reconciliation of perfect benevolence with the vast use made of suffering, when analyzed, appear closely allied to the one problem of a personal God. The mysteries of life fall back into the life which sends forth, and again swallows up, all other mysteries.

The difficulties which emerge in the concept of God when we try to unite in it the two factors of infinity and personality, are much like those which have just been discussed. The methods of barren dialectics, or of nescience, or of scepticism as to the positive and necessary contents of consciousness, can play their tricks within this sphere of thought as well as within the other. The word "infinite" may be used

as barren of all contents, and so have no worth to contend about. But the infinite, in the sense of the unknown indefinite, lies back of all our contents of conscious personality in ourselves; and in the sense of the great without limit, or the absolutely perfect, it unites with the definite contents of our highest conception of personality, to form the concept of God.

With the discussion of these two metaphysical difficulties, viz. that of the objective validity of the concept and that of the Personal Absolute, we must for the present content ourselves. To sum up what results have been reached in their discussion, a few words will suffice. The difficulties of the concept of God, so far as they are inherent in the organon of the divine self-revelation, are metaphysical difficulties. They call for a complete and metaphysical criticism of the positive contents of consciousness. This criticism shows us the limited but trustworthy knowledge which the soul has of objective reality. It shows this knowledge in the form of postulates. It warrants us in saying, we have the knowledge of God, as we have all our knowledge, in fragmentary form, but also in the form of a divine self-revelation, the verity of which is averred and guaranteed in the prime convictions of the soul. Nay more, this knowledge of God is the one form of knowledge which seems best to bind together, harmonize, underlie, and explain all human knowledge.

But we think we hear some reader complain; You have not shown us God as the conclusion of an indisputable syllogism; you have told us nothing comprehensible concerning the limited absolute, the finite infinite, the uncaused Causa sui which is out of all relation to every effect; you have not shown us how we may "conceive" God. No, reader, the solution or the negation of such mysteries is only for those who are giants in philosophical speculation, of whom we do not claim to be one. We do not know so much about the transcendental nature of the inscrutable Power which the universe manifests to us, as does Mr. Spencer. We have no "reasoned realism," which is adequate to explain everything

by the principle of identity, and then explain away even this principle itself; we do not know the universe without postulates, as Mr. Lewes appears to know it. Therefore it is that we have admitted many insuperable difficulties, taken many things for granted, and averred as true much which we confess we cannot understand. But we need only to open our eyes in the simplest act of sense-perception, and then criticize thoroughly the contents of consciousness called up in the act, to find therein a whole world of postulates, incomprehensibles, and insoluble puzzles. Such lofty problems of theology are, however, best solved by authority. Seeking one which all the theologians on their side of the problem will consider with most favorable predisposition, we light upon the dictum of Augustine: "Deus, sine qualitate bonus, sine quantitate magnus, sine indigentia creator, sine situ praesens, sine habitu omnia continens, sine loco ubique totus, sine tempore sempiternus, sine ulla sui mutatione mutabilia faciens nihilque patiens." And when this princely philosopher of theology soars above all the Aristotelian categories in the effort completely to think God, and then, by the very expression of his thought discloses himself as still within the region of those categories, does he not teach the same truth which all history and philosophy and theology affirm, viz. that a complete and adequate knowledge of Divine Being is wanting, but that his self-revelation furnishes within the symmetrical activities of the human soul a valid though fragmentary knowledge of Him?

The third and last class of the difficulties of the concept of God, we have called the historic or evolutionary; they are such as admit of relief or solution by the growing correspondence which takes place between the objective process of divine self-revelation and the organon through which the revelation is made. A full discussion of these difficulties would take us from the work of analysis and into the field of history. It may be at some future time attempted. We content ourselves for the present with the following somewhat desultory thoughts.

It is part of the creed of any one who intelligently believes in God, that there is an objective process of revelation to be detected in the universe, and that there is also a growth of the soul of man in adaptation to receive, to comprehend, and to sympathize with the process. This growing correspondence between soul and process belongs both to the individual and to the race.

The sum-total of influences in which every man is set forms an organic whole, which may be looked upon as constituting for the man so much of God's self as presses for consideration upon him. The objective phenomena remain disjointed and utterly unintelligible, unless they are regarded as representing the plan of God; every man's life is a plan of God. It is the universe in so far as it constitutes the individual's element of life, which is to be regarded as representing for each the process of the divine self-revealing to him. Sickness and health, sorrow and joy, gains and losses, the knowledge which comes from study of science, history, politics, the emotions which come from the beauties of nature and human art, the purposes which are strengthened or broken down in the hard strife of practical life, are to be unified only under the supposition that they constitute parts of one process. And in close correspondence with the objective process, regarded as the vehicle of divine disclosure, goes on the growth of the soul of the individual, which is the organon for the disclosure. The objective process is from the more to the less limited; the growth of the organon is from selfishness and crudeness toward that condition of light and love which enables it to take in more and more of God. This, when there is that true development of the constitutional powers of the soul which he undergoes who becomes a self-conscious child of God. But when the soul refuses or neglects to respond to the truth of God by which it is surrounded, it not only mutilates its own growth, it even reacts upon the process. "There is the true light that lighteth every man coming into the world." "The light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness taketh it not in."

But it is with a world-process of divine self-revealing and an historic growth in the spirit of the race that our thought is chiefly occupied. This process gives us the nature of God more and more clearly written as the centuries move on. And the inworking of the same God makes the soul of man more and more capable to receive and understand the process. Standing at our point in this great world-process, and opening our souls to its voices, we can catch certain intimations at least, of a clearing-up of certain difficulties. We can put forth certain hopes for the future, which are in a measure certified by the experience of the past.

The improvement of man in the total of his soul will help to solve some of the difficulties of the concept of God. Certain arguments for the being, the benevolence, and other attributes of the Personal Absolute, will gain in scope and cogency from the increase of man's knowledge. They have already made gain; they will make still greater. If we make our theology, as we are bound to do, more and more *biological*, we shall comprehend under it all the facts and laws of life, looked upon as proofs of the living God. "The Father worketh hitherto," and present life is the manifestation of a living God. The biological turn which human research is now taking has helped, and will still farther help, in understanding the source of all life. We hail the sifting of that pile of mingled chaff and wheat which has lain upon the debatable threshing-floor of natural theology, because we know that though the interpretation and collocation of the facts of natural theology may be changed, the ideas under the pressure and guidance of which it does its work are eternal.

But it is not the whole truth that man is improving, and so growing in fitness to receive the divine self-disclosure. The improvement itself is part of this disclosure, for it is of God.

In the objective process itself lies also a promise of help for the race in the solution of certain difficulties. Some of the greatest difficulties of the concept of God arise from mis-

conception, or imperfect conception, of the final purpose and goal of this process. Imperfect conception is inevitable for those who stand so far away from the goal and who see only fragments of the final purpose. The more of the journey is run, the more clear will the law of the journey and the destination of the traveller appear. The fullest strength and harmony of the teleological arguments depend upon our being able to gather up all the phenomena and show them in the light of one comprehensive and sufficiently worthy final purpose. This we cannot, as the result of a logical argument, now accomplish. When we look to the end and read the law of the process in the light of the end, we hope for and believe in what we do not now see. Yet this hope and belief are not without rational foundation. We are urged forward to a point of relief and rest; we find it in victorious divine love securing the completed kingdom of our God. But that the goal *is* one worthy, and that the motive power *is* love, we shall see more clearly in the nearer approach to the goal.

It is evident, however, that when we attribute so much to the love of God, and hope for so much from the triumph of love, we must use the word in some sense which shall not contradict the present patent facts and laws of suffering. That suffering is no mere accident of the universe is sufficiently evident to him who reads aright the laws of life. To all life, as we know aught of it, craving and resistance are necessary; both of these, in the very essence of their meaning, involve suffering. It is by understanding more and more clearly how this enormous use of suffering comports with love and works out its purposes, that we may hope to have also lightened some of the difficulties which accompany our knowledge of God.

And it may be — we only make the suggestion — it may be that the advance of dormant necessary truths and ideas into the consciousness of the race, will clarify, widen, and ground in reality, more and more, our knowledge of God. All historic process in the matter of the soul's fundamental

ideas, beliefs, hopes, and aspirations has consisted, so far as we can discern, not in shoving them back and gaining from the conquest of their territory more ground for the shallow, muddy pools of positivism, but in bringing them forth more clearly, and establishing them more firmly in the domain of human consciousness. It may not, then, be impossible for some of those very truths of Christianity which now seem to stand most isolated and remote from the necessary, or even the real, knowledge of the race to establish themselves in closer organic connection with the sum-total of its knowledge. The contributions which Christianity has made to our concept of God is one of those interesting collateral subjects of research which are suggested by our general theme.

"The concept of God is the resultant of God's revelation of himself to the human soul." It is a centre upon which converge many lines, not only of argument, but also of intuition, feeling, and purpose. Viewed in the light of these statements, the difficulties of this concept seem to us to lose their weight as objections to the reality of that Personal Absolute whom faith calls our Father and our God. The difficulties make the thinker feel, with a sense of awful mystery, the inadequacy of his attempts perfectly to compass the Eternal with forms of sense and understanding. But they also show that Eternal One as, in his valid but limited revelation of himself, he stands before, and within, the human soul. They make the thinker conscious of his own finiteness, but conscious also of possessing the self-disclosure, according to the form of his finiteness, which the Infinite has made. They permit him to say: I know not the whole of God, and many things, therefore, I dare neither to affirm nor to deny; but what I do know of Him, I find so grounded in my very being, so confirmed by the forms of all external being, so comforting to the heart, so fruitful in the life, that I affirm it beyond the possibility of trustworthy denial.

ARTICLE II.

ATONEMENT.

BY PROF. JOHN MORGAN, D.D., OBERLIN, OHIO.

INTRODUCTORY.

A Moral World.

THIS is a moral world, under a moral government, because mankind are conscious of moral ideas and of moral law, and know themselves to be moral agents, subjects of free-will, of the power to obey or disobey moral law.

Outside of the sphere of moral agency mankind are as much under the control of necessitative forces as brute animals or insentient matter. But within this sphere necessity can have no compulsive operation, however mighty the influences that act on the soul, whether these influences press from within through the working of the living organism, or from without through the action of other living beings or the action of material external nature. As moral law commands, there must be the power to obey, even if the heart of the moral agent is set in disobedience. In general, sceptical necessitarians admit the incompatibility of universal necessity with obligatory moral law. But many Christian philosophers, strenuously maintaining universal necessity, still hold to the validity of moral obligation. The sceptics appear here to have the logical advantage; but the saintly character of many of the advocates of universal necessity is beyond question.

It would seem not to be easy to perceive how blameworthiness or praiseworthiness can attach to qualities called moral, when the subjects of these qualities no more freely produce them than the rose so produces its fragrance, the rainbow its beauty, or the serpent the poison of its fangs. We like a

beautiful or beneficent thing, and we dislike an ugly or baneful thing, and we praise the one sort and dispraise the other; but this is a totally different operation of our minds from moral approbation or disapprobation.

The moral law commands only one thing — love, benevolence, good-will. This implies that the moral agent knows something of the value of well-being or good. Obedience to the moral law is holiness — the only holiness conceivable or possible. Obedience is in its very conception voluntary. It cannot be the product of creation, in the literal sense of the word. Creation gives existence to being and its natural attributes. But it may be conceived that when man was ushered into being God at once so operated on him in a moral way as to secure in him, as his first character, obedience to the moral law, or holiness. Thus man would be made, or induced to be, upright.

Refusal to love, or disobeying the moral law, is sin or unholiness. This may appear in various forms; but the essence of sin is found in not loving, or in not exercising good-will. No moral agent can be made the subject of holiness or sin without his consent. Neither holiness nor sin can be propagated from father to son, as scrofula may be. Disease, physical depravity in countless forms, may be immediately inherited, and of course without the consent of offspring. But these are not sin or sinful, however harmful. These may be the occasions of sin, but not without the consent of offspring. When sin or vice is said to be inherited, the word ought to be considered as employed in a secondary sense, unless the context forbids this interpretation. A whole family, tribe, nation, or race may *thus* inherit moral qualities; but the moral quality resides only in each individual moral will, and originates there. In no other possible way can we conceive of moral responsibility as properly attaching to each individual moral agent. However powerful the principle of heredity, we must not give it an interpretation which will sweep away the moral world, or use it to explain the universal prevalence of sin in mankind

in such a way as to annihilate the sin which it is sought to explain.

If an inworking of the Holy Spirit is an essential condition of the holiness of creatures, their holiness is still their own personal holiness, consisting of their own willing and doing. The occasion or condition makes no part of the thing. And when man first sinned, his sin was disobedience to the moral law. The sin was occasioned by temptation applied to the susceptibilities of his nature. These were not sinful nor evil in any sense. They were necessary constituents of his form of being, necessary to its activity. But moral creatures always know propensities are not to be indulged in opposition to moral law, but always governed in accordance with it.

All the susceptibilities or propensities, being essential to the nature which God has given to man, were transmitted to their posterity by the first parents of the race. I do not find that the Scriptures explicitly tell us whether human nature was changed by the fall of Adam and Eve. But observation has determined that propensities may be made morbidly intense, or irregular, or both, by wrong indulgence, and thus changed may be transmitted to offspring. But this change does not constitute the propensities themselves sinful in any sinner. Sin consists in the surrender of the will to their control, in the consent of the man to obey them against the moral law. When offspring inherit them in this disordered state, it is an inheritance of increased temptation. But however strong the temptation may be, the propensities cannot govern without the consent of the tempted party, even if the temptation is aggravated by the wily influence of Satan. We do not yield to absurdity, when we believe that our first father has transmitted to us an inheritance of increased temptation, certain to lead us into sin. But to say that a necessitative force infuses sin into us in connection with our descent, is to contradict the very nature of sin, which can be nothing else than disobedience to moral law, and so the free action of moral beings. The principle of heredity is one of tremendous influence, and recognized in

the Scriptures; and it is seen to mould families, nations, and races in a marvellous manner. But it is never in the Scriptures spoken of as necessitative, or as fating any creature of God to be wicked. The Bible would be a very different book if it represented mankind as inheriting sin as they inherit scrofula, consumption, or leprosy.

Nor has the Bible any responsibility for the doctrine that when a moral creature has once sinned he is bound to sin by chains of necessity. For the moment necessity comes in morality and all moral action cease, and all moral responsibility, except for the past. It may be that a sinner, or every sinner in the world, has so set his heart to do evil that there is no hope of his turning from evil-doing unless a Divine Redeemer undertakes his deliverance; but all his obstinate sin is as free as if he were just beginning his evil course. The distinction between moral certainty and physical necessity must be held fast, or there comes a total collapse of all moral ideas.

The first man, by becoming a sinner, became the natural representative of the race in sin, as from him descends the nature or propensities which, with Satan's influence, successfully tempt mankind to sin. It is not Adam and Eve alone who, in the third chapter of Genesis and in the fifth of Romans, are set forth as sinning, but the whole human race of moral agents. But nowhere in the Bible is the offspring of the first pair said to inherit in a purely passive way their sinful moral character. The first sin of every human being is as free as the first sin of Eve and Adam. The disobedient attitude toward God and his law is as freely assumed. And no *necessity* of continuing in sin is caused by any sin of any sinner. All sin is always freely committed, and is the abusive product of free-agency. Guilt is proportioned to the degree of light enjoyed. If sinners have now more light than Adam had, they are, in committing sin or in continuing in it, greater sinners than he could be. The cigar-smoker, who knows better that it is wrong to smoke cigars than Adam knew that it was wrong to eat of the tree of knowledge of good

and evil, is a worse sinner than Adam was in his sin. This, of course, could not be, if man existed under the operation of a necessitating force of evil, inserted in his nature by his mere descent from the first sinner of the race, or if he did not remain, as to his faculty of moral will, as free as Adam was before he sinned.

But this freedom does not interfere with the certainty of the occurrence of sin. The first sin of Adam was beforehand as certain as any sin ever was or ever will be. God infallibly knew that it would occur, and occur freely, not even occasioned by any antecedent moral bias, but opposed by a bias to good; for an evil bias would itself be sinful, and obviously the first sin could not in any sense arise from what was itself sin. The only account the Bible gives of Adam's first sin is, that Eve tempted him, and he ate the forbidden fruit; his innocent propensities, including his affections, being presupposed as conditions of his temptibility. This is the only explanation that can be given. Some so-called philosophers imagine that it is an explanation to say that God created the sin; and they propose the same explanation for all sin and holiness, and, indeed, all thought and choice. The trouble is, that the explanation annihilates the sin sought to be explained. It is self-evident that any attempted explanation of sin or holiness that makes them or it a product of necessity, like an effect of a natural cause or natural causes, is inadmissible, as not germane to the subject.

I have said that all moral events, as well as events in the world of matter and necessity, are antecedently certain to God. This certainty is regarded by Christian necessitarians as proving the necessity of the events. On no other principle, they argue, could they be certainly foreknown. To me the argument appears plausible; and I confess I know not where the fallacy lies. It is like the famous puzzles about motion in space and about the reality of time. Augustine said: "If you do not ask me about time, I know about it; but if you do ask me, I don't know." I think it is self-evident that necessity and morality are incompatible, and that the uni-

versality of necessity would sweep away responsibility and moral government, or reduce them to an illusion. This is generally held with respect to the pantheistic philosophy; and most pantheists maintain that the notions of moral merit and ill-desert are illusory. But I see no difference between the logical outcome of the necessitarianism of some Christians and that of Spinoza. Christian philosophers do not accept this logical outcome; but Spinoza boldly faced the music, or "horrible discord." Holding that there cannot be virtue or sin without free-will, I hold that free-will is a reality, and that we know its reality by immediate consciousness. Kant and Hamilton seem to maintain that we do not know our freedom immediately, but infer it from our consciousness of the moral law. This removes the idea of freedom from the domain of knowledge to that of faith.

As that freedom which is the condition of moral responsibility exists in all moral agents, and is not destroyed by sin, we are not to regard ourselves as a race of unfortunates who by the fall of their first father have been made sinful. We are really guilty ourselves, as he was of his own sin, of all the sin charged to us; and continuing in sin under the light of the gospel, we must be more guilty than Adam ever could be. In this way the Bible speaks of the wickedness of mankind, never representing the sin of any generation as any the less their own personal sin for any influence descending to them from Adam.

History of Sin.

Consciousness, observation, and Scripture unite in the recognition of the awful actual sinfulness of man. The picture which Scripture gives of man's moral character, aside from the influence of grace, is truly frightful. The moral depravity ascribed to him is total, "every imagination of the thoughts of his heart evil continually." He is free from righteousness, and no good thing dwells in him. A large part of the Bible is occupied with the history of the wickedness of mankind, very different from the history of the

prevalence of small-pox or cholera. We have the wickedness of the antediluvians set forth in terms of awful significance. Then comes the wickedness of the Canaanites of Abraham's time, culminating in that of the inhabitants of the cities associated with Sodom, horribly infecting even the family of Lot. Then follows the wickedness of the later Canaanites, heaping up its measure till it was full. The wickedness of the Edomites, Moabites, and Ammonites, and, indeed, of all the nations and races with which the family of Abraham had to do, moves before us. Neither Abraham nor Isaac thought that their children could safely intermarry with them. The Abrahamic race itself presents a mournful spectacle of depravity — deceit, violence, murder, even fratricide, breaking out among them. And what a melancholy picture does the history of Israel exhibit in the different eras of their existence — in Egypt, in the wilderness, under the judges, under the kings, in their own land, and in the land of captivity! Finally, when the return from Babylon promised better things, how soon and how long did odious exhibitions of sin show themselves — a formalism and hypocrisy more odious than the old idolatry! The culmination of sin was reached in the rejection, persecution, and murder of the Son of God, and in the persistent resistance to his claims to the present day. All this was perpetrated under a supernatural system of appliances which ought to have made Israel a nation of exemplary saints — a glorious, transforming spectacle to all the other nations.

When we turn to the great Gentile nations and empires, we find them of such a character that they are fitly symbolized to the student of history under the figures of the most ferocious wild beasts, which succeed each other with no moral improvement; the last being the most ferocious and destructive, stamping with his feet what he cannot destroy. The apostle Paul photographs the characters both of the Gentiles and of the Jews in lines and colors which all history attests. The testimony of intelligent travellers and missionaries assures us that the heathen of the present genera-

tion are in moral character as hideous as the heathen of past ages.

This wickedness, thus darkening the historic page, is not to be excused on the plea of ignorance. God has never left himself without witness. "The invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse." They have known that "God gave them rain and fruitful seasons, filling their hearts with food and gladness." His law has stood written on their hearts; and the story of his supernatural interpositions has gone to all the world. Egypt, Nineveh, Babylon, Greece, Rome, have had the story told them, and might have known its full purport if they had desired the knowledge of God's ways. And what a wonderful comment upon the poisonous influence of a perverse heart that has given itself to sin, that the revelation of God to Israel had so little power over the souls of the chosen race! Even Josephus represents that the Jews of his time were the most wicked people on the face of the earth.

No doubt, in important respects civilization had a favorable influence; but civilization itself became the occasion of corruption. The Greek and Roman writers abound in testimonies to the great corruption that reigned in the most civilized and refined nations of the earth, and in the character of persons of the highest rank and influence. The Greek and Roman military power was used for the enslavement and robbery of the ruder nations. And the same wild scene of slaughter and pillage continues to the present day — the game of war still played by the nations on various pretences. The support of armies has been the greatest burden of mankind, exhausting the productions of the field and factory, and even the wide ocean. The villanies of trade are countless. The adulteration of all articles of food, of wear, and of medicines, and often of the most dangerous character, abound on every side. Many live on the vices and miseries of their fellow-men, reducing innumerable women and chil-

dren to starvation, selling to those who ought to feed them maddening and murderous poisons. Large and often triumphant political parties sustain these wretches in their villanous trade, and share with them the spoils, buying their nefarious votes with nefarious laws. In Great Britain and the United States probably more capital is engaged in this atrocious business than in any other. And these intelligent nations suffer this ruin to rage from generation to generation. And slavery and the slave-trade forced on us unspeakable horrors for hundreds of years. The unclean spirit, though cast out, still manifests his foul temper, not only where he reigned, but in vast numbers and regions long called free.

The treatment the gospel has received presents another aspect of human wickedness. The persecution and murder of the Son of God has been already spoken of. "He was in the world," writes the apostle John, "and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not. He came unto his own, and his own received him not." "This is the condemnation, that light has come into the world, and men have loved the darkness rather than the light, because their deeds were evil." As the apostles traversed the earth on their mission of mercy they were everywhere persecuted with murderous malice; and it is remarkable that the great Apostle to the Gentiles himself was, before his conversion, a great persecutor, and made havoc of the church.

After Christianity spread its conquests till the Roman empire became nominally Christian, Christianity became dreadfully corrupted, and the whole Orient where it prevailed so extensively is now overspread with a miserable formalism and a dead faith, where Mohammedism or some other alien religion has not utterly displaced it. To a vast extent the same corruption pervades Europe; and one America is almost wholly occupied by debasing superstition, and the other America, partly occupied by it, is seriously threatened with the same general spiritual bondage. A grievous unbelief, worse than these corruptions of Chris-

tianity, extensively prevails throughout the so-called Christian world. Romanism in France, Italy, Germany, and Spain is often a mere cover, and scarcely a cover, for some form of infidelity. And the same is the case with much of the Protestantism of Continental Europe, and even of Great Britain and of the United States.

Infidels often make their proud boast that Christianity, through their great discoveries, is well-nigh obsolete. The history of the world proves abundantly that mankind, left to themselves, or supplied with all the reformatory means in operation before Christ, are likely to be forever the slaves of Satan, and need the mightiest divine interposition for their salvation from delusion and sin.

Punishment of Sin.

The Bible and all rational observation testify that wickedness is followed by misery, known to be punishment for sin. A sense of guilt and a fear of evil always follow wickedness. When God placed man in the world, and laid on him a command as a test of his loyalty, he said to him: "In the day thou transgressest thou shalt surely die." The words may be interpreted as a prediction, or a threat, or both. The result, as well as the nature of the case, is our best guide to the correct interpretation. It could not but be that sin would introduce into the soul intestine war, a sense of degradation, remorse, and fear.

Cain was a miserable, soul-harassed wretch, — a trembler, full of agitation, afraid that whoever met him would slay him, although his brothers. He hardly needed to be told that the voice of his brother's blood cried to God from the ground. He felt that he was accursed of God, though protected from violent death. The consequence of sin is not merely the disordering operation of sin on the inner man and its wasting influence on the body, working independently of the will of God or man by virtue of its own tormenting power. One of its consequences is the wrath of God on the sinner, pressing him every day. He is cursed when he lies

down and when he rises up, when he sits in the house and when he walks in the way, and accursed in all the works of his hands and of his mind. A flaming sword turns every way to keep him from the tree of life. The ground is accursed for his sake, and he is driven out from his Heavenly Father's beautiful paradise. Mourning, lamentation, and woe fill the world.

The flood, the fire and brimstone that devoured Sodom and Gomorrah, the countless calamities visited upon man attest that the punishment of sin is not its mere natural working within the soul or on the body and the outward world. Positive punishment of sin is just as natural as any punishment at all; and the idea of a divine nemesis is universal to man, except where an artificial philosophy has perverted the spontaneous sentiments of the soul.

The natural apprehension of the sinner is that he is shut out from mercy; for he knows that he deserves eternal punishment as truly as he deserves any punishment at all. Ill-desert, when once incurred, can never cease to be. Even George Eliot, in her Daniel Deronda, recognizes this. The degree of punishment incurred must of course depend on the degree of light in which the sin was committed. The state into which the sinner falls is a state of exposure to all the punishment which the wisdom and goodness of God must inflict, as well as the misery of that internal laceration which no will can control.

Mercy.

But it is plain that man was not doomed for his first sin, or for manifold sins, to eternal woe. In that case there would be no room for any gracious interposition. Of course, if the sin continued the curse remained, yet so that God, to gain if possible the sinner, made his sun to shine on him and his rain to descend for his benefit. A merciful promise was given to our first parents; Cain was spared; the long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah; God bore long with the Amorites; he showed Pharaoh great mercy, and

was not ready to destroy him or his people till the last effort of graciousness was tried: the Canaanites would all have been spared if they had humbled themselves as the Gibeonites did, who needed no deceptive trick to secure grace from the God that made them.

All through the history of Israel and of the Gentiles, as they appear in the Bible, we find mercy alternating with judgment or intermingled with it. The threatenings of God, even when expressed without qualification, were found to mean that they would be executed unless there was repentance, as in the case of Nineveh. Jonah was right in his interpretation of the nature of God's comminations; and he was afraid he would lose his character as a prophet, because in case the Ninevites repented his denunciation would come to nought. God said to Jeremiah: "In what instant I shall speak concerning a nation and concerning a kingdom, to pluck up, to pull down, and to destroy it, if that nation against whom I have pronounced turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil that I thought to do unto them." In Ezekiel the principle is extended to the individual: "When I say unto a wicked man, Thou shalt surely die, if he turn from his sin, ... none of his sins which he hath committed shall be mentioned unto him."

Everything shows that man was not brought by the representative sin of Adam into a hopeless condition. But there were some forms of evil to which, in general, the race was to be subjected, as disease, decay, and animal death, and the train of bereavement and sorrow connected with these — evils such that, on account of the fear of them, men, till the hope of the gospel delivers them, are all their lifetime in bondage.

Prophecy, especially in the Apocalypse, speaks of the visible judgments on the nations under the reign of Christ, to whom his Father has committed all judgment, as quite as terrible as those inflicted on the old world. The imagery of the prophet of Patmos is fully as awful and impressive as that of the more ancient seers. The same may be said of

the language of our Lord himself. The judgments on the old world are represented in the New Testament as the punishment of the time of God's forbearance — of the time when God relatively overlooked, winked at, the ill-desert of men.

In a large degree the punishments of Old Testament times are the visible judgments exhibited on the theatre of history; for it was God's design to prepare thus a historical, matter-of-fact proof of his moral reign over the nations of the earth. This would prepare mankind to appreciate the revelations respecting the retributions of the unseen world. These were not brought into the bold relief they present in the New Testament revelation, though they were by no means unknown to ancient Israel, and are spoken of in the Book of Daniel as plainly as in the apostolic writings.

Object of Judgments and Mercies.

When sin is perpetrated, it seems due to God's moral creatures that he should make manifest his views on the subject, demonstrate his abhorrence of the sinner, and counteract as far as possible his evil influence. Words are not enough for this end. Punishment seems the natural and necessary resort of him who is the moral Guardian of the universe. It plainly must be pushed to such an extent as to be an emphatic expression of the mind of God, to show that to him sin is an evil and bitter thing indeed. Hence the awful severity of God's punishments, often fitted to make the ears of all that heard of them tingle, and their hearts fail them for fear.

Prophetic records, whether in form denunciatory or historical, are adapted to produce that quailing of the soul that the prophets themselves mention as the natural effect of the judgments of God on evil-doers. And yet we are not to think of them as a full execution of retributive justice. They might have been, with no exceeding of the ill-desert of the sinner, pushed much farther. But they were pushed as far as infinite wisdom saw good for the best effect. What is the full ill-desert of sin is known only to God; and we know

not that sin is ever punished in any world as much as it deserves to be. Objective penal justice is not an end; and God will urge its infliction no farther than benevolence requires.

If towards sinners God had appeared in no other light than that of a punisher, though not in any instance putting forth all his wrath, there might have been a sadly false impression made respecting his character; it might have seemed unamiably stern. It was wise, then, for God to manifest himself as a God of mercy — as forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin. That grand revelation of his mercy to Moses appears in all his ways in the history of the world.

Towards Israel and towards the Gentiles there was mercy, all along down the ages, ready for the penitent, sometimes unmingled with severities, at other times accompanied by such severities as served to keep alive a sense of God's hatred of sin, of his remembering wrath in mercy as truly as mercy in wrath.

How wonderful the discipline and training through which mankind were carried by the various dispensations,— the antediluvian, the patriarchal, the legal, — all tending to show how weak man is, and how much in need of the mightiest divine working in wisdom and love to rescue him from sin, to reconcile him to God, and to fit him to stand in the filial relation to his Heavenly Father. There doubtless was, as has been said, a moral necessity that God should give an emphatic expression, in act as well as word, to his sense of the evil of sin. Many hold that the law, both of nature and of revelation, contains a commination that must be executed, either on the sinner or a substitute. But no law ever did or could contemplate substitution in such a way that vicarious obedience and punishment should be regarded as a proper fulfilment of the precept and penalty of law.

Substitution is said to be resorted to sometimes in China; but this cannot be according to the provision of any law, but must be a contrivance of corrupt officials, substituting defenseless plebeians for rich criminals of rank. This view is sup-

ported by the fact that a son, recently substituted for a father at his own request, had to persuade the magistrates that he was the real criminal.

The precept of law is laid on every individual, and it is absurd to imagine that one can obey for another. The obligation of obedience extends to every moral being in the universe. Nor is it possible that one moral being should be punished for another, and that thus the sinner himself should be legally exempted from just liability. No legislative authority ever could have enacted such a law. Each subject, on the other hand, is held to his personal, untransferable responsibility.

But does not such an interpretation of law as this preclude pardon? No: it never was the case except in the instance of the laws of the Medes and Persians, that pardon was made impossible by the published penalty of any law, unless it was expressly said that there would be no pardon. The promise of a law must be fulfilled, because the promisee has an indefeasible interest in its fulfilment; but in every case when pardon may be exercised without detriment to the public good, pardon may be legitimately granted, and sometimes it may be in the power of the government to remove obstacles standing in the way of pardon. On these principles governments have almost universally acted; and the scripture history shows that God has acted on the same principles, pardoning when he could wisely and benevolently do so. The same principles sometimes authorize a commutation of punishment, or punishments of less severity than the laws seem to prescribe. Indeed, every exercise of mercy rests on the same fundamental reason, including the forbearance or long-suffering so often spoken of in the Bible. But obviously the public good must in every case be paramount to private interest, and be guarded with the most scrupulous care. The idea that penal justice must always be done, in the sense that the penalty of the law must always be inflicted, would exclude the possibility of pardon and of atonement. For the infliction of the penalty on a substitute would not be justice,

but, if the substitute were innocent, manifest injustice, and his consent would not materially alter the case. If by justice be meant justice to the public good, this indeed must be always done, and no pardon or mercy inconsistent with this can be legitimate. I shall by-and-by speak of the governmental expedient for the legitimation of pardon, called atonement.

Not all who suffer when punishment is inflicted are punished. Near friends are smitten when a criminal is struck down, as when a criminal father or son or brother is executed. Infant children perished in the flood, and with the Sodomites. These were slain in mercy, not in wrath, as was also the case when the doomed Canaanites were destroyed. It may be difficult to explain all the cases; but we have no reason to doubt that the Abrahamic doctrine, that the Judge of all the earth must do right, is true. At present, when possible, the tares, for the sake of saving the wheat, are spared till the harvest; but the pious Elijah suffers with the people whom his own prayer has smitten with famine.

But there is often real responsibility when a superficial view does not recognize it. Had Israel been as zealous for the honor of God as was incumbent, Achan might not have committed his sin, and it is therefore charged on all Israel, and chastisement accordingly inflicted. But when the chief criminal was discovered, the weight of punishment fell on him. If Israel had been entirely innocent the anger of the Lord could not have been kindled against them. In some degree the crime was practically laid to the charge of the whole.

In case murder is committed it is said to defile the land. Somehow it is an evidence that a brother's life is not so precious there that a murderer is wholly an unnatural product of the land. Till his crime has brought the community to such a hatred of the atrocity as is expressed in the solemn shedding of his blood, the land is unclean. His execution makes atonement, not for him, but for the land, and is an expression of the repentance of the people. Or if the previous

guilt is not considered so great, the land is plainly held in duress, and, as it were, suspected, till they have shown by punishing the murderer that they have no voluntary part in his crime. So when any crime had been committed and the perpetrator was unknown, or when any one had ignorantly done anything forbidden by the law, there was supposed to be some possible lack of vigilance and care, and a solemn atonement was made on the part of those who might be suspected of this deficiency, though conceived to be guilty of no wilful violation of the divine law. God walked among the people as a holy, jealous God, not allowing his creatures to stand in any doubtful relation to his law and its violation.

Another instance of awful but most wise severity, is found in the visitation of the sins of the fathers on the children, recognized by our Lord in his declaration that all the righteous blood shed from the foundation of the world would be visited on that generation.

These passages, and others like them, have often been sadly misinterpreted. Onkelos long ago in his Targum gave the key to their meaning in the few words: "When the children *imitate* the iniquity of their fathers." They thus indorse it, and really make it their own, instead of considering, and refusing to do such like. Men are thus held responsible to profit morally by the history of the past, not to follow recklessly in the way of ancestors. The great French poet Racine, in his Athalie, has put into the mouth of Joad [Jehoiada] an indignant denial of the doctrine maintained by some:

> Il ne recherche point, aveugle en sa colère,
> Sur ce fils qui le craint l'impiété du père.
>
> "God does not visit, in his anger wild,
> The father's sin upon the pious child."

There are cases, not to be confounded with this, in which children are placed in less desirable circumstances, and even subjected to painful diseases in consequence of the sin of parents; as when leprosy was inflicted on Gehazi and descended to his children, or the priesthood was taken from the family of Eli. These evils were not punishments to the

innocent children, but to the parents, yet disadvantages assigned by the All-wise Sovereign to the children as motives to parents for parental fidelity. The law of the descent both of advantages and disadvantages is one of great influence to the human soul, and is therefore maintained by God with great constancy. But punishment can descend only when the immoral character descends also. Punishment must, in the nature of things, be a purely personal matter, that cannot come, like leprosy or scrofula, by mere natural causation.

Extensive infliction of punishment is often avoided by human authorities by the punishment of the ringleaders in the case of an outbreak of iniquity — multitudes being spared the roughest brunt of suffering, though bearing the shame of crime. A course similar to this was pursued in the case of those who perished in the flood. They were the indorsers of the wickedness of all past generations of sinners, and were most justly made examples, after God's long-suffering gave them ample opportunity for repentance and mercy.

The Sodomites were the vilest sinners of the period and the region. They had long been the recipients of kindness, till the ill-fame of their vileness went up to heaven; and when God sent down to them an angel committee of inquiry they gave the angels abundant proof that the report did not exceed their enormous guilt; and the rain of fire and brimstone came down. Had ten righteous men been found there the city would have been spared. The solitary one was rescued. There were guilty cities that deserved to perish with Sodom and the other four; but they were spared.

We find mercy mingled with the chastisement of the guilty sons of Jacob. Though their sin found them out, and they suffered severely for it, they were not destroyed, but even blessed, while most of them deserved to die as murderers.

When Israel sinned in the wilderness, — almost all guilty, — God did not destroy the whole of the guilty ones, but smote down the ringleaders, and made their doom a warning to the rest. When sentenced to die in the wilderness they had

a space for repentance and for the admonition of their children.

The same course of merciful limitation of punishment characterized the way of God in the whole recorded history of Israel, and characterizes it still; so that we can easily accept Paul's declaration that "they are beloved for the fathers' sakes." Nor are these comminglings of mercies with judgments confined to Israel, or to sinners of the antediluvian period. They appear in the whole history of the world.

It is remarkable that when Daniel is telling us of the destruction of the great empires of antiquity he tells us that there was mercy for all but the last and most tyrannous. The wild beast representing this was slain, and his body destroyed and given to the burning flame. "As concerning the rest of the beasts, they had their dominion taken away, yet their lives were prolonged for a season and time."

But God, while he thus revealed his mercy, and showed that he forgives transgression and sin, was careful to provide that he should not be trifled with. So when Moses sinned he sentenced his beloved servant never to tread the land of promise, and would not hear his supplications for full forgiveness. He might behold the land, but might not enter it. How affecting the rebuke to Moses, and how solemn the lesson to Israel and to all the nations and all their generations! And when David sinned, though God did not reject him as he did Saul, how awful was the punishment inflicted — not in secret, but in the light of the sun. And the instrument of his punishment was his beautiful and beloved son Absalom, over whose deserved ruin and slaughter he wailed out that most pathetic outcry of a stricken father's heart, probably pierced through with the thought that his own sin had contributed to make Absalom the contemptible fool that he was.

The Atonement.

In the heathen world there were propitiatory rites. The serious heathen felt that to propitiate Deity it was not enough to repent of wrong done, or to confess it humbly. They

sacrificed animals, and even their own children and other selected human victims, apparently as self-inflicted loss or suffering; hoping thereby to excite the pity of the offended gods. It is in allusion to this that Micah the prophet represents man as asking, "Wherewith shall I come before the Lord, or bow myself before the high God? Shall I come before him with burnt-offerings, with calves of a year old? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or ten thousands of rivers of oil? Shall I give my first-born for my transgression — the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?" This is a natural and affecting expression of belief in an avenging God. It is very different from a belief that there is no mercy needed, or none to be possibly obtained. The answer of the prophet is not to be considered as a denial of any need of atonement, but as declaring that if there is a humble use of the atonements provided by God, and doing justly, and loving mercy, and humble walking with him, all will be well.

The heathen really endeavored to make expiation for their offences against their deities by devoting costly offerings to their honor, and to appease or propitiate their supposed wrathful feelings by the sacrifice sometimes, at the demand of the priests, of their dearest — according to Tennyson's terrible poem, "The Victim." The sacrifice of Iphigenia may furnish an illustration. Sometimes the gods were imagined, in their rage, to send pestilence or famine or wide-sweeping ruin upon armies and nations, in revenge for an offence to a priest or dishonor done to a temple; and the god must be appeased in this awful way, not merely by the reparation for the wrong.

The human victims were slain, it seems to me, as in great straits a victim is thrown to a herd of hungry wolves, to save the rest; or less odiously, a few of an offending family, army, or nation sacrificed to save the residue. I know of no case of a victim not connected with the offenders thus sacrificed; and never does the idea appear of vicarious *punishment* recognized as a full equivalent for the punish-

ment of the offenders. There was, perhaps, a parallelism between the human sacrifices and the punishment of one or several of a company of mutineers, instead of the whole number.

There were sometimes sacrifices of quite another sort. Where a great deliverance or a great victory had been granted, so supposed, costly offerings were made in acknowledgment; rivers of oil and wine were poured out, thousands of animals slaughtered, and sometimes, as the crown of all, human victims slain. The case of Jephthah's daughter was, perhaps, of this class. There was here no idea of atonement.

Much as there was revolting in the heathen propitiations, they had a real origin in the sense of guilt in the souls of men, and in the struggle to obtain relief and still the clamors of remorse and fear. They had the same origin with the rough shirts, the painful penances, and abject humiliations of some who bear the Christian name; and they had the same efficacy. Read Tennyson's "Simeon Stylites," where the subject is treated with the power of a master.

The atonements prescribed in the law were of a fundamentally different character, though appealing to the same susceptibilities of the human soul. It was not the case that all the sacrifices of the law were propitiatory. The burnt-offerings and other offerings appear to have been symbols of the offering up of one's self to God, as I think Hengstenberg has correctly explained them. But the sacrifices on the great day of atonement, and the sin-offerings and trespass-offerings, were propitiatory. They had a relation to sin and its forgiveness, and are said to make atonement for the soul; and this atonement was a condition of forgiveness in the sense in which forgiveness was dispensed under the law. Was the idea ever expressed in the Mosaic code, or anywhere in the Bible, that the animal slain was *judicially* substituted for the sinner, and *punished* by death instead of him? Or is it said that the animal typifies a future victim who was to be *punished* for him? I think no such language is found. The natural import of the sin-offering seems to be that the

death of the victim symbolizes the death which the sinner deserves to suffer — that in the offering he acknowledges this, while he casts himself on the mercy of God for pardon, according to God's own appointment. In like manner, the ablutions symbolize the cleansing of the soul by the grace of God — a cleansing confessed in the ablutions to be needed. This seems to be the simple import of these rites. They do not imply that God's feelings or dispositions are altered by them, but only our relations to him, justifying him in treating us with a kindness which he could not use if we did not thus come to him. These rites were adapted to exert a wholesome influence on the observer himself, and on all, too, who witnessed his observance of them; and the effect was naturally much greater when all Israel, on the great day of atonement, joined in the atoning observances. No mere verbal confession of sin could have an equal effect, though the verbal confession had its place, and was also required.

The law not only did not require, but utterly prohibited human sacrifices; though the Israelites, from time to time, roused God's intensest indignation by falling into the horrid heathen practice. For animals no nobler use could be imagined than to serve the uses of the human soul, and to prepare the way for the grand atonement of the Son of God. These animal sacrifices did not, in the deepest sense, take away sin. It may be said that, in that sense, all the sin of the world remained unatoned till the work of Christ was finished — till he had by himself purged our sin. We are not yet prepared to enter upon this great theme. A few things remain to be said of atonements before Christ.

It may be interesting to refer to the passage, Num. xxxv., respecting the murderer. Here the representation seems to be that until the murderer is duly punished the whole land is held guilty of his crime, and cannot be released till his blood is shed by them; for on them rests the responsibility of protecting innocent blood, and of vindicating it when shed; and when a murder has occurred it is assumed that

the proper state of feeling with respect to murder had not been present in the land. "Blood defileth the land [makes it profane before God]; and for the land *atonement is not made* except in the blood of him that murderously shed blood" (vs. 33). The technical word for atonement is used, which our translation here and elsewhere obscures. In this case, atonement is not effected by the blood of the murderer as a sacrificial victim, but by the righteous conduct of the authorities and people in slaying him, and thus endeavoring to make murder odious. All is done by divine command. In a similar manner, when a person was found slain by an unknown homicide the nearest town was held responsible till in a solemn manner they had gone through rites of atonement appointed by God, and God was himself entreated to atone for his people; and then it was declared that atonement had been made. The translators here again fail to use the technical word. It is obvious what a spirit of vigilance in guarding human life this institution is adapted to promote. Till it was duly honored, the sunshine of divine beneficence could not be enjoyed in full by the town.

When in Micah the proposed heathen atonements are rejected, the Lord tells what he will accept, namely, justice, mercy, and humble walking with God. This seems to mean that the chief atonement or condition of accepting one who has sinned is a return to right doing. But this right doing must include the observance of the atoning rites appointed by the Lord. Indeed, the moral influence on others of a sin-offering must have depended much upon a belief in the sincere repentance of the offerer.

In Prov. xvi. 6 it is said: "By mercy and truth iniquity is purged." Strictly, it should be rendered, "iniquity is atoned." "The departure from evil" of the remainder of the verse is not departure from sin, but from evil as punishment. The whole seems to mean, Mercy and truth obtain atonement for us, and the fear of the Lord escape from punishment. The two parts of the verse form a parallelism. Mercy and truth and the fear of the Lord conspicuously in a

man may be the occasion of grace and salvation to others, as well as to the subject.

In Numbers xxv. we have a remarkable example of an atonement expressly declared by the Lord himself to be effected by the zealous righteousness of Phineas. Israel had fallen into foul idolatry and the vile lewdness connected with it. God had commanded that the heads of Israel should be hanged up before him, and Moses had issued the order that each still faithful Israelite should slay his men who were joined to Baal-Peor. A plague had gone forth which slew twenty-four thousand men. While Moses and the congregation of Israel were weeping before the door of the tabernacle, Zimri, a prince of the tribe of Simeon, in the sight of Moses and all Israel, took Cozbi, a Midianitish princess, and went with her to his tent. Then Phineas, grandson of Aaron, indignant at this impudent abomination, seized a javelin, followed into the tent, and thrust them both through, killing them on the spot, in accordance with God's commands. Then the plague was stayed; and the Lord said to Moses "Phineas has turned my wrath away from the children of Israel, in being jealous with my jealousy among them, that I consumed not the children of Israel in my jealousy. Wherefore say, I give unto him my covenant of peace; and he shall have it, and his seed after him, even the covenant of an everlasting priesthood, because he was jealous for his God, and *made an atonement* for the children of Israel." I have changed the translation to make it a little more literal, and to harmonize its parts. This is to me one of the most instructive passages in the Old Testament. It seems plain that the atonement here made was not made by means of a slain animal, but by the manifestation of whole-hearted interest in the honor of God and the salvation of Israel. In thus making an atonement, Phineas acted as a true priest of the Lord, and the reward was fitly the establishment of the priesthood in his family. It was an atonement, because a holy moral influence went forth from it, turning Israel from foul idolatry to the sole service of

Jehovah. On account of it, therefore, God could fitly turn from the fierceness of his consuming wrath, and grant Israel a space for repentance, and finally blot out the sin confessed and forsaken through the influence of the manifestation Phineas had made. This atonement would give a better efficacy to the atoning rites in established use.

It cannot be reasonably supposed that the case of Phineas stands absolutely isolated, and that the devoted jealousy for God's honor and Israel's good of other distinguished saints, who have stood in the breach when God's cause was in most danger, had no similar atoning efficacy. It was often the case that for their sake the church was spared, and through them often restored from threatened ruin. Some of them hazarded, others laid down, their lives, and the zeal of the Lord's cause ate them up. Their testimony in word and deed for God and for his law were always ready, and both boldly and lovingly given. Hence many of these holy men have been considered and called by the church types of Christ, imperfectly yet really foreshadowing him and his work in various relations. Atonement as effected through them was very different, in the manner of it, from atonement made by the blood of animals, yet had the same general aim and result, to bring Israel into such a moral state, and such a relation to God, that he could properly show mercy, forgive, and bless; that no mistake would be left in the minds of his rational creatures with respect to his hatred of sin and love of holiness. But Phineas would not have increased the efficacy of his atonement if he had surrendered himself to his father or grandfather to be slain on an altar, that his blood, in the manner of an animal's blood, might be sprinkled for the people. Such things were done among the heathen, but God had forbidden them most solemnly, and expressed his horror of them. They never could have produced a beneficent effect. But if Phineas, in his devoted effort to vindicate the claims of Jehovah to be the God of Israel, and to annihilate the foul worship of Baal-Peor, had lost his life, that might have added to the effect of his holy zeal.

The object and aim of the God who had created man in his own image, and whose heart was grieved to see his so richly-endowed creature fallen and lost, was to recover him from his ruin, and to re-instate him in his full-orbed favor. This was the end of all his operations in all stages of the world's history. And in a comprehensive view the whole series of providential and moral dispensations, of judgments and mercies, of trials without revealed law and with revealed law, the whole array of rites and institutions, of punishments and atonements, was necessary. But man was not restored till the gracious Father had done something higher and better for him than he had yet done; nor even then, until his last and most perfect system of operations had worked in the world for many generations. All along multitudes would be saved; but the world, ruled by the original arch-enemy, would show itself a mighty antagonistic force, long resisting, with apparent success, the power of the great Redeemer. All, however, would result in a most glorious triumph of redemption, and the kingdoms of the world become the kingdom of God and his Christ.

In all that God ever did by men for the behoof of their fellow-men, whether in the way of physical force or moral influence, he did it through his Spirit, guiding, actuating, and empowering them. In large measure the Spirit was in them, and presided over their speech and actions, and especially qualified them to provide that wonderful collection of divine inspirations, the Old Testament.

But when the fulness of time had come, prepared by all the past, the Word that was in the beginning with God, and was God, through whom all things that exist came into existence, in whom is the life that is the light of men, became flesh and sojourned among us (and we beheld his glory, glory as of the only begotten one from the Father), full of grace and truth. For the law was given through Moses; the grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. In him dwells all the fulness of the Godhead bodily, the Word, and the immeasurable abundance of the Spirit. In all the holy

patriarchs, prophets, priests, kings, and mighty men, God dwelt in measure; in Christ, in absolute fulness, so that it was absurd for any one who knew him to ask to see the Father. He that had seen him had seen the Father. His words are the words of God; his works the works of God. Perfect infallibility characterizes every manifestation. He was infallible in the knowledge and utterance of the truth. The law he perfectly understood in all its breadth and spirituality. Mere men, the best, the highest of them, might be partially ignorant of the law as to its spirit or application, but he could not be. His spirit and life were a perpetual outflow of holy obedience, an absolute, matter-of-fact commentary on the law. He is God with us, in and with humanity, a real and true brother of the race, full of all human sympathies; while he is perpetually in the Father and the Father in him in an ineffable closeness of interfusion.

Being such in his person, he was qualified as no one else ever had been, or ever could be, to open up to our souls all spiritual reality and truth. There is a dark haze drawn over man's interior eye by sin with respect to the glory of the divine law, the guilt of sin, the value of the good of rational beings, the sacredness of the relations man sustains to God and his throne. It is his mission to be the light of the world, to chase away the darkness, to send down into the depths of the soul the true illumination. For this end was he born, and for this came he into the world, that he should bear witness unto the truth. He is the faithful and true witness, bearing witness to the truth as no other could. He bore witness to the precepts of the law, showing their breadth and spirituality as it had never been shown before. He testified of the world that its deeds were evil as no mere human prophet ever did. He tore the veil from sanctimonious hypocrisy. His teachings have confessedly spread through the world a blaze of light with regard to moral truth, compared with which all that was seen before was but as twilight to noonday. In this way he magnified the law and made it honorable, exhibited the glory of the precept and

showed how worthy it is to be the rule for the heart and life of all God's moral creatures. He magnified also the penalty, showed up the ill-desert of all sin, whether it stained the heart or the life. His instructions were wonderfully illustrated by all the manifestations of his life. That was the love commanded by the law perfectly embodied, and blazing in the eyes of mankind as the sun of righteousness. Till Christ acted in the world man hardly knew what the word love meant; but he has to millions of hearts effectually interpreted it, and yet has made them feel that they did not know the meaning as he did. All his actions, whether divine or human, or both, showed it forth transcendently. Perpetually there streamed forth from him love to poor, ignorant, sinful, lost men, — love for the most lost; tender interest in all their interests; heartful compassion for all the woes they suffered or feared. And never did this world's sinners so see in any other presence how guilty they were, how unworthy of favor or blessing, yet were they emboldened by divine benignity to ask what they needed; and it was only there that any such grateful love was felt.

It was not towards man only that our Lord manifested love, but supremely to his Heavenly Father; showing the most perfect regard for his will, even when it called him to die the most revolting death. While no one else set the value on human good that he did, by word, by deed, by suffering, yet he was infinitely removed in his whole career from the mere humanitarianism that ignores God while it professes to devote itself to man. Every manifestation he made falls in with and echoes the words that he calls the great commandment, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart." In life and in death he magnified this law and made it honorable, with a devotion no one had ever so gloriously shown before. Thus he condemned godlessness, and gibbeted it on his cross.

No one with any spiritual eyesight can fail to see in Jesus a deep, solemn earnestness of devotion to God's glory and man's good, transcending all ever beheld in any other life.

It is no fanatical or enthusiastic devotion, but as calm and rational as it is earnest and intense. And had he only lived such a life, and we possessed the true and fit record of it, it would have been a priceless treasure to the race. But his great mission of magnifying the law and making it honorable, and thus laying the foundations for man's salvation and his Father's highest glory on earth, was to have a most tragic close, one which was to make the cross the highest symbol of holy love and redemptive power which mankind or the universe ever possessed. He was to seal his testimony, that of his whole career, with his blood. That was the appointment of his Father, and it was his will that his Father's will should be done. And we can, with our child eyes, see the wisdom. For his death intensifies infinitely the apparent earnestness and whole-hearted lovingness of his entire manifestation. It is here that love shines in full-orbed blaze. Here it shines on the icy hearts of sinners with dissolving power. In the light of this love how odious does sin appear, how worthy of all condemnation. Here is the loveliest, most fragrant beauty of holiness; and in its pure light how ugly and hateful are sin and the sinner.

In its contact and connection with the Son of God sin had the greatest opportunity that it ever had to exhibit its nature and malignity. How blind it was to the most resplendent light that had ever irradiated earth, or even heaven. When sinful men not only rejected, but persecuted, reviled, and, finally, with infuriated rage, murdered the Son of God, sin manifested its true character and horrible baseness. And thus sin wrote, as it were, in letters of blood, its own condemnation and the rectitude of the law which denounces it. It would have been wonderful if at such a spectacle there had not been darkness over all the earth, and if there had not been such a shaking as rent the rocks. It seems as if on this little spot outside of Jerusalem, at Golgotha, the place of malefactors' skulls, there occurred the most marvellous exhibition the universe ever witnessed. Holy love and sin here met, and spontaneously manifested their genius and

power. Holy love could not act itself out in its simplicity without manifesting its own exceeding beauty and loveliness, and, in contrast, the ugliness and hatefulness of sin. And sin could not here act itself out without showing its detestable character and worthiness of intensest condemnation.

In every possible rational point of view there goes forth from the whole character and career, and especially from the cross of the Son of God, where the manifestation of his holy love culminates, the mightiest moral influence, not only to rescue sinful men from sin, but to clarify and exalt the moral ideas and moral life of the whole universe. Christ is therefore set forth as a propitiation, or propitiator, in his blood. He is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world. The facts of his history are great public facts, published for their natural influence to the whole universe, but especially to his human brethren. He bore all his sufferings, all the horrors of his death, primarily for them. He bore them that the eternal weight of God's wrath might not abide on his brethren. Therefore they are vicarious sufferings, but not at all in the sense that they are the literal punishment for their sins. But if his love wins our faith and transforms us, then we may be legitimately pardoned. For the moral influence of his suffering love is of far more efficacy to deter all God's moral creatures from sin, to magnify the law and make it honorable in their hearts, than the deserved punishment of countless millions of sinners could be. But still pardon can only reach the penitent. For, as our Lord himself asked on his way to the cross, "If these things are done in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry?" The dry tree, the persistent sinner, fit for fuel, can get no legitimate hope from the cross; it rather bids him despair. "He that believeth not is condemned already" — has his certain condemnation emblazoned in his black unbelief — "because he hath not believed in the name of the only-begotten Son of God."

According to the view of Christ's atonement here presented, there is a closer analogy between the atonement made by Phineas and that by Christ, than between the atonements

made by the blood of brute animals and the atonement made by our Lord. But there is an analogy belonging to all atonements; and the blood which always accompanied the legal sacrifices occasioned the frequent allusions to them, as also their being a regular institution of Moses, still in use when the apostles wrote.

When Paul says that "God made him to be sin for us who knew no sin," the reference is to our Lord's being delivered up by God's counsel to be treated by men as the vilest malefactor. There is no allusion here to the sin-offerings. The original word here rendered sin is by some thought to mean in this place sin-offering; but this translation, while it rejects the ordinary meaning of the word, nullifies the antithesis of the apostle. Paul says, in sense, God delivered up Christ to be treated as if he were *sin*, that we might be treated as if we were *righteousness*. In a similar way we must interpret Gal. iii. 13: "Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us; for it is written, cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree." Here Paul alludes to a saying in the Old Testament, that an executed criminal is deemed accursed of God. The manner of such a criminal's death was the manner of the death of the Saviour, as Isaiah predicted it would be. And this was indeed an awful humiliation for the Son of God to endure. But to suppose that *he* was accursed of God, or regarded otherwise than with the highest complacency, is simply monstrous. The apostle does not say having been made the curse of the *law* for us, but simply a curse, that is, a person hanged on a tree like a malefactor.

If the Jews before the time of Christ had understood the language as many now take it, they must have supposed that the Messiah was to be made an awful exception to the law against human sacrifices; and that he was to be slain, as brute animals were, on an altar, as an atonement for sin. But I am not aware that any ancient Jewish interpreter ever had this idea; and it was certainly alien to all the ideas of our Lord's earthly time. The disciples of John the baptizer,

when he spake of Jesus as the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world, never thought of such a thing as his being slain for sin in the manner of an animal. And no such thing appears in the historic record. What a different record it would be if the Jewish high-priest had been commanded to slay him on the altar of sacrifice, and he had actually done so. Or if Jesus himself, our great High-priest, had built an altar, and on that, in the manner of Racine's Eriphyle in his Iphigenie, had slain himself, or had laid himself on the altar, and had there awaited a thunder-bolt from his Father's hand, and the thunder-bolt had pierced the heart of God's Son, would such a transaction have been a fit one to be done in this universe of God? I feel sure that no Christian can think it would be fit, or that it is possible to imagine a scene like that to be presented. Nor can any one believe that the effect of such a transaction would be wholesome in heaven, earth, or hell. The conception, or a similar one, it seems, did arise in heathen minds; but Christians are all glad of the abhorrence expressed for the entire thing in the sacred records. We feel no such horror when irrational animals are so employed; but we should experience a revolting if the innocent creatures were tortured.

The obedience of our Lord unto death, even the death of the cross, was no vicarious obedience to the law, and endurance of its penalty to be imputed to the elect; but was the most effectual condemnation of sin and glorification of holiness ever exhibited in this or any other world. All along it was rendered in contrast with the most awful display of wickedness ever made; which, in its murderous culmination, brought out in the boldest relief the nature of sin. Christ, therefore, in this obedience did that which was more fit to be an atonement for all worlds, reconciling holy angels and sinful men to God, than any other conceivable provision that God could make, because it introduces into the universe among the moral creatures of God the highest possible redeeming moral influence. In its presence how ill-deserving every believing sinner must feel; while he, at the same time,

feels, too, that through this he may be fitly forgiven, his merited punishment being an infinitesimal, or mere zero, compared with the condemnation which the cross visits upon his sin. But, as has been said above, the saving power can reach only the believer. To the unbeliever the holy sufferer says, "If these things be done in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry?"

These sufferings of Christ, while they are not punishment, are, to all who are saved, in the highest sense vicarious. *They more than answer* the purpose of the redeemed sinner's punishment, but they do answer that purpose. The end of his sufferings is not, could not be, mere retributive justice, but the promotion, among the moral creatures of God, of obedience to the law of love more directly than any punishment possibly could do it. The Saviour's obedience unto the death of the cross promotes this obedience, not only among men, but in all worlds. The believing sinner's pardon, instead of interfering with this great end, is itself an exemplification of the love which the law commands. For mercy, when it can be fitly exercised, is itself a sweet demand of the holy law.

Though our Lord is not a victim, laid by divine command on a literal altar of sacrifice, much less a formal substitute executed under law in place of the actual criminals, no sinner can, if he beholds him on the cross, with a believing heart, help saying, It is I that deserve death for my sin, a death more dreadful than that which my Redeemer suffers. It is natural, therefore, for him to sing,

> "My faith would lay her hand
> On that dear head of thine;
> While like a penitent I stand,
> And there confess my sin."

The entire holy universe might fitly sympathize with the scene, and rejoice to see the curse removed.

One of the solemn and awful ways by which God has guarded against the abuse of the gift of his Son is, appointing him to be the Judge of the world; and at the great day he

will so proceed as to show that he exercises no weak and demoralizing pity for incorrigible rebels. "The Lord Jesus," Paul says, "will be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ; who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power, when he shall come to be glorified in his saints, and to be admired in all them that believe ..... at that day." Then will be seen the wrath of the Lamb, and blood, not his own, will sprinkle his garments and stain all his raiment, when he treads the wine-press alone, needing no help from his people, treading his enemies and theirs in his anger, and trampling them in his fury. But then believers lift up their heads, for the time of consummated redemption is come.

All the allusions of the Bible to atonement and sacrifice, and all the usual language of evangelical preaching and song fall in with this view of the atonement of Christ. And especially does it fit into the language which the Christian naturally uses with respect to his own bearing of the cross and being crucified with his Lord, filling up that which is behind of the sufferings of Christ for the sake of his body, the church. None of this language detracts from the soleness of the work of Christ, as this is the origin or fountain of all the spiritual manifestations of his people.

I have already spoken of the atonement of the Son of God as reaching back through all past ages. That seems the import of the remarkable language of the apostle Paul in Rom. iii. 25, imperfectly translated in our English Bible, "Whom God set forth as a propitiation, through faith, in his blood; unto a showing of his righteousness, on account of a pretermission of sins formerly committed during the forbearance of God, with a showing of his righteousness at the present time, unto his being righteous and justifying him that is of faith." There can be no sinner who remembers the mercy of God shown him in any age of the world, whose heart is not utterly hardened, that will not learn in the Saviour's life and

death a deeper lesson respecting his sin, and find mightier motives there for holiness, than all other manifestations from God afford. It is according to the same principle that the apostle represents that the heavenly beings are themselves reconciled to God by Christ; which can mean nothing else than their effectually receiving higher lessons in moral excellence than they ever before knew.

Inflicted punishment is, of course, always a condemnation of sin, and less directly a commendation of righteousness; and any imaginable atonement must have its moral power in the condemnation of the former and commendation of the latter. Righteous conduct is several times spoken of as condemning sin. Thus Noah, by his faith, manifested in building the ark, "condemned the world." The repentance of the Ninevites condemned the impenitence of our Lord's contemporaries; and so did the respect which the Queen of Sheba showed to the wisdom of Solomon. It is too obvious to need insistence that this is an effect of righteous conduct, and the condemnation and commendation are the more emphatic the further the zealous adherence to righteousness is carried. The effect is naturally reformatory; and in proportion to this influence mercy to the reformed becomes safe and salutary, since the influence is not confined to the reformed, but extends through the whole moral community. As in the case of Phineas and Moses, the influence is atoning. Nothing can be plainer than the condemnatory and commendatory power of our Lord's character and actions. It is plainly transcendently the greatest power for condemnation and commendation the moral world has ever known. "What the law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh, that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us." When Christ, as the God-man, and, as such, the highest witness, had by word and deed, pushed his practical testimony (*the* testimony at the appropriate epoch, 1 Tim. ii. 6) in the face of all human enmity, in the face of the cross, this constituted the highest

conceivable atonement. Death, inflicted by God's command, on a literal altar, could not have enhanced the beneficent influence, but must have unutterably marred it. All the theories that so teach do mar it; but, thank God, it is too mighty to be destroyed by worlds of false philosophy and false interpretation. It remains, amid all perversions that do not set aside the dignity of Christ's divine-human person and the facts of his life and death, the highest moral influence in the universe.

I have quoted several scriptures in which our Lord's suffering obedience to death is spoken of as the chief constituent of the atonement; but I wish specially to signalize Hebrews x. 5–10, because this epistle is thought most plainly to exhibit the common notion of vicarious punishment. Here the writer quotes a passage from the fortieth Psalm, in which the sacrifices of the law as insufficient atonements are apparently contrasted with Christ's cordial obedience to his Father's will as the all-sufficient atonement. The offering of the body of Christ is spoken of, not as indicating that he is laid on an altar, and slain like an animal victim, but as showing that he, as God's saints always do in an inferior degree, laid himself out in death-bringing sacrifice for the ends for which he lived and died. The "body" of our Lord is here the organ of obedience provided as such by God. The Hebrew literally translated is "ears hast thou dug out for me," that is, fashioned for me, ready to listen to all thy commands. The rendering of the Septuagint can be made to agree in sense with this only by making "body" mean a ready organ of obedience. In the psalm no mention is made of death endured, but the mode of obedience specified is declaring God's truth in the great congregation, as the faithful and true witness for God. This was what brought on his death, in which he died as the highest witness for God and his holy law. So his atoning work was analagous to that of Moses and Phineas, though both on account of the superiority of the truth he declared, the dignity of his person, and the greatness of his sufferings, infinitely more significant and impressive.

It is a most fit and glorious work of the Spirit of God to bring to bear upon the souls of men the life and death of the Son, the only-begotten, to take of the things of Christ and show them to men. The blindness and stupidity which sin produces in human souls renders this work of the Spirit absolutely essential. Thus the gospel, the good news respecting this glorious Saviour, must be proclaimed with the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven, with demonstration of the Spirit and power. To perfect men in the knowledge of Christ, and to educate them to be his younger brethren in the kingdom, the Spirit takes up his permanent abode in believers. And this indwelling of the Spirit belongs to the heavenly as well as to the earthly state. What the Scriptures say of the present glory and reign of our Lord, of his coming to judge the world, and of his receiving believers to himself to enjoy him forever, does not belong to the atonement, which was finished in his earthly sojourn. But these truths constitute a part of the gospel, and have an influence in promoting faith and practical holiness. The Spirit, therefore, takes these things as part of the things of Christ, and shows them to our souls. They serve to awe sinners, and cheer the saints of God; they have always been much dwelt on by faithful ministers of the gospel, and always will be.

It may assist in the comprehension of the views here presented, to sum up more briefly what has been said in the preceding pages.

1. One of the most important provisions of the ancient time was what are called atonements. They were of different forms, but all united in being designed to promote repentance and obedience, and to create a public influence against sin which would render forgiveness safe and wholesome. (1) There were the so-called sin-offerings and trespass-offerings, and the offerings of the great day of atonement, consisting mainly of the solemn slaying of clean animals, with confession of sin, intended to symbolize and set forth the ill-desert of the sinner who was to be forgiven. The anger of God of course ceases when the sinner repents;

but the atonement, while it wholesomely affects the mind of the penitent believer, puts God publicly into a position in which he can properly pardon. (2) There were atonements effected by the conspicuous zeal and devotion of eminent saints of God, in which their conduct sent forth a healthful moral influence to bring their brethren to repentance, and made it safe for God to forgive them when penitent, and even to exercise forbearance towards them before repentance. The most signalized case of this kind is that of Phineas, who is expressly said by his jealousy for God to have made atonement for Israel. Moses is similarly said to have made an atonement for Israel. (3) Human sacrifices, offered frequently by the heathen, were never tolerated by God, but most strictly forbidden; and there is no heathen practice mentioned with more horror by the prophets of the Lord. It was impossible that they ever should have sent forth a healthful moral influence, even though offered under the lashings of conscience for the sins of the soul.

2. In the fulness of time, that is, when the world had had all the necessary previous experience, and had been carried through all the needful preparatory training, the Word, who was in the beginning with God, and was God, became flesh, and sojourned among us; and thus there was on earth literally an Immanuel, a true incarnation of God himself. The incarnation alone was a most wonderful expression of divine interest in the lost race of mankind; but the history of the career of the Redeemer — for it was to redeem he came — makes it the most stupendous marvel that the human heart can contemplate. His chief object here below was to make such an atonement for sin as to save from sin and death all that could by any possible atonement be saved, his atonement being the highest and most efficacious possible to the infinite goodness, wisdom, and power of God.

The atonement made by Christ consisted in the creation of the greatest beneficent moral influence that could be sent forth into the universe. To create this he must, in a transcendent degree and manner, magnify the law and make it honorable, and thus lift it up on high from the dishonored,

prostrate, and trampled situation to which in this world sin had brought it down. He was to rescue the honor of God, and make him to man God and the Heavenly Father. He was to prepare the deliverance of man from debasing selfishness, and from bondage to sensual and passional gratification. This he was to do by means of the various wonders he did and suffered, manifesting all the perfections, natural and moral, of divinity, and as well all the perfections of an absolutely innocent and holy humanity. To his Heavenly Father in his law of love he was obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. All he said, all he did, all he suffered, was the most awful condemnation sin ever received, or could receive; for he placed the resplendent whiteness of heaven's highest holiness alongside of the dark abomination which had befouled and laid waste the fair creation of God, and threatened to turn it into a hell. This abomination raged shamelessly around his cross, where his wondrous testimony for God and divine love, and against all sin, had its most glorious culmination; a testimony that would, in spite of all the rage and cunning of Satan, take effect in millions of human hearts, subdue the world, and extend its influence even to the angels of God. The cross could not but show that all sin deserves a worse death than was suffered there in behalf of the sinner; could not but show, too, the certain doom of him who tramples under his profane feet the sacred blood, and refuses to yield his heart to its influence. This great showing up of sin by the obedience of Christ unto the death of the cross, renders unnecessary the showing up of the penitent's ill-desert by his personal punishment. That becomes, not undeserved, but inappropriate in the presence of the great Sufferer, on whose sacred head he lays his hand and confesses his sins.

3. The manner of the atonement of the Son of God is not the same with that of the sin-offerings of the Mosaic law. That was appropriate for animals, but not for any rational being, much less for the Son of God. Sacrificing him on God's part in that way would have horrified the whole rational creation, and could not have been of beneficent

influence. But as Christ did die, his death glorifies the Father and saves the world.

4. The great moral function of the Divine Spirit is to take the things of the Saviour and to show them to mankind. This work is essential; for left to themselves sinners would fail of any effectual knowledge of what our Lord has done and suffered for them. The gospel must be preached with demonstration of the Spirit and of power.

5. A necessary part of the gospel follows the story of the cross, — the resurrection, the ascension, the reign at God's right hand, the constant working of Christ with his church, the second advent, the resurrection at his call of all the dead, the last judgment, the relations of Christ to his people in the post-resurrection state. All these things shed light on the atonement, illustrate its importance and eternal influence.

6. No character that ever shone in our world has exerted the actual influence against sin and in favor of virtue that has flowed from Jesus Christ. This is nearly the universal testimony of the best writers who have expatiated on the characters of history. By general confession he only has realized the ideal of moral excellence. Rousseau, in his eloquent way, merely echoed the general voice when, in his Emile, he wrote, "If Socrates lived and died like a philosopher, Jesus Christ lived and died like a God." The very ideas of mankind respecting right and wrong have been wonderfully changed, clarified, and glorified through him, by his deeds as well as words. Even those who have denied his divinity have talked of him, of his transcendent character, as it is fit to talk only of a divine person; not only such men as Dr. Channing, but even such as Renan, and, recently, John Stuart Mill, who went so far as to think that Jesus might have an unique mission in the world. How sunlight plain it is that if man is to be brought to true virtue, and realize the law of his moral reason, Christ is to be the influence to effect it: he is to be the Atonement, the Reconciler. He is the one who, as Gabriel says to Daniel, is "to make an end of sins, and to make reconciliation for iniquity, and to bring in everlasting righteousness."

ARTICLE III.

THE MORAL DIFFICULTIES OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

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NOTHING is gained, but much is lost, by unwarranted claims in behalf of any good thing. Such claims, it will hardly be denied, have sometimes been made even for the Holy Scriptures themselves; and in so far as this is true, its influence must have tended to weaken, rather than to strengthen, their authority. In fact, it has proved a fruitful source of scepticism and infidelity. For, just as the attempt to interpret all scriptural allusions to physical phenomena so as to express the results of modern science has been a great obstacle to faith, so the groundless assumption that the morality which is tolerated in the Old Testament must be regarded as precisely on a par with that of the New has loaded them both with a weight which they were never intended to bear. Hence the whole subject of the relation between these two parts of the sacred canon requires to be thoroughly reworked, if God would only send us a man capable of doing it any sort of justice. Meanwhile, all that we can undertake is to throw a little light upon it for the relief of our faith from some of those moral difficulties of the Old Testament which are deeply felt by almost all students and readers of the Bible.

But before entering upon this somewhat extended discussion, it seems necessary, in order to guard against misunderstanding, that we should declare the faith which we hold in common with all Christians, that the Scriptures, both of the old and new dispensations, are, in their substance and true import, and in a sense which can be predicated of no other writings, the word of God. For, beyond controversy, this has been the faith of the church ever since these books have been in her possession. Moreover, it is a faith which

has become so inrooted in the Christian mind, and so fully identified with the growth of civilization, that we have no fears of its ever being eradicated. It is like the granite which underlies the superincumbent strata of the earth's crust — like the great mountains whose foundations defy the earthquake. It will take a great deal more than even modern scepticism has ever dreamed of to overthrow it.

For the evidences upon which it rests are such as can never lose their force. The claims to divine inspiration which the sacred writers make for themselves with such unwavering assurance; the corresponding simplicity and elevation of their style; their moral characters and manifest aims to do good; the consciousness of God, in his holiness, justice, goodness, and truth, which they everywhere express; the character of the revelations which they represent him as communicating through them to mankind; the unity of purpose and of doctrine which runs through so great a number and variety of authors for so many ages; the spirit of prophecy which they breathe; the boldness of their almost innumerable predictions, such as no men in their senses, without the consciousness of supernatural illumination, would ever have dared to hazard; the wonderful fulfilment of these predictions, especially with respect to the advent and sacrifice of Christ; the experience which the church has had for so many ages of the power of the word to enlighten, comfort, and save from sin; the fulness with which it satisfies all man's spiritual wants; the influence for good which the Christian religion, as based upon revelation, has always exerted; the miracles of Christ and his apostles, especially his resurrection from the dead, as certified by unimpeachable eye-witnesses; the difficulty of imagining that all the sacred writers, including Christ himself, were either fanatics or impostors, — such considerations as these do constitute a body of evidence for the divine authority of the Scriptures, which, as it never has been, can never be without the greatest weight and force with reasonable people.

Together with all this, which is equally good for both the

grand divisions of Scripture, we have for the New Testament, all those full and unambiguous assurances of supernatural enlightenment which Christ gave to his apostles, such as the following: "When they deliver you up take no thought how or what ye shall speak, for it shall be given you in that same hour what ye ought to speak; for it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you. . . . . When the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth . . . . . he shall testify of me. . . . . He will guide you into all truth . . . . . and he will show you things to come." Now, although these promises are not to be restricted to the apostles and writers of the New Testament, yet in reason must they be understood as applying to these chosen and commissioned teachers and evangelizers of the world in an eminent manner. Moreover, the inspiration thus guaranteed to them must be conceived of as of a superior order to that of the Old Testament, inasmuch as previously to the fulfilment of these promises on the day of Pentecost, it could be said comparatively that "the Spirit was not yet given." Accordingly they claim to speak and write with all fulness of divine revelation; and this claim is abundantly confirmed, not only by their miracles, but perhaps with even greater force, by the unparalleled moral and spiritual revolution which their writings and influence have wrought in the world.

On the other hand, the inspiration of the Old Testament is supported by all the authority of the New, so that both must stand or fall together. For but one meaning can be ascribed to such declarations as the following, "The testimony of Jesus is the spirit of prophecy. . . . . For the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man, but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. . . . . All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness." Besides these and other citations of similar import which might be added, Christ himself frequently appeals to the Old Testament as of divine authority, expressly

naming David as having spoken in the Psalms by the Spirit of God, and, together with Moses and Daniel, as having prophesied concerning himself. Hence the above-cited passages from the writings of John and Peter and Paul must be understood to express the views which the apostles were instructed by their divine Master to hold and teach. He therefore who gives up the inspiration of the Old Testament is logically bound to give up that of the New; he who loses faith in Moses and the prophets will hardly be able to maintain his faith in Christ.

With this summary statement of our faith, and of some of the grounds upon which it rests, we proceed to exhibit our method of dealing with the moral difficulties which it has to overcome, and to which we shall freely concede whatever force they can reasonably claim. The statement of these difficulties will come up in order as we undertake to grapple with them; but here, at the outset, it is necessary to lay down and establish the principle by which, in most cases, we propose to solve them. This may be stated as follows: The moral and spiritual light of the New Testament is superior to that of the Old; in other words, the revelations of the old dispensation were not complete or final, but partial, in great part provisional, and necessarily accommodated to the low intellectual, moral, and spiritual condition of the people to whom they were originally communicated. We shall find that this principle rests, not only upon the reason of the case, but also upon the authority of the apostles, and of the Lord himself.

There was, then, an unavoidable necessity for such accommodation of the revelations of the Old Testament to the capacities or susceptibilities of the people to whom they were made. For it is certain from all human experience, that truths, ideas, and even rules of moral conduct, which present no difficulty to people of developed and cultivated faculties, cannot be received, nor even comprehended, by those who are in comparatively a low state of intellectual culture, moral sensibility, and spiritual enlightment, such as,

beyond a question, was that of the Israelites in the time of Moses. For they were a vast horde of emancipated slaves, just escaped from centuries of degrading and corrupting bondage, among a people wholly given to the grossest idolatries and superstitions. Consequently they were incapable of receiving those high and pure and spiritual revelations of God and divine things which we have in the New Testament. These would have made no impression upon their unsusceptible moral and spiritual faculties — upon what Christ called the hardness of their hearts — for which reason, as he explained to the Pharisees, they were accommodated by Moses, in one case at least, with an inferior rule of moral conduct — a significant case which will come up hereafter. A national education of fifteen hundred years in the doctrines of the unity of God, and of the expiation of guilt by a sin-bearer, as well as in many other things, was indispensable to prepare them for the reception of the gospel as revealed by Christ and his apostles. The proof of this is, that God actually subjected them to such a course of training and preparation, under their ritual and moral laws, the ministry of their prophets, and the discipline of their wonderful providential history. And thus, in the fulness of time, they were actually prepared for the superior light of the new dispensation. For, notwithstanding the rejection of their Messiah by the Scribes and Pharisees and the people who followed their lead, the apostles and first heroes of the Christian religion were all Jews, and certainly could not have been raised up from among any other people. The great apostle of the Gentiles himself was a Jew, and addressed his preaching in every city first of all to his Jewish brethren. The churches which he founded throughout the Roman empire consisted at first mainly of little communities of converted Jews; in proof of which we have only to observe that the most important epistles in the New Testament, namely, those addressed to the Romans, the Galatians, and the Hebrews, are filled with arguments against Judaizing errors. Everywhere the people of Israel, then, as now, scattered abroad through the world,

were, from the influence of their training and preparation, the first to receive the gospel; and from them it spread among the Gentiles.

But this principle does not rest exclusively upon the necessity of it as evinced by human reasoning, but finally upon the authority of Christ and his apostles, by whom we find it clearly stated, strenuously defended, and copiously applied in explanation of the differences between the old and the new dispensations. Thus, in general, we are informed by Paul that "Moses put a veil over his face"; that the people "were under a cloud"; that "their minds were blinded"; that "a veil was upon their hearts, ... so that they could not steadfastly look to the end of that which is abolished." Now, such declarations can hardly be understood otherwise than in the sense that Moses could not tell the people, and if he had told them they could not have received, — what nevertheless was plainly true, — that the revelations delivered by him were incomplete, provisional, and destined to be supplemented, or even in part superseded, by more full and perfect disclosures in the future. For if they had been informed that this was the nature of his communications, they could not have received and held fast to them as a complete and final exhibition of the character of God and of his salvation. Yet this was the great error into which they fell, and which, continuing to blind their minds long after it should have given place to the enlightenment of the gospel, opposed the greatest obstacle to the labors of Paul for their salvation.

We come now to exhibit, in several particulars, the incompleteness and provisional character of the Old Testament revelations, together with the manner and degree in which they are affected, modified, or even superseded, by the superior light of the New. In this procedure we may anticipate that the principle which we have laid down will be still farther confirmed, not only by its adequateness to the solution of our difficulties, but also by the use which was made of it for this purpose by the apostles and by the Lord himself.

First, then, the moral law itself, as delivered by Moses, although it embodied and represented the eternal truth of the divine justice, yet as a revelation of the character of God and of the way of salvation was incomplete, and required to be supplemented by the gospel. For in connection with it the grace and mercy and love of God were not exhibited with that fulness and plainness of speech with which it set forth his justice and severity; nor was the way of escape from its penalties — the way of salvation by grace and faith — represented otherwise than in obscure symbols and adumbrations, which it subsequently required the Epistles to the Romans, the Galatians, and the Hebrews to interpret and explain. The character and spirit of that law are expounded by Paul in such words as the following: "For Moses describeth the righteousness of the law, that the man which doeth these things shall live by them. ..... The soul that sinneth, it shall die. ..... Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of this law to do them." It is evident, from these quotations, that in the law there was set forth a way of salvation which was, and is, and ever must be, impracticable for sinners, and which was never intended to save them, but rather to convince them of the utter impossibility of their being saved by their own agency or works. Hence, also, it is elsewhere characterized as a "ministration of condemnation" and "of death," whose chief object was to prepare the people for that ministration of life and peace by which, in its Old Testament relations, it was to be superseded and done away. Yet in all this God was revealed to the people of that dispensation in those traits of his character which were specially adapted to their spiritual wants in their low moral and spiritual condition.

The spirit of the gospel is altogether different, and in certain respects the reverse. For its general tone is not represented by curses upon disobedience, although these are by no means wanting, but rather by blessings upon obedience: "Blessed are the poor in spirit. ..... Blessed are

they that mourn. ..... Blessed are the meek. ..... Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness. ..... Blessed are the merciful. ..... Blessed are the pure in heart. ..... Blessed are the peacemakers." Justice and severity are predominant in the law, love and mercy in the gospel: "God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life. ..... When the fulness of time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying Abba, Father. ..... God commendeth his love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." Here now the grace and mercy and love of God, which were veiled under the law, are fully disclosed, and a way of salvation which is practical for sinners is laid open. For here God is revealed not as inflicting the curses of the law upon us, but as giving his Son to die that we might be delivered from its penalties; and by faith in this sacrifice, involving as it does this new revelation of the character of God, we are delivered from the claims of the law as a condition of acceptance with him, and are brought under the immeasurably deeper and stronger and more tender and effectual obligations of grace and love on his part, and of love and gratitude on ours. In what respect this way of salvation is the reverse of legality appears from this — that in the law God said to the people of the old dispensation, Obey me, and I will love and bless you; but if you disobey me I will curse and destroy you. Whilst in the gospel he says to us, You have already transgressed my law and incurred all its penalties; nevertheless, I still love you with an inalienable love, and have given mine only-begotten Son to redeem you from the curse of the law by bearing it himself; therefore love me, and keep my commandments.

But for this complete unveiling of the character of God and of the way of salvation by grace and faith, the people of

the old dispensation were not prepared; therefore it was not given to them. The gospel fulness and freeness of God's love to sinners they could not yet bear; therefore it was withheld from them. How, then, it may well be asked, was it possible for them to be saved? The answer is, that they had a refuge from the condemnation and penalties of the moral law in the sacrifices which God ordained should be continually offered for their sins. These were to them, in some sort, what the sacrifice of Christ, which they typified, is to us. For when they confessed their sins over the sacrificial victim, symbolically putting them upon its head, and that victim was either slain and consumed in the fire, or sent away into the wilderness where it could never more be found, they must have understood from these expressive rites that their transgressions would never more be brought up against them. This was the divinely ordained means of communicating to them the forgiveness of their sins, peace of conscience, and reconciliation with God. But it is hardly conceivable that these typical adumbrations should have taught them more of gospel truth than we ourselves could have gathered from them without the explanations of the New Testament. The incompleteness of the knowledge attainable by them is represented in the words of the Lord to his disciples: "Blessed are the eyes which see the things that ye see; for I tell you that many prophets and kings have desired to see those things which ye see, and have not seen them, and to hear those things which ye hear, and have not heard them." Hence, also, Paul could declare, in words the significance of which is strangely overlooked by those who attribute New Testament light to the people of the old dispensation, that "before faith came we were kept under the law, shut up unto the faith which should afterwards be revealed." For in what conceivable sense could he say that they "were kept under the law," except that the legal dispensation over them was still in force? or, that they "were kept ..... shut up unto the faith which should afterwards be revealed," if salvation by grace and faith had been fully

made known? To the same effect, also, are the words of John: "For the law was given by Moses; but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. ..... The darkness is past, and the true light now shineth."

Moreover, it is evident that all other communications, on whatsoever subject, which were made to the people of the old dispensation, had to be conformed to their imperfect knowledge of the gospel. Accordingly it appears that, in the Old Testament, especially in the writings of Moses, the motives of hope and fear are addressed by considerations mostly of a temporal character. His allusions to a future life are so infrequent and obsure that eminent Christian authors have been unable to find them. He never speaks even of the patriarchs as going to heaven, but simply declares that they were "gathered to," or "slept with their fathers." Consequently the faith of immortality, although it certainly had some influence, must have been comparatively a feeble element of spiritual life even in the saints of that day. In their darkest hours it seems to have failed them altogether, as where David praying to be healed of some threatening illness, adds: "For in death there is no remembrance of thee; in the state of the dead, who shall give thee thanks?" Also the same sentiment is expressed by the pious king Hezekiah, in his song of thanksgiving for his miraculous restoration to health, as follows: "The dead cannot praise thee; death cannot celebrate thee; they that go down into the tomb cannot hope for thy truth; the living, the living, he shall praise thee, as I do this day." Hence, also, the words of Peter: "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, which, according to his abundant mercy, hath begotten us again to a lively hope, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, to an inheritance incorruptible, undefiled, and that fadeth not away, reserved in heaven for you"; and Paul declares that a superior light upon this point "is now made manifest by the appearing of our Saviour, Jesus Christ, who hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light through the gospel." For in what sense

could it be said that immortality had thus been brought to light, in connection with the appearing of Christ, and through the gospel, if it had been fully revealed before?

Since, then, the gospel, as distinguished from the law, was thus imperfectly revealed to the people of the legal dispensation, and since all other revelations were necessarily conformed to their ignorance upon this point, it follows that these revelations require, in our interpretation of them, to be supplemented and modified by those which we have in the New Testament, and that if we take them without such qualification, our knowledge of God and divine things must be, as theirs was, extremely one-sided and defective. For so great and essential is the effect produced upon the incomplete by the complete disclosures of truth, that Paul could represent the one as, in some sort, abolished by the other: "When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away."

In the second place, the ritual law, with its priesthood, sacrifices, tabernacle and temple worship, and all its ordinances, was a typical, provisional, and temporary arrangement, which was destined, from the first, to be superseded and wholly done away by a subsequent revelation. Its priesthood, though ordained of God, had no inherent validity, nor other than as typical of the priesthood of Christ. Its sacrifices had no efficacy in themselves, nor otherwise than as typical of that one offering of the body of Christ, which alone could be a valid atonement, "to finish the transgression and make an end of sins." It is the chief object of the Epistle to the Hebrews to reveal this gospel truth, as in the following and many similar passages: "The first tabernacle ..... was a figure for the time then present, in which were offered both gifts and sacrifices that could not make him that did the service perfect as pertaining to the conscience; which stood only in meats and drinks and carnal ordinances, imposed on them until the time of reformation. .... For it is impossible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sin. .... We are sanctified through the offering of the

body of Jesus Christ once for all. . . . For by one offering he hath perfected forever them that are sanctified."

But that this was the character of the ritual law was not revealed to the people of the old dispensation. For if they had been capable of this knowledge, they would not have needed its educating influence, nor could they have been induced to observe it. How is it conceivable that they should have borne so patiently as they did its vast expense and intolerable burden, for thirty generations of mankind, if they had known that it had no inherent efficacy, and that the blood of bulls and of goats could never take away sin? Consequently, Moses gave them no hint that it was of a typical or temporary character; on the contrary, he everywhere spoke of it as if it were to continue forever: "The Lord spake unto Aaron, Behold, I have given the charge . . . . . of all the hallowed things of the children of Israel . . . unto thee I have given them . . . and to thy sons forever. . . . Their anointing shall be an everlasting priesthood throughout their generations. . . . This day of atonement shall be an everlasting statute unto you, to make atonement for the children of Israel for all their sins, once a year. . . . Ye shall keep the passover a feast to the Lord throughout your generations by an ordinance forever." Evidently it was to such unqualified declarations as these that Paul refers in the words, "We use great plainness of speech, and not as Moses, which put a veil over his face, that the children of Israel could not steadfastly look to the end of that which is abolished." And no wonder they could not; for so thick and impenetrable was this veil that it required the labored Epistle to the Hebrews, and many other revelations of the New Testament, to let in the light of the gospel through it. Even Peter, after all the personal instructions of the Lord, and the Pentecostal illumination, had his mind so clouded by it that it was found necessary still further to enlighten him by a divine vision. It seems plain, therefore, that the people in general, whilst they were under this law, must have understood that they received the forgiveness of sins through its sacrifices in a

sense in which we, with our New Testament light, know that this was impossible.

Now such representations as these, understood as they must have been, carried with them, of necessity, very much lower and less spiritual views of the character of God, and of divine things in general, but especially of the nature and punishment of sin, than those which are brought to light in the gospel. For when it was revealed that God could no longer be acceptably worshipped with such sacrifices, a flood of new light was poured upon his character, and upon the spirituality of the worship which he required. When it was made known that the sacrifices of the law could not take away sin, that it could be atoned for by no sacrifice less costly or precious than that of the only-begotten Son of God, then and thereby was it declared to be a spiritual, abominable, and unfathomable evil, such as had never before been conceived of by the human mind. This it was which brought out "the exceeding sinfulness of sin," and the awful punishment which in the sight of God it deserves, in such expressions as "the worm that never dies ..... the fire that never shall be quenched ..... and these shall go away into everlasting punishment."

Here, then, we have one of these moral difficulties, together with the solution of it which is, in part supplied by the principle we have endeavored to establish. For how, it must be asked, are such expressions as those which have been cited, and which represent the ritual law as "an everlasting ordinance," to be justified? And the answer is: first, that no special stress is to be laid upon the words "everlasting" and "forever," because they are as frequently used to express times of great length, the termination of which could not be foreseen, as they are in their literal import; secondly, those spiritual things of which the rites and observances of the law were typically significant, that is, its very substance, without which it really had no meaning, shall continue literally forever; thirdly, the educating influence of this law was indispensable to prepare the people for the gospel, and this

influence could not be brought to bear upon them — they would never have endured its intolerable burden — if they had been given to understand that it was of temporary obligation, and destined to be superseded by a future revelation. If it was right to put them under this preparatory discipline, of which there can be no question, then was it right to withhold from them whatever knowledge would have rendered it incapable of being enforced. The one must be held to justify the other as its necessary consequence.

In the third place, it was evidently regarded by God as indispensable to the great object which he designed to accomplish through the instrumentality of the people of Israel, that they should be called out of the world, and separated as completely as possible from the rest of mankind. This rigorous sequestration, as we now understand, was for the purpose of their education during what Paul calls their childhood and minority, in preparation for the advent of their promised Messiah, and the gospel dispensation; in other words, that the germs of divine truth, which God had planted in the soil of Abraham and his seed, might be protected and cherished, as in a sheltered nursery, until they should take firm root, and grow up into a tree of life, which the wild and brutal nations — the *goiim*, or heathen — should not be able to uproot nor cut down.

Now this separation of Israel from the heathen, being indispensable to the accomplishment of the divine purposes of grace and salvation, must be accepted with all its necessary consequences, which are very numerous, and of great significance. For among them we have the commands given through Moses to exterminate the inhabitants of the land of Canaan, which have always and justly been regarded as one of the greatest moral difficulties of the Old Testament. These commands were such as the following: "When the Lord thy God shall deliver them before thee, thou shalt smite them, and utterly consume them. Thou shalt make no covenant with them, nor show mercy unto them. . . . . Thou shalt consume all the people. . . . . Thou shalt destroy

their name from under heaven. . . . . Thou shalt save nothing alive that breatheth. . . . . Thine eye shall have no pity upon them." And the Israelites themselves were threatened with a similar destruction if they should fail to execute these injunctions: "It shall come to pass that I shall do unto you as I thought to do unto them." We have, also, abundant evidence of their zeal in this work of general and indiscriminate slaughter: "They utterly destroyed all that was in the city of Jericho, both man and woman, young and old. . . . . Joshua drew not back his hand wherewith he stretched out the spear, until he had utterly destroyed the inhabitants of Ai. . . . . We took all the cities of Sihon, king of Heshbon, and utterly destroyed the men and the women and the little ones of every city."

Now the difficulty here is not whether it was right thus to destroy, root and branch, a people whose cup of iniquity was full. Of this there can be no question with any who believe in the providence of God. For it was under his providential government that these nations, like Sodom and Gomorrah, Pompeii and Herculaneum, were actually destroyed. But the difficulty is this: how the giving of such commands to his moral creatures — how his requiring of them to slay without pity such multitudes of their fellow-creatures, including, of necessity, the aged and infirm, parents and children, infants at the breast, nursing mothers, women with child, and in their travail sorrows — how all this is to be reconciled with the character of God, the teaching of Christ, and, especially, with his law of love to enemies, and pity for the feeble and suffering. We do not write for those, if any such there be, who cannot feel that there is any difficulty here.

It may not, indeed, be possible, in the present state of our knowlege, to give a solution of this difficulty which shall be perfectly satisfactory. For we are surrounded by mysteries in the providence of God — undeniable facts — which no created mind can fathom. But it is essential to the account here given us, that the agency of the children of Israel in

this destruction of the Canaanites should be regarded as a solemn judicial act, in execution of the judgment of God upon a people whose moral corruptions were such that their continued existence upon the earth could be no longer tolerated; whose extermination, moreover, was indispensable in order that the covenant people might be effectually separated from their corrupting influence; in other words, that the whole object for which Israel had been called out of the world, and consecrated to the work of making the necessary preparation for the coming of Christ and the blessings of the gospel, might not be frustrated. Hence its justification is placed upon this ground by God himself in the words, "Thou shalt consume all the people. . . . . They shall not dwell in thy land, lest they make thee to sin against me; for if thou serve their gods it will surely be a snare unto thee." And so it proved, wherever they failed to obey these commands, in all their subsequent history. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the highest and most spiritual laws of morality had not yet been revealed, nor could be, as is proved by the fact, until the time should come when the necessity for this outward separation of the people from other nations should cease. The commands which were given to them upon this subject, as upon all others, had to be accommodated to the degree of moral light which they were capable of receiving, and could not go beyond it. Hence this whole transaction must be regarded as belonging to a lower moral condition than that for which it was intended to prepare, though doubtless to the highest which was possible in consistency with the necessity of thus keeping the covenant people sequestered from the influence of the heathen.

Here, also, we must take into consideration the words of Paul: "Moses put a veil over his face, so that the children of Israel could not steadfastly look to the end of that which is abolished," as applied to this separation. For they remind us of what we can hardly fail to see from other evidence, that in this case, as in the preceding, Moses could not tell his people, and if he had told them they could not have received

it, that this separation was to be temporary, that the partition wall between Jew and Gentile, which God himself had set up, was destined to be broken down. The gospel truth that the Gentiles were to be fellow-heirs with Israel in the great salvation, could not be revealed to the people of the old dispensation, at least in the early stages of their history, whilst the necessity of keeping up the separation was most pressing. It is true, they had glimpses and adumbrations of it, as in the promises given to Abraham, that in his seed all the families of the earth should be blessed, which were more fully unfolded by the later prophets; but these foreshadowings of the great truth, though clear enough to us from the light of the gospel and of the history of their fulfilment, the people of the old dispensation did not understand, nor was it intended that they should; for if they had understood them as we do, that would have effectually broken down this partition wall before it had ceased to be indispensable for the protection of the infant church. For it consisted, in great part, of distinctions between clean and unclean animals for food and sacrifice, and of a vast system of ritual observances, including circumcision itself, all having reference to ceremonial purity, by which, as far as they were observed, the people were prevented from eating and drinking, intermarrying, and otherwise intermingling with the heathen. If, now, they had been given to understand that all these distinctions and rites were of a positive and temporary character, and would be abolished in the light of a future and higher revelation; that unclean animals were not such in their own nature, but swine in themselves were as pure as lambs, is it conceivable that they could have been induced to observe this law of distinction, with all its burdensome inconveniences, for so many ages, and to abhor swine's flesh, as they do to this day? And what, then, must have become of their separation from the heathen, to maintain which these distinctions were established, after its principal support had thus given way, and they had come to understand that it also was destined to be abolished? Hence there was an

unavoidable necessity that they should not be informed of this gospel truth; and that they were not, we have crowning proof in the words of the great apostle of the Gentiles himself, where he speaks of it as "the mystery which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God ..... the mystery which hath been hid from ages and generations, but now is made manifest ..... the mystery of Christ, which in other ages was not made known to the sons of men, as it is now revealed to his holy apostles and prophets by the Spirit, that the Gentiles should be fellow-heirs, and of the same body, and partakers of his promise in Christ by the gospel."

Since, then, it was necessary that this truth should be veiled from the people of the old dispensation, all other revelations had to be conformed to their ignorance upon this point. Hence the evangelical command to go forth and disciple all nations could not be given to the church of that day. It was no part of her duty to preach the gospel to every creature. The gospel itself, as we have seen, was very imperfectly revealed. It is true that evangelical light — twilight rays from the Sun of Righteousness, heralding the brightness of his rising — did, from time to time, fall upon the minds of the prophets, and enable them to anticipate, in a manner, that God would gather a people unto himself out of the whole world. But, as they were understood by Paul, they did not foresee "that the Gentiles should be fellow-heirs, and of the same body," with the people of Israel. No communications from God, with respect to his character, attributes, purposes, or providence, could be allowed to withdraw this veil which Moses had put over his face. God could not be represented to the people of that day as the God of other nations, in any such sense as that in which he is so revealed in the gospel. Other nations must needs be spoken of as aliens and outcasts, as the enemies of God and of his people.

Now, in consequence of this necessary veiling of the truth for which they were not prepared from the people of the old dispensation, they did not, and could not, know God in his

whole character, nor in all his relations to his moral creatures, as we know him; they did not, and could not, feel towards other nations as we are instructed and required to feel by the Lord and his apostles. In their eyes, as a matter of necessity no less than of fact, the uncircumcised heathen were impure and abominable, whom, in some cases, at least, it was a pious and godly work to exterminate from the earth. In no other way, as it seems to us, is it possible to understand some of the sentiments which are expressed in the maledictory Psalms, which do not always represent God as he is revealed to us in Christ, but rather that lower and partial view of his character, which yet was the highest and best which the people, in their necessary sequestration from the rest of mankind, were capable of receiving.

These maledictory Psalms, together with other similar portions of the Old Testament, constitute one of its greatest moral difficulties. We subjoin a few examples, taken almost at random from innumerable others: "Let them be confounded and consumed together that are adversaries to my soul; let them be covered with reproach and dishonor that seek my hurt. ..... Pour out thine indignation upon them, and let thy wrathful anger take hold upon them. ..... Let their table become a snare before them, and their prosperity a trap. ..... Let their habitation be desolate, and let none dwell in their tents. ..... Let their eyes be darkened that they see not, and make their loins continually to shake. ..... Let them be blotted out of the book of the living, and not be written with the righteous. ..... Let Satan stand at his right hand. ..... Let his prayer become sin. ..... Let his children be fatherless, and his wife a widow; let his children be continually vagabonds, and beg. ..... Let there be none to favor his fatherless children. ..... Happy shall he be that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the stones."

Now, it does not seem strange that good men should often be troubled to know how to deal with such fearful maledictions. For the writer well remembers that when he was a student at Princeton College, the venerable Dr. Ashbel Greene, who

had previously been president of the institution, and whose orthodoxy was one of his distinguishing traits, whilst on a visit such as he frequently made, having read at evening prayers one of these maledictory Psalms, suddenly paused and exclaimed: "Young gentlemen, what shall we do with all this cursing? I will tell you: 'The times of this ignorance God winked at'; and that is all that can be said about it." This, however, is by no means all that can be said about it, nor even this, without severe qualification; but this full recognition of the greatness of the difficulty, and this wild dash at a solution of it, by such a man, could never be forgotten.

The true solution depends upon several considerations. For, in a vast proportion of these maledictions, there are no sentiments expressed in the original Hebrew but such as are in perfect accord with New Testament light. Instead of being prayers or wishes, they are simple declarations or predictions of the punishments which shall come upon the wicked under the providence and government of a just God; and such predictions are as full and emphatic in the New Testament as they are in the Old. In many cases, if we examine them attentively, we shall see that they express love rather than hatred. For even where the Psalmist prays that his enemies may be confounded and put to shame, he often gives us to understand that the burden of his prayer is that their enmity against God and his people may be frustrated, and not that their persons or souls should be destroyed. Some of his keenest maledictions upon them he follows with prayers for their conversion, as in the following case: "O my God, make them as stubble before the wind. As a fire burneth a wood, and as a flame setteth the mountains on fire, so persecute them with thy tempest, and make them afraid with thy storm. Fill their faces with shame, that they may seek thy name, O Lord." Now, if these last words had not been added, we might have understood all the rest as an unqualified malediction upon the prophet's enemies. But here we see that it is really a prayer for their conver-

sion — that God would bring them to the saving knowledge of himself, though by the infliction of such judgments upon them as we, with our New-Testament light, are not allowed to invoke upon our own, nor even upon the enemies of God. In other cases, however, sentiments are expressed which require to be interpreted by the principle that the revelations of the Old Testament were necessarily accommodated to the degree of moral and spiritual light which the people were capable of receiving.

Here, then, it is necessary to take into consideration one of the ways in which this accommodation appears to have been effected, that is, through the mediation of the prophets. For, except in the proclamation of the ten commandments, God never spoke directly to the people themselves. It seems that they could not bear to receive communications from him, without human mediation. For when they heard that mysterious "voice of words," as "the voice of the trumpet exceeding loud," which "sounded long, and waxed louder and louder," proceeding out of the midst of the cloud and flame on the summit of Mount Sinai, they were filled with terror, and fled from the awful presence. This is explained in the Epistle to the Hebrews, by the words: "For they could not endure that which was commanded"; that is, their spiritual state was such that they could not receive revelations immediately from God, such as became the mouth of Jehovah to utter. Hence they said to Moses: "Go thou near, and hear all that the Lord our God shall say, and speak thou with us all that the Lord our God shall speak unto thee, ... and we will hear it and do it; ..... but let not God speak with us, lest we die." And this request God himself recognized as a reasonable one; for he said to Moses: "I have heard the voice of the words of this people, which they have spoken unto thee; they have well said that which they have spoken." Accordingly, it was on this occasion that he established Moses in the office of a mediator between himself and them for the delivery of his oracles, saying: "But as for thee, stand thou here by me, and I will

speak unto thee all the commandments, the statutes, and the judgments which thou shalt teach them, that they may do them." At the same time, also, he promised to supply them with a succession of prophets, each like unto Moses, to stand in his place after his decease, in the words of that famous prediction which included the Messiah himself, who as the last of the series "should come into the world," saying: "I will raise them up a prophet from among their brethren like unto thee, and will put my words in his mouth, and he shall speak unto them all that I command him." Nor is there anything in their whole history more wonderful than the actual fulfilment of this prophecy through so many centuries, from Moses to Christ.

Now these prophets, possibly with some exceptions, as in the case of Balaam, were doubtless the most exalted and pure and heroic souls of the times in which they lived. But all of them, except the last, by whom the series was crowned, were men of like passions with others; and the sentiments which they felt whilst delivering the word of the Lord to the people could not always have been those of perfectly sanctified hearts. Let us endeavor to comprehend the circumstances under which they spoke. Let us ascend, in imagination, the stream of time, and of the development of moral and spiritual light in the world, until we can take our stand where David stood, three thousand years ago, and look forth out of his eyes upon the church and the world in their relations to each other. Here, now, we behold the church, consisting of one small people, surrounded by great and mighty heathen nations who stand ready to devour her. The people of God and the people of Israel are one and the same. The enemies of the holy nation and the enemies of God are hardly distinguishable, even by the prophets themselves. The wars of Israel with the surrounding heathen are a life-and-death struggle of the truth of God against the principalities and powers of evil in the world. This deadly conflict between truth and error, good and evil, which is destined to take on hereafter a spiritual form, is now at an earlier stage of its

development, and is waged in an outward manner, with carnal weapons. "For that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterward that which is spiritual."

Now, in these circumstances, in order that the people of God might not be discouraged, but might be animated and strengthened to fight manfully the good fight of faith, it was revealed to them, through the instrumentality of the prophets, that their enemies should never be allowed permanently to triumph over them, but that the church and the truth should assuredly come off more than conquerors in the end. The prophets gave utterance to this assurance mostly in their own words, in their own figures of speech, and in their own various forms of expression and style; but chiefly, as was natural, in reiterated and tremendously emphasized predictions of calamity, disaster, defeat, overthrow, and utter destruction, to the enemies of God, of his people, and his truth. And such predictions in the mouths of the prophets naturally and inevitably took the form of maledictions; for how otherwise could they be sufficiently emphasized to assure the hearts of God's people, who were as sheep and lambs in the midst of ravening wolves?

These maledictions, therefore, are to be understood as the revelation of the judgments of God upon men and nations regarded as the incorrigible enemies of his church, his truth, and his salvation; and such judgments are as frequent and emphatic in the New Testament as they are in the Old. But if at times the human sentiments of the prophets, or even their resentments of personal wrongs and outrages, did color their forms of expression in delivering to the people God's assurances of the overthrow and destruction of his and their enemies, what is this but that they were men of like passions with those to whom they were sent? Was it not for this very likeness that they were chosen of God to be the organs of communication between him and their brethren, because he saw that he could reach the minds of his people more effectually in this way than he could without such mediators? What though, whilst they waited for the fulness of evan-

gelical light, and in the flame of their unrivalled patriotism, they felt, and sometimes gave expression to, a joy which was too near akin to that of revenge over the assured downfall of their proud and cruel oppressors, by whom their sacred country was ravaged, their holy city and temple burned with fire, and they themselves carried away captive among the heathen, — in fact, transported to penal settlements, — what does it all amount to, but that they had "this treasure" of God's eternal purpose to defend his church and people, and to punish his and their incorrigible enemies, "in earthen vessels"? This, surely, ought not to weaken our faith in their deliverances as being in their substance and true meaning the very word of God.

Another of these moral difficulties is connected with the custom which prevailed among the Israelites, and all others of their time, to include the innocent children and families of criminals in the punishment of their parents. Thus, by the order of Joshua, "the sons and daughters" of Achan were put to death for their father's sin. Jehu, also, in fulfilment of prophecies by Elijah and Elisha, slew all the family and kindred of Ahab, "until he left him none remaining." His sons, to the number of "seventy persons," were thus beheaded at one time, and their heads were carried in baskets and deposited in two heaps at the gate of the city of Jezreel. In like manner, David, in a time of famine, inquired of the Lord for what it had been sent; and "the Lord answered, It is for Saul, and for his bloody house, because he slew the Gibeonites," that is, in violation of the sworn league which Joshua had made with them. By way of atonement for this crime, and upon a demand made by the surviving Gibeonites, David took the two sons of Saul by Rispah his concubine, and five of his grandsons by Michal his daughter (Michal being probably a clerical error for Merab) and delivered them up to the Gibeonites, who straitway "hanged them up [or crucified them] unto the Lord in Gibeah of Saul." And here, by the way, we have an incident of overwhelming pathos; for "Rispah, the daughter of

Aiah, took sackcloth, and spread it for her upon the rock, from the beginning of harvest until water dropped upon them from heaven, and suffered not the birds of the air to rest upon them by day nor the beasts of the field by night." Had not this poor mother some rights in her children? Would Christ have commanded that these seven innocent persons should be thus horribly done to death in expiation of a crime committed by their father or grandfather, probably before some of them were born?

We have no hesitation in answering that Christ would have given no such command; neither does the inspired record claim for this execution the sanction of divine authority. For the oracle which ascribed the famine to the guilt of Saul and his bloody house does not even suggest any such atonement. There is nothing to indicate that either David or the Gibeonites acted by the direction of God in putting these men to death. For aught that appears in the record, it was a judicial murder, for which there was no excuse; and this view of it is confirmed by the fact that all such punishments had been expressly prohibited by Moses, in the words: "The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for their fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin." It seems that this law was powerless against the universal custom of the times. Precisely the same view is to be taken of the execution of Achan's children. Nor is the case of Jehu different, although it is somewhat complicated by the prophecies which had gone before concerning the destruction of Ahab's house. But these prophecies cannot be held to justify the agency of those by whom they were fulfilled — least of all, that shocking spectacle of human heads which was exhibited at the gate of Jezreel. For the sufferings of Christ were equally a matter of prophecy; but that did not justify those who crucified him. All such cases must be interpreted by the principle contained in the following words of Peter, addressed to the crucifiers of the Lord: "Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge

of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain." Thus Jehu, notwithstanding his professed zeal for the Lord, was an idolater in heart and practice, and evidently had no other object in cutting off the whole house of Ahab than to secure his own possession of the throne. At the same time, the purposes of God as revealed by his prophets were fulfilled, and that great law of his providence expressed in the words, "I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me," was carried into effect. For this law, ordained for all times and dispensations alike, that the children shall be partakers of the evil as well as the good of their parents, simply represents a fact of the divine providence which is patent to all men, which is a necessary consequence of the organic unity of the family, and against which all objections are as vain and foolish as against any other fact of the constitution of the universe.

It remains now for us to consider after what manner our Lord himself recognizes and applies to these moral difficulties of the Old Testament the principle by which, in most of the preceding cases, we have attempted to solve them. For in his sermon on the mount, and elsewhere, he refers to a number of the enactments or allowances of the Mosaic law, and either completes or corrects them, as he judged that they required. It is true, indeed, that his criticisms and corrections have commonly been explained as applying not to the law itself, but to misunderstandings or perversions of it by its Jewish interpreters; but such explanations cannot be maintained without resorting both to misinterpretation and mistranslation. For the words ἐρρήθη τοῖς ἀρχαίοις, which in the English Bible are translated sometimes "it was," and sometimes "it hath been said by them of old time," ought to have been uniformly rendered, as is now generally acknowledged, "it was said to them of old time." There is no reason whatever for this variation from "was" to "hath been." With respect to the rendering "it was said by [in-

stead of to] them of old time," the Greek will bear either sense; but the former is proved to be incorrect by the fact that in four out of six cases the statements of what was said under this formula are made in the precise words of the law, as delivered either by God himself in the Decalogue, or by Moses in his name, and in the other two perfectly fair and unimpeachable abstracts or summaries are given. Hence this rendering, "it was said by," requires that God and Moses, whose precise words are quoted under this formula. should be meant by "them of old time." But if Moses could, surely God could not, be fitly or reverently designated by any such expression. Now, if Christ had intended simply to correct perversions or misunderstanding of the law, no reason can be assigned for his exact quotation of its words, nor for setting his own teaching in contrast with them, under the strong formula of opposition: "It was said to them of old time, ... but I say unto you." In addition to all this, we shall see hereafter how totally inapplicable this view is to one case, at least, wherein he expressly prohibits what Moses undeniably had allowed.

The words which have been misinterpreted in support of this view are as follows: "Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets. I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil. For verily I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in nowise pass from the law till all be fulfilled." Now, in this declaration the Lord evidently intended to guard against that entire misunderstanding of his relation to the law which would have been natural, perhaps unavoidable, from his subsequent treatment of its enactments; but he cannot reasonably be understood as affirming its absolute completeness in the form in which it had been delivered "to them of old time," nor that one jot or one tittle of it should never pass away. For he himself, in the same breath, states a condition upon which very much might and did pass from the law, namely, that it should be fulfilled; and this fulfilment to which he refers is his work. not ours. Consequently these words have no

bearing upon the question whether the law, in its requirements of us, was such that it could never have anything added to or taken from it. He fulfilled the ritual law, in consequence of which it ceased to be of any moral obligation, although it had been called "an everlasting ordinance"; also, the moral law as a condition of acceptance with God, in consequence of which its penal claims ceased to stand against the believers. Now, if the words "One jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law till all be fulfilled," are not inconsistent with these two great modifications of it, still less are they inconsistent with his giving to it, regarded as a rule of life, its final and perfect form, wherever it had been provisionally enacted, or incompletely made known "to them of old time."

We proceed, then, to exhibit these six cases wherein our divine Teacher completes by correcting or extending the provisions of the moral law as delivered to the people of the old dispensation. In two of these he refers to the decalogue itself, by quotation of its very words, and develops its spiritual import both with respect to the extent of its obligation and to the punishment of its violation.

In the first case he quotes the sixth commandment, and subjoins a reference to the judgment of God incurred by its violation, — in which reference he gives a perfectly fair summary of the general import of the law, — then he adds what he judged necessary to complete it: "Ye have heard that it was said to them of old time, thou shalt not kill, and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment. But I say unto you, that whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council: and whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire." Is it not evident that he here treats the commandment itself as not expressing the whole truth? For the condemnation of an outward act does not necessarily express condemnation of the state of mind from which it springs; neither does the prohibition of murder logically

contain a prohibition of injurious words. Consequently, he here proceeds to complete this commandment by unfolding the spirituality of its obligation, as comprehending the feeling of anger without just cause; by extending it to all injurious and reviling words; and by adding to it what it does not even intimate, and what cannot fairly be inferred from anything in the whole law of Moses, namely, that the punishment of its violation included the future torments of hell; in all which it seems plain enough that he is dealing with the commandment itself, rather than with any perverse misunderstanding of it.

This, however, is still more evident, if possible, in the second case, in which he quotes the seventh commandment. But here we must take into view the impure relations between the sexes which were tolerated under the old dispensation, and which our Lord evidently contemplated in his treatment of this commandment. For in the law no restriction appears to have been laid upon polygamy or concubinage, both which, on the contrary, are regarded without censure or reproof. Except that kings were forbidden to multiply wives and horses to themselves, we find nothing in the law to restrain any man from having as many wives and concubines as he might desire. In fact these customs originated among the Hebrews in the very source of their life as a distinct people, and were authorized by their noblest examples. For Abraham himself, their great forefather and covenant head, although he restricted himself to one wife at a time, seems, from the following notice, to have had more than one concubine: "Unto the sons of the concubines which Abraham had, Abraham gave gifts, and sent them away from his son Isaac, while he yet lived." Jacob, also, the father of the twelve patriarchs, by whose God-given name of Israel his descendants have always delighted to distinguish themselves, was both a polygamist and a concubinist; and if he had not been, there would have sprung from him but six tribes at most, instead of the sacred number twelve. What restrictions in this respect his posterity could have been induced

to accept, and what must have been the influence of these high examples, may readily be inferred. For these impure sexual relations, in the very fountain of their ethnic life, and these high examples, could not fail to influence their subsequent history. Hence the populous harem of David himself, and the one thousand wives and concubines of Solomon.

Now, with all this in view, together with much more which will require to be exhibited in the next case, under the head of divorce, our Lord here declares that, in the superior light of the new dispensation, such impure relations between the sexes could not be tolerated. He says nothing, indeed, expressly about polygamy or concubinage, but strikes directly at the impurity of heart from which they sprang, and which the seventh commandment, in the form in which it had been delivered to the people of the old dispensation, did not explicitly condemn. He places the stigma of divine condemnation upon the bosom sin from which all impure acts proceed; also upon its primary form of expression, the lustful eye; and he adds to the commandment what, in its original form, it did not even suggest, namely, that its violation incurs the punishment of hell: "Ye have heard that it was said to them of old time, Thou shalt not commit adultery. But I say unto you, that whosoever looketh upon a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart. And if thy right eye offend thee [in this way] pluck it out and cast it from thee, for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell."

Such is our Lord's treatment of the decalogue itself, in order that it might be made fully to express what the perfect law of moral duty required, together with the spiritual penalty of its violation. Its previous insufficiency in this respect is to be explained solely by the fact, to which he subsequently refers, that the people of the old dispensation, by reason of the hardness of their hearts, were incapable of receiving it in any more searching or spiritual form. And we shall immediately see that he treats with still greater

boldness other enactments or allowances of the law of Moses, which were so far accommodated to the moral capacities of the people that they now required to be abrogated altogether.

Accordingly, in the third and most significant of these cases, Christ, by his own authority, totally abrogates that freedom of divorce which had been previously allowed. For we find nothing in the law to restrain any man from putting away his wife, or wives, at his own pleasure, nor from marrying other women, nor women so divorced from marrying other men. On the contrary, all these customs were tolerated in the following prescribed form: "When a man hath taken a wife and married her, and it come to pass that she find no favor in his eyes, because he hath found some uncleanness in her, then let him write her a bill of divorcement, and give it into her hand, and send her out of his house; and when she is departed, she may go and be another man's wife." And, from the manner in which such divorces are referred to by the later prophets, as also from our knowledge of human nature, we may be sure that they ultimately became very common, and an evil of enormous magnitude.

One reason for this toleration, however, may have been that it enabled the prophets to purify the people, from time to time, after they had corrupted themselves by intermarriages with heathen women. This, at least, was the most important use that ever seems to have been made of it. For, notwithstanding the stringent prohibitions of Moses, as in the times before the flood, the charms of "the daughters of men" often proved irresistible to the frail "sons of God." These prohibitions were a feeble obstacle to the tide of previous custom, both of the people and their princes. For the twelve sons of Jacob, and heads of the tribes of Israel, must have had alien wives. Joseph, we know, was the husband of an Egyptian woman, who was the mother of the two tribes of Ephraim and Manasseh, the former of which became so numerous and powerful that, throughout the subsequent history, it was the great rival of the tribe of Judah. Judah himself had at least one Canaanitish wife, and his

son Pharez, from whom descended the royal and sacred line of David, was the offspring of his involuntary connection with his daughter-in-law, who, also, probably was a Canaanitess. Farther on in the history, we find Salmon, a prince of the house of Judah, married to Rahab, a Canaanitish harlot, who was the mother of Boaz, who was the husband of Ruth, a Moabitess. All these were the immediate ancestors of David, and, remotely, of the Lord himself. David, also, had alien women among his numerous wives, one of whom was the mother of Absalom; and Solomon had many such, among whom an Ammonitess was the mother of Rehoboam, his successor on the throne; whilst his marriage with another, the daughter of Pharaoh, was, as it seems, the occasion upon which he composed his "Song of Songs." In fine, the captives who returned from Babylon, influenced, no doubt, by these high examples, immediately began to corrupt themselves by intermarrying with, and "doing according to the abominations of, the Canaanites, the Hittites, the Perizzites, the Jebusites, the Ammonites, the Moabites, the Egyptians, and the Amorites." It was on this occasion that the prophet Ezra took advantage of this freedom of divorce which Moses allowed, to purify "the holy seed," by constraining upwards of one hundred heads of families to put away their heathen wives.

But the great reason why this freedom was tolerated must have been that which our Lord himself gives, in this passage, where he abrogates it in the most unequivocal manner: "It was said, Whosoever will put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement; but I say unto you, whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery; and whosoever shall marry her that is [so] divorced committeth adultery." Now, when the Pharisees objected to this doctrine on the ground that Moses had authorized them thus to repudiate their wives, he admits the fact as undeniable, and assigns as the reason for this toleration the hardness of their hearts, which rendered them incapable of receiving any better or more perfect

rule of moral conduct. At the same time he reiterates his own prohibition of what Moses had allowed, on the ground that it was not in accordance with the eternal laws of morality,— "from the beginning it was not so," — and affirms on his own authority, as before, that if they should continue to practise it they would incur the guilt of adultery: "The Pharisees also came unto him, tempting him, and saying unto him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause? And he answered and said unto them, Have ye not read that He which made them at the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh? Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What, therefore, God hath joined together, let not man put asunder. They say unto him, Why did Moses then command to give a writing of divorcement, and to put her away? He saith unto them, Moses, because of the hardness of your hearts, suffered you to put away your wives; but from the beginning it was not so: And I say unto you, whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery; and whoso marrieth her which is [so] put away doth commit adultery."

Here, now, we have a case which clearly interprets all the others, not as directed against misunderstanding or perversions of the law, but as qualifying or completing, or even abrogating, those things in it which had been accommodated to the low moral and spiritual susceptibilities of the people, and replacing them with final and absolute revelations. Thus, we have established, on the authority of Christ himself, the main principle which we have applied to the solution of the moral difficulties of the Old Testament. And what can we possibly gain — do we not stultify ourselves — by denying that he opposes, in those cases, his own teaching to things which Moses had allowed, when he himself unequivocally admits the fact, and fairly shoulders the whole difficulty?

Hence, in the fourth case, he must, in reason, be under-

stood in a similar manner. For here he refers to a rule of morality many times reiterated by Moses in such words as the following: "Ye shall not swear by my name falsely. ..... If a man swear ..... an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word, but shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth." And, precisely as in the last case, he absolutely prohibits what is here allowed: "Ye have heard that it was said to them of old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths; but I say unto you, swear not at all; neither by heaven, for it is God's throne; nor by the earth, for it is his footstool; neither by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great king; neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black. But let your communication be yea, yea, nay, nay; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of the evil one." Our present purpose does not require us to touch the vexed question, whether this is to be understood as a prohibition of judicial, as well as private, oaths; but simply to show that the Lord here forbids what Moses had allowed.

In the fifth case, he takes up the *lex talionis* as given by Moses, quoting his exact words, which, whether so intended or not, the people were left free to understand as equally applicable both to private and to public wrongs. For in the whole law there is no intimation that these words were to be limited to the administration of public justice; nor were they so understood, as is evident from the regulations given concerning the avenging of blood and the cities of refuge. Now, to all this the Lord opposes what was altogether unknown to the people of the old dispensation, namely, his own doctrine of non-resistance to evil: "Ye have heard that it was said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth; but I say unto you, that ye resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also; and if a man shall sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also; and whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain." Again, we need

not inquire whether all this is to be interpreted literally, or by the common figure of speech called hyperbole.

In the sixth and last case, he lays down the New Testament law of love to our enemies, with a reference to what had gone before precisely similar to those in the other cases: "Ye have heard that it was said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy." Now, it would seem that these preceding cases, especially the third, in which undeniably he revokes what had been previously allowed, ought, if other evidence were wanting, to govern the interpretation of this one. For, although the latter clause of what "was said" does not occur in the Old Testament, yet it does not seem to be a strained or unfair summary of such passages as the following: "Remember what Amalek did unto thee in the way when ye came forth out of Egypt; how he met thee by the way, and smote the hindmost of thee, all the feeble ones behind thee, when thou wast faint and weary. Therefore it shall be, when the Lord thy God hath given thee rest from all thine enemies round about, in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee for an inheritance to possess it, that thou shalt blot out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven: thou shalt not forget it. ..... An Ammonite or a Moabite shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord, even to the tenth generation ..... forever: because they met you not with bread and water by the way when ye came forth out of Egypt, and because they hired against thee Balaam the son of Beor ..... to curse thee ..... Thou shalt not seek their peace nor their good all thy days forever." All this, no doubt, was indispensable to secure that rigorous sequestration of the covenant people from the influence of the heathen without which the great object for which they had been called out of the world could not be accomplished. But is it in accordance with New Testament light that they should be thus enjoined to cherish from generation to generation the memory of the injuries which they had received from these neighboring and kindred tribes? Is not the appeal here made to this motive in order to secure the result

as palpable an accommodation to their low moral condition which rendered them unsusceptible of higher and purer motives, as that freedom of divorce which Moses allowed, and which Christ abrogated? Hence he proceeds to deal with this case precisely as he had dealt with that, and with all the others: "Ye have heard that it was said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy; but I say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you; that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven; for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth his rain on the just and on the unjust."

The practical consequences of the views which have now been presented are very numerous and far-reaching; but our prescribed limits exclude them. We can only add, in conclusion, that no objection to the method we have employed in dealing with these moral difficulties of the Old Testament can have any force or validity which does not offer a more satisfactory solution of them, and which does not invalidate the evidence here given that this was the method adopted by the Lord himself. Until this is done, we may safely rest in the conclusion that the moral light of the New Testament is superior to that of the Old, and that whatever there may be in the latter which is not in perfect harmony with the teaching of Christ is to be explained by the unripeness of the times, and is to be corrected, as he sets us the example of correcting it, by the perfect light of his own words and gospel.

ARTICLE IV.

PRESIDENT FINNEY'S SYSTEM OF THEOLOGY IN ITS RELATIONS TO THE SO-CALLED NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY.

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If any excuse is required for an extended discussion of the system of theology[1] elaborated by the late President of Oberlin College, it will be found, we trust, mainly in the merits of the system itself. His scheme of theology and ethics is also worthy of the attention of thoughtful men, because it is so great a present factor in the theological thought of this country.

President Finney had under his personal instruction in systematic theology four hundred and seventy-five young men, the most of whom are now in active pastoral labor, and many of whom are instructors in the numerous colleges at the West. In addition, more than a thousand members of the advanced classes in the college have been thoroughly instructed in his system of moral philosophy; and, to say nothing of his general labors as a revivalist, his regular preaching to the undergraduates for forty years (from 1835 to 1875) was so surcharged with philosophy and doctrine that the eighteen thousand of that class who felt its power cannot fail to have been more or less moulded thereby. Furthermore, two editions of his Systematic Theology — a book of a thousand pages octavo, and selling at a high price — have been ex-

[1] "Lectures on Systematic Theology, embracing Moral Government, the Atonement, Moral and Physical Depravity, Natural, Moral, and Gracious Ability, Repentance, Faith, Justification, Sanctification, etc. By the Rev. Charles G. Finney, Professor of Theology in the Oberlin Collegiate Institute, Ohio, America. The whole work revised, enlarged, and partly re-written by the Author. Edited and revised with an Introduction by the Rev. George Redford, D.D., LL.D., of Worcester. London: William Tegg and Co. 1851. pp. xviii and 996." Our references will all be to this edition.

hausted, and are in the hands of appreciative students. If this system of thought, already so thoroughly disseminated, is fundamentally erroneous, it is worth while for religious teachers to understand its principles, that they may know how to counteract its influence. In the writer's own mind, subsidiary reasons for this paper are, to point out some minor errors in the system; to show wherein it is in special danger of being misapprehended by those accustomed to a different nomenclature from that of the author; and to illustrate the fact that great minds are likely to differ more in the words which express their ideas than in the ideas themselves.

I. *On the Purposes of God.*

In the outset, it should, and can easily, be made to appear that President Finney is distinctively Calvinistic. "The essential Calvinistic tenet is that of the divine purposes."[1] That is the shibboleth of Calvinism. It is in point to ask first, if our author pronounces this correctly, and without hesitation or timidity. The purposes of God have regard both to ends and means; his purposes are both ultimate and proximate. And

"If he [God] purpose to realize an end, he must, of course, purpose the necessary means for its accomplishment."[2]

"There must be some sense in which God's purposes extend to all events. This is evident from reason. His plan must, in some sense, include all actual events. He must foreknow all events by a law of necessity. This is implied in his omniscience. He must have matured and adopted his plan in view of, and with reference to, all events. He must have had some purpose or design respecting all events that he foresaw. All events transpire in consequence of his own creating agency; that is, they all result in some way, directly or indirectly, either by his design or sufferance, from his own agency. He either designedly brings them to pass, or suffers them to come to pass without interposing to prevent them. He must have known that they would occur. He must have either positively designed that they should, or, knowing that they would result from the mistakes or selfishness of his creatures, negatively designed not to prevent them. ..... He cannot be indifferent to any event. He knows all events, and must have some purpose or design respecting them."[3]

[1] Prof. H. B. Smith in American Theological Review for 1865, p. 127.
[2] Finney, Systematic Theology, p. 812. [3] Ibid., p. 815.

It may be necessary to observe, at this point, that we are aiming in this Article to present the degree of philosophical consistency with which President Finney held the high doctrines of evangelical religion. It is appropriate for us, therefore, to limit ourselves to his metaphysical principles and arguments. In all cases he goes "to the law and to the testimonies" for his positive doctrines; and a large part of his volume consists in a compilation and elucidation of the passages of Scripture which set forth, imply, and illustrate those doctrines. Furthermore, that Mr. Finney did not regard his views upon the distinctive points of Calvinism to be of small importance is evident, both from the extent and vigor of his treatment of them (one hundred and fifty pages of his Systematic Theology, included in the "etc." of the title, being devoted to election, reprobation, divine sovereignty, purposes of God, and perseverance of saints), and from an interesting passage of his Memoirs, recently published.[1] It seems that during the period of his second revival labors in England Mr. Finney was invited to preach in the "Evangelical Union" churches of Scotland. The Rev. J. Kirk, with whom he labored in Edinburgh, was also editor of a religious paper, and professor in a theological school of Glasgow. This gentleman entertained the belief that Mr. Finney's views were identical with his own and with those of the theological seminary in which he was a teacher, and so represented it in his paper. Mr. Finney says that by this means he found himself in a "false position," since he did not agree with them in their peculiar views. Among other things, he remarks that they explained away in a manner to him utterly unintelligible the doctrine of election. It was largely on account of this that as soon as opportunity offered he cut short his labors with them.

But for an author's views concerning the purposes of God, we must examine the manner in which he elaborates subordinate points. We turn, therefore, to his views

[1] Memoirs of Rev. Charles G. Finney, written by himself (New York, 1876), p. 477. See pp. 455–458.

II. *On Fore-ordination.*

What is the logical order between the divine purpose and the divine foreknowledge. The Arminian says that foreknowledge precedes fore-ordination.[1] But it is clear that in this order *knowledge* is confounded with *foreknowledge*. There is a failure to discern the logical distinction between the knowledge of what in all contingencies of the divine activity *may* be, and what *will actually* be as a consequence, and upon condition, of God's determining upon a particular line of creative activity. The confusion has its origin in a failure to separate chronological from logical sequence. With truth it may be affirmed that God's foreknowledge of what he is going to do is chronologically indistinguishable from that action of his omniscience in which he discerns all the possible results of every particular form of his possible activity. But logically the purpose of God to enter upon a definite line of activity intervenes between this knowledge of what might be and the definite knowledge of what will be; for this latter is conditioned upon God's choosing a particular system. We can do no better than transfer the clear statement of President Finney.

"The question will arise, Was election in the order of nature subsequent to, or did it precede, the divine foreknowledge? The answer to this plainly is, that in the order of nature what could be wisely done must have been foreseen before it was determined what should be done. And what should be done must, in the order of nature, have preceded the knowledge of what would be done. So that in the order of nature foreknowledge of what could be wisely done preceded election, and foreknowledge of what would be done followed, or was subsequent to, election. In other words, God must have known whom he could wisely save prior, in the order of nature, to his determination to save them. But his knowing who would be saved must have been, in the order of nature, subsequent to his election or determination to save them, and dependent upon that determination."[2]

III. *Reprobation.*

Upon the subject of reprobation our author is careful to

[1] See Whedon on the Will, pp. 216, and 267–282.

[2] Systematic Theology, p. 776. Compare with these statements, those of Rev. D. T. Fiske, D.D., in Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. xix. p. 415.

deny that "the purpose or decree of reprobation is the procuring cause of the destruction of reprobates." [1]

"The doctrine of reprobation is not the election of a part of mankind to damnation, in the same sense that the elect unto salvation are elected to be saved. ..... Election, with those who are saved, extends not only to the end, salvation, but also to the conditions or means. ..... He [God] uses means with them with the design to sanctify and save them. But he has not elected the reprobate to wickedness, and does not use means to make them wicked, with the ultimate design to destroy them. ..... The destruction of the reprobate is ..... only an incidental and an unavoidable result. That is, God cannot wisely prevent this result," [2]

"He [God] regards their [reprobates] destruction as a less evil to the universe than would be such a change in the administration and arrangements of his government as would secure their salvation. Therefore, for their foreseen wickedness and perseverance in rebellion under circumstances the most favorable to their virtue and salvation in which he can wisely place them, he is resolved upon their destruction, and has already in purpose cast them off forever." [3]

These extracts concern so nearly the diverging points of Arminianism and Calvinism that it will be profitable to dwell upon the subject still more. We cannot do better than follow our author while he turns the question over in different lights. It is objected,

"That if God designed to make known his attributes in the salvation of the vessels of mercy, and in the destruction of the vessels of wrath, he must have designed their characters as well as their end, inasmuch as their characters are indispensable conditions of this result." [4]

Our author replies:

"That it is true that the characters of both the vessels of wrath and of mercy must have been, in some sense, purposed or designed by God. But it does not follow that he designed them both in the same sense. The character of the righteous he designed to beget or induce by his own agency; the character of the wicked he designed to suffer him to form for himself. He doubtless designed to suffer the one, rather than to interfere in such manner and form as would prevent sin; seeing, as he did, that, hateful as it was in itself, it could be overruled for good. The other he designed to produce, or rather induce, both on account of the pleasure

[1] Systematic Theology, p. 784.

[2] Systematic Theology, p. 785. See further on this general subject, pp. 821–836.

[3] Systematic Theology, pp. 786, 787.

[4] Ibid., p. 797.

he has in holiness, and also for the sake of its bearings on the subject of it and upon the universe." [1]

This view of the relation of the divine purposes to the salvation of the elect and the destruction of the non-elect was not with Mr. Finney an "esoteric" doctrine. He believed that it should be inculcated. He did not believe in lighting a candle and putting it under a bushel. For

"(*a*) The Scriptures that teach it are not less likely to be a snare and a stumbling-block than are the definition and explanation of the doctrine. (*b*) The proper statement, explanation, and defence of the doctrines of election and reprobation are important to a proper understanding of the nature and attributes of God. ..... Again, these doctrines have often been so misstated and perverted as to make them amount to an iron system of fatalism. ..... It is therefore all the more important that these truths should find a place in religious instruction. Let them be understood, properly stated, explained, and defended, and they can no more be a stumbling-block than the fact of God's omniscience can be so." [2]

IV. *Sovereignty of God.*

In regard to the doctrine of divine sovereignty, President Finney denies "that God in any instance wills or acts arbitrarily, or without good reason"; or "that he lives "wholly above law" and is "disposed to have his own will at any rate, reasonable or unreasonable." But God is a "law to himself." "The divine reason must impose law on, or prescribe law to, the divine will."

"The sovereignty of God is nothing else than infinite benevolence directed by infinite knowledge. ..... He consults his own intelligence only, not from any arbitrary disposition, but because his knowledge is perfect and infinite, and therefore it is safe to take counsel nowhere else. It were infinitely unreasonable and weak and wicked in God to ask leave of any being to act in conformity with his own judgment." God so disposes "of all things and events as to meet the ideas of his own reason. ..... This he does, be it distinctly understood, without at all setting aside the freedom of moral agents. His infinite knowledge enables him to select an end and means that should consist with and include the perfect freedom of moral agents." [3] God is sovereign, also, "in the sense that his will is law, whether we are able to see the reason for his commands or not, because our reason affirms that he has, and must have, good and

[1] Systematic Theology, p. 797. [2] Ibid., p. 798. [3] Ibid., p. 802.

sufficient reasons for every command. ..... We therefore need no other reason for affirming our obligation to will and to do than that God requires it."[1] God's "end was chosen, and the means decided upon, when no being but himself existed, and of course there was no one to consult but himself. Creation and providence are only the results, and the carrying out of his plans settled from eternity." "The law of benevolence, as it existed in the divine reason, must have eternally demanded of him the very course he has taken. ..... If infinite wisdom or knowledge is not to give law, what or who shall? If infinite benevolence shall not disclose and enforce law, what or who shall?"[2]

Here, too, our author bewails the timidity with which preachers are accustomed to handle the scriptures which speak of these high themes. After proving the doctrine abundantly from the Bible, he remarks:

"Many seem afraid to think or speak of God's sovereignty, and even pass over with a very slight reading those passages of Scripture that so fully declare it. They think it unwise and dangerous to preach upon the subject, especially unless it be to deny or explain away the sovereignty of God." On the contrary, "a proper understanding of God's universal agency and sovereignty, of the perfect wisdom and benevolence of every measure of his government, providential and moral, is essential to the best improvement of all his dispensations toward us and to those around us. When it is understood that God's hand is directly or indirectly in everything that occurs, and that he is infinitely wise and good, and equally wise and good in every single dispensation, ... there is then a divine reasonableness and amiableness and kindness thrown like a broad mantle of infinite love over all his character, works, and ways."[3]

We should always bear in mind that a thing may be providential and manifestly from God without being miraculous.

"God's sovereignty manifests itself through and by means, or second causes, and appropriate instrumentalities. God is as much a sovereign in the kingdom of nature as of grace."[4]

The prevalent New School Calvinism is so well known that it is not necessary here, for purposes of comparison, to present quotations from other defenders of the system.

V. *Freedom of the Will.*

President Finney left no separate treatise upon the will. But a tolerably distinct idea of his views upon that intricate

[1] Systematic Theology, p. 803. [2] Ibid., pp. 803, 804. [3] Ibid., p. 811. [4] Ibid., p. 811.

subject may be gathered from his theological system. A little later, when we come to consider his analysis of virtue, we shall discuss his most peculiar views concerning the action of the will. It will no doubt prevent some little confusion to remark here that we have, for various reasons, reversed the order of treatment pursued in his volume, and and reserved till the last his most distinctive peculiarities of argument, but which he in the natural order put first. We may perhaps thus pass from the familiar to the unfamiliar with less effort of mind. We premise, however, that Mr. Finney defended the doctrine of the simplicity of the action of the will, maintaining that every ultimate act of choice is either wholly virtuous or wholly sinful. Of this we will speak fully hereafter. We must now consider what he has to say about the determination of the will. How does he reconcile liberty with certainty? This should appear in the discussions which pertain to depravity and the perseverance of the saints.[1]

VI. *Coexistence of Freedom and Certainty.*

In two conditions the actions of the human will are uniform and infallibly certain. Previous to regeneration, every moral act of the human will is a wicked act. Sin is uniform and certain without the influences of the Holy Ghost. Subsequent to regeneration and previous to death, virtuous choice is the rule and sinful choice the exception, with the assurance that through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and the discipline of providence the soul shall be fully established in virtue. In the heavenly world the saints uniformly and certainly put forth virtuous choices.

Certainty is of three species[2] — that of absolute necessity, such as belongs to all intuitional truth; physical necessity, such as pertains to the succession of events in the physical world, where there is a necessary connection between antecedent and consequent, conditional on the original act of creation; and thirdly, moral certainty, or the certainty of liberty. This certainty of liberty is a very peculiar and

[1] See pp. 370–401, 836–901.

[2] See pp. 836, 837.

puzzling thing. We can make statements about it; but there is no satisfactory and adequate statement of it. Paradoxes must abound, in whatever shape we attempt to realize it to our imagination. It is a certainty which at every step runs a hazard of being otherwise than it is. It is a definite line which keeps its direction, against the possibility of changing its course at every point. The pathway of the will is through the high seas in which one could always have moved to the left when he moved to the right; yet there is not only a certain course which each will is to pursue, but God knows beforehand what that course will be. Our author does not attempt to reconcile foreknowledge with freedom, but contents himself with postulating both in the most emphatic manner. As we have seen, also, he maintains that when "viewed relatively to what he [God] would do, and what would be done and would come to pass, the divine purpose must, in the order of nature, have preceded the divine prescience."[1] In point of time, however, the purpose and the foreknowledge were "contemporaneous and co-eternal." In some way God knew what his creatures were going to do by knowing what he himself should do. The certainty of their action was thus dependent on the certainty of his own. Our author does not encumber himself with Edwards's dictum, that the "will always is as the greatest apparent good is";[2] nor with that other dictum, that the will always acts according to the highest motive.

It may be well for us, just here, to raise a cautionary signal, to warn the reader that he is in hazardous seas and in the latitude of very unsettled weather. When touching on the doctrine of the action of the will, the natural infirmities of language render it proper to ask for some degree of indulgence. Language is far less flexible than thought. But even human thought must confess itself unable to penetrate all the ramifications of this interminable labyrinth. If we

[1] Systematic Theology, p. 834.

[2] Edwards's Work in ten volumes (New York, 1870), Vol. ii. pp. 20, 24, 80, et al.

utter the truth at all regarding the freedom of the will and the subjects dependent upon and connected with it, we must speak in paradoxes, and with more or less of pleonasm and tautology.

We are now where difficulties are thickest and paradoxes most abundant. If the will be free, how can its action be either uniform or foreknown. But it is frequently both. God has that freedom of will which is essential to the existence of virtue; yet we are confident, that he never puts forth any but virtuous choices. Man, likewise, is always free in his volitions; yet in all conditions, *God* can predict them. How can there be this prediction of the action which a self-determining power will initiate?

From the days of Socrates down to our own, it has been maintained that there was an equation between the motive and the action of the will. It was held by him that the will is reached through the sensibility only, and that the sensibilities being aroused by knowledge of the means of gratification, the will might be controlled by enlightenment of the mind. The dictum, that the action of the will is as the greatest apparent good, would seem to be coincident with this Socratic idea. But the Edwardeans are, in general, careful to insist that the connection between their subject and predicate is merely infallible and certain, but not necessary. The will, *is* as the greatest apparent good, not *must* be. In this relation of the strength of the motive to the action of the will, foundation exists for omniscience to foresee *all* the future actions of a moral agent, and for finite reason to predict the course of the will in a certain environment of motives.

That there is what Leibnitz would call a "sufficient reason" for the action of the will in every case, President Finney seems, in various passages, to hold. For example, he argues[1] the immutability of God's benevolence from the power of the motives which reside in his omniscience.

"Every motive that exists lies with all its weight upon his mind, and that constantly. And as there are infinitely higher motives to benevolence

[1] Skeletons of a Course of Theological Lectures (1840), p. 78.

than to malevolence, and as these motives are fully known to and appreciated by God, we reasonably infer from this consideration that he is benevolent."

Furthermore, confidence in this foundation seems to be implied in all that is said about moral government. There is in the presentation of motives certainly a ground of probability laid concerning the will's action, else why should we ply the motives of the gospel? We should remember that probability is not a cover for chance, but for our ignorance. What is ground of probability for finite beings is ground of certainty to the infinite mind. "The lot is cast into the lap; but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord." It will prove interesting, not merely as a personal matter, but as shedding some light on a very abstruse subject, to partially cellate the language of President Finney on the connection between the use of motives and the action of the will.

"A want of experience in the universe in regard to the nature and natural tendencies and results of sin prevented the due influence of sanctions. . . . . All the developments of sin are enlarging the experience of the universe in regard to its nature and tendencies, and thus confirming the influence of moral government over virtuous minds."[1]

The "universality of moral depravity" is accounted for, without involving the idea that the constitution of man is itself sinful, on the supposition that

"Sin may be the result of temptation; temptation may be universal, and of such a nature as uniformly, not necessarily, to result in sin, unless a contrary result be secured by a divine moral suasion."[2]

"We can predict, without the gift of prophecy, that with a constitution physically depraved, and surrounded with objects to awaken appetite, and with all the circumstances in which human beings first form their moral character, they will seek universally to gratify themselves, unless prevented by the illuminations of the Holy Spirit."[3]

"Free, responsible will is an adequate cause [for the universality of sin in the human race], in the presence of temptation, without the supposition of a sinful constitution."[4]

How is moral depravity to be accounted for?

"It consists, remember, in the committal of the will to the gratification

[1] Systematic Theology, p. 34. [2] Ibid., p. 380. [3] Ibid., p. 381.
[4] Ibid., p. 387.

or indulgence of self — in the will's following, or submitting itself to be governed by, the impulses and desires of the sensibility, instead of submitting itself to the law of God revealed in the reason. This definition of the thing shows how it is to be accounted for; namely, the sensibility acts as a powerful impulse to the will, from the moment of birth, and secures the consent and activity of the will to procure its gratification before the reason is at all developed. The will is thus committed to the gratification of feeling and appetite when first the idea of moral obligation is developed. This committed state of the will is not moral depravity, and has no moral character, until the idea of moral obligation is developed. The moment this idea is developed, this committal of the will to self-indulgence must be abandoned, or it becomes selfishness or moral depravity. But as the will is already in a state of committal, and has to some extent already formed the habit of seeking to gratify feeling, and as the idea of moral obligation is at first but feebly developed, unless the Holy Spirit interferes to shed light on the soul, the will, as might be expected, retains its hold on self-gratification. Here alone moral character commences, and must commence. No one can conceive of its commencing earlier. ..... Again, it should be remembered that the physical depravity of our race has much to do with our moral depravity. A diseased physical system renders the appetites, passions, tempers, and propensities more clamorous and despotic in their demands, and of course, constantly urging to selfishness, confirms and strengthens it. It should be distinctly remembered that physical depravity has no moral character in itself. But yet it is the source of fierce temptation to selfishness. The human sensibility is manifestly deeply physically depraved; and as sin, or moral depravity, consists in committing the will to the gratification of the sensibility, its physical depravity will mightily strengthen moral depravity. Moral depravity is then universally owing to temptation. That is, the soul is tempted to self-indulgence, and yields to the temptation; and this yielding, and not the temptation, is sin or moral depravity." [1]

"The constitution of a moral being, as a whole, when all the powers are developed, does not tend to sin, but strongly in an opposite direction, as is manifest from the fact that when reason is thoroughly developed by the Holy Spirit it is more than a match for the sensibility, and turns the heart to God. The difficulty is, that the sensibility gets the start of reason, and engages the attention in devising means of self-gratification, and thus retards, and in a great measure prevents, the development of the ideas of the reason which were designed to control the will. It is this morbid development that the Holy Spirit is given to rectify, by so forcing truth upon the attention as to secure the development of the reason. By doing this he brings the will under the influence of truth. Our senses reveal to us the objects correlated to our animal nature and propensities. The Holy

[1] Systematic Theology, p. 397.

Spirit reveals God and the spiritual world, and all that class of objects that are correlated to our higher nature, so as to give reason the control of the will."[1]

In the chapter on "Perseverance of the Saints," the relation of motives to the constancy of the will's action is turned over and over in a very instructive manner. The certainty pertaining to the action of the will is called "moral certainty," as distinguished from that "of absolute necessity," and from that "of physical, but conditioned necessity." This is called moral certainty not because it is any "less certain" than the other kinds, but simply because it is conditioned upon the free actions of moral agents." The class of actions to which only "moral" certainty belongs are "contingent, in the highest sense in which anything can be contingent." The certainty

"Is not of necessity in any sense; it is only a mere certainty, or a voluntary certainty — a free certainty — a certainty that might by natural possibility, in every case, be no certanity at all. ..... God, in every instance knows how these events will be as really as if they occurred by necessity; but his foreknowledge does not affect their certainty, one way or the other. ..... All events [however] may be traced ultimately to the action of God's free-will; that is, God's free actions gave existence to the universe, with all its physical agencies and laws, so that all physical events are in some sense owing to, and result from, the actions of free-will. ..... [The actions of a finite free-will] find the occasions of their occurrence in the providential events with which moral agents are surrounded, and therefore may be traced, indirectly and more or less remotely, to the actions of the divine will."

Humanly speaking, there is utmost danger that a regenerate person will fail to persevere in holiness, i.e. there may be to our ignorance "millions of chances to one" that he will fail.

"[His actions] are contingent in such a sense, that should the means fail to be used, or should any event in the whole chain of influences connected with their occurrence be otherwise than it is, the end, or event resulting, would or might be otherwise than in fact it will be. They are, nevertheless, certain, every one of them, together with all the influences upon which each free act depends."[2]

The dependence of the will for its final victory, upon the

[1] Systematic Theology, p. 404.

[2] Ibid., pp. 836–839.

enlightening influences of the Holy Spirit, is set forth in the most emphatic language.

"Who that knows himself does not understand that he never would have been converted but for the grace of God anticipating and exciting the first motions of his mind in a right direction? And what true saint does not know that such are his former habitudes, and such the circumstances of trial under which he is placed, and such the downward tendency of his own soul, on account of his physical depravity, that, although converted, he shall not persevere for an hour, except the indwelling grace and Spirit of God shall hold him up, and quicken him in the path of holiness?"[1]

Neander[2] maintained that "it lies in the idea of evil [sin] that it is an utterly inexplicable thing, and whoever would explain it nullifies the very idea of it. It is not the limits of our knowledge which make the origin of sin something inexplicable *to us*, but it follows from the essential nature of sin as an act of free-will, that it must remain to all eternity an inexplicable fact. It can only be understood *empirically* by means of the moral self-consciousness." A favorite theme with President Finney in the pulpit was that "Sin is Moral Insanity."[3] Yet even he, as we have seen, maintains that there is method in the sinner's madness, and that the particular course of every person's moral development is dependent upon the divine act by which the universe was created and is sustained. God knew what he was doing when he created the universe. It is difficult to see how such knowledge can exist except there be an infallible connection between the influence of motives, in the broad sense (including what are subjective as well as what are objective), and the action of the will. There is a paradox in the very idea we are trying to represent. We are not sure but the best way is boldly to express the paradox in words, as Edwards did in calling it a moral necessity for the will to act as it does. It is certain that orderly operations such as are implied in the very idea of the success of moral government could not be

[1] Systematic Theology, p. 877.

[2] History of the Planting of Christianity (Bohn, London, 1859), Vol. i. p. 424.

[3] See Sermons on Gospel Themes, pp. 147–160.

the effect of chance, for chance is no cause at all and no sufficient reason for anything. God cannot be conceived as throwing up dice with any uncertainty as to the result. Nor can we escape the difficulty by abolishing time, for time will not be abolished. It is a question whether the phrase, 'God is independent of time,' can have any other meaning than that, God in knowing perfectly the scope of the secondary causes and the established certainties which he has brought into existence, sees the end from the beginning, and is thus immutable in his knowledge.

The phraseology of President Edwards is peculiarly open to criticism, from the fact that his writings were largely controversial, making it necessary to interpret his language as in antithesis to that which embodied the errors which he was opposing. The very title of his famous treatise on the will should put us on our guard. "A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame." When now we find him stating that nothing ever comes to pass without a cause, we need to make "careful and strict enquiry" as to the sense in which he uses the word "cause." "For want of a better word," he took "occasion to use it in a sense which is more extensive than that in which it is sometimes used."

"I sometimes," he writes, "use the word *cause*, in this enquiry, to signify any *antecedent*, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an event, either a thing or the manner and circumstances of a thing, so depends that it is the ground and reason, either in whole or in part, why it is, rather than not; or why it is as it is, rather than otherwise; or, in other words, any antecedent with which a consequent event is so connected that it truly belongs to the reason why the proposition which affirms that event, is true, whether it has any positive influence or not."[1]

The Edwardean phrases, "*moral* cause" and "*moral* necessity," seem unfortunate; but it is a misfortune for any words to fall between the upper and nether millstones of the ideas of free-will and foreknowledge. President Finney contented

[1] Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will. Part ii. Sect. iii.

himself with the phrase "*moral* certainty." But then he did not venture so far into this subject as the Edwardses. Perhaps he displayed his sagacity in not doing so. We presume, however, if the three persons had been together they would have had no difficulty in understanding each other, and would very likely have agreed upon a statement something like this: Whatever line God's creative activity were to pursue, when that was once determined upon, it would determine, or make certain, the existence of all other things in any manner dependent upon that activity. If God had chosen another plan of operations, everything subordinate would in some degree have been changed. The *knowledge* of God comprehended the details and incidents of every possible plan. The choice of a plan made his *knowledge* determinate as *foreknowledge*. So that the actions of finite free-wills are foreordained as well as foreknown. The action of the will is the effect of concauses, of which the will itself supplies part, and the motives, in the large sense, supply the rest. As we have seen, neither President Finney nor President Edwards hold that a knowledge of how the will would act, derived from a knowledge of the motives, would necessarily be irreconcilable with the doctrine of responsible freedom of will. It is a mystery, but not an absurdity, that the two facts should co-exist. If we fly from this mystery by eliminating the element of time, we encounter another equally insoluble. It is as if a man escape from the jaws of a lion, and a bear meets him. President Finney, in his earlier writings, and the younger Edwards use language regarding God's relation to time which is almost identical. Thus Finney:

"Eternity, to us, means all past, present, and future duration. But to God it means only now. Duration and space, as they respect his existence, mean infinitely different things from what they do when they respect our existence. God's existence and his acts, as they respect finite existence, have relation to time and place. But as they respect his own existence, everything is *here* and *now*. With respect to all finite existences, God can say I was, I am, I shall be, do, will do; but with respect to his own existence, all that he can say is, *I am, I do*."[1]

[1] Skeletons of a Course of Theological Lectures, pp. 70, 71.

Thus Doctor Edwards (the younger):

"There is no succession in the divine mind; therefore no new operations take place there. All the divine acts are equally from eternity, nor is there any *time* with God. ... The *effects* of those divine acts do indeed all take place in time, and in a succession. If it should be said that on this supposition the effects take place, not till long after the acts by which they are produced; I answer, they do so in our view, but not in the view of God. With him there is no time, no before nor after with respect to time; nor has time any existence either in the divine mind or in the nature of things, independently of the minds and perceptions of creatures; but it depends on the succession of those perceptions."[1]

VII. *Ground of Obligation.*

President Finney is believed by his pupils to have rendered substantial service to the cause of philosophy in his discussion of the "Foundation of Moral Obligation." His elaboration of the subject is more complete than that of any other author, and his theory incorporates what of truth there is in utilitarianism, while, at the same time, he makes obligation rest upon an intuitional basis. What advantage there is in his statements will be seen to arise from perspicuity and breadth of thought together with rare logical discrimination in the use of language. A great deal of confusion has come into the field of this discussion through the ambiguity of the word "good." *Good* is either ultimate or relative. If this distinction is overlooked, endless confusion will arise, and ever after this element of confusion is admitted, abundance of words will lead to anything but fulness of knowledge. *Good* is, in the nature of the case, related to the sensibility, using that word in its fullest meaning. *Ultimate* good, is the gratification of the sensibility,— in one word, happiness. *Relative* good, is that which is adapted to evoke happiness from a being possessed of a sensitivity correlated to the thing; or is a condition of his receiving blessedness. Ultimate good is good *in itself*, or the realization of good. Relative good is good *for* something, or good in *correlation* to something else. An apple is good to the taste; but until

[1] Edwards's Works, Vol. i. pp. 386, 387.

the apple and the organs of taste are brought in contact, the real good is hypothetical or possible only. Were there no sensibility of taste correlated to the peculiar chemical constitution of the fruit, that peculiarity would not be good for anything.

In the creation, the advent of happiness is co-incident with the appearance of sensibility in contact with its correlated objects. The idea of obligation could not arise except in beings possessed of sensibility, and in regard to beings capable of happiness or misery. The experience of personal happiness or misery, and the perception of the possibility of the existence of it at other times and places, is a logical prerequisite to the intuition of obligation. This is one of the ideas which Mr. Finney has elaborated more fully than any other author.[1]

Obligation is, in the philosophical sense, limited to choice. The choice which is characteristic of true benevolence is called an *ultimate choice*, and is what in its essence constitutes true holiness; while the *refusal* to put it forth constitutes the essential attribute of sin. The central and highest law of obligation is, that *a moral being ought to choose the highest good of being in general.* This law is one of the intuitive facts of the reason. The person who puts forth that choice is a holy being. He is praiseworthy. He is an object of moral approbation. He is "good" in the sense that he has, in his measure, attained the "*summum bonum*" of moral excellence. His choice is praiseworthy in itself, without regard to the use God may make of it in the economy of the universe. In this sense of the word "choice," virtue is benevolence (*bene volens*), and love (*ἀγάπη*) is the fulfilment of the law. This choice, however, is not a mere wish, but involves an election of all the means and conditions of the highest well-being. Holiness is also something higher than a means of happiness. It is a quality of character upon which happiness must, in a moral being, be *conditioned.*

[1] See statement of President Mark Hopkins, in "The Law of Love, and Love as Law" (New York, 1869), Preface, p. 7.

"It is naturally impossible for a moral agent to be satisfied with the happiness or enjoyment of moral agents except upon condition of their holiness."[1] This is an ultimate dictum of the reason and conscience. The holy being wills hypothetical good to all possible being. He wills actual good to all known existent holy beings. He wills actual good to unholy beings upon condition that they become holy, and that some way is devised to repair the evil of their past guilt. He wills suffering to the unholy because they deserve it, and because punishment will promote the general good. "Ultimate intention is right or wrong in itself; and no questions of utility, expediency, or tendency, have anything to do with the obligation to put forth ultimate intention."[2] In the highest sense, and with regard to universal being, the "expedient" and the "right" are one. It is impossible, without a reversal of the powers and laws of moral agency, that general happiness should be connected with sin, or universal misery with holiness. "If our being were so changed that happiness were naturally connected with sin, and misery with holiness, there would of necessity be a corresponding change in the law of nature, or of moral law; in which case we should be as well satisfied as we now are. But no such change is possible, and the supposition is inadmissible."[3]

Compare with this presentation President Edwards's Dissertations on the "Nature of True Virtue,"[4] and concerning "The End for which God Created the World." But especially Dr. Samuel Hopkins's "Inquiry into the Nature of True Holiness,"[5] and Dr. Emmon's "Sermon on Love the Essence of Obedience."[6] The point is stated with great clearness by the latter.

"True love is universal, extending to being in general, or to God and all his creatures..... The primary object of true benevolence is *being*, simply considered, or a mere capacity of enjoying happiness and suffering pain.

[1] Systematic Theology, p. 95. See also, pp. 68, 69, 70, 78, etc.
[2] Systematic Theology, p. 123. [3] Ibid., p. 109.
[4] See Works, Vol. iii. pp. 94, 97, 129, 133, 139, 141, 153, et al.
[5] See Works, Vol. iii. [6] Sermon, No. 68.

It necessarily embraces God and all sensitive natures. Though the man of true benevolence has a *peculiar complacency* in God and in all other benevolent beings, yet he *wishes well* to creatures that have no benevolence, and even to such as are incapable of all moral exercises. It is, therefore, the nature of true benevolence to run parallel with universal being, whether uncreated or created; whether rational or irrational; whether holy or unholy."[1]

This view of the case avoids the errors of utilitarianism, and coincides very closely with the views of President Edwards and Dr. Samuel Hopkins.

Utilitarianism is a genus with innumerable species. The generic distinction of utilitarianism consists in the idea that the *promotion* of the good of being is the foundation of obligation. Utilitarianism may be "high" or "low" according to the conception of those who hold it. The utilitarian may be a follower either of Epicurus or of Zeno, according to his conception of what is the highest form of attainable well-being. As the example of Paley and Dr. N. W. Taylor and Mill shows, a utilitarian does not by any necessity maintain that bread and butter are the highest objects of utility. With Paley one may refine and enlarge his object of desire till it becomes nothing less than the kingdom of heaven. But in this event, while he frees himself from the charge of "*this*-worldliness," he may lay himself open all the more to that of "*other*-worldliness." As J. S. Mill has remarked:[2]

"The happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned." Again, "Whatever aid religion, either natural or revealed, can afford to ethical investigation, is as open to the utilitarian moralist as to any other. He can use it as the testimony of God to the usefulness or hurtfulness of any given course of action, by as good right as others can use it for the vindication of transcendental laws having no connection with usefulness or happiness."[3]

The intuitional philosopher would say that benevolence is *goodness in itself*, and therefore praiseworthy, whether it be good *for* anything or not. The utilitarian would say that benevolence is good *for* something, viz. the *promotion* of the

[1] Emmons's Works, Vol. iii. p. 175.
[2] Utilitarianism (4th ed., London, 1871), p. 24.
[3] Ibid., p. 32.

general well-being, and therefore worthy of approval. Thus Dr. Taylor:

"All the worth or value of man, or of any other moral being, consists in his capacity of happiness and of that self-active nature which qualifies him to produce happiness to other beings and to himself. All the worth or value or goodness or excellence which pertains to action on the part of a moral being, is its fitness or adaptation to produce these results. The best kind of action, therefore, on his part, is that which is exclusively and perfectly fitted to produce the highest happiness of others and his own highest happiness.[1]

So far is the above passage from expressing the views of President Finney, that he is at considerable pains to refute the position there maintained. To get the points clearly before his mind the student should take particular notice of the distinction between an *ultimate* act of the will in choice, and an *executive* act of the will.

"Ultimate choice, or the choice of an object for its own sake, or for its intrinsic value, is not an effort designed to secure or obtain that object; that is, is not put forth with any such design. When the object which the mind perceives to be intrinsically valuable (as the good of being, for example) is perceived by the mind, it cannot but choose or refuse it. Indifference in this case is naturally impossible. The mind, in such circumstances, is under a necessity of choosing one way or the other. The will must embrace or reject it. The reason affirms the obligation to choose the intrinsically valuable for its own sake, and not because choosing it will secure it. Nor does the real choice of it imply a purpose or an obligation to put forth executive acts to secure it, except upon condition that such acts are seen to be necessary and possible and calculated to secure it. Ultimate choice is not put forth with design to secure its object. It is only the will's embracing the object, or willing it for its own sake. In regard to ultimate choice the will must choose or refuse the object entirely irrespectively of the tendency of the choice to secure the object. ..... But executive acts, be it remembered, are, and must be, put forth with design to secure their object, and of course cannot exist unless the design exist, and the design cannot exist unless the mind assumes the possibility, necessity, and utility of such efforts."[2] Again, "It is absurd to say the foundation of the obligation to choose a certain end is to be

[1] Lectures on the Moral Government of God. By Nathaniel W. Taylor, D.D., late Dwight Professor of Theology in Yale College (New York, 1859), Vol. i. p. 32; see also, pp. 19, 33, 34, 65, 66, etc. See also, Metcalf, "The Nature, Extent, and Foundation of Moral Obligation," pp. 22, 36, 60.

[2] Systematic Theology, p. 33

found, not in the value of the end itself, but in the tendency of the intention to secure the end. The tendency is valuable or otherwise as the end is valuable or otherwise. It is, and must be, the value of the end, and not the tendency of an intention to secure the end, that constitutes the foundation of the obligation to intend."[1] Still again, "A consistent utilitarian cannot conceive rightly of the nature of morality or virtue. He cannot consistently hold that virtue consists in willing the highest well-being of God and the universe as an ultimate end; or for its own sake, but must, on the contrary, confine his ideas of moral obligation to volitions and outward actions, in which there is strictly no morality, and, withal, assign an entirely false reason for these; to wit, their tendency to secure an end, rather than the value of the end which they tend to secure."[2]

When a little ambiguity on the part of President Edwards, in the use of the words "good" and "love," is eliminated, there does not seem to be any irreconcilable difference between him and President Finney upon this point. The former says with the latter, that "True virtue most essentially consists in *benevolence to being in general*."[3] The latter could say with the former that virtue is "something *beautiful*" in itself; and both might unite in the language of Kant:

"A good will is good, not through that which it accomplishes or attains, nor through its fitness for attaining any object set before it, but solely through the volition, i.e. in itself; and, considered for itself, it is beyond comparison more highly to be prized than all which can ever be brought to pass through it to the satisfaction of any possible inclination, or, if you will, the sum of all inclinations. Though through some peculiar unpropitiousness of fate, or through scanty endowment from unkind nature, this will should altogether lack the means for carrying out its purpose; though by its greatest effort nothing should be accomplished, and there should remain only the good will (plainly not a mere empty wish, but the summoning of all means as far as they are in our power); even then would it, like a jewel, shine for itself, as something which has its full worth in itself."[4]

[1] Systematic Theology, p. 52.

[2] Systematic Theology, p. 122. Consult also Fairchild's Moral Philosophy, pp. 1–29.

[3] See Edwards, Dissertation on the Nature of True Virtue. Cap. i. See also Dr. Samuel Hopkins, Works (Boston, 1854), Vol. i. pp. 236, 237; Vol. iii. pp. 16, 17.

[4] "Der gute Wille ist nicht durch das, was er bewirkt, oder ausrichtet, nicht

President Finney does, indeed, maintain that there is a distinction between what is *right* in itself and what is *good* in itself.[1] He also denies that virtue is an ultimate good, but calls it a relative good of infinite value. "It is the condition of blessedness in all moral agents, and of the infinite blessedness of God, and therefore infinitely valuable."

"Holy beings delight in it for its own sake. It is morally beautiful and lovely, and the contemplation of it gives a sweet satisfaction and pleasure to the mind of a holy being. Hence we say, we love it for its own sake; and so we do if by love we mean delight. But to delight in a thing for its own sake is not the same as choosing it for its own sake." "Obedience to moral law is morally beautiful; that is, we so regard it by a law of our being, just as we regard a rose as naturally beautiful."[2]

We should guard ourselves against the error of supposing that benevolence is, with New School theologians, a word of narrow significance. It is a word of a very high generic meaning. By these writers it is simply the apex in a vast hierarchy of generalizations concerning virtue. It has a great variety of attributes. President Finney enumerates no less than thirty-seven. But we will not pause longer upon this part of the subject.

durch seine Tauglichkeit zu Erreichung irgend eines vorgesetzten Zweckes, sondern allein durch das Wollen, d. i. an sich, gut, und für sich selbst betrachtet, ohne Vergleich weit höher zu schätzen, als Alles, was durch ihn zu Gunsten irgend einer Neigung, ja wenn man will, der Summe aller Neigungen, um immer zu stande gebracht werden könnte. Wenn gleich durch eine besondere Ungunst des Schicksals, oder durch kärgliche Ausstattung einer stiefmütterlichen Natur, es diesem Willen gänzlich an Vermögen fehlte, seine Absicht durchzusetzen; wenn bei seiner grössten Bestrebung dennoch nichts von ihm ausgerichtet würde, und nur der gute Wille (freilich nicht etwa ein blosser Wunsch, sondern als die Aufbietung aller Mittel, so weit sie in unserer Gewalt sind) übrig bliebe; so würde er wie ein Juwel doch für sich selbst glänzen, als Etwas, das seinen vollen Werth in sich selbst hat." — Immanuel Kant's Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten und Kritik Der Praktischen Vernunft. Herausgegeben von Karl Rosenkranz (Lepzig, 1838), Vol. viii. p. 12. For similar statements, see Emmons's Works, pp. 189–199. Finney, Systematic Theology, pp. 97, 98, 933, 950, 951, 953, etc. Fairchild, Moral Philosophy p. 29.

[1] See Systematic Theology, pp. 97 and 110.

[2] See Systematic Theology, pp. 950, 951; see also, p. 97, etc.

VIII. *The Simplicity of Moral Action.*

The key to much misapprehension of President Finney's theology is to be found in the divergent views which are held concerning the unity of the will's action. Finney, in company with Dr. Emmons, conceived of the will as necessarily altogether holy or altogether sinful in each moment of activity. In the nature of the case, the will, if it put forth moral activity at all, cannot be indifferent in character. Like a railroad train, if it have motion, the motion must be either forwards or backwards. The velocity and momentum may be of varying degrees, but the motion must be in one direction or the other. Likewise, at each instant of activity, the momentum of the will in sinful action is in proportion to the degree of light resisted. If the will is bad at all, so far as present guilt is concerned, it is as bad as it can be; it may be worse the next instant. But if God is not chosen with all the heart, it is for a reason that is wholly sinful.

Dr. Emmons has treated this subject at length and with great cogency of logic.[1] According to him the heart "consists in nothing but moral exercises."

"We never approve or disapprove of anything in ourselves or others but free voluntary exercises; and God requires and forbids nothing but free and voluntary exercises, in his word. All that the divine law requires summarily consists in pure benevolence; and all it summarily forbids consists in pure selfishness. Benevolence is a free, voluntary exercise, and selfishness is a free, voluntary exercise; and every human heart consists in a train of free, voluntary, benevolent exercises, or in a train of free, voluntary, selfish exercises, or in a train of both benevolent and selfish exercises. A sinner's heart consists in a train of mere selfish affections; but a saint's heart consists in a train of both benevolent and selfish exercises. The best of saints are imperfectly holy in this life; and their imperfection in holiness consists in their sometimes having holy and sometimes unholy affections. Their holy and unholy affections are always distinct, and never blended together. Their holy exercises are never partly holy and partly unholy, but perfectly holy; and their unholy exercises are never partly holy, but perfectly unholy."[2]

[1] See Sermons, xxvi, lxxvi, and lxxvii. The first on Ps. lxxxvi. 11, entitled Prayer of Saints for Constant Holiness. The last two on Rom. vii. 18, concerning the Character of Good Men.

[2] Emmons's Works, Vol. iv. p. 357.

"If the hearts of saints consist altogether in moral and voluntary exercises, then they never have any more holiness than they have holy exercises. Many suppose that good men are much better than their good exercises, for when their exercises are not good, still they have a good principle, or good heart abiding in them, which is indeed the essence of all goodness. ..... Some have supposed that Christians may live days and months, and even years, in a dull, stupid, lifeless state, their principle of grace continuing, but not in proper, sensible exercises. This is both a groundless and dangerous doctrine."[1] "The breast of every Christian is a field of battle, where sometimes benevolence and sometimes selfishness gains the victory."[2]

Speaking of the character of good men Emmons remarks[3] that

"There are but three different suppositions to be made concerning the imperfection of saints. The first is that all their moral exercises are perfectly holy, but too low and languid. The second is that all their moral exercises are partly holy and partly sinful. The third is that some of their moral exercises are perfectly holy, and some are perfectly sinful."[4]

To the first this reply is given:

"The sacred writers clearly distinguish between holy and unholy affections, but never intimate that one holy affection is more perfect than another. They represent all true love to God as *supreme*. ..... The truth is, whenever any person really loves God he loves him for what he is in himself, and consequently he loves him supremely; which is loving him as much as it is possible to love him, with his present attention to, and knowledge of, the divine character. ..... One saint may love God more than another, because one saint may have more knowledge of God than another. And so the same saint may love God more at one time than at another; ..... or, which is the same thing, he may attend to more of the divine perfections, and to more displays of those perfections at one time than at another. This is the only difference between the love of saints and the love of angels in heaven."[5]

The supposition that the imperfection of saints arises "from their moral affections being partly holy and partly sinful," is rebutted by the assertion that "it is absolutely absurd to suppose that any voluntary exercise should be partly holy and partly sinful."

"This is no more conceivable than that a volition to walk should be partly a desire to move and partly a desire to stand still." "Can the

[1] Emmons's Works, Vol. iv. pp. 366, 367. [2] Ibid., p. 368.
[3] See Works, Vol. iii. p. 293 ff. [4] Ibid., p. 293. [5] Ibid., p. 295.

affection of love be partly love and partly hatred to God? Can the exercise of repentance be partly love and partly hatred to sin? Can the exercise of faith be partly love and partly hatred to Christ? Can the grace of submission be partly resignation and partly opposition to the will of God?"[1]

The doctrine is then stated and defended that the imperfection of good men "arises from their having some sinful as well as some holy affections." In reply to the objection that such an alternation from sinfulness to holiness is not recognized by consciousness, and that therefore it is to be presumed that the good and bad exercises of imperfect saints are united and blended together, Dr. Emmons remarks:

"It has been observed in this discourse that sin and holiness are diametrically opposite affections, and cannot be united in one and the same volition. And it has been farther observed that the Scripture represents them as totally distinct exercises of heart. These considerations afford a much stronger proof that all holy affections are distinct from all unholy ones than the mere want of consciousness of this distinction affords to the contrary. We all know that our thoughts are extremely rapid in their succession. We cannot ascertain how many thoughts we have in one hour, nor even in one minute. And our affections, or volitions, may be as rapid in their succession as our thoughts; yea, it is very evident that they are too rapid for observation."[2]

Farther on we find Dr. Emmons saying, that saints

"Would be entirely sinless if they would only *continue* to exercise just such holy affections as they sometimes do exercise."[3] "They never stand still, but always go either forward or backward in their religious course."[4] "Their gracious exercises are not necessarily and inseparably connected with each other; and, of consequence, they may at any time be interrupted by totally sinful affections. They have no permanent source or fountain of holiness within themselves, from which a constant stream of holy affections will naturally and necessarily flow. As one holy affection will not produce another, so they are immediately dependent upon God for every holy affection. ... Their sanctification, therefore, is precisely the same as continued regeneration."[5]

President Finney has entered at considerable length into the discussion of this so-called "impartiality" of obedience to the moral law.[6] He maintains that the will cannot, "at

[1] Works, Vol. iii. p. 296. [2] Ibid., p. 300. [3] Ibid., p. 305.
[4] Ibid., p. 308. [5] Ibid., p. 309.
[6] See Systematic Theology, pp. 135–155.

the same time, choose opposite and conflicting ultimate ends"; and that the will cannot "honestly intend or choose an ultimate end, and yet not choose it with all the strength or intensity which is required." Five contrary suppositions are considered and disposed of; namely, 1st, "that selfishness and benevolence can co-exist in the same mind"; 2d, "that the same act or choice may have a complex character, on account of complexity in the motives which induce it"; 3d, "that an act or choice may be right or holy in kind, but deficient in intensity or degree"; 4th, "that the will or heart may be right, while the affections or emotions are wrong"; 5th, "that there may be a ruling, latent, actually-existing, holy preference or intention co-existing with opposing volitions."[1] All these suppositions are maintained to be logicaliy incompatible with the correct view of the action of the mind in willing, and to be contrary to the Scripture; and moral character is said to be "*always wholly right or wholly wrong, and never partly right and partly wrong at the same time.*"[2]

To the objection that upon this view there could be no growth in grace, President Finney replies: "Growth in grace consists in two things, 1st, in stability or permanency of holy ultimate intention; 2d, in intensity or strength. As knowledge increases, Christians will naturally grow in grace in both these respects."[3]

The similarity between the views of President Finney upon this point and those of Dr. Emmons is so striking that farther elaboration will not be necessary.

IX. *Sanctification.*

It is absolutely essential to keep in view this position regarding the action of the mind in willing, when we consider what is supposed to be President Finney's widest departure from the ordinary orthodox statement of Calvinistic theology in New England, namely, regarding the doctrine of sanctification. With Mr. Finney, sanctification is really

[1] See Systematic Theology, p. 141. [2] Ibid., p. 140. [3] Ibid., p. 153.

confirmation or *stability* of will — a state to be secured by the enlightening influence of the Holy Spirit in revealing Christ to the soul. The practical effect of his discussion, when understood, is to enhance one's sense of the enormity of present sin, rather than to beget a presumptuous confidence of future security, and least of all is it calculated to encourage boasting in the flesh. The two hundred pages[1] which President Finney has devoted to the offices of Christ in securing our sanctification will always remain a classic of devotional literature, and wherever known will be best appreciated by the most devout in the Christian church. To overcome the world and become confirmed in holiness, we need to know Christ in such relations as the following: King, Mediator, Paraclete, Redeemer, Justification, Judge, Repairer of the Breach, Propitiation for our sins, the Surety of a better covenant. We need to apprehend him as dying for our sins, as risen for our justification, as bearing our griefs, as the One by whose stripes we are healed, as being made sin for us, as our Prophet and Priest, as the Bread of Life, as the Water of Life, as the true God and Eternal Life, as the Husband of the soul, as the Shepherd, the Door, the true Light, the Lamb of God; and so on, to sixty-one heads. We give a single specimen of the poetic fervor with which these points are developed. It is concerning Christ as "the Truth."

"But I am aware that none but the Holy Spirit can possess the mind of the import of this assertion of Christ. It is full of mystery and darkness, and is a mere figure of speech to one unenlightened by the Holy Spirit in respect to its true spiritual import. The Holy Spirit does not reveal all the relations of Christ to the soul at once. Hence there are many to whom Christ has been revealed in some of his relations, while others are yet veiled from the view. Each distinct name and office and relation needs to be made the subject of a special and personal revelation to the soul, to meet its necessities and to confirm it in obedience under all circumstances. When Christ is revealed and apprehended as the essential, eternal, immutable truth, and the soul has embraced him as such, as he of whom all that is popularly called truth is only the reflection, as he of whom all truth in doctrine, whether of philosophy in any of its

[1] Systematic Theology, pp. 568–766.

branches or revelation in any of its departments, — I say, when the mind apprehends him as that essential truth of which all that men call truth is only the reflection, it finds a rock, a resting-place, a foundation, a stability, a reality, a power in truth of which before it had no conception. If this is unintelligible to you, I cannot help it. The Holy Spirit can explain and make you see it; I cannot. Christ is not truth in the sense of mere doctrine, nor in the sense of a teacher of true doctrine, but as the substance or essence of truth. He is that of which all truth in doctrine treats. True doctrine treats of him, but is not identical with him. Truth in doctrine is only the sign or declaration or representation of truth in essence — of living, absolute, self-existent truth in the Godhead. Truth in doctrine, or true doctrine, is a medium through which substantial or essential truth is revealed. But the doctrine or medium is no more identical with truth than light is identical with the objects which it reveals. Truth in doctrine is called light, and is to essential truth what light is to the objects which radiate or reflect it. Light coming from objects is at once the condition of their revelation and the medium through which they are revealed. So true doctrine is the condition and the means of knowing Christ, the essential truth. All truth in doctrine is only a reflection of Christ, or is a radiation upon the intelligence from Christ. When we learn this spiritually we shall learn to distinguish between doctrine and him whose radiance it is — to worship Christ as the essential truth, and not the doctrine that reveals him — to worship God, instead of the Bible. We shall then find our way through the shadow to the substance. Many, no doubt, mistake, and fall down and worship the doctrine, the preacher, the Bible, the shadow, and do not look for the ineffably glorious substance of which this bright and sparkling truth is only the sweet and mild reflection or radiation."[1]

The introduction to the lecture from which this extract is taken[2] enforces the following points: that in conversion "the heart or will consecrates itself and the whole being to God"; "that this is a state of disinterested benevolence"; "that all sin consists in the will's seeking the indulgence or gratification of self" — "in the will's yielding obedience to the propensities, instead of obeying God as his law is revealed in the reason"; "that the department of our sensibility that is related to objects of time and sense has received an enormous development, and is tremblingly alive to all its correlated objects; while, by reason of the blindness of the

[1] Systematic Theology, p. 661.

[2] Lecture lxiii. Systematic Theology, pp. 635. 636

mind to spiritual objects, it is scarcely developed at all in its relations to them." The soul

"Needs such discoveries of the eternal world, of the nature and guilt of sin, and of Christ the remedy of the soul, as to kill or greatly mortify lust or the appetites and passions in their relations to objects of time and sense, and thoroughly to develop the sensibility in its relations to sin and to God and to the whole circle of spiritual realities. This will greatly abate the frequency and power of temptation to self-gratification, and break up the voluntary slavery of the will. The developments of the sensibility need to be thoroughly corrected. This can only be done by the revelation to the inward man, by the Holy Spirit, of those great and solemn and overpowering realities of the 'spirit-land' that lie concealed from the eye of flesh."

It will be readily seen that with the theory of the will elaborated by Mr. Finney the question concerning sanctification resolves itself into this: Have we promise of such a development of the religious sensibilities in this life that the will shall be confirmed in holiness? There are no sources but the Bible and experience from which light can fall upon this question. All evangelical Christians agree in the belief that after death saints will be forever free from sin. Calvinists hold that through the care of God those who are once regenerated will be found at death in a state of obedience. Now, whatever may be one's theory of the will, he may hold that this permanency in holiness which is to characterize the heavenly state may be secured by divine grace before that state is reached. The doctrine must be determined by the interpretation of the Bible. As shown by President Fairchild,[1] there is a failure in much of President Finney's reasoning upon the subject, arising from the fact that a large part of the Scripture which he adduces as an argument for encouraging a hope of attaining a permanent state of holy exercises in this life, is really nothing but an argument bearing upon the duty and ability of complete present consecration. If there should be such a development of our religious sensibility as to assure future permanence in holiness, we should have no means of knowing the fact,

[1] See Congregational Quarterly for April 1876, pp. 256–259.

except by a special divine revelation; for the future lies beyond the reach of consciousness. And if we had such a revelation it would not have authority outside of our own hearts; for we should have no way of making the revelation authentic to others, except by the conformity of our future life to the present profession of assurance. The prophet would, as of old, have to be tried by the test of the fulfilment of his prophecy. Others could not make it a basis of confidence beforehand. Moreover, if it should turn out according to our professed prophetical assurance, the fulfilment would be impossible of proof, since virtue is of the heart, and not altogether of the outward life. The state of the heart is not always distinct in the consciousness, much less is the memory infallible in its record. Besides, to profess an assurance of future perfection in obedience puts the soul under such a temptation to hypocrisy in making the testimony conform with the hope, that it is doubtful if any one could endure the strain, and so the expectation would be likely to defeat itself. Mr. Finney was careful, on his own part, not to express presumptuous confidence either regarding the past or future. The concluding paragraph of his chapters upon the subject of sanctification is worthy of special note:

"I must not fail to state what I regard as the present duty of Christians. It is to hold their will in a state of consecration to God, and to lay hold on the promises for the blessing promised in such passages as 1 Thess. v. 23, 24, 'And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly,' etc. This is present duty. Let them wait on the Lord in faith for that cleansing of the whole being which they need to confirm, strengthen, settle them. All they can do, and all that God requires them to do, is to obey him from moment to moment, and to lay hold of him for the blessing of which we have been speaking, and to be assured that God will bring forth the answer in the best time and in the best manner. If you believe, the anointing that abideth will surely be secured in due time."[1]

Although it is difficult to see the advantage of concerning oneself very much about such a hope as this, yet on the other hand there is an immense advantage in retaining clear conceptions of the completeness of that present consecration,

[1] Systematic Theology, p. 765.

which is necessary for acceptance with God. The importance of emphasising this point, is well presented by Professor Morgan,[1] who has developed this portion of doctrinal theology, though not so elaborately, yet more to our satisfaction than President Finney. In the extract we give from him the reader may notice how certain doctrinal objections to the theory of the "simplicity" of the will's action are obviated; for example, the difficulty of adjusting it to the doctrine of the perseverance of saints.

"The Bible knows nothing of a 'perfect heart' which retires in its perfection somewhere into the recesses of the inward being and goes to sleep, while the members of the body are employed in adultery or murder, and the thoughts are full of pride. Nor does the Bible make the ways of God so unequal that *every sin* in one man who has never experienced the grace of God, shall incur the danger of eternal damnation, and that *no sin*, not even *murder*, in another whose sins are aggravated by the rupture of all the endearing ties of intimate filial communion and glorious discoveries, never made to his sinning brother, shall incur the danger of no severer penalty than God's fatherly displeasure and the withdrawal of the light of his countenance. ..... It is sometimes argued that the sins of persons who have been converted, do not bring them into a state of condemnation or forfeit their justification, because the discipline of the Lord is to bring them to repentance. But the true question which determines the relation of the sins of such persons to the divine wrath is, what would they incur if the perpetrators were to persist in them — or were their probation at once closed? The fact that they are brought to repentance by divine chastisements and are then forgiven, no more proves that their sins did not expose them to damnation, than the same fact proves that the unconverted who will yet be saved, have not hanging over their guilty heads the poised thunderbolts of divine indignation."[2]

X. *Conclusion.*

Since the object of this paper is mainly that of comparison, and as the space is also limited, we have for the most part avoided both a defensive and a controversial attitude, and have omitted reference to the elaborate proofs by which the author sustains his positions, — proofs drawn for the most part from the Bible. We are compelled also to leave un-

[1] See "The Holiness Acceptable to God," by Prof. John Morgan, D.D. (Oberlin, 1875), pp. 119.

[2] Ibid., pp. 41–43.

touched the author's treatment of the doctrines of atonement and of future punishment. Regarding the former of these fundamental doctrines, he defended what is called the governmental theory. Touching the latter, he was an outspoken advocate of the endless duration of future punishment.

For the reasons mentioned we have confined our comparison to those points in regard to which our author was least understood, and to those regarding which he is most in danger of being misunderstood. The life of President Finney was one of such untiring activity in the promotion of religious revivals, and he was put under such restraint by the hyper-Calvinism of his time, that the mass of his contemporaries failed to see the man in his true perspective. There was, moreover, less of originality in his views than some of his admirers are accustomed to suppose, and than some of his opponents would be glad to believe. As a theologian, he was in the main, eminently conservative. There is the least possible display of erudition in his published works. Indeed, he was far from being an omnivorous reader; yet it is evident that he was familiar with the standard authors in both philosophy and theology. While he did not feel himself competent to enter upon an independent criticism of the Scriptures in their original languages,[1] he had what was still more important, a very complete and well-balanced knowledge of them in their broader outlines of thought, which are sufficiently plain in the English translation. If he lacked some of the advantages to be derived from a microscopical examination of the original Scriptures, he was saved from that petty bondage to details, which, with so many, confuses the perspective of biblical theology.

Mr. Finney elaborated his theology about 1840, with an enthusiastic and able class of students gathered under peculiar circumstances in the back-woods of Ohio. So to speak, they together sunk an artesian well at Oberlin, and found an abundant supply of refreshing water. Analysis, however, shows that this water filtered into its subterranean channels

[1] See Memoirs, p. 5.

from New England. It would be out of our province to ask here concerning its ultimate origin. The "Western Reserve," was a "New Connecticut." Theological ideas are transported by a thousand different methods. President Finney himself was born in Connecticut. In a region where preaching is the pre-eminent influence, the language of common life becomes impregnated with its philosophical conceptions, and its forms of expression are transported with the other household furniture. The impressions of childhood are much more permanent than the memory of them. In 1827, while laboring in Utica with Rev. S. C. Aiken, Mr. Finney got hold of Edwards on Revivals, and other volumes of the same author, and read them almost constantly, and "spoke of them with rapture."[1] The first theological classes at Oberlin were largely of New England descent, and had been under New England teachers at Lane Seminary. The doctrine of the simplicity of moral action, — which as we have seen was elaborated by Emmons — was incorporated into the Oberlin theological system through the advocacy of William and Samuel D. Cochran.[2] If the historical relation of President Finney's theology had been more clearly apprehended and set forth by him, his views would have been regarded with much less prejudice than they encountered at the time. He probably underrated the importance of the historical method. But in their present form there is a freshness and individuality about his writings which add greatly to their value as a stimulant to thought upon the profoundest of philosophical themes. No student of philosophy or theology can afford to remain ignorant of what he has written. Indeed, it will not be surprising if the future shows, that President Finney's greatest service to the world, was that which he was most reluctant to enter upon, viz. the production of a systematic treatise on biblical theology, — a treatise in which the truths of rationalism and mysticism are equally present, and their errors avoided; and in which logic and Christian experience are equally yoked together.

[1] See Autobiography of Lyman Beecher, Vol. ii. p. 91.

[2] See Congregational Quarterly for April 1876, p. 247.

ARTICLE V.

IDENTIFICATION OF SUCCOTH AND PENUEL.

BY REV. SELAH MERRILL, D.D., ANDOVER, MASS.

These places are mentioned in the Bible in connection with such men and events as to make their identification a matter of peculiar interest and importance. Although the references to them are clear and explicit, it has at the same time required an unusual amount of study and research to find a definite and reliable clew to their location. And this remark applies with equal force to other sites east of the Jordan of which we have notices in the Bible. If sometimes there appears to be confusion in such biblical notices, it arises not from ignorance or carelessness on the part of the sacred writers, but from our inability to obtain the key to the topography of the country at the particular periods of history when those writers lived. The number of puzzling questions in biblical geography that have already been solved by patient research is something remarkable, and encourages us to hope that by a thorough exploration of the country we shall be able to locate with absolute or approximate certainty the larger part of those biblical sites which still remain unidentified. Among the places that have been brought to light by recent and careful researches carried on in the country itself I may mention, besides Succoth and Penuel, Horonaim, the Cities of the Plain, Ephron of the Maccabees, "the land of Tob" where Jephthah was living when called to be captain and judge of Israel, Golan, "the wood of Ephraim" where the battle took place between the forces of David and Absalom, Pella, Jabesh Gilead, and Tishbi the home of Elijah. It is hoped that the details with regard to the identification of these and other places will, when published, prove of interest to the students of the Bible.

I dislike to say anything that shall appear like a criticism of so eminent a biblical scholar as Dr. Grove, yet it seems to me that in his Article in Smith's Bible Dictionary he has misunderstood Burckhardt's account of "Sukkot." Burckhardt (p. 345, note) says: "Near where we crossed, to the south, are the ruins of Sukkot." There can be no doubt that the whole paragraph from which this sentence is taken refers to the west bank of the Jordan; for it begins with the Lake of Tiberias, and ends with Jericho. Dr. Grove, however, supposes that Burckhardt refers to a place on the east side of the river. But it will be noticed that in his text (pp. 345, 346), after he has crossed the river, he gives with great minuteness the names of all wadies, ruins, and tombs between the crossing and the Zerka or Jabbok, and among them Sukkot is not mentioned. Burckhardt did not himself visit Sukkot. Dr. Robinson and Mr. Van de Velde visited a place on the west of the river, about ten miles south of Beisan, which they call "Sakut," which, instead of being as Dr. Grove thinks, "entirely distinct both in name and position from that of Burckhardt," is certainly identical with it. In like manner, the Rev. W. Wright, formerly a missionary in Damascus, in some popular papers upon the Hauran in the Leisure Hour for 1874 (p. 599, col. 1), makes a similar mistake, and takes it for granted that Burckhardt's Sukkot was on the east of the river. He says: "Jerome places Succoth east of the Jordan, opposite Scythopolis, at the place where Burckhardt found its ruins." But in reality, Burckhardt found no ruins, and the place he heard of was on the west of the river.

But, independently of these writers, neither of whom has been on the ground, I can testfy that in the portion of the valley opposite Beisan there are no ruins, nor, further, are there anywhere on the eastern side of the river any ruins bearing the name of Succoth, or any name that might correspond to it. In the division of the country under Joshua (xiii. 27) Succoth was allotted to the tribe of Gad, and hence must certainly have been on the east of the river. Jerome

seems to know of a town named Succoth which was "beyond the Jordan."[1] The Talmud, in its physical divisions of Perea, adopts those of the Bible, namely, "Beth Haram, Beth Nimrah, Succoth, and Zaphon," which makes Succoth a district as well as a town, and fixes it on the east of the river (Neubauer, pp. 247, 433). Again, in Gideon's pursuit of Zebah and Zalmunna, it was after he had crossed the Jordan, going south and east, that he came to Succoth (Judges viii. 5–17).

It has seemed necessary to state the foregoing facts carefully and in detail, because Dr. Robinson has, carelessly perhaps, given the weight of his great name to the groundless theory that the Succoth of the Bible was on the west of the Jordan, whereas it is certainly on the east side of that river.

Dr. Grove is right in saying that the "Sakut" of Robinson is too far north, and entirely out of the way of any route leading from the Jabbok to Shechem. This writer's conclusion (derived from Gen. xxxii. 30; xxxiii. 18) that Succoth lay between Penuel (on the Jabbok) and Shechem is correct, and also important, and if borne in mind will help us in its identification.

The next step in this discussion is to notice the physical divisions of the valley east of the river, as stated in the Bible (Josh. xiii. 27), and repeated, as I have already said, in the Talmud; namely, "Beth Haram, Beth Nimrah, and Succoth." Beth Haram is the vast oasis of the Shittim plain at the north end of the Dead Sea. Beth Nimrah is the oasis immediately north of the Shittim plain, and which appears to be really a part of it when looked at from the neighboring hills. From wady Nimrin northward to the Jabbok there are no fountains or streams, and that portion of the valley is entirely desolate and barren, except during the rainy season. About the mouth of the Jabbok there is a plain of great extent and fertility; and this is the Succoth region of the Talmud; and here, if anywhere, we are to seek for the Succoth of Jacob and Gideon and Jerome.

[1] Quaest. in Gen. xxxiii. 17.

But have we any clew as to the precise locality which bore the name of Succoth? I think we have, and, further, I think that this interesting biblical site can be identified beyond any reasonable dispute. The Talmud states definitely that in its time Succoth was called "Ter'alah," and in the great plain north of the Jabbok, about one mile from the stream and about three miles from where the river leaves the hills, there is a large mound or tell which bears the name of Der 'ala. The letters correspond to those of the Hebrew word, except that *t* in Hebrew becomes *d* in Arabic — a change of very frequent occurrence. There are places in other sections of the country bearing the name of Der 'ala; but in this case, the fact of its being found in this particular locality, considered in connection with the testimony of the Talmud, is more than a coincidence. Adjoining this tell is a smaller one — a kind of shoulder — on which there are at present some ruins with a few columns. The principal mound is so thickly covered with broken pottery that it could be raked into heaps. I picked up, as I passed over the tell, as many as twenty specimens of different kinds and qualities of pottery. On one side of the tell some animal had burrowed, which enabled me to examine the soil for at least four feet below the surface; and I was surprised to find that the broken pottery extended all through it. I was anxious to make some cuttings into this mound, but had neither time nor means to do so. The Bedawin living in that region have a tradition that a city existed upon that mound in ancient times. This I mention incidentally, attaching to it no special weight.

Among the facts brought to light in this region during my researches is that of a ford or crossing of the Jabbok some distance to the east of Tel Der 'ala, but before the hills are reached, which bears the name of "Mashra'a Canaan," i.e. *Canaan's Crossing*. Canaan may here be a man's name or the name of the country, and the words may mean "the crossing which leads to Canaan." But either way this discovery is very interesting and important, because, as I shall

soon show, the course of the Jabbok is the only feasible route by which the caravans of commerce and the swarms of Midianites from the east and south could reach the country of the Hebrews on the west of the Jordan.

If we examine the account of Gideon's pursuit of the Midianites, we may get some hints as to where we should look for Penuel. After their terrible midnight rout in the valley of Jezreel, a remnant escaped, amounting to about fifteen thousand men. These Gideon pursued. "And Gideon came to Jordan and passed over, he and the three hundred men that were with him, faint, yet pursuing them. And he said unto the men of Succoth, Give, I pray you, loaves of bread unto the people that follow me, for they be faint, and I am pursuing after Zebah and Zalmunna, kings of Midian. And the men of Succoth said, Are the hands of Zebah and Zalmunna now in thine hand, that we should give bread unto thine army? And Gideon said, Therefore, when the Lord hath delivered Zebah and Zalmunna into mine hand, then will I tear your flesh with the thorns of the wilderness and with briers. And he went up thence to Penuel, and spake unto them likewise; and the men of Penuel answered him as the men of Succoth had answered him. And he spake also unto the men of Penuel, saying, When I come again in peace, I will break down this tower" (Judges viii. 4–9).

These "children of the East" keep to the lowlands, plains, and the good roads. They come down from the deserts of Arabia; they follow the course of the Jabbok to the Jordan; they move up the Jordan valley till nearly opposite Beisan, and then cross, and spread themselves, "like grasshoppers for multitude," over the great Esdraelon plain. After the rout just referred to, they retrace their steps, hotly pursued by one of the heroes of Hebrew history. Gideon crosses the Jordan by one of the fords near Beisan, hurries down the Jordan valley as far as Succoth, and halts there to rest and refresh his weary, but resolute band. The men of Succoth reason with themselves: "We live on the great army route between Canaan and the East, and it will not do for us

to show a decided friendship for Gideon; for if we do, and he is unsuccessful, we shall bring upon our heads the terrible vengeance of the Midianites. Our own safety demands that we be strictly neutral." The men of Penuel, living on the same great thoroughfare, were actuated by similar motives, and likewise refused to assist Gideon.

It will be noticed, from verse 8 of the chapter just quoted, that Gideon *goes up* from Succoth, evidently leaving the Jordan and turning into the mountains to the east. But we know with absolute certainty, from the account of Jacob's return (Gen. xxxii.), that Penuel was somewhere on the line of the Jabbok; and hence we are justified in concluding that Gideon on this occasion followed the course of that stream.

The impression that I get from reading this eighth chapter of Judges is, that Penuel was at no great distance from Succoth, although there are no certain hints to prove this beyond dispute. The points that have been hitherto established with certainty are: 1. that Penuel is on the line of the Jabbok; and 2. that below Penuel, near where the stream leaves the hills, there is a ford called "Canaan's crossing." It is also established beyond any reasonable doubt that Succoth is situated a little to the west of this crossing and north of the Jabbok. So far everything seems to corroborate Dr. Grove's conclusion, noticed above, that Succoth must be somewhere between Penuel and Shechem. If Succoth is where I have placed it, it will be on the direct route between the Jabbok and Nablûs, or Shechem, by way of the Damia ford.

But we have still an interesting hint with regard to Penuel in the life of Jeroboam. After the division of the kingdom "Jeroboam built Shechem in Mount Ephraim, and dwelt therein; and went out from thence, and built Penuel" (1 Kings xii. 25). It will be remembered that Gideon, in his threat to the men of Penuel, says: "I will break down this tower," — as if a tower or fortress were a principal feature of the place. This leads to the suggestion, which is confirmed by all the circumstances connected with the case,

that Penuel was a frontier fortress, built on the great thoroughfare from the East for the purpose of repelling invasions from that quarter. When Jeroboam comes into possession of his kingdom he feels the need of a defence on that side, and hence one of his first acts is "to go out" and rebuild Penuel, which lay almost directly east from his capital. Otherwise invading bands or hosts might pour down the valley of the Jabbok, cross the Jordan by the Damia ford, and sweep up what is now called wady Farî'a, and attack him in his royal residence. The rebuilding of Penuel was evidently of such importance to the nation as to demand the personal attention of the king, and such as to receive special mention in the annals of his reign.

In the account of Jacob's journey after he had parted with Esau it is said: "And Jacob came to Succoth, and built him an house, and made booths for his cattle" (Gen. xxxiii. 17). Even to this day the fertile fields along the mouth of the Jabbok are the favorite resort of the powerful tribes which occupy the eastern plains; for here they find abundant pasture for their numerous flocks and herds. They could not go south of the Jabbok, and very seldom do they go very far north of it; but if they desire to find pasture for their cattle they go directly to the Succoth region. The same physical conditions exist now that existed in Jacob's time; and, coming from the East with his sheep and cattle and camels, he went at once to Succoth, where he abode perhaps for a considerable period.

I have alluded to the valley of the Jabbok as being the main thoroughfare from the eastern plains to the land of Canaan. There is more evidence for this than perhaps would occur to the casual reader. When Gideon pursued the Midianites from Succoth up through the eastern hills on to the plains beyond, he "went up," it is said, "by the way of them that dwelt in tents,"[1] i.e. went up by the route which such people usually took — as if they were confined to one route, or had, at least, a favorite route by which to ap-

[1] Judges viii. 11: וַיַּעַל גִּדְעוֹן דֶּרֶךְ הַשֹּׁכְנִי בָאֳהָלִים.

proach the country on the west of the Jordan. The apparently incidental circumstance which the words just quoted record did not assume in my mind the importance which they now have until I had been back and forth over all that region several times, and followed the whole course of the Jabbok from its source to where it enters the Jordan. North of the Jabbok there is no other possible route until the valley of ʿAjlûn is reached; and this is altogether out of the question, if considered as a thoroughfare for the "children of the of the East" on their way to Canaan. South of the Jabbok, again, as far as the line of the Dead Sea and Hasban, there is no feasible route by which to descend from the eastern plains to the Jordan valley. This mountainous region is intersected by several deep wadies, along which paths lead, to be sure, but which could never have been followed by large caravans, and least of all used as military routes by the hosts that made their periodical invasions of the West. Besides, I am of the opinion that all this hilly region was in ancient times clothed with forests, which would preclude the passage of any "host" on its way to Canaan. This region is now in many parts covered with a thick growth of pine and oak, and the whole of it would in a hundred years be covered with a dense forest were not the young trees constantly destroyed. On the whole, I judge that the phrase "the way of those dwelling in tents" refers to a well-known route that had been followed for ages. Often these eastern invaders not only made the highways in Canaan unsafe, — as we learn from the Book of Judges, — but rendered it almost impossible for the Hebrews to cultivate their land or to gather any crops. "Because of the Midianites the children of Israel made them the dens which are in the mountains, and caves, and strongholds. And so it was, when Israel had sown, that the Midianites came up, and the Amalekites, and the children of the East, even they came up against them: And they encamped against them, and destroyed the increase of the earth till thou come to Gaza; and left no sustenance for Israel, neither sheep nor ox nor ass. For they came up

with their cattle and their tents. And they came as grasshoppers for multitude; for both they and their camels were without number; and they entered into the land to destroy it. And Israel was greatly impoverished because of the Midianites; and the children of Israel cried unto the Lord" (Judges vi. 2–6). The terrible distress at a certain period here pictured was repeated, with less severity perhaps, at intervals during many centuries of the Hebrew history.

With regard to their route it may be said, 1. That such a a people as are here under consideration do not, when they move in large masses with their flocks and herds, go over difficult hills if there is a better road, even if this should be somewhat longer. 2. From a thorough personal examination of the country, I think I can say with truth that neither to the north nor to the south of the Jabbok is there any other feasible route by which to enter Canaan from the plains and deserts of Arabia. 3. Along the course of the Jabbok these people were sure of a good and easy road for themselves and their camels. 4. Here they would always be sure of grass for their flocks. 5. Here they would always be sure of abundance of water.

It is on this great thoroughfare that we suppose Penuel, a frontier tower or fortress, to have been built, in the earliest times, in order to repel invasions from the East. Jeroboam, as we have seen, felt the need of defence on that side, and therefore he rebuilt Penuel. This frontier fortress may have played a more important part in the history of those troublous times than we at present have any conception of. How many times the garrison was successful in repelling invasions, or how many times they must yield to superior numbers, and allow the desert hosts to sweep on to plunder their fatherland, we cannot even guess.

But can Penuel itself be located with any certainty? In my judgment the possible places that can represent Penuel are reduced to a single locality, which I will proceed to describe:

About one hour and twenty minutes, or say four miles,

above Canaan's ford or crossing, following the course of the stream, there is one of the most singular formations in Syria. At this point the valley is quite narrow, and its walls are precipitous. In a line with the valley, the course of which is from east to west, there spring from its lowest level and rise to a height of two hundred and fifty feet *two conical hills*. One of these sugar-loaf hills is on one side of the stream, and the other is on the other side, and the stream winds about them in a peculiar manner as will be seen by the accompanying chart. The sides of these mounds are steep,



and it took me fifteen minutes to reach the summit of one of them. These hills are called at present Tulul edh-Dhahab, or "Hills of Gold." The inhabitants of the region can give no account of the origin of the name. They speak of a place on the side of one of the tells from which a strong current of air issues at times; but I did not remain there long enough to investigate the matter. The prevailing stone or rock upon the tells is a yellow sandstone, which one might fancy to resemble gold, and the modern name may have arisen from this fact. On both these tells there are extensive and ancient ruins. The one to the west is larger than the other, and has upon it more ruins; but the ruins upon the one to the east are remarkable. They consist of the ruins of buildings on the summit, and of a long wall of massive stones which runs from the summit to the foot of the mound on the southwest

side. The hill at this side is so steep that it is a marvel to me how the wall could have been built. In addition to this wall there is, about half way up the mound, or a little less, a great platform, running along the side of the hill for several hundred feet, which is supported by a wall of great strength and solidity. In some places this wall is fifteen and twenty feet in height, and one portion of it is still quite perfect for a distance of over one hundred feet. The walls which remain have a substantial appearance, and the platform referred to was probably the foundation of a castle or fortress. Whatever the nature of the structures once standing here may have been, they could have been built, considering the nature of the ground and the size of the stones, only at enormous expense. The work is certainly not Moslem, nor does it appear to be Roman; while the great unhewn stones would seem to classify it more properly with the ancient Cyclopean work, which still exists in a very few places — perhaps half a dozen — in the country east of the Jordan. This, if anywhere on the Jabbok, would be the most suitable place for a frontier fortress, and such, we have reason to believe, was Penuel. A fact which seems to indicate that this may have been Penuel is that on the whole line of this great thoroughfare which followed the Jabbok there are no ruins, except ruined mills here and there, until Kalat Zerka is reached, fifty or sixty miles from the mouth of the river. At this point the Haj road touches the Zerka, and this castle was built for the protection and convenience of the pilgrims to Mecca. If this is Penuel, the ruins are certainly such as would justify Jeroboam in recording in his public annals the fact of his having rebuilt the place.[1]

[1] Prof. Kiepert on his "Neue Wandkarte" (1874), and his "Neue Handkarte" (1875), puts down the word Peniel — followed in each case by an interrogation mark — among the hills at some distance south of the Zerka; and this fact has led an anonymous writer in the New York Independent for July 26, 1877, to suppose that Penuel is to be sought for at that point. But if this writer had read my Report on the Jordan Valley in the "Fourth Statement of the Palestine Exploration Society," or examined my map which accompanies the report, he would have learned that all the valley, including the foot-hills, between Wady Nimrin and the Zerka is a barren region, and destitute of ruins. I locate Penuel

What I have called the "Succoth region" answers very appropriately to the "valley of Succoth," in Ps. lx. (repeated in cviii.). This Psalm appears to refer to some victory, or to the wresting some portions of the fatherland out of the hands of their enemies. Putting Succoth where there are valid reasons for locating it, the order of places is very natural; namely, "Shechem, the valley of Succoth [in the direct line towards Gilead], Gilead, and Manasseh."

A theory hardly worth noticing has been advanced, which proposes to identify the Jabbok with wady Yabis. But in reply it may be said, that Eusebius and Jerome locate the Jabbok between Gerash and Amman, places that are perfectly well-known. Again, Josephus, in describing the boundaries of that portion of the Amorite territory which constituted the kingdom of Sihon, says that it naturally resembled an island, being bounded by rivers on the south, north, and west (Ant. 4, 5, 2); and he might have added, on the east, as well. The river Jabbok formed the northern boundary. How would any writer pass over two vast wadies like those of the Zerka and the ʿAjlûn, and mention the Yabis, — which is smaller than either of these, and contains but a comparatively small stream, — as a "river" forming the northern boundary of a province which (we know from other sources) at no point, except in the Jordan valley, extended so far north? Further, the word "Yabis" is well known to be a relic of the Hebrew word "Jabesh." Besides, the theory that the Yabis is the ancient Jabbok is, in a word, simply impossible.

With regard to the name Penuel or Peniel, I am pretty well convinced, since I have been over the ground and examined the strange physical conformation there existing, that it is connected in its origin with that remarkable phenomenon. Dr. Grove has already anticipated me in referring

a few miles west of the Burma crossing, in the valley of the Jabbok, and on the stream itself; while Kiepert's doubtful Peniel is, on the latest of the two maps just noticed, fully ten miles away in a straight line, and twelve or more by any available path, and on the south side of Jebel Mesara. Furthermore, Prof. Kiepert has told me himself that he had no certain data for placing the name where he has.

to a similar fact occurring in another section of the country: "The promontory of Ras esh Shukah, on the coast of Syria above Beirût, was formerly called "Theouprosopon," *face of God*, probably a translation of Peniel, or its Phoenician equivalent" (Smith's Bible Dictionary, Article *Peniel*). An Oriental people would easily persuade themselves that such a place as the Hills of Gold marked the site of some special manifestation of Deity, and would give it a name accordingly. And as the same name is frequently given a second time to one and the same place, the foregoing remarks can be made without invalidating or obscuring in the slightest degree the truth and beauty of that incident in the life of Jacob where the process of giving this particular name was a second time repeated.

From the ruins and summits of these strange tells, as my eye followed the course of the valley east and west, I felt that I was looking down upon the very route along which the ancient "sons of the East" passed with their camels, — a wild throng from the desert, on their way to the land of Canaan; or by which they returned, either laden with plunder gathered from the Hebrews on the west of the Jordan, or, as sometimes happened, a fugitive rabble — the mere wreck of a host, — beaten and ruined by the bravery of some Old Testament hero. Succoth and Penuel are interesting places in the geography of Palestine because they are associated with the life of Jacob. Here at Penuel the patriarch wrestled all night with a strange messenger, and at sunrise he passed on to meet his brother. Esau came from the south along this very road, and somewhere not far from this spot, probably, was the scene of the famous meeting and reconciliation between them. It was at Succoth that Jacob rested for a season on his way to Canaan after his injured father-in-law and brother had been appeased and the offending one had by them been forgiven. Succoth and Penuel are associated, again, in the life of Gideon, and the details of this event suggest to the careful student many valuable lessons.

ARTICLE VI.

NOTE ON GENESIS XI. 26.

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"AND Terah lived seventy years, and begat Abram, Nahor, and Haran." It is plain, upon the face of this statement, that it is in some way or other a condensed expression of the facts. No one supposes that the three sons of Terah were born at one birth, and the subsequent narrative gives ground for supposing a considerable difference of age between them. The genealogy of the sons of Noah has already shown that priority in age is not necessarily indicated by priority in the order of names: Shem being named first not because he was the oldest, but because he was the ancestor of the chosen line. The general understanding of the text has been that Abram was the youngest of the three sons of Terah, the eldest of whom was begotten by Terah at the age of seventy.

Terah (vs. 32) lived to the age of two hundred and five. After his death mention is made of the departure of Abram from Haran at the age of seventy-five. It is expressly asserted by Stephen (Acts vii. 4) that Abram's departure actually took place after the death of Terah. By Alford and others it is vigorously maintained that this is a chronological blunder on the part of Stephen; but from his familiarity with Jewish history, and from the circumstances under which he spoke, it might have been assumed that his statement was at least in accordance with the current Jewish opinion of the day. There need be no uncertainty, however, upon this point; for Philo (*De Migr. Abrah.* § 32, P. 325 A, ed. Col. 1613) is quite as positive in the statement as Stephen. Have we any data at this day to show that Philo and Stephen were both mistaken about this fact in the history of their

ancestors? It is quite common now to say that we have; and we propose to examine the evidence.

In Gen. xvii. 15, 16, when Abraham was ninety-nine, God promised him a son by his wife Sarah, who was only ten years his junior. This thing seemed incredible to Abraham (vs. 17), on account of the age both of himself and of Sarah, and he pleaded earnestly for Ishmael. Sarah also (xviii. 12, 13) was convinced of the impossibility of the fulfilment of the promise, and is told that even this is not too hard for the Lord. In the New Testament, also, in Rom. iv. 18–21; Heb. xi. 11, 12, strong emphasis is placed upon the fact that the birth of Isaac was out of the course of nature; and Abraham's faith is eulogized, because "he considered not his own body now dead (when he was about an hundred years old), neither yet the deadness of Sarah's womb." And this faith thus shown is made, in both these epistles, the basis of important exhortation and doctrinal argument. But how could the birth of a child when he was a hundred have seemed so impossible to Abraham, and so contrary to nature, if he had himself been born when his father was one hundred and thirty? At first view, this consideration seems to settle the question, and to convict Stephen of a chronological error, and his Jewish contemporaries of knowing less of the detail of the history of their fathers than we are able to ascertain at the present day. Only in such case it is very remarkable that Paul should have based his argument on the contrary supposition without noticing the error, and especially that this should have been done in the Epistle *πρὸς Ἑβραίους*. If the facts which have been mentioned were all that bear on the case, there might seem some reason for the lecture that Alford reads to those who follow the chronology of Stephen, and thus, "from motives however good, begin to handle the word of God deceitfully" (Alf. in Acts vii. 4).

There is really a serious difficulty in putting the parts of the narrative together; but it arises from the story in Genesis itself, and is not changed by the views taken of it by Stephen and Paul. Let us look at the facts as they appear there.

The age of Abraham at the promise of Isaac is distinctly said to be ninety-nine (xvii. 1, 24), and at his birth one hundred (xxi. 5); and there can be no question of his opinion as to the probability of his having a son at that age, or of his wife's bearing one (xvii. 17). Sarah was at least equally incredulous; and it is distinctly said of her that she had already passed "the change of life" (xviii. 11, 12). Nevertheless, as nothing is "too hard for the Lord," the promise was duly fulfilled, and Isaac was born.

Thirty-seven years rolled away, and Sarah died, at the age of one hundred and twenty-seven, Abraham being now one hundred and thirty-seven (xxiii. 1). After her death Abraham sent his servant to Mesopotamia to take a wife for Isaac from among his kindred. He successfully accomplished his mission, and brought back Rebecca. "And Isaac brought her into his mother Sarah's tent, and took Rebekah, and she became his wife; and he loved her: and Isaac was comforted *after his mother's death*" (xxiv. 67). Immediately after this we read: "Then again Abraham took a wife, and her name was Keturah. And she bare him" six sons (xxv. 1, 2). If the story be taken in the order in which it stands, Abraham must have been at least one hundred and forty-seven when the last of these was born, for Isaac was forty when he married (xxv. 20); and yet there is nothing said of this being out of the course of nature, nor do the circumstances render it at all likely that the birth of these sons was miraculous. Two or three different explanations have been given of this. The one most common among modern expositors is, that the supernatural renewal of Abraham's natural vigor before the birth of Isaac continued in its effects for more than forty years, and accounts for his abundant posterity through Keturah. This is, of course, pure hypothesis, and all that can be said of it is that it is contrary to the analogy of the working of the supernatural that a miracle should extend so greatly beyond the purpose for which it was wrought. Another supposition is that of a portion of the Jewish commentators, which has been incorporated in

the Targums of Jonathan and of Jerusalem, that Keturah is identical with Hagar — it being supposed that she was recalled by Abraham after the death of Sarah. In verse 6, however, the *concubines* of Abraham are mentioned in the plural, and in 1 Chron. i. 28–33 the sons of Keturah are distinguished not only from Isaac, but also from Ishmael. Setting aside this hypothesis, there remains another, — that Abraham had taken Keturah during the lifetime of Sarah, but the mention of the fact was deferred to avoid interrupting the story of Sarah and her son. This supposition is perfectly consistent with the language of the original of xxv. 1, and such going back from the close of one completed story to take up the thread of another which occurred in its midst is common enough in the historical books of Scripture. But admitting it, does it remove the difficulty? Abraham was still childless just before he took Hagar (xv. 2). His taking Keturah must be subsequent to this. He was eighty-six (xvi. 16) when "Hagar bare Ishmael." Now, as he had six sons by Keturah, the last could hardly have been born before he was ninety-three, and the interval between ninety-three and ninety-nine is not sufficient to explain the language of the Old Testament in regard to the supposed impossibility of his begetting children, nor that of the New, in regard to the deadness of his body, and his hoping for the promise of posterity "against hope." The difficulty, therefore, still remains in the narrative of Genesis itself, without reference to the language of Stephen.

Let us look at the matter from another point of view. The term of human life, and consequently the term of possible paternity, lessened from the time of Noah down, gradually on the whole, but by somewhat irregular steps. Noah's children were born when he was five hundred. Shem was one hundred when he begat Arphaxad, but lived after this, begetting sons and daughters, five hundred years (Gen. xi. 10, 11). We have no means of knowing definitely at what age his last child was born; but the narrative leaves us to infer that he was several hundred years old. After this the

patriarchs began to have children at a much earlier period, varying from Salah's "thirty years" (vs. 14) and Nahor's "nine and twenty years" (vs. 24) to Terah's seventy and Abram's eighty-six years. Isaac was sixty at paternity (xxv. 26), and Jacob about forty-eight (xxvi. 34, with xxvii.; xxviii.; xxix. 20). But it is recorded of most of the earlier ones that they continued to live for long periods, and to beget sons and daughters; so that Terah's having a son at one hundred and thirty, or Abraham one at one hundred, seems quite in accordance with the general course of the story. Jacob, Abraham's grandson, must have been nearly eighty when Benjamin was born. The conditions of human life, therefore, at this period, are represented as such that there would have been nothing remarkable in the age of paternity, either in Terah or in Abraham. Terah, according to the genealogy, was the ninth, Abraham the tenth, and Jacob the twelfth generation from Noah. As already noticed, Noah had children at five hundred, Jacob at near eighty, giving an average diminution in the age of paternity of about thirty-five years. This would make it possible for Abraham to have had children at one hundred and fifty and Terah at one hundred and eighty-five. Or, if we make the more probable supposition that the age diminished more rapidly at first and more slowly afterwards, and were to take half this amount for the later diminution, still it would allow Abraham to have become a father (relatively to Jacob) at above one hundred, and Terah at very nearly the age supposed. We are brought, therefore, to the same conclusion as before — that the difficulty is inherent in the narrative, and is not affected by the statements of Stephen and Philo.

There is still one other point of view to be taken as regards Sarah. The improbability of her bearing a child in her old age is made especially prominent both in (Genesis xvii. 17; xviii. 12), and in the New Testament (Rom. iv. 19; Heb. xi. 11). Was this because child-bearing at her time of life was an unheard of thing among her contemporaries? Or was it on account of some peculiarity individual to herself?

There is quite plain evidence upon this point. She was ninety when Isaac was born; yet it was within the previous year, apparently after the actual conception of Isaac, that the strange incident happened in connection with Abimelech king of Gerar. The course of events is as follows: In chapter xviii. the three superhuman beings appear to Abraham in the plains of Mamre and promise him the birth of Isaac, "according to the time of life." Whatever may be critically determined to be the exact sense of this phrase, it must mean within a year. In the latter part of the chapter is the account of Abraham's pleading for Sodom, and in the following chapter the narrative of the destruction of the cities of the plain. At the very opening of chapter xx. Abraham went to sojourn in Gerar, and "said of Sarah his wife, She is my sister: and Abimelech, king of Gerar, sent and took Sarah." Then Abimelech is divinely warned of his error, and remonstrates with Abraham for his deceit; Abraham tries to excuse himself (vs. 11) by reason of the danger of his life on Sarah's account. Immediately afterwards (xxi. 1, 2) follows the account of the birth of Isaac. It is clear, therefore, that Sarah must still have retained her striking beauty, and that there was nothing apparent to a stranger, either in her person or in her age, which in those times should have prevented her being a desirable acquisition to Abimelech's harem. Yet at this time she must have been actually pregnant with Isaac. Certainly the difficulties here are compressed into quite too narrow a compass to be affected either by the statement of Stephen or the assertion of Philo.

The only solution seems to lie in the fact that the incapacity for children was personal to Abraham and Sarah, not belonging ordinarily to men and women generally of that period at their age. In regard to Sarah it is expressly said — and the mention of it seems to imply that it was something singular — that "it ceased to be with Sarah after the manner of women" (xviii. 11). If a similar constitutional change be supposed in Abraham, we shall then have a reason which accounts for the incredulity of both in regard to the

birth of Isaac. It is a reason, however, known only to themselves; to their contemporaries there would be nothing strange in their having a child.

This view is further strengthened by the fact that after the conception of Isaac Sarah lived thirty-eight years, and Abraham seventy-six. They had therefore advanced somewhat less than two thirds of the way through the whole term of their lives, and, according to the ordinary proportion of life in our own day, should still have been able to have children, unless prevented by special personal hinderance.

The objection to this view is obvious in the stress which is laid upon the fact of their *old age*, both in Genesis and in the New Testament; but this is removed if it be understood of old age as manifested to themselves by changes prematurely taking place within themselves; in other words, of old age *quoad hoc*. The point of the argument in the Epistles to the Romans and the Hebrews is, that Abraham and Sarah were in a condition in which they could not have a child in the ordinary course of nature; the same thing is emphatically said in Genesis. Yet it is plain from the considerations which have been adduced, that this would not ordinarily have been the case with their contemporaries at their age. The difficulty was therefore personal.

There is, then, no reason to question the accuracy of Stephen's statement, or to change the order of the narrative in Genesis by which Abraham is made to have left Haran after the death of Terah.

ARTICLE VII.

IS ΠΑΡΘΕΝΟΣ THE CORRECT RENDERING OF עלמה IN ISAIAH VII. 14?

BY REV. HENRY FERGUSON, EXETER, N.H.

THE answer to this question must depend upon the usage of the Hebrew language and upon the etymology of the word itself. We also need to inquire what is the necessary meaning of *παρθένος*. The importance of the question lies, of course, in its connection with the prophetic sign given by the prophet to Ahaz, and which is applied by Matthew to the conception of our Lord in the womb of the blessed Virgin Mary.

The Septuagint in this passage translates the Hebrew word עַלְמָה by *παρθένος*, and it is repeated by Matthew. It is not our purpose to enter at all into the general argument, or into the question as to exactly what the prophetic sign consisted of, but simply to investigate the meaning and usage of the Hebrew word, as a purely philological question.

עַלְמָה is derived, according to its form, from the root עלם, and is the most simple derivative form, corresponding to the Arabic *nomen actionis*, and usually known as a Segholate. This root when pointed עָלַם has the signification of *hiding, concealing*, and occurs very frequently in the Hebrew literature. From it are derived the words עוֹלָם (עֹלָם), עֲלוּמִים, תַּעֲלֻמָה, Chald. עָלַם. But there is another class of derivatives which cannot be ascribed to this verb, and which accordingly are attributed to a root עָלַם, which, though not appearing in its verbal form in Hebrew, does exist in the cognate languages, while these do not possess the verb עָלַם with the sense of *to hide* (though the Chald., Sam., Syriac, and Ethiopic have derivatives from it, with the senses of *aeternitas* or *mundus*). Such words are עֶלֶם *a young man* (1 Sam. xvii. 56; xx. 22), עַלוּמִים *youth* (Job xx. 11; xxxiii. 25; Ps. lxxxix. 45; Isa. liv. 4). עַלְמָה, the word in question, the general meaning of which is *young woman* (Gen. xxiv. 43; Ex. ii. 8; Ps. lxviii. 25; Prov. xxx. 19; Cant. i. 3; vi. 8; Isa. vii. 14). עַלָמוֹת, probably plural of preceding, a musical term answer-

ing to our *soprano* or *treble* (1 Chron. xv. 20; Ps. xlvi. 1). These all have the sense of youth and of youthful vigor, and the meaning accordingly attributed to the root is that of *growing up, becoming strong, coming to puberty;* cf. אָלַם, חָלַם.

This root appears in Arabic under the form غَلَمَ *coëundi cupidus libidinosus eoque velut furibundus fuit* [*camelus*] IV. *Ad venerem incendit c. a.* VIII. *Coëundi Cupidus, libidinosus fuit* (Freytag, Lex. Arab.).[1] From this verb come the derivatives غَلِمٌ *libidinosus*, غُلَامٌ *adolescens* (masc.), غُلَامَةٌ *adolescens* (fem.), غُلْمَةٌ *libido venerea*, غَيْلَمٌ *adolescens amplus medio capite multisque crinibus praeditus.*

In Syriac it also appears with much the same meaning, e.g. ܥܠܡ *juvenis factus est, juvenescere fecit.* Ethpa. *adolevit*, from whence come ܥܠܡܐ (i.q. Heb. עֶלֶם) *adolescens* (masc.), ܥܠܡܬܐ *adolescens* (fem.), ܥܠܘܡܬܐ *pueritia, adolescentia*, ܥܘܠܡܐ *adolescentia, juvenilitas.*

In Chaldee עֲלַם = *roboratus est, roboravit se, fortis fuit*, עוּלָם = *puer lactens, adultus ad ministerium aptus*, עַלְמְתָא = *adolescentula*, עַלְמוּת = *adolescentia.*

In Samaritan the verb is used only in the sense *connivit*, but the nouns 𐤏𐤋𐤌, 𐤀𐤏𐤋𐤌 (equivalent to עֶלֶם and עַלְמָה) are found, and also 𐤏𐤋𐤌 *homo*, and 𐤔𐤏𐤋𐤌𐤄 *puer, servus.*

In Phoenician (Punic), according to the testimony of Jerome, **Alma** was the common word for *maiden.* The same root is found in the Maltese **hlym** = *adolescens.*

The meaning, therefore, by the etymology, would seem to be *a young woman at the age of puberty*, with no implication whether married or not (so Abulwalides, "העלמה est puella et adolescentula sive virgo est sive non virgo est"). The old derivation from עָלַם *to hide, to conceal*, = *the secluded one*, is extremely improbable, and has no philological parallel in the cognate languages, and is now very generally given up by scholars. Cf. Hengstenberg, Christol-

[1] Note. — The Arabic definitions in this Article are taken from Freytag's Smaller Lexicon (Halle, 1837), the Syriac, Samaritan, and Chaldee from Castle's Lexicon Heptaglotton.

ogy, i. p. 325; Delitzsch, Commentary on Isaiah, Vol. i. p. 217; Cheyne, p. 31.[1]

Let us now examine the usage among the Hebrews. It is to be regretted that there are so few instances of the occurrence of this word — only six in the whole Bible, besides the passage in question. However, the usage can be shown from these six to be upon the side of the meaning *maiden* or *virgin*.

The first passage is Gen. xxiv. 43: "Behold I stand by the well of water; and it shall come to pass that when the *'Almah* cometh forth," etc. Here the term is applied to Rebekah, who is expressly stated in vs. 16 to be a בְּתוּלָה. From this we gather two things: first, that עַלְמָה is used in this passage of a *virgin;* second, that it is not an equivalent of בְּתוּלָה; that is to say, it is not a specific term as the latter is. The LXX in this place translate it by *παρθένος*, the Targ. of Onkelos by עוּלֲמְתָא, Targ. Jonathan and Jerus. by רְבִיָא, the Syriac (Peschito) by ܥܠܡܬܐ, the Sam. by ⱷⱰⱱ, the Arabic by اَلْبَحَارِيَةُ. It is to be noted, however, that in verses 14, 16, 55 the Sept. translates נַעַר (K'ri נַעֲרָה) also by *παρθένος*, as it does also in xxxiv. 3 *bis*, and 3 Kings i. 2. It also occurs as a *var. lect.* Joel i. 8. These are the only examples of this translation of נַעֲרָה,

[1] Cf. per contra, Jerome, Comment. in Isaiah vii. 14. He translates עַלְמָה by *virgo*, and gives his reasons as follows: Quando autem dicitur, Dabit dominus ipse vobis signum, novem debet est atque mirabile, Sin autem juvencula vel puella, ut Judaei volunt, et non virgo pariat, quale signum potest appellari, cum hoc nomen aetatis sit non integritatis? Et revera, ut cum Judaeis conferamus pedem: et nequaquam contensioso fune praebamus eis risum nostrae imperitiae, virgo Hebraice בְּתוּלָה appellatur, quae in praesenti loco non scribitur, sed pro hoc verbum positum est עַלְמָה, quod praeter LXX qui posuerunt *ἡ παρθένος*, omnes adolescentulam transtulerunt. Porro עַלְמָה apud eos verbum ambiguum est, dicitur enim et adolescentula et abscondita, id est *ἀποκρυφός*. Unde et in titulo Psalmi ix., ubi in Hebraeo positum est עַלְמוּת caeteri interpretes transtulerunt pro adolescentia, quod LXX interpretati sunt, pro absconditis. Et in Genesi legimus, ubi Rebecca dicitur *alma*: Aquilam non adolescentulam, nec puellam sed absconditam transtulisse. Sunanimitis quoque mulier amisso filio, cum Helesei fuisset pedibus provoluta, et prohiberet eum Iezi, audit a propheta: Dimitte eam, quia in dolore est, et dominus abscondit a me. Pro eo quod in Latino dicitur, abscondit a me, in Hebraeo scriptum est הֶעְלִים מִמֶּנִּי. Ergo *alma*, non solum puella vel virgo; sed cum *ἐπιτάσει* virgo abscondita dicitur et secreta, quae nunquam virorum patuerit aspectibus, sed magna parentum diligentia custodita sit. Lingua quoque Punica, quae de Hebraeorum fontibus manare dicitur, proprie virgo *alma* appellatur."

it being rendered in other passages variously, sometimes by παῖς, sometimes by νεᾶνις, sometimes by κοράσιον.

2. Ex. ii. 8: "And the *'Almah* went and called the child's mother." Here used of Miriam, who at the birth of Moses can hardly have been married. Here the Sept. translates by νεᾶνις, Targum Onk., Syriac, and Arabic as above, Sam. ⳉⳀⳎⳍⳄⳇ, Vulg. *puella.*

3. Ps. lxviii. 25: "among them were the *'Alamoth* playing with timbrels." The passage illustrating this best is Ex. xv. 20 (see also 1 Sam. xviii. 7) where the corresponding word is נָשִׁים, and where Miriam — who was at that time at least eighty-five, and, according to Josephus, the wife of Hur — was the leader of the dance. Still the almost universal custom in the East confines these dancers and players on the timbrels to unmarried women. The Sept. here translates, as above, by νεάνιδες, the Targum paraphrases it with the expression נַעֲרָא צַהֲרָקָתָא, the Syriac has ܥܠܡܬܐ, the Arabic بَيْنَ ٱلْفِتْيَاتِ (*among the girls*), Ethiopic ፈትውያት (*virgines*),[1] Vulg. *juvenculae.*

4. Prov. xxx. 19: "and the way of a man with an *'Almah.*" Here the allusion is evidently to the sexual act, and particularly to the first sexual act of the *'Almah;* the case is expressly stated as different from the way of the adulterous woman. The force in this case seems to depend upon the *'Almah* being considered as a virgin. The Sept. does not give the passage; the Syriac misunderstands it, and translates it by ܥܠܡܬܐ, as if the text read עֲלוּמִים, Vulg. the same. The Targ. reads the text we have, and translates עוּלֲמְתָא.

5. Cant. i. 3: "therefore do the *'Alamoth* love thee." From this passage no decided conclusion can be drawn either way. It is perhaps best explained by vi. 8, which see below. Sept. νεάνιδες, Vulg. *adolescentulae,* Syriac ܥܠܡܬܐ, Arabic ٱلشَّبَابُ = *adolescentulae,* Ethiopic ፈትውያት = *virgines.*

6. Cant. vi. 7: "There are threescore queens and fourscore concubines, and *'Alamoth* without number." Here the parallel word in the next verse is בְּנוֹת, which proves nothing; but the mentioning of the *'Alamoth* as inhabitants of the harem, distinct from the queens (wives) and the concubines, shows that in this passage it

[1] The Ethiopic in the first two cases is translated *adolescentulae* by Walton. The rendering given is from Dillmann (Chrestomathia Aethiopica, Leipz. 1866).

must be applied to virgins. The Sept. here gives, as above, *νεάνιδες*, Vulg. *adolescentulae*, Syriac ܥܠܡܬܐ, Arabic اَلشَّوَابُّ = *adolescentulae*, Ethiopic ፈትውያን = *adolescentulae*.

From this examination we may see that in no passage is the usage decidedly against the meaning *virgin*, and in several that meaning seems to be required by the context. We come now to the passage in question.

7. Isa. vii. 14: "Behold an *'Almah* shall conceive, and shall bring forth a son," etc. Here the Sept. translates *παρθένος*, Aquila, Theod., Symm. *νεᾶνις*, Vulg. *virgo*,[1] Chald. עוּלֶמְתָּא, Syr. ܥܠܡܬܐ Arabic اَلْعَذْرِيُّ = *virgo*.

There seems at first sight to be a consensus among the versions here, with the exception of the version of the Chaldee paraphrast, which is indeterminate, and that of Aquila, Theod., and Symm.; but the fact must be acknowledged, that here the Sept., Syr., etc. have varied from their usual rendering, and have intentionally used *παρθένος* in place of *νεᾶνις*. This we have already seen was done in Genesis in the case of Rebekah, who was expressly stated to be a virgin. Accordingly we see that in the mind of the interpreters עַלְמָה had no such force as to render it impossible to translate it by *παρθένος*, and as they, in common with all Jews of their day, believed that the word here was used of a virgin, they translated it by the less general and more specific term, which is properly more nearly equivalent to בְּתוּלָה than to עַלְמָה. The word *παρθένος* does not necessarily convey the idea of an unspotted virgin,[2] but the usage is so general that we may call this sense almost universal. In the same manner *virgo*, from *vireo*, has no etymological meaning of chastity, but simply means the ripe, marriageable maiden; usage, however, has given it its more restricted signification.

The translation, then, is an allowable, though not a necessary, one; and though no stress should be laid upon עַלְמָה, as if it were בְּתוּלָה, still its force is such as to make it impossible that in this passage the wife of Isaiah can have been intended, who was already the mother of at least one son. Whether or not it refers to any virgin living at that time, and who was shortly to become pregnant and bring forth, or only to her who should be the mother of the Messiah, is a question which must be determined on other than philological grounds.

[1] Cf. note on p. 764.

[2] Cf. Homer, Il. ii. 514.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE THEOLOGICAL JOURNALS OF GERMANY.[1]

TRANSLATED BY CASPAR RENÉ GREGORY, DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, LEIPZIG, GERMANY.

THE periodical organs of theological science necessarily share in the prosperity or ill-fortune of theology itself. They are in this respect like the attendance upon, or the attention paid to, theological studies at the universities, only that they speak more distinctly. Their bearing and the influence they wield mirror the healthful or diseased condition of theological life and work within given periods of time.

Leaving out of consideration the papers which serve at the same time the practical interests of various churches, it may be said that scarcely any scientific theological sheet in Germany enjoys at present a brilliant or even a satisfactory and comfortable position. This is a like sign of the times with the lack of theological students, a lack much grieved over, but hard to remedy. Almost every turn of the year announces the suspension of one or other of the journals which have existed for years. Occasional appeals for help in gaining new subscribers have long been part of the indispensable measures for every publisher of such journals, but probably none of them secure an increase that more than covers expenses.

The cause of this phenomenon can scarcely be sought, as a general thing, in a want of editorial skill or of ability on the part of the contributors. The existing journals, without distinction as to theological party, all enjoy an intelligent guidance. It is not likely that one of those already suspended was compelled to cease its activity because of a lack of suitable literary matter.[2] Indeed, those which now have almost reached the verge of possible existence, must complain rather of excess than of want of able contributions. This is clearly seen in the facts, that articles, even of very direct application to the times, often appear to be much delayed, and that, as for the critical and bibliographical part, scarcely any editor is in a position

[1] This paper appeared, in four articles, in the *Allgemeine Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirchenzeitung*, for Jan. 12, 19, 26, and Feb. 2, 1877. Professor Christoph Ernst Luthardt of Leipzig is the responsible editor of this journal, which therefore represents the strictly orthodox (in the German sense), confessional, Lutheranism of Saxony.

[2] If we are not mistaken one of the chief difficulties which led to the suspension of the *Zeitschrift für historische Theologie*, edited by Professor Kahnis, was the want of support from contributors to its pages. — TR.

to keep pace with the more important new issues. If to this be added the consideration that the last two or three years have seen the founding of no less than five new theological journals, some of them on an important scale, we shall almost be tempted to think that a superabundance rather than a lack of productive living power is the cause of the generally unfavorable circumstances and prospect of this class of literature.

We shall first take up these new productions of theological journalism. They all belong, as might be expected, to the evangelical theology and church. It is true that a review has been announced as to begin at Innsbruck with this January, the *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*. The editors are the Jesuits Dr. J. Wieser and Dr. J. Stenstrup, and it will be the organ of the Innsbruck theological faculty, which is made up almost exclusively of Jesuits. But whether it will have a right or not to figure in the list of "scientific" theological journals cannot yet be decided.

Theologische Literaturzeitung.

The J. C. Hinrichs' publishing house in Leipzig unquestionably met a need when it started the "Journal of Theological Literature," *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, January a year ago. It appears every fourteen days in large form, from one and a half to two sheets, and is under the editorial care of Professor Emil Schürer, of Leipzig. Protestant theology in Germany has needed a critical central organ of this kind for many years. The "Theologisches Literaturblatt," edited by Professor F. H. Reusch in Bonn, being directed very skilfully and supported by vigorous contributors, had done for the sphere of Catholic theology what could be expected from a journal of this character, and that in a manner almost to put to the blush the scientific theological circles of Protestantism, certainly in a manner worthy of imitation, and in many respects fitted to serve as a standard. Even after the events of 1870–1872 had changed it to a specifically Old Catholic organ, and drawn upon it the implacable hostility of ultramontane theological circles, it had continued to do good work in spite of external difficulties. Zimmermann's "Theologisches Literaturblatt" appeared for a while by the side of Reusch's, but in 1871, in company with the Darmstadt "Allgemeine Kirchenzeitung," to which it belonged as a supplement, after fifty years continuance it had to close its existence; towards the last it had been growing feebler and feebler. The "Theologischer Jahresbericht," edited by Pastor W. Hauck, died the same year, after continuing ten years.

It was really very necessary that at least the attempt should be made to establish a paper in which, under the co-operation of well-known evangelical theological teachers and writers, the principal publications of scientific and practical theology should constantly receive critical mention. This attempt now lies before us in the form of the first year of the *Theologische Literaturzeitung;* (quarto, columns x, 688: Leipzig, Hin-

richs'; 16 Marks = $4.00). It may in the main be called a success. The majority of the productions of the years 1875 and 1876, in the sphere of the scientific theological literature of Germany, and at least a part of the practical theological publications and a selection of the more important new theological books of foreign countries, are discussed in it more or less thoroughly. Not a few of the reviews of scientific theological works, by reason of their entering fully into critical and exegetical or into historical details, bear the character of learned treatises with an independent scientific value. A few foreign scholars have also contributed valuable articles to this first year, namely Professor A. von Oettingen, in Dorpat, the Dutch theologian Chantepie de la Saussaye, and the American Professor Steenstra, of Cambridge, Massachusetts.

As for the theological bias of the journal, it entirely lacks such a thing in a definite form, and should the principles which have thus far guided the editing of it continue in force, it will probably never come to assume a uniform color and firmly fixed party spirit. The editors permit theologians of different parties to speak, in so far as they show themselves to be strong in serious scientific discussion. At the side of Lutherans like Von Oettingen, Köhler, and Plitt, are seen representatives of the positive union, such as Weiss, Kähler, W. Schmidt, and F. W. Schultz. There is also a fair number of *Vermittlungs* [mediating] theologians, and among these are several who decidedly belong to the left wing of this party, such as Gass, Kamphausen, Krauss, Lipsius, and Ritschl. Indeed, single reviews have been accepted even from such representatives of theological radicalism as Overbeck in Basel. The editors cause each contributor to sign his article with his full name, and thus endeavor to free themselves from responsibility for any extreme expressions of opinion on the one side or the other. The whole journal, in consequence of these diverse views, bears a somewhat variegated, many-colored, changeable stamp, perhaps less calculated to please churchly-disposed readers who desire, along with scientific instruction, religious or churchly incitement and advancement. There are, doubtless, weighty grounds for the course which the editors have taken in this regard. A theological literary journal may, if it chooses, bear the character of a hall for general discussion among the different scientific parties which at any given time exist side by side in the theological world. If it assumes this posture it will be in a position to do good service to any one who desires to obtain a true and complete picture of the condition of theological instruction and life at each period. Of course a literary paper edited on such principles renounces more or less the possibility of exercising a decisive influence upon the course of development of theology in the church. Moreover such a journal can hardly be long in a condition to secure itself against the danger, that the most active and zealous (not to say the loudest-spoken) of the schools or parties expressing themselves in

it, may at last go forth as victor from the play of parties, and seize the dominion for itself.[1]

Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte.

Just after the "Theologische Literaturzeitung," a new journal for church history, the *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, made its appearance, under the editorship of Theodor Brieger, until lately extraordinary professor in the theological faculty at Halle, now ordinary professor at Marburg. This seems in many respects intended to take the place of the "Zeitschrift für historische Theologie," which was started by Illgen, continued first by Niedner and then by Kahnis, and which expired at the age of forty-three years, in 1875. Nevertheless, though in the hands of the same publisher, F. A. Perthes of Gotha, and though gotten up in similar style, the new quarterly declares itself "entirely self-dependent, and independent" of the former undertaking. So far only three numbers have appeared (at 4 Mark = $1.00 apiece). It hardly looks now as if the plan of bringing out four numbers each year would soon be realized.

The numbers already issued are scarcely sufficient for us to form a judgment as to the bearing and party character of the review. The names of the theologians, Gass, Reuter, and Ritschl, standing at the side of the editor as counsellors and guarantees, permit us to expect that the left and the right wing of the *Vermittlungs* theology will be alike represented; aside from Dr. Reuter, the editor himself, as his direct pupil, probably belongs to the latter school. The first number (174 pp. 8vo) opened with an article by Professor H. Weingarten, now of Breslau, upon the "Origin of Monasticism in the Period after Constantine": its developments breathing something of the spirit of a hypercritical ultra-Protestantism, would find many an objection on the part of the representatives of a less prejudiced historical school. Ritschl's article in the same number, on "The Origin of the Lutheran Church,"[2] comes out daringly and as if with a

[1] The present writer is constantly asked how news of theological publications can be best attained. Entirely aside from the question of his own connection with it, he can only say that the *Theologische Literaturzeitung* is the only Protestant journal which announces and as quickly as possible discusses briefly all important theological works of all lands. Last year's numbers treat of American, Dutch, English, French, German, Italian, Russian, and Swiss publications. As for the announcement of new books, of articles, and of reviews in other journals, it is believed that little of importance escapes prompt notice, and greater fulness and promptitude are objects of constant endeavor. — Tr.

[2] Albrecht Ritschl has passed through several phases. While he was a student at Halle, Tholuck replied to a question on the atonement, put one day while walking, that Ritschl should read his, Tholuck's, book and Baur's. Ritschl did this, and, enraptured with Baur, made haste to Tübingen. In his first publication, upon "Marcion's Gospel," in 1846, he outdid Baur himself. Habilitating at Bonn also in 1846, he published in 1850 the first edition of his "Origin

challenge, opposing many traditional views, especially concerning the relation of Melanchthon to the later Lutheran orthodoxy. Yet in general the opponents, rather than the defenders, of the Lutheran confessional position will have cause to be dissatisfied with the results of these certainly brilliant and suggestive researches of the Göttingen theologian. There are also in these numbers two articles by Adolf Harnack on the second Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians; a critical review by him and by W. Möller in Kiel, of the previous year's monographs on early church history, down to the time of Charlemagne; a learned archaeological and patristic study by F. Piper on "The History of the Church Fathers from Epigraphic Sources"; and two articles by W. Gass, "General Considerations as to the Value and Effect of the Historical Sense," and "On the History of Ethics (Vincent of Beauvais and the *Speculum Morale*)." These, by their scientific, earnest, and objective bearing, are enough to dispel the fear that historical researches will here be pursued in a spirit akin to that of the Tübingen school. The undertaking is in any case supported by men of good ability, and promises to afford scientific theology much thankworthy assistance.

Deutsch-Evangelische Blätter.

In the course of the past year still another journal came into existence, edited by the Halle theologians Willibald Beyschlag and A. Wolters — the *Deutsch-Evangelische Blätter*, July to December, 1876. Six numbers, Berlin, Rauh; 3 Mark = $0.75 per quarter). It calls itself a "journal for the whole sphere of German Protestantism," but instead of the variety one might expect from this statement, it rather displays a quite narrowly limited partisan tendency. At least, in the articles treating of church politics, with which must be reckoned the "Church Chronicle" given at the close of each number, there plainly appears the endeavor to further the action of the so-called "Passage-Fraction"[1] in the sphere of Prussian synodal life. The popular scientific and apologetic treatises

of the Old Catholic Church," wherein he left Baur to a certain degree. In 1853 he became extraordinary professor. In the second edition of his invaluable book in 1857, he cut Baur's company still more completely, and Baur dismissed him summarily when visited by him. In 1860 he became ordinary professor, and in 1864 he was called to Göttingen, where he now is. Ritschl plies systematic theology, and has, as he says himself, left the field of early church history. His book on the early church needs a new edition, and it were much to be wished that he would hand over the title to Professor Harnack, and let him rewrite the work. — Tr.

[1] The "Passage-Fraction" was a section or fraction of the *Vermittlungs* or mediating party in the Prussian general synod. They sympathized with the Oberkirchenrath ("Upper Church Council"), in Berlin. The name was derived from the fact that they held their meetings or caucuses in a place, restaurant, hall or what not, called the "Passage." — Tr.

appeal to the interests of a wider circle. The six monthly numbers which have thus far appeared offer several such articles of good material and of general interest; for example: "A Visit to the Roman Catacombs," by Preacher Dryander in Bonn; "Israel's Exodus and the Later Egyptian Researches," by Division-Pastor[1] Brandt; "Spiritual Relationship of the Monists and Socialists," by Superintendent Trümpelmann. This element of the journal, opposing itself to modern unbelief, has already in different ways excited the wrath of organs, such as the "Protestantische Kirchenzeitung," which go more towards the left.[2] Should this element continue to receive the prominence due to it, we might rejoice at having the journal as an ally. Yet it is to be feared that in times of future church conflicts its anti-orthodox polemics may experience a considerable addition in severity. Nothing else could be expected from the long list of contributors, who almost without exception belong to the absorptive-union school.

Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie.

Two theological organs date from the year 1874; one from the end, the other from the beginning, of that year, and are accordingly entering, respectively, on their third and fourth years. They have thus sufficiently proved their capacity of life and their security in the favor of the circles reading them.

The "Annual for Protestant Theology," the *Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie* (4 numbers; Leipzig, Barth; 15 Mark = $3.75), turns more strongly towards the left, and is pervaded to a higher degree than any of the journals yet considered by the "keen air-currents of the world's history," to use Rothe's phrase. It was founded by Professors Hase, Lipsius, Otto Pfleiderer, and E. Schrader, who at that time all belonged to Jena. Half of them have since been transferred to Berlin.[3] The title-page gives as among its contributors members of the theological faculties at Berne, Bonn, Giessen, Heidelberg, Jena, Kiel, Leyden, Strassburg, Vienna, and Zürich, and other notable scholars. Nevertheless, the whole review bears prevailingly the Jena type. Lipsius, especially, the leading business editor, has to a certain degree stamped upon it his own peculiar mental character, although thus far only a few, and those not very extensive, articles directly from him have appeared in it. The preponderatingly negative tendency of the views presented is characterized especially in the exegetical-critical, as well as in the religious-philosophical and the dogmatical essays.

In exegetical criticism we find, Nöldeke: "On the Criticism of the Pentateuch"; Studer: "On the Integrity of the Book of Job" (one of

[1] Division-Pastor is the military chaplain of a division. — Tr.

[2] Left = rationalistic; right = orthodox.

[3] Pfleiderer and Schrader are now in Berlin. Otto is to be distinguished from Edmund Pfleiderer of Kiel. — Tr.

the most radical attempts at cutting a book to pieces that has ever appeared in this sphere); Holsten: "The Epistle to the Philippians" (an attempt to renew Baur's objections to the apostolic authenticity of the epistle, of the most tiresome diffusiveness, and yet without the least demonstrative power); Hagge: "The Two Traditional Epistles of the Apostle Paul to the Church at Corinth" (a re-shaping of Hausrath's hypothesis concerning the so-called "Four Chapter Epistle," 2 Cor. x.–xiii.);[1] Holtzmann: "Review of the Department of New Testament Criticism"; and Lipsius: "Peter not in Rome." In the sphere of religious philosophy and dogmatics appear, Pfleiderer: "On the Question as to the Beginning and Development of Religion"; Holtzmann: "Review of the Religious Philosophical Research of the Present Day"; Lipsius: "Schleiermacher's Discourses upon Religion"; Biedermann: "Strauss and his Importance for Theology"; Hermann Schultz: "The Protestant Doctrine of the Invisible Church"; A. Pierson: "On Kahnis's Systematic Theology (Dogmatik)." These last essays are followed up by a few apologetical and polemical articles directed against the modern natural philosophical unbelief.

There is, for example, a very good article by Superintendent Trümpelmann, named above as a contributor to the "Deutsch-Evangelische Blätter"; it is called "Darwinism, Monistic Natural Philosophy, and Christianity." The stand-point of this anti-materialistic critic is, at any rate, that of a Christian theism, if not a strictly church stand-point. A younger man, the new Jena Privatdocent in theology, Licentiate Pünjer, treats of the same theme in his academic inaugural address, in the first number for 1877, but only thinks it necessary to oppose the most extreme form of the doctrine of development or descendence, as it is found imprinted in Häckel's writings. On the other hand, as for Darwinism as such, including the assumption of the descent of man from beasts, he holds that this theory, "with its exclusion of all miracles and the declaration of a purely natural course of events, does not in the least stand opposed

[1] Schürer refers to this article of Hagge's in the *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, March 17, 1877, col. 130, in the following terms: "With an enviable confidence in the range of his own critical sagacity, the author is not only able to prove that our two Epistles to the Corinthians are patched together in a motley way out of various larger and smaller fragments of genuine epistles, but also understands how to reconstruct from these fragments the original form of the genuine epistles. For example, the second epistle according to his view consists of the following pieces of our first and second epistles: 1 Cor. i. 1–3; i. 9–iv. 15; iv. 21; 2 Cor. x. 1—xi. 4; 1 Cor. xv.; 2 Cor. xi. 5, 6; 1 Cor. ix. 1–18; 2 Cor. xi. 7–xii. 21; 1 Cor. v., vi.; 2 Cor. xiii. 1–10; 1 Cor. xvi. 22, 23. In comparison with this complicated scheme, in fact, all artificial plans which have hitherto been brought to light in the realm of biblical criticism are very models of simplicity. Glancing at it, one can scarcely avoid the thought that it is written only to work into the hands of those who despise biblical criticism. At any rate, whether the intention or not, this is the result." — Tr.

to Christian religion and morality." The most substantial articles belong to the field of historical research, — to the general religious-historical field, — as, for example, Schrader: "Semitism and Babylonianism," and "Assyrian-Biblical Matters"; and to the field of the history of the church and of doctrine, as H. Schultz: "Origen's Christology, in connection with his View of the Universe"; Fr. Nitzsch: "The Causes of the Change in and the New Upgrowth of Scholasticism in the Thirteenth Century," and "The Historical Importance of the *Aufklärungs* Theology" (the theology of the latter part of the eighteenth century, the time of the movement for general enlightenment or *Aufklärung*); Karl Alfred Hase: "Bernhardin Ochino of Siena," and "The Trial and Martyrdom of Pietro Carnesecchi." In these fields above all, or perhaps, indeed, only in them, can useful results be expected from the further productions of this journal.

The "General Journal for Missions," the "Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift" (12 numbers; Gütersloh, Bertelsmann; gr. 8vo.; 7½ Mark = $1.87½), started out at the very beginning of the year 1874. It is edited by Dr. G. Warneck, pastor at Rothenschirmbach, near Eisleben, with the assistance of Professor Theodor Christlieb of Bonn, and of Pastor R. Grumdemann of Mörz. Of all the newest issues here discussed in the sphere of theological journalism, this one has doubtless the most speedily secured for itself a large circle of readers, and begun to exert a not unimportant influence, which we may rightly hope will be fraught with blessing both for missionary interests and for the wider sphere of all scientifically educated friends and furtherers of the cause of missions.

We may note that this deserves to be called the first organ for the really scientific treatment of the more important questions concerning missions — the first journal for "the science of missions," in the sense intended by the late Graul in his day. At the same time, the editors have thus far succeeded in happily avoiding the danger of losing themselves in abstract learned discussions, or in technical details not appreciated by readers who are out of the missionary circle. In order to satisfy the practical needs, and to assist in the edification, of such readers as take but an indirect interest in the problems of the science of missions, the journal has since last year widened its previous repertoire by a supplement, which meets these needs with its views of missions, its brief edifying paragraphs, and the like.

It will not be necessary to say much about the older reviews. Their general peculiarities are known. We need only give a brief report as to their bearing during the last few years and as to their present condition.

Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie.

The "Journal for Scientific Theology" belongs chiefly to the negative critical party. It has been edited by Professor Adolf Hilgenfeld in Jena

since 1858 (*Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, four numbers a year, Leipzig, Fues; 12 Mark = $3.00), and contains partly essays, partly criticisms. Entering on life as the continuation of Baur and Zeller's "Theological Annual," *Theologische Jahrbücher*, this quarterly at first served chiefly, or almost exclusively, as the organ only of the younger shoots of the new Tübingen school. Of late, however, scholars of a more positive leaning have more frequently than before taken part in contributing to it. In consequence of this, its earlier monotonous uniformity of researches in the criticism of the Gospels, or concerning Jewish-Christian apocryphal and pseudepigraphic literature, has yielded to a greater variety of material. Besides, the review has in general assumed a more conservative character.

Studien und Kritiken.

Now, as formerly, the majority of the theologians who use the "Theological Studies and Criticisms" as their scientific organ belong to the decidedly unionistic party (*Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 4 numbers a year; Gotha, F. A. Perthes; 15 Mark = $3.75). This quarterly, still very influential, and especially respected in foreign lands, was founded at the instance of the well-known Hamburg (later Gotha) publisher, Friedrich Perthes, in 1828, under the editorial care of Ullmann and Umbreit. Hence it will have to celebrate its fiftieth anniversary next year. Since Dr. Riehm assumed the editorship, in 1865, practically, though not avowedly, the theological faculty at Halle has become its chief editor or patron. The spirit and tone now ruling in it is especially determined by the younger ordinary[1] members of this faculty, namely, the real editors, Dr. E. Riehm and Dr. J. Köstlin, with Dr. Willibald Beyschlag, who is very active. Since 1860, particularly since the starting of Schenkel's "General Church Journal," *Allgemeine Kirchliche Zeitschrift*, theologians of the party leaning more to the left have hardly contributed anything to the *Studien und Kritiken;* the representatives of the confessional school have always been but chance contributors. For the sake of the imposing wealth of thoroughly learned treatises and detailed reviews which they have published since the beginning of their activity, we venture to suggest to the editors and the publishers that the issue of a single index-volume of the complete contents, which would remove the need of the former occasional and partial indexes, would be an especially worthy and practical way of celebrating the coming semi-centennial occasion.

Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie.

The "Annual for German Theology" was founded in 1856 by three Göttingen and three Tübingen theologians, Liebner, Dorner, Ehrenfeuch-

[1] It will be remembered that the "ordinary" professors are the full professors. Below them stand the extraordinary professors, and lower still the privatdocenten, which last may be termed professors on trial. — Tr.

ter, Palmer, Landerer, and Weizsäcker, and since then has been chiefly supplied by contributions from the members of these two schools. For more than ten years it has been entrusted to the special direction of the Göttingen church historian Wagenmann (*Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 4 numbers; Gotha, Besser; Mark 14.40 = $3.60). This quarterly, particularly since it has added to its essays a separate division for critical bibliography, namely, since 1862, bears externally a tolerably similar form to that of the "Studien und Kritiken." As to contents it is predominantly an organ of the mediating theological party, the *Vermittlungstheologie*, to which the large majority of its especially active regular contributors belong, such as Diestel, Dillmann, H. Schultz, Weizsäcker, Zöpffel. The chief founders, Liebner and Dorner, meant by the name *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie* to refer to the thoughtful German mysticism of the closing middle ages. The corresponding theosophical mystical element was at first quite powerfully represented in the journal. Of late, however, it has gone more into the background; at least, the contributors like Schöberlein and Hamberger, who chiefly pursued such thoughts, seem for several years past to have been less diligent in articles whether in the essay or the review department. The contributors who now come forward most distinctly, belong almost, for the larger part, to the left rather than to the right wing of the *Vermittlungs* theology. The department of Old Testament exegetical and theological research, in particular, has for a considerable time been supplied with scarcely any other articles and reviews than those of a negative critical stamp.

Zeitschrift für Protestantismus und Kirche.

One of the two scientific organs of the Lutheran confessional theology has with the opening of this year ceased its activity; it is the "Journal for Protestantism and Church," founded at Erlangen by Dr. A. Harless in 1838, on the occasion of his contest with the Bavarian ultramontanism of that day. We regret that this journal should have fallen a sacrifice to the ecclesiastical indifference of the present. It was constantly edited with judgment, and by its thorough papers in almost all the chief departments of theology it had a thankworthy influence on the course of the theoretical and as well of the practical development of the evangelical church in Germany. From the first also it secured for itself abundant sympathy and an important influence outside of the Lutheran state church of Bavaria. Naturally enough in times of the internal conflicts of the state church, the specifically Bavarian-Lutheran questions were assigned in it an extended space. Yet they exercised but temporarily an injurious effect on the variety of its contents.

Zeitschrift für die gesammte lutherische Theologie und Kirche.

The "Journal for the entire Lutheran Theology and Church" began

only a few years after the above-named journal, namely, in 1840. At first it was edited by A. H. Rudelbach and H. E. F. Guericke; since Rudelbach's death in 1862, Franz Delitzsch has taken his place (*Zeitschrift für die gesammte lutherische Theologie und Kirche;* 4 numbers; Leipzig, Dörffling und Franke; 12 Mark = $3.00). It has striven to answer to its name both by its contents, through a striking variety of material treated in the articles and in the "critical bibliography," and by its practical church tendency. The latter, on account of the breadth of the programme, which includes the interests of the whole Lutheran church, could never be narrowly limited and sharply defined. Hence, Lutherans who belong to the Prussian, Saxon, Bavarian, and Hessian churches, as well as the representatives of the Lutheran Free Church movement, have been able to raise their voices in it. Its defensive and offensive activity has, above all, sought constantly to serve the common sanctuary of all Lutherans, the doctrine of the Lutheran church. What the journal has done for this cause, positively as well as negatively, directly as well as indirectly, is its chief merit, and the chief ground for the authority and importance accorded to it even beyond the boundaries of Germany, particularly in Scandinavia and in North America. At this day, within the German theological review literature, it is the only organ for decidedly positive Scripture research in the Old Testament department, seeing that the other reviews favor in this respect almost unanimously the "critical" or modern liberal party.

Der Beweis des Glaubens.

We now turn to evangelical theological journals with a more narrowly limited programme, that is with a more particular definition of a scientific department. The first to be named is an apologetical monthly. "The Evidence of the Faith" is published under the directing co-operation of Professors O. Zöckler and R. Grau of Königsberg, Pastor O. Andreä in Wilmersdorf near Berlin, and Pastor K. Brachmann in Cologne (*Der Beweis des Glaubens;* 12 numbers; Gütersloh, Bertelsmann, 12 Mark = $3.00). The corps of editors is thus made up of representatives of academic scientific theology and of practical theology, and in it the confessional Lutheran element and the positive unionistic element join hands. Since its founding, some twelve years ago, 1865, it has with all its powers exercised not only a scientific theological, but also a more popular apologetical activity, according to its task, which consists in the "establishing and defending Christian truth for the educated." It has rejoiced in, if not a growing, at least a constant sympathy within the positive evangelical circles of Germany and of the neighboring countries. Since 1875 there has appeared also in its monthly numbers, besides the essays, a critical review division, in which new books, in and out of the sphere of theology, are discussed in so far as they offer a nearer or more distant relation to the apologetical task of the journal.

Two other journals for special scientific departments, after a brief existence, were compelled by the unfavorable times to cease their issue; the "Archives for the Scientific Study of the Old Testament," *Archiv für wissenschaftliche Erforschung des Alten Testaments*, by Dr. Adalbert Merx, of Jena, later in Tübingen, Giessen, and Heidelberg; and the "German Quarterly for the Study and Criticism of English Theology," *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für englisch-theologische Forschung und Kritik*, edited by Dr. M. Heidenheim, and issued in irregular numbers, 1862–1872, with frequent interruptions.

A few journals, chiefly serving practical Christian interests may still be mentioned here, in so far as they at least occasionally open their columns to the scientific theological element. The "Weekly Journal for Evangelical Pastors and Church Officers," *Wochenschrift für das evangelische Pfarramt und das kirchliche Gemeindeamt* (52 numbers of ½–1 sheet, high 4to; Gütersloh, Bertelsmann; 8 Mark = $2.00) seems in general thus far to have gained a circulation only among the Lutheran pastors of the state church in Prussia. An undertaking of a similar kind, which started in 1865 under the care of E. Ohy, the "Pastoral Journal for the Evangelical Church," *Pastoralblatt für die evangelische Kirche* (Wiesbaden, Niedner), had to stop in 1871.

On the other hand, the "Pastoral Journal for Homiletics, Catechetics, and the Care of Souls," *Pastoralblatt für Homiletik, Katechetik und Seelsorge* (12 numbers; large 8vo; Leipzig, Teubner; Mark 9.60 = $2.40), in its "New Series" the practical theological review, "Law and Testimony," *Gesetz und Zeugniss*, has already begun its seventh year, the nineteenth volume of the whole. It is a widely circulated homiletical organ of the Lutheran churchly party, and contains brief criticisms of literary theological publications.

Connected with this comes the "Catechetical Quarterly for Clergymen and Teachers," *Katechetische Vierteljahrsschrift für Geistliche und Lehrer* (4 numbers; large 8vo; Leipzig, Teubner; Mark 3.60 = $0.90), which has with 1877 reached its thirteenth year, a token of the sympathy it meets with, and of the solid character of its contents. Besides catechizings, it contains articles on catechical questions, school discourses, and the like, and critical reviews.

We find moreover a few organs for missions, which at least in many numbers approach the scientific character of the above-mentioned "General Journal for Missions," although the practical popular element predominates in them. The oldest of all these sheets is the Basel "Magazine for the Newest History of Missions and of Bible Societies," *Magazin für die neueste Geschichte der Mission und der Bibelgesellschaften*, founded in 1816; since 1857, partly changing its form and arrangements, it has taken the shorter title: "Evangelical Magazine for Missions," *Evangelisches Missions-Magazin*. Professor Franz Delitzsch has edited since 1864, for a time in

connection with Pastor Becker of Koenigsberg in the Neumarkt, a "Journal for the Mission of the Church to Israel" under the title of "Sowing in Hope," *Saat auf Hoffnung* (4 numbers; Erlangen, Deichert; Mark 1.50 = $0.37½). Pastor Theodor Schäfer in Altona edits the "Monthly for Church Charity,[1] and for Inner Missions," *Monatsschrift für Diakonie und innere Mission.*

We have also received since the beginning of last year a "Monthly for Liturgy and Church Music," under the title of *Siona.* It is edited by Pastor M. Herold in Schwabach and Dr. E. Krüger, professor of music at Göttingen (*Siona;* 12 numbers; one sheet, large 8vo; Gütersloh, Bertelsmann; 4 Mark = $1.00); and the illustrated "Archives for Church Architecture and Church Ornament," *Archiv für kirchliche Baukunst und Kirchenschmuck* (6 numbers; folio; Berlin, Logier in commission; 12 Mark = $3.00), edited by the Berlin architect, Theodor Prüfer. These are both worthy publications, not of a directly theological character, and yet of large importance for certain special lines of theological research and of the official work of ordinary clergymen.

Catholic Journals.

Finally, we may say a word about the Catholic theological periodicals of Germany. If we leave out of consideration the Church papers, the numerous pastoral journals for particular dioceses, the organs for Inner Missions, and the Christian newspapers for the people, we have really but one strictly scientific organ to name. This is the "Theological Quarterly," *Theologische Quartalschrift* (4 numbers; Tübingen, Laupp; 9 Mark = $2.25), edited since 1819 by the Catholic faculty at Tübingen. The present editors are Professors Kuhn, Himpel, Kober, Linsemann, Funk, and Schanz. In view of its honorable age and its not unimportant historical past, it may claim among Roman Catholic journals an authority similar to that of the "Theologische Studien und Kritiken" among evangelical reviews. Yet for a long time it has failed to accomplish the task it executed in its prime, under the leadership of Möhler, Herbst, Von Drey, and Hefele. Of late, owing to its very moderate character and its not particularly friendly posture towards the doctrine of infallibility, it seems to have suffered quite a severe diminution of its former popularity. At the beginning of this article we referred to the fact that another organ of thoroughly scientific character, Reusch's "Theologisches Literaturblatt,"

[1] "Church Charity" is not the equivalent of the German word "Diakonie." German deaconesses, like sisters of charity, take care of the sick, and of children, and of servants, and "Diakonie" is the general term for this activity. Inner Missions comprise all manner of charitable enterprises, which are chiefly exercised, it would appear, by laymen under the general direction of clergymen, such as lodging-houses for apprentices, sometimes Sunday-schools, Bible-classes, Young Men's Christian Associations, Mothers' meetings, and the like. — Tr.

had been anathematized by the Ultramontane party and completely excluded from the company of the journals recognized as belonging to the church.

The "Catholic," *Katholik*, published under Bishop Ketteler's auspices by the Mainz Canons Moufang and Heinrich, is an influential review in ultramontane circles. Owing to its strictly scholastic[1] character we can hardly attribute to it the importance of a scientific theological organ. We should much sooner have to grant the title of vigorous scientific character to Von Moy's, now Vering's, "Archives for Catholic Canon Law," *Archiv für katholisches Kirchenrecht*, and to the Munich "Historico-Political Journal," *Historisch-Politische Blätter*. But these fall outside of the number of theological journals strictly so-called, the one being chiefly a scientific legal journal, and the other a scientific historical journal.

ARTICLE IX.

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

THE SOCIETY OF BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY. — MR. GEORGE SMITH.

The readers of the Bibliotheca Sacra are doubtless familiar with the fact that there exists in England a "Society of Biblical Archaeology," instituted "for the investigation of the Archaeology, History, Arts, and Chronology of Ancient and Modern Assyria, Palestine, Egypt, Arabia, and other biblical lands, the promotion of the study of the Antiquities of those countries, and the record of future discoveries which may be made in connection therewith."

The first movement to organize such a society was made, under the direction of Dr. Birch of the British Museum, in November 1870, and it now numbers several hundred members, among whom are found many of the ablest Biblical and Oriental scholars of England and the continent of Europe. Not the least interesting fact in regard to the membership is that the names of fifty or more ladies appear upon the roll, and the large number of wealthy and cultivated women that are seen at the regular meetings of the Society shows that they desire to promote its objects not only by their means, but by personal observation and study. The "Transactions" of the Society which are published from time to time, — generally two parts a year, — have now reached the fifth volume, and are to be found in all our larger libraries, and occasionally in the possession of private scholars.

It should be mentioned that the present Society absorbed several older

[1] In the sense of the scholasticism of the middle ages. — Tr.

ones, namely, the Syro-Egyptian, founded in 1844, the Chronological Institute, founded in 1850, the Anglo-Biblical Institute, founded in 1852, and the Palestine Archaeological Association, founded in 1853; and furthermore, that it does not conflict with the object and purpose of the Royal Geographical Society, or the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, or with the Palestine Fund Association. The Society of Biblical Archaeology holds meetings every month from November to June, when papers are read and discussed, and the interest manifested is so great that the papers are seldom all read or the discussions completed.

It has been my good fortune to attend two of the meetings of this Society held in a commodious hall in Conduit Street, London, and the large number of gentlemen and ladies present, and the interest manifested in learned papers and discussions upon Egyptian hieroglyphics, Assyrian Cuneiform Slabs, Cypriote Palaeography, Hamathite Inscriptions, Himyaritic or Sabaean Grammar, Hebrew and Accadian, and inscriptions and legends that go back to the Tower of Babel, the Deluge, and even to the Creation, would surprise beyond measure the people of America, who, as an eloquent orator has said of us, "have our heads buried in newspapers and ledgers."

But it is very important to the world and especially to biblical science that such a society exists, and more battles are fought by its members from year to year, and victories won for the authenticity and historical fidelity of the Scriptures than the Christian public, either here or abroad, is aware of. The "Transactions" already referred to form a storehouse of valuable facts pertaining not only to all departments of Hebrew life, but to the Semitic peoples and languages which surrounded the people of God as a common centre.

In connection with the work of this Society it is appropriate to mention the name of one of its most active and efficient members, whose papers enrich its volumes, and who laid down his life in efforts to advance the objects which it was designed to promote. I refer, of course, to George Smith, who "died at Aleppo in 1876, aged 36 years."

Those who have had no experience of Syrian deserts cannot realize the hardships and exposures which those must encounter who, in those inhospitable regions, seek to gather facts and evidence to corroborate and illustrate biblical history. Whether or not a monument be erected over his far-off resting-place, he has certainly erected for himself a lasting monument in his work, only a part of which, however, is revealed in the volumes and articles that have appeared under his name. Mrs. Smith, his widow, told me that he left a vast quantity of notes and materials, the accumulations of years of patient study, which the Trustees of the British Museum were designing to purchase.

Besides paying a brief tribute to the memory of a personal friend, I wish to call attention to two or three qualities for which this eminent scholar

was distinguished. I would make special mention of the devout and reverential spirit with which he approached the study of the biblical records. He said that we could afford to be patient with their apparent difficulties; and he cherished the hope that, since so much light had been shed upon them by the researches of the past few years, we should be able in time to solve, with partial or entire satisfaction, all the questions that have been raised with regard to them from the period of Genesis to that of the Babylonian captivity. In the second place I would notice the kindly spirit with which he always spoke of other laborers in the same field, scholars whose means of judging had been far less favorable than his own, and who therefore, or for other reasons, differed from him with regard to certain disputed points. Certain Englishmen have told me that Mr. Smith was spoiled by his success. On the contrary, from my personal acquaintance with him, I should say that he cherished a very humble opinion of himself and his labors, that he was always ready and willing to help others, and that he was never forward to insist upon his own opinions and views. He coincided with the opinion of Renan, who on one occasion said that scholars are frequently "too severe in the judgments which they pronounce of each other. Whoever occupies himself with honesty and perseverance in disinterested research, is worthy of our esteem. It shows great presumption to employ contemptuous and ill-natured expressions. Let him who has never made a mistake, throw the first stone."

The transition from his room, or "cell," as he called it, in the British Museum, which was a very small apartment surrounded by thick stone walls, and where a ray of sunshine seldom or never entered, to the heat and malaria of the deserts and valleys of the East, was too sudden and great, and his system gave way at last. His death was not only a terrible blow to the Society of Biblical Archaeology, but it makes a great gap in the ranks of Assyriologists, especially since he stood head and shoulders above all his co-laborers, whether English or German or French.

Among the papers presented to the Society at its meeting in June, was one by Mr. W. St. Chad Boscawen, Mr. Smith's successor in the British Museum, giving some of the results of Mr. Smith's last expedition to the East. About two thousand five hundred new tablets were obtained, and, as it happened, without much digging, for the heavy rains during the wet season of 1875–76, had washed down the side of one of the mounds, and left exposed a number of large jars in which the valuable documents had been stored. They relate to all conceivable details of business — sales, contracts, descriptions and deeds of land, etc. Many of them belong to a certain firm called "Egibi," which preserved this name for several generations. The accounts or records of this firm extend from the first year of Nebuchadnezzar II., B.C. 604, to the end of the reign of Darius Hystaspis, B.C. 485. The data which these tablets furnish pertain to an important

period of history, but we have not space at present to give even a summary of the results gained.

But while Mr. Smith appeared to have a natural gift for reading the tablets, which enabled him to proceed rapidly where others could only spell their way slowly, syllable by syllable, his superiority was after all mainly due to his long-continued and untiring application. Mrs. Smith spoke to me of his habit of close study day after day and month after month, until it seemed to her that his strength must be exhausted. What he said on one occasion to a gentleman who knew him well, gives us a hint of his habits of study, and shows at the same time how necessary he felt it to be for students, if they would be accurate and really proficient, to copy from the original documents: "When I am gone there will be a regular rush to study Assyrian, but the students will never get on unless they do as I have done for fifteen years, copy, copy, copy, every day from the tablets themselves; it is no use attempting to become an Assyriologist from the study of the printed text. One must get acquainted with the way in which the Assyrians wrote, and the wretched style of their script. The words look so different on the tablets from what they do in the books that one can hardly make them out to be the same. Half of those who write about Assyriology can't read a single line of the clay; even a stamping won't do, as you want to catch the light on the wedges in a peculiar way." S. M.

ARTICLE X.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE BOOKS OF THE NEW COVENANT TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK INTO HEBREW. By Prof. Franz Delitzsch.[1]

We have been favored with a copy of this work by the translator, and take pleasure in bringing it to the notice of the Christian student. It is not the first Hebrew translation of the New Testament, but the latest, and we may hope the last, which will be the standard for times to come. The first translation was published in 1599, by Elias Hutter, in his Polyglot Bible, and since that time only single parts have been published by different translators. The work for a new translation was not resumed until the beginning of our century, when, in 1817, the London Society for Propagating the Gospel among the Jews published a new translation. In 1821 the same society issued a second edition, and so on, from time to time, till 1866, when a thoroughly revised edition, with vowels and accents, was published.

But this edition, in spite of the great amount of labor bestowed upon, and the money spent for it, proved itself not to be the *ne plus ultra*, especially through the criticism concerning the text as well as the accents which Professor Delitzsch published in his Hebrew edition of Paul's Epistle to the Romans. Considerations like these — especially the desire of realizing a hope cherished for about forty years — induced Professor Delitzsch to undertake this great task ; and we believe that he has executed his task in such a way that it will stand the severest criticism of all living divines. Professor Delitzsch is, according to our judgment, the only man competent for a work of this nature, and his life-long studies in Jewish literature have best qualified him for it. Only a thorough acquaintance with the idiom current in the time of Christ and the apostles can bring about this result ; and the *Horae Hebraicae et Talmudicae*, which Delitzsch published in the *Zeitschrift für die lutherische Theologie und Kirche*, Leipzig, Octobor, 1876, etc., show not only his thorough acquaintance with the whole range of Jewish literature, but may also serve as a critical commentary to his Hebrew translation of the New Testament, because they are the best proof of the superiority of his translation above its predecessors. There is another point which is worthy of consideration. All former translations were made from the *Textus Receptus;* the present,

[1] ספרי הברית החדשה נעתקים מלשון יון ללשון עברית בחשת דליטש ובהשגחת חתכם פראפעסאר פראנץ דעליטש Leipzig. 1877.

from the *Codex Sinaiticus;* and the student who peruses this Hebrew translation will find all such passages as are wanting in א or the *Codex Sinaiticus* put in brackets.

We have before us, besides Delitzsch's Hebrew New Testament, four other editions; the earliest dated 1821; the latest, 1872. A comparison of these with Professor Delitzsch's would be of great interest to the student; but the space allotted does not permit it. We will, however, select some passages at random; thus in Matt. ii. 23 *ὅτι* Ναζωραῖος *κληθήσεται*, the *ὅτι* is not expressed in the older editions, while Delitzsch translates, כי נצרי יקרא; iv. 5, *ἐπὶ τὸ πτερύγιον τοῦ ἱεροῦ* is translated in one edition by על אלם ההיכל, in two על־כנף ההיכל, in another על־פנת ההיכל, while Delitzsch translates על־גג בית המקדש. Now, the latter translation correctly expresses the *ἱερόν* of the text; for היכל is not the *ἱερόν*, but *ναός*, and thus we find it rendered by the Sept. 1 Kings vi. 5, 17; Ps. v. 8; xi. 4, etc.

We could greatly multiply examples like these, especially from the Epistles; but we will give the reader the Lord's Prayer as rendered by Delitzsch, and add in notes the readings of the other translations.

אָבִינוּ שֶׁבַּשָּׁמַיִם[1] יִתְקַדַּשׁ שִׁמְךָ׃

תָּבוֹא מַלְכוּתֶךָ יֵעָשֶׂה[2] רְצוֹנְךָ כְּמוֹ בַשָּׁמַיִם[3] כֵּן בָּאָרֶץ׃[4]

אֶת־לֶחֶם חֻקֵּנוּ תֶּן־לָנוּ הַיּוֹם׃[5]

וּסְלַח לָנוּ אֶת־חֹבוֹתֵינוּ כַּאֲשֶׁר סָלַחְנוּ גַּם־אֲנַחְנוּ לְחַיָּבֵינוּ׃[6]

וְאַל־תְּבִיאֵנוּ לִידֵי נִסָּיוֹן[7] כִּי אִם־הַצִּילֵנוּ מִן־הָרָע׃[8]

[כִּי לְךָ הַמַּמְלָכָה וְהַגְּבוּרָה וְהַתִּפְאֶרֶת לְעוֹלְמֵי עוֹלָמִים[9] אָמֵן]׃

It may be asked *cui bono?* We answer, not only as a mere literary production, but especially as a work prepared with a higher object in view, it should be welcomed by every Christian who prays for the coming of the kingdom of Christ. In Europe, Asia, and Africa, and, in fact, everywhere, the Jew must have the gospel in the same language

[1] Three translations read אֲשֶׁר בַּשָּׁמַיִם.

[2] Three read וְיָחִי.

[3] One reads כַּאֲשֶׁר בַּשָּׁמַיִם, two read בְּבַשָּׁמַיִם.

[4] Two read כֵּן גַּם בָּאָרֶץ, two בְּכָאָרֶץ.

[5] One reads חֶתֶן לָנוּ חַיּוֹם לֶחֶם צָרְכֵּנוּ, one חֶתֶן לָנוּ חַיּוֹם לֶחֶם חֻקֵּנוּ, two read חֶתֶן לָנוּ הַיּוֹם לֶחֶם חֻקֵּנוּ.

[6] Two read כַּאֲשֶׁר אֲנַחְנוּ סוֹלְחִים לְחַיָּבֵינוּ, one reads כַּאֲשֶׁר אֲנַחְנוּ סוֹלְחִים לְבַעֲלֵי חוֹבֵינוּ, one כַּאֲשֶׁר אֲנַחְנוּ סוֹלְחִים לְחוֹבֵינוּ.

[7] Three read לְמַסָּה.

[8] Two read מֵרָע.

[9] Four read לְעוֹלָמִים.

in which he reads Moses and the prophets; and it is but right that a society like the British and Foreign Bible Society, which prints the gospel in more than two hundred languages, should print it also in Hebrew. To preach the gospel to the Jew is just as important as the preaching to the Chinese, and to preach the gospel to "all nations" includes the Jew as well as any other nation. And if the reader is anxious to know what the effect of the preaching of the gospel to the Jews in all ages has been, I beg to refer to our Article "The Mission among the Jews," in the Quarterly Review, Gettysburg, Pa., July, 1876.

Let it be hoped that the example of Professor Delitzsch, whose learning has acquired him a world-wide reputation, and who has prepared his translation with love to and prayer for the salvation of Israel, will find many followers; and that Christian ministers will show their love to Israel not by interchange of pulpits, which is generally done by unbelieving Jews and Gentiles, but by prayer for and preaching the gospel to the Jews.

B. Pick.

Reconciliation of Science and Religion. By Alexander Winchell, LL.D., author of "Sketches of Creation," "The Doctrine of Evolution," etc. pp. 403. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1877.

It is best to let Professor Winchell speak for himself. "It might be expected that I should appear before you in a militant character. I do not. I shall assume the office of a mediator. ..... Extremists will say I have no opinion, and court the favor of both the combatants. I shall, nevertheless, be brave enough to face *such* dangers; and I shall deliberately incur the risk of *losing* the favor of both combatants by refusing to take sides with either. To be positive is not to be strong; to be dogmatic is not to be brave. ..... Wherever conflict is possible, neither side has all the right, nor all the virtue, nor all the truth. ..... Truth is a structure reared on the battle-field of contending forces. .... The judicial attitude is not the neutral or apathetic one. I fancy it is regal, honorable to the loftiest intellect, congenial to the purest conscience" (pp. 17, 18). "Instead of the *conflict* of religion and science, I should prefer to speak of the interaction of the religious and intellectual faculties. .... I deplore the spirit which seeks to put faith and science in deadly antagonism. This is a weakness of which representatives of both interests must plead guilty" (pp. 34, 35). "It is the nature of religion to be invariable, and this central character is transferred to all the accessories of the religious system. Religion is based on the being and attributes of an unchanging Deity, and the dominion of unchanging principles. .... Were the religious nature so constituted as to content itself with appropriating only the central truths of the religious system, science and philosophy, which recognize these, would never attempt to drive faith from its positions. The fact is otherwise, and this reveals the cause of the secular conflict" (pp. 32, 33).

"The body of accessory beliefs accepted at any particular period, accreted around the central facts of religion, constitute, for the time, the religious system. With the enlargement of the intellectual horizon, the cruder accessories become eliminated. The religious system always consists, therefore, of constants and variables. Progress is incident only to the variable factor. This is the human and finite and imperfect element of religion. The constant factor is an eternal truth, resting on the Rock of Ages" (p. 37). "I entertain the strongest confidence that all the conflicts of the passing hour will only result in the elimination of a body of truth — religious and secular — more beautiful and lovely than any upon which human thought has yet been fixed. . . . . But more than faith sustains me. . . . . To my mind the inspired epic of Moses presents an accordance with the geological history of the world which is almost, if not quite, supernatural" (p. 222).

"The disputed points in physical science lie rather within the territory of philosophy than of physics" (p. 313).

Touching the antiquity of man, the author remarks, 1. That the chronology of the Bible is not determinate. 2. It may be, as "Dr. M'Causland, Dr. Whedon, and many others maintain," that exclusive reference is made to the Caucasian race. 3. Science has not yet spoken in unmistakable language.

In regard to the origin of species, he holds that the conflict is as irrelevant as a conflict would be concerning the origin of coal. "Even if species have a derivative origin, there is not a moment between the initial act and the final result when the impress of intelligent will is removed. In this view, not only is every species, but also every individual, the result of direct creation. . . . . But, I desire to say for myself that the derivative origin of species seems not to be proved" (p. 224).

Later, in a note, we find that, "In the judgment of the writer, the evidence for derivation has been continually accumulating, and *pari passu*, the difficulties encountered by it have disappeared. This admission, however, concerns the theory only as *a* mode *of succession of phenomena* and as *an explanation of the material conditions and physiological instrumentalities* under which and through which the succession is effectuated by some cause existing without the province of science. It is made, also, in view of the entire range of evidence, — geological, zöological, embryological, and morphological, and not on the naked evidence of a few nicely graduated successions of forms" (pp. 253, 254). "Evolution is the method of methods; and is one of the strongest possible attestations of the dominion of thought in the universe" (p. 154).

The author at length and with rare discrimination dwells upon the fact that "*life* is an entity which has nothing in common with matter;" that "heredity transmits what it receives — nothing more;" that "we demand some cause which can originate a differential character *de novo* — inde-

pendently of heredity and in opposition to the influence of surroundings — and, what is most significant of all, in *anticipation* of an environment which, in the animal's plan of life, will surround it at maturity." "In other words, the environment has been the existent fact which *has conditioned the* INTENTION *of the causal intelligence*" (see pp. 139–149).

But space fails us to give any adequate idea of the author's able and comprehensive treatment, among other topics, of the questions relating to the "Interaction of the Religious and the Intellectual Faculties"; "The Doctrine of Causality"; "The Doctrine of Intentionality"; "The Manifestations of 'Power,' 'Intelligence,' and 'Beneficence' in Creation"; "The Religious Nature of Man"; "The Finiteness of the Existing Order of Things," and "The Bible in the Light of Nature." His satisfactory conclusion is, that "a revelation respecting man's moral relations and future state must touch upon topics beyond the reach of science and philosophy. .... Such a revelation, as science itself gives us ground for anticipating, must be a revelation involving important statements that transcend the reach of demonstrations, and must be accepted solely on the established authority of the revelator. Faith is the logical corollary of science, and the highest flight of reason. Thus we are led to believe that the cultivation of science and philosophy is not only harmless, but leads the candid mind to a reverent knowledge of God, and an implicit faith in the most mysterious utterances of his sacred word" (pp. 383, 384).

G. F. W.

ON CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH. Translated and adapted, under the direction of the Author, from the German of Dr. Henry W. J. Thiersch. 8vo. pp. 272. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong. 1877.

Dr. Thiersch is well known as the author of "The Church in the Apostles' Time," "Christian Family Life," "The Parables of Christ," "Grammatical Manual for the First Instruction in the Hebrew Language," etc. etc. The present volume is equal to any he has hitherto published. It vigorously opposes the views of Vilmar in regard to monarchical government, and expresses many just thoughts on the nature and necessity of civil freedom. If not all, yet certainly some, of his ideas on a Christian State are sound and important.

Dr. Thiersch's views of church government are: "a bishop at the head, who has to guide the whole; under him a body of elders or priests, who assist him with counsel and action; under them the body of deacons, chosen by the community, from whom the bishop and the elders learn the wishes of the congregation" (p. 223). The bishop corresponds to the king; the elders to the senate, or house of lords; the deacons to the house of commons, or representatives. There are Congregationalists, and even Independents, who adopt a theory somewhat resembling this. They

regard the pastor as, not indeed the king, but the president of the church; the deacons as, not indeed the house of lords, but the senate — the pastor's more constant advisers and helpers; the church committee as the house of representatives, elected annually by the church. The principle is this: One man should be the leader; he should have permanent counsellors; he and they should have the aid of persons fresh from the community over which the one man is ordained as bishop.

The Anti-Pelagian Works of St. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. Translated by Peter Holmes, D.D., F.R.A.S., Domestic Chaplain to the Right Hon. the Countess of Rothes, and Curate of Pennycross, Plymouth; and Rev. Robert Ernest Wallis, Ph.D., Incumbent of Christ Church, Coxley, Somerset. Vol. III. 8vo. pp. 384. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1876.

The most superficial reader of this volume will easily detect the influence of Augustine on what is called the Genevan system. The varying schools of Calvinism will find here various passages confirmatory of their distinctive tenets; and the opposers of Calvinism will find renewed occasion for their old charges that the system favors the doctrine of infant damnation, the doctrine that God is the author of sin, that the human will is not free, etc. No candid reader will fail to acknowledge the marvellous power of Augustine and the quickening influence of his writings. His opponents admit the ingenuity, when they do not admit the justness, of his reasonings. The present volume gives to an English reader a fair specimen of Augustine's logic, and also of his depth of spirituality.

Epochs of Modern History: The Fall of the Stuarts, by Rev. E. Hale, M.A.; The French Revolution, by William O'Connor Morris.
Epochs of Ancient History: The Greeks and the Persians, by Rev. G. W. Cox, M.A.; Roman History — The Early Empire, by W. W. Capes, M.A. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Company.

These series of abridgments, several of which, in the Bibliotheca for January 1876, we spoke of in very favorable terms, continue to be marked, as they successively appear, by very much the same excellences, and scarcely need, therefore, to be individually characterized. The youthful student must not expect to find in them what he may perhaps not unnaturally look for in ordinary abridgments. They suppose in the reader an amount of historical knowledge superior to what most possess. They do not aim to supply the place of larger histories. Grote and Mommsen and Hallam and Ranke and Gardiner must still be read by every one who is anxious to possess anything like a thorough knowledge of history.

The maps which accompany these books are a very valuable appendage. We are sorry to have to speak of typographical errors. Some errors that may seem perhaps at first to be of this kind are chargeable to the care-

lessness not so much of the printer as of the author. We fail to see the advantage of changing the orthography of so many names of Grecian men and places. On what ground is it better to write Tainaros and Aigina and Boiotia, instead of Taenarus and Aegina and Boeotia, except to let the readers know that the writer is familiar with the Greek language, and knows how words are spelled in it? These books, nevertheless, possess solid merit, and we congratulate the public on their appearance.

American State Universities; their Origin and Progress; a History of Congressional University Land Grants; a Particular Account of the Rise and Development of the University of Michigan; and Hints toward the Future of the American University System. By Andrew Ten Brook. 8vo. pp. 410. Cincinnati: Robert Clark and Company. 1875.

The history of the University of Michigan is really the nucleus around which the historian has gathered a vast amount of useful information in regard to education in general. The volume abounds with interesting statements respecting various colleges and universities in our own and in other countries. We had intended to cite several passages which illustrate the true theory of education; but our limits compel us to omit them. Among these paragraphs is one on pages 374 and 375, in which Professor Ten Brook says that the multiplication of studies in our higher schools of learning "has had the effect, by extending culture over a larger surface, of making it more superficial, and of giving it less of strength and depth." He does not condemn the multiplication of studies; he justifies and demands it, but affirms that "the range of elective branches must be largely extended." The truth is, that a certain amount of solid study in certain branches is essential to a professional education; such a multiplication of branches as interferes with *this* degree of solid study is relatively an evil; beyond *this* definite amount studies may be multiplied just so far as, but no farther than, the peculiar traits or needs of the individual student may require; what these may require should be determined not by the individual student alone, but also by those who have educated or thoroughly examined him.

History of the College of New Jersey, from its Origin in 1746 to the Commencement of 1854. By John Maclean, Tenth President of the College. 8vo. Vol. I. pp. 414; Vol. II. pp. 450. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Company. 1877.

We think that some statements in these volumes might have been wisely omitted. Still, the volumes are interesting, and will be, in process of time, more and more important.

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